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**Towards a Neo-Kantian Buddhism or a Neo-Buddhist Kantianism:
A Critique of Existing Normative Thought in International Relations
and International Political Economy**

Regina Watkin-Kolb

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of
The Nottingham Trent University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

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
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Abstract

I have used the terms "neo" in my title since, in the end, a sense of modesty overcame me as I contemplated the vast fields I had to synthesise.

This thesis is dedicated to two enterprises (the word 'projects' seems too brief a term), these being a critique of the broad canon of mainstream normative theory in International Relations (IR) - this done against the author's close reading, over several years, of Kant and Hegel, extensively, in German - and the so-called new canon of International Political Economy, as it seeks to push itself towards its rebirth as Global Political Economy (GPE); and construction of a radically different and new ethical premise for IR and GPE together. This is based on the Theravada School of Buddhism and takes up Stephen Chan's complaint that the Third World "Other" knows so much of us, but we know so little that is theirs.

This thesis brings some of their discourses into ours, and seeks to demonstrate the uncanny similarities between Kant and Theravada, arguing furthermore the superiority of Theravada for our normative project. The author argues against Frost's Hegelian project, against the essential self-containment of Rawls, and continues the aeons-long tradition of Theravada, that is, a tradition of ethical discourse.

Finally, added as an appendix, the author proposes her own Buddhist-informed model for global ethical governance.

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I am grateful to Nottingham Trent University and the International Studies Department from whom I found endless encouragement. I thank Chris Farrands and Roger Tooze who believed in my work from the beginning. A special tribute I pay, in the sense of a sermon, to my 'Doktorvater', Stephen Chan, a true Master in the highest of academic art, who guided me to its completion.

My research was, in part, sponsored by Nottingham Trent University, The British Studies Association, The American International Studies Association and The Japanese Studies Association, to whom I express gratitude and appreciation. The many times I was invited to present my research and to chair panels gave me confidence and brought my research alive.

My dissertation is a tribute to my family. During my research, my father and mother died and I nearly lost my daughter Anna Maria. I thank my grandfather, Peter, for teaching me the values of a spartan life. I thank my father, Walter, for demonstrating to me nothing less than a straight way in life. I thank my mother, Lina, for sharing with me her creativeness of making something of nearly nothing. I thank my children, Lara Lisa, Anna Maria and Florentyna, for loving me unconditionally. I thank my husband, Colin, for giving me an opportunity to pursue my academic career.

My thanks must also include two friends whose untimely deaths overshadowed my research – my dear friend Katharina Westerburg, who gave me endless encouragement for my projects, and Charles Lean, who never grew tired of reading my first drafts when I was still hesitant in writing in English and when it was not easy to read. A job, so very kindly continued by Jutta Britz, Ann Forshaw and Norman Cliff.

In addition, I thank all the people who believe in me and all my academic colleagues who are waiting for me to engage in future projects. I am honoured by their trust and patience.

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INTRODUCTION

The significance of my title is twofold. The first part relates to the growing ambition of the thesis during my investigation: *Towards a Neo-Kantian Buddhism or a Neo-Buddhist Kantianism*. My research left me wondering what the outcome would be at the end. The use of the term 'neo' therefore points to this. The second part of my thesis indicates to the reader my methodological departure. The topic demands a vast survey of literature, and therefore requires careful selection. I based my selection on the following criteria:

- Literature marking the importance of Global Political Economy.
- IR literature which includes an open debate on normative theory (chapter 1, 2).
- IPE literature which indicates a hidden debate on normative theory (ch 3).
- Literature of related disciplines in Economics and Development Studies which offers valuable critique in respect of the perceived normative debate (ch 4).
- Literature on moral philosophy which applies as a background theory (ch 5).
- Literature on applied moral conduct which offers a non-biased neutrality (ch 6).
- Equal representation of male and female authors in the chosen discipline.
- Originality of critique in order to enhance the argument.
- Equal evaluation of old and recent publications addressing the investigation.

In addition to my research in the libraries at The Nottingham Trent University and (with special permission) at the School for Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, I used the opportunities given to attend national and international conferences, mainly the British International Studies Conference (BISA) and the International Studies Association in America (ISA). It was here that I met many of the authors face to face whom I have quoted in this thesis, and witnessed the often lively debates on normative theory, which increased more and more my ambition to search further into the problem of morality in International Relations (IR). I became aware that I had to look for more detailed moral thinking as part of knowledge to enable me to conduct a thorough critique.

Since the days when I was a pupil I have had a fascination for what is called political philosophy. For me it meant engaging in a method which enables us to enter the

depths of human existence, the so called *sein* in German philosophy, or as expressed in the famous Shakespearean words: “*To be or not to be, that is the question*”. Little did I realise then that later in life, my study of International Studies would bring me back to a childhood ambition. The timing was right because my study began when exciting times of changes had commenced in the realm of International Relations because the very neatly set Cold War dichotomy had ceased to exist. Capra’s *The Turning Point* seemed revolutionary and so did later Fukuyama’s *The End of History*. Hutton’s *The State We’re In* caused lively debates, and Czempiel’s *Weltpolitik im Umbruch* discussed global governance as collective responsibility and the willingness to solve problems and many more.¹ A theoretically apparent well balanced security of the bipolar world became outdated overnight by historic events, which had never been included in any theoretical speculation. Theory had failed practice and the questioning of the prevailing theory had begun. Pettman, for example, asked for “the search for alternatives: emotive, subjective, unconventional.”²

In addition to historical changes in politics, enormous changes demanded that International Political Economy (IPE) questions its very aims and objectives. Theory in this subject was compelled to accept the globality of the financial markets, where an increase or decrease of shares could overnight either make or break whole businesses. The case of Soros is one of the best success stories. His *Quantum Fund* has been the best performing investment fund in history and his foundations have helped re-shape the post-Cold War world.³ I soon applied my interests to the development of Global Political Economy (GPE) and the critique of the still prevailing ideology of realism and the method of Rational Choice (RC). The question seemed to me well put: How can theory cope with measuring conducts and outcomes only with rationality, if so much depends on factors outside the rational and the usually small irrational but very effective component of the unpredictability of the human mind, which so often in history has caused major changes. And more so, the boundaries of investigation extended to what was called by then the phenomenon of globalization.

¹ Fritjof Capra, *The Turning Point. Science, Society and the Rising Culture*. London: Flamingo, 1983; Susan Strange, *Casino Capitalism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*. London: Penguin Books, 1992; Will Hutton, *The State We’re In*. London: Random House, 1995; Peter Drucker, *Post-Capitalist Society*. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1993; Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Weltpolitik im Umbruch. Das Internationale System nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts*. München: Beck’sche Reihe, 1993; Lester C Thurow, *Die Zukunft des Kapitalismus*. Düsseldorf und München: Metropolitan Verlag, 1996.

² Ralph Pettman, *Understanding International Political Economy, with Readings for the Fatigue*. London: Lynne Rienner, 1996, page 13.

Globalization is a process of compactness which nearly every scholar takes (in particular since the 1980s) reference to this phenomenon. The major reason for the creation of globalization was the liberation of the financial markets which lost their dependency on the politics of the nation state. Money and assets were dealt with as independent commodities outside the sovereign zone of the former anarchy of states, as worshipped by the Realist school in IR. Globalization was part of numerous academic investigations e.g. Gill's work on globalizing elite and global transformation⁴; Rosenau's discussion on globalization as the latest "buzz" word, "a label that is presently in vogue to account for peoples, activities, norms, ideas, goods, services, and currencies that are decreasingly defined to a particular geographic space and its local and established practices."⁵ Pfetsch⁶ discussed globalization as threat or challenge. Douglas wrote about the fatality of globalization, Held gave an important contribution to the debate in his *Democracy and the Global Order*⁷, and many more authors enlivened the debate on globalization.⁸

To summarise, the term globalization relates to the conditions arising from a changing world, in an era involving fundamental transformations, an era of discontinuity with the past, where according to Holsti "the very rules of the game of international relations have shifted, ... but our ways of seeing the world have not changed. ... [and we] continue to employ the older conceptual apparatus at our intellectual peril."⁹ Strange lists six aspects of globalization: the emergence of a truly global financial market, the transnationalisation of technology, the 'go global' trend of corporations, the transnational economic diplomacy of statepower, the rise of global cultural flows and the rise of new global geographies.¹⁰

Globalization is still debated by scholars from two camps, either somewhat positive

³ George Soros, *The Crisis of Global Capitalism; Open Society Endangered*. London: Little, Brown and Company, 1998.

⁴ Stephen Gill, "Globalization, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism". Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1995, vol.24:3, pp 399-423.

⁵ James N Rosenau, "The Dynamics of Globalization: Toward an Operational Formulation", paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, April 18th, 1996.

⁶ Frank R Pfetsch, "Globalization: A Threat or a Challenge for the State?", paper presented at the Annual Conference of BISA, University of Durham, 16-18th December, 1996.

⁷ David Held, *Democracy and Global Order*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.

⁸ Jan Aart Scholte, *International Relations of Social Change*. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993; Lynn H Miller, *Global Order, Values and Power in International Politics*. Oxford: Westview Press, 1994; Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R D Underhill, (eds.) *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*. Houndmills: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1994; Peter Drucker, *The New Realities*. Oxford: Butterworth - Heinemann, Ltd., 1989; Philip G Cerny, *Finance and World Politics: Markets, Regimes and States in the Post-Hegemonic Era*. Vermont: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1993; Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996; Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schuhman, *Die Globalisierungsfalle: Der Angriff auf Demokratie und Wohlstand*. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1997.

⁹ Kal J Holsti, "The Problem of Change in International Relations Theory", paper presented at the joint ISA-ECPR conference, Vienna, September 16-19, 1998, page 3.

or negative about the movement. The full effects of globalization can only be speculated on as Scholte demonstrates in his recent book *Globalization, a Critical Introduction*.¹¹ Scholte's analysis deserves all the praises it received for trying to comprise the various aspects of globalization. Regardless of which definition is acceptable, the phenomenon of globalization had a revolutionary influence on my mode of research.

At the end of the 20th century scholars in International Relations (IR) faced with changing world conditions, found it necessary to adopt two new terms - first International Political Economy (IPE) and then Global Political Economy (GPE), in order to deal with a new situation of global politics and global economy. These new terms, particularly the latter, were required to give expression to the recently described new phenomenon called globalization.

When the discourse on International Relations was commenced it related mainly to the subject of war and peace. Within the field of IR, the term IPE has a distinctive meaning. It is one connected with the inseparability of economics from politics, as well as with the international scene as a sphere of activity over and above the national one. IPE sought to analyse the rational global interactions in politics and economy. Despite this advantage of IPE in relation to IR, it was not until the term GPE was coined that a theoretical discourse was found which could attempt to address the enormous social changes in the world. GPE became a theoretical vehicle with a great degree of flexibility. It represents a 'moral turn' for IPE. GPE studies not only economic globalization, but its social and other consequences. In doing so, it is able to offer a normative critique of the world of globalization. However, this critique – I shall argue – is limited. I shall seek to extend the limits here.

As I mentioned at the beginning I was surrounded by this turmoil of thought when I started to study, and more so as I became more and more intrigued by the demand for changes without demanding at the same time to include morality as a vital component for ordering global affairs. Before the word globalization had become a vital component of theory Carr had claimed that to exclude morality in the theory of IR was an artificial undertaking which could never play a responsible role for the

¹⁰ RIPE (Review of International Political Economy). "Editorial: Forum for Heterodox International Political Economy". London: Routledge, vol.1:1, Spring 1994, page 2.

¹¹ Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization, a Critical Introduction*. Houndmills: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 2000.

practice.¹² The search for a framework of morality took me always back to Kant, a moral philosopher extensively mentioned in IR but mainly on his writing of *Perpetual Peace*. I played with Kant's concept of *Perpetual Peace* in respect of creating some ideas of a possible world governance, but it did not give enough guidelines for dealing with the uncontrolled ruling of the global financial markets. Therefore I searched for other systems of moral conduct, also through a whole terrain of other possibilities. In my appendices I mention a few, for example Confucius. As it happened this lead led me into a cul-de-sac, because the Confucian system of values had proven very dubious when applied, because it excluded women, and built up a very strict hierarchy between teachers and pupils, barriers which could not be broken down.

First of all, I could not believe that Kant had no more to say on the subject, and so I started to study the works which Kant wrote before *Perpetual Peace*.¹³ I came to realise that there was an essential part of thought neglected without which *Perpetual Peace* could not have been constructed. I did not have to look far in order to find the clue. When I looked at Kant's earlier and essential work *The Critique of Pure Reason*, I noticed the word "transcendence" appearing on the top of every page.¹⁴ This revelation encouraged me to reflect on Kant's German *Transzendente Ästhetik*, *Transzendente Analytik* and *Transzendente Dialektik*. Revitalised by my findings, I searched for more recent German literature on Kant and I found in the writing of Höffe enough confirmation to manifest my interpretation of the importance of Kant's method of transcendence.¹⁵

In the face of globalization, the main criteria for a successful ethical system seems to be the quality of neutrality, universality and practicality. A global morality should become an inherent element for global politics and economics. It should be acceptable to all nations, races and cultures. I was confronted with the question as to whether Kant could withhold these global demands. Within the framework of globalization we find the expression of 'otherness', a term of research used by Chan. Chan looks at the phenomenon of 'otherness' in the circumstances of globalization. I share his view that it is a major issue to advise on terms of how to overcome the gulf

¹² Edward H Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*. Houndmills: Macmillan Press, Ltd., reissued second edition, 1981, page 94.

¹³ Phil Abbott's opening lecture gave me the encouragement to look at Kant again. The Lecture "*Kant or Won't - Theory and Moral Responsibility*", was presented at the BISA Conference, Southampton, 18th December, 1995.

¹⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* 1 & 2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 55, 1995.

¹⁵ Otfried Höffe, *Immanuel Kant*. München: Verlag C H Beck, 1996.

between the various forms of 'otherness'. On the other hand 'otherness' is a fruitful attribute to a variety of people all over the world. People share the diversity of their cultures and manifold talents for the benefit of mankind in creating an ethical world community. Kant's morality does include all that is 'other' and could it therefore be useful to serve as a moral basis?

This is an important question, because this thesis seeks to provide theoretical bases for a world community to be powerful enough to create global economic morality which will in time override national interests. I would like to suggest a theory which can introduce a moral consciousness for the world, and create the conceptual conditions under which its practical transformation is possible.

However, unlike IR, GPE's moral and normative concern is not underpinned by extended philosophical investigation of a normative nature. I will therefore engage in a thorough investigation into IR literature, and show that IR's efforts to establish such philosophical underpinning have led to many illuminations but also to many limitations.

Firstly, it sought a communitarian vision. This is most evident in the work of Frost. But his work never attained as clear a position on individual economic and entitlement rights as in the work of development specialists dealing with international systemic aid, such as Harrell-Bond; or looked at the recipient end of systems of aid, such as Sen. IR has sought to be both moral and rational – for instance in the work of Nicholson. Nevertheless this had the effect of not treating thoroughly, or with deep sympathy, the irrational elements of clamour caused by hunger, want, or the search for control of scarce resources. Some elements of development economics have sought to do this, and this is most evident in the work of Dasgupta. The two IR concerns - morality and rationality - are also however found in GPE, so that GPE may suffer from the same limitation suggested above. Moreover, neither IR nor GPE has sought to combine moral underpinnings with cultural considerations drawn from non-Western systems of thought, the rationality of which is not always immediately apparent. Although Dasgupta made a bold attempt to combine moral underpinnings with cultural considerations (but still within rational calculations), for IR, Chan has said that the rational project should itself be questioned in the name of international cultures.

In so far as IR has been successful in its moral and normative concerns, it has been to a large extent through the study of Kant. However, it has focussed rather narrowly on Kant, and has not fully articulated the central and centralising principle of Kant's work, his understanding of the transcendental meaning of the world. This principle of transcendence is a provision of great moral emancipation, as well as individual moral responsibility.

Through my own interpretation of theory I shall seek to show Kant's recognition of the method of transcendence. I would like to demonstrate what I mean when I say that I have revealed a particular Kantian view as useful for a normative theory of GPE. My research reveals that Kant's interpretation of the transcendental meaning of the world brings us closer to the understanding of practice, and in particular of how we deal with morality as a component of each person's life because Kant looks at a human being in his/her totality. Kant's morality is a knowledge which is willed in order to become a practical force. This revelation is useful for my research when dealing with the moral demands on politics and economics with or without the state. Kant's object is the morality of human beings within a permanently renewable and redefinable context of political order. Kant's political philosophy aims to reach the status of a perpetual peace which overrides the quest for power and destruction.

According to Kant, his and all our critiques of reason discover the elements and laws of abstract knowledge via perception and, therefore, our judgement is drawing conclusions. Kant says that thoughts without content are empty, and views without concepts are blind, and one could add, that life without morality is anchorless. Kant believes that morality is unconditionally a necessity. Every human individual has a will and therefore, according to Kant, is capable of behaving in a moral way. Therefore, in this dissertation I will follow the idea that GPE theory can provide a more satisfactory normative view if moral considerations were included in the political and, in particular, the economic parameters. However, theory alone makes for an unsatisfactory "homo" without a Kantian transcendental self-consciousness. I seek to explain what this 'transcendentalism' is.

This research has led me to a second original contribution which is to parallel this Kantian transcendence with the ethical concept of Theravada Buddhism. My investigation led me to Theravada Buddhism because I searched for a "non-Western"

ethical approach which offers morality in a Kantian sense as an *a priori-meta* cognition, which is a concept beyond our grasp, and which can be depicted as culturally neutral and universal. As part of my studies of Chan I came across some of his research on other religions, including Buddhism and Theravada Buddhism.¹⁶ His investigations concluded with the recognition of the diversity of the subject, but I took it further and compared the ethical system of Theravada Buddhism with that of Kant.

Compared to Kant there is in Buddhism an analogous but deeper explication of transcendence. This is not the only such analogous explication, but it has been chosen in this thesis for its exemplary nature. Other examples of non-Western thought are given in the appendices, as are suggested applications of such moral thought. I have resisted, however, the temptation to be policy programmatic in the body of this thesis.

Buddhism was chosen here, however, amongst many other schools of thought – within a world of confessional differences – because it contains no totalitarian focal point. There is no creator-divinity, no diversion from the individual freedom towards good, and the creation of the good through individual efforts to construct the good community, including the good economic community. It is thus not a competitor against other confessional schools in that there is no god-head to be counterposed against other god-heads. In addition, Hans Küng found, in his world parliament of religions, how distinct Buddhism is in its lack of a god-centre, and Chan commented on how apposite Küng's work is to IR.¹⁷

However, it is not the intention here to be drawn into the contrasts of Chan on Küng and Küng on Buddhism, but to state the exemplary nature of Buddhism and the at least equal standing it should have to that of Kant. The author has tried to paint a picture of Theravada Buddhism that is moral, within rational explication, and able to be applied globally.

My research led me to Theravada Buddhism, because it formulates an ethical system, which is universal by its very nature and interconnected with all strands of life.

¹⁶ Stephen Chan, "And so what would a Buddhist Ethics of IR look like then?" Paper delivered to the University of Swansea Gregynog Conference on International Relations, 2nd – 4th December, 1996, and Stephen Chan, "Writing Sacred IR: An Excavation Involving Küng, Eliade, and Illiterate Buddhism", in: *Millennium*, vol.29:3, 2000.

¹⁷ Stephen Chan, "Hans Küng and a Global Ethic", in: *Review of International Studies*, vol.25:3, 1999.

Theravada ethics include the person both as an insider and outsider of society. It does not postulate laws of morality but moral imperatives that are resonant as Kant's categorical imperative. Life is a way above suffering. The Theravada ethical system combats social dislocation and material inequality. It postulates the worth of every human life, its environment, nature and all creation.

This thesis has three major progressions:

- i. a review of IR and IPE and GPE's efforts to establish moral underpinnings, comparing these to the efforts of development studies, and explaining the rational bias of such IR and IPE and GPE efforts
- ii. a profound analysis of Kant, working from original German language sources
- iii. an explication of Theravada Buddhism as a vehicle for a moral GPE.

After the critical survey work under (i), it contributes for IR an original treatment of Kant in (ii), and contributes for GPE an original argument for Buddhist moral underpinning in (iii).

The prime concern of this dissertation is to impart additional meaning to the GPE discourse of the 21st century. 'Meaningful' in the context of the thesis means that the argument relates to economic, political and sociological practice within ethics. The discussion about ethics has always played a role in politics, but the acceptance of ethics is part of a new international order. This thesis treats the meaning of ethics as equal to the meaning of morality. There is, here, no difference made in using the term ethical or moral.¹⁸

¹⁸ According to Wolf, ethics is a normative system because ethics is occupied with the ideal character of human conduct. The same is true for morality. Ethics or morality aim at the ultimate ideal for the highest good of human conduct and are therefore not so much occupied with factual knowledge as they are with value, namely human conduct as it ought to be. The study of ethics includes "the origin or source of our knowledge of the highest good or of right or wrong. ... the sanctions of moral conduct, ... the motives which prompt right conduct" and further the philosophical problem of the freedom of the will. The consideration of Buddhist ethics is an advantage in the understanding of ethics in general. See "Ethics" defined by Abraham Wolf, in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1951 (ed.), vol. 8, page 757.

Ethics or morality is concerned with establishing standards or norms for conduct and how one ought to live. Ethics aims to be applied to practical moral problems, such as inequalities, human rights and justice, and in general questions about the value of human life.

Philosophers from ancient times to the present use both terms freely. While Plato talks about "*Nicomachean Ethics*", Kant uses the term "morality", which he defines as "*officia virtutis*" or "*virtutis ethica*", the act of the mind in opposition to "*officia iuris*", the lawful duty. His understanding of morality is based on the individuals' freedom to rights as much as duties in doing the right thing according to the moral imperative. See "*Einteilung der Metaphysik der Sitten überhaupt*", in Immanuel Kant, *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*, Band VIII, Suhrkamp, Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 190, (ed.) Wilhelm Weischedel, Frankfurt am Main, 10. Edition, 1993, page 347. It is also known that Kant gave lectures from 1775 - 1785 entitled "*Ethica*", which started to prepare the way for his 'categorical imperative', see Immanuel Kant, *Eine Vorlesung über Ethik*, (ed.) Gerd Gerhardt.

My work is divided into three parts. **Part One** gives an extensive framework of the analysis of IR and IPE theory.

Chapter One opens up the thesis with basic questions regarding the meaning of globalization, and the relevance of ethics/morality to the development of a theory in GPE. Theory should be practice related to be a useful tool in order to influence the conduct of politics and economics. GPE was defined by Gill and Law¹⁹ in order to gain a greater awareness of the implications created by globalization with the aim to indicate development areas and unexplored areas of thought which require urgent attention. I continue by demonstrating in a careful manner the normative debate on ethics in IR and IPE, followed by a critique of literature based on Kant, and giving as an example the quasi-Hegelian attempt by Frost. IR literature seems to overstate the communitarianism versus cosmopolitanism dichotomy. I write extensive on Linklater, and more so on Frost, because both authors are outstanding with their courage to imagine a future political community and a future civil society.

Chapter Two examines how IPE scholars like Strange and Murphy and Tooze deal with ethics. Whereas IR tries to be analytical and synthetical in a philosophical sense and plays with political philosophical thought at random, IPE produces a lot of critical questions, but without supplying answers. Strange's deep analysis of power structures in a newly globalized world helps us to understand the circumstances of a new theory. Murphy and Tooze question the validity of IPE theory which, as they argue, cannot supersede the common orthodoxy of thinking. In particular Murphy and Augelli use a Gramscian critique in order to provide some hope for changes. Without relating their research to a philosophy of morality Murphy and Augelli discuss the non-rational theoretical element of the so called 'social myth', a meta-cognitive phenomenon, which commits IPE to an awareness of knowledge outside the otherwise 'naturally' accepted scientific discourse. But the aspiration of change in IPE theory does not leap over an embryonic stage of criticising epistemology.

Part Two of my dissertation investigates the voices of interrelated concerns. Research in this field seems justified because the methodology of the reassertion of

Frankfurt am Main: Philosophie Fischer, 1990. The expressions ethics and morality differ in their origin; whereas ethics is Greek, morality is Latin.

¹⁹ Stephen Gill and David Law, *The Global Political Economy, Perspectives, Problems, and Politics*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988.

ethics outside IR and IPE can help to reform the discipline of GPE - the methods used try to overcome the orthodoxy of theory.

Chapter Three looks into economic theory to find efforts for an ethical debate in the works of Frey, Sen, Dreze and Dworkin. Frey tries to reform economy by accepting the influence of the socio-cultural systems. In this context, the reasserting of ethics in Development Studies brings into the research the ontological aspect of life outside the Western world. The investigation of systems of aid makes the work of Sen and Drèze touch the very issues of globalization. Harrell-Bond is cited in this respect, and Manor's cultural studies in order to highlight the need for multicultural discourse. Culture is as important as an interrelated building block to the structure of global society.

Chapter Four is a further development of Chapter Three with a deepening of the understanding of the Third World and the cultural context of rationality. The hindrance of rational choice theory is demonstrated in the context of dealing with the basic needs in the Third World. In this investigation I shall clarify which methodology could be accepted as useful for a new theory. In Chapter Three I have written on the importance of cultural concerns, but here I want to see how far this concern has been recognised in IR and IPE and if it, therefore, has led to some progress in theory, according to the demands of Dasgupta and the theoretical aspirations of Chan.

In **Part Three** I evaluate moral-philosophical concepts of thought with the aim of finding a background theory, providing the methodology for a moral GPE.

Chapter Five introduces the essential teachings of Kant. In so far as IR has been successful in its moral and normative concerns, it has been through the study of Kant. With this statement I relate to the discussion of IR authors in Chapter One. I ask the question whether Kant can serve as a background theory for morality, not without testing my findings of Hegelianism as its counterpart. The ideas of Hegel, as the uniter of man at home with himself, set restrictions to the growth of international

Cupertino. Reconciliation can only be based on Kant's idea of the beautiful unity or infinite worth as summarised in Cooper. But this, as will be seen in the following chapter, is curiously close to Buddhism, without ever being noticed by IR or IPE or GPE scholars.

Chapter Six represents my findings of Theravada Buddhism, a system with many similarities compared with Kant. I present as an antidote the Buddhist ethics of political economy, as discussed by Sizemore and Swearer and others²⁰, based on the classical teachings of the Theravada School. The classical system of Theravada ethics lends itself as a missing piece of the jigsaw for GPE. The introduction of the Eastern ethical system is a global act of reconciliation in practical as well as in theoretical terms. A moral conduct for the distribution of wealth is vital for the future global society. Theory thus becomes a tool to formulate an executive formula for a meaningful practice.

Chapter Seven deepens the understanding of a Western concept of distributive justice explored with Rawls and his critics, compared to Theravada Buddhist understanding. As Green helps us to understand, Buddhist ethics is neither constituted nor based on contractarian modes.²¹ Instead, welfare of the many is an ethically inherent obligation. Reform is based on reconciliation. Globalization needs global moral guidelines for mutual advantage. The global society needs to adopt the Theravada Buddhist principle of sharing wealth, whereby it is a virtue to be wealthy as long as the rich contribute enough to guarantee the poor their basic entitlement in a Sen'sian sense. The advantage of the Theravada ethical life lies in its profound understanding of the meaning of interrelatedness. The understanding that exists between men, and the harmony between men and nature, are the guarantees of survival. Ethical life is not demanded by constituted or contracted rules, but is self explanatory. This thesis offers an input for the future development of theory which I call the Social Political Economy of Globalization.

²⁰ Russel F Sizemore and Donald K Swearer, (eds.), *Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation, A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990.

²¹ Ronald M Green, "Buddhist Economic Ethics: A Theoretical Approach", in Sizemore and Swearer, *op.cit.*

Part I

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

* * * * *

The background to my dissertation is Global Political Economy (GPE) theory. GPE is a new formulation which is the results of International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) theory having problems with coping with the world changes brought about from what is called 'globalization'.

I started to search for a normative theory based on my experience when following the academic discussions in the field and during national and international study conferences on the subject during the last decenary of the 20th century. It seemed to me that debates, in general, lacked normative components.

Part I of my dissertation evaluates the attempts of IR and IPE theory in respect of a normative debate. This task asks for careful selection because of the vast amount of related literature. Therefore I have chosen authors who acknowledge the necessity of normative debate, also IPE authors are, I feel, less successful in proposing norms than IR ones.

Chapter One tries to shed some light on the relevance of globalization in relation to this project. Globalization is a progressive historic phenomenon which sets the stage for the adoption of a concept of morality. I explore how much the IR discourse engages in the normative debate and to what effect. It is revealing, that IR's moral and normative concern is underpinned by extended philosophical investigation, mainly by Hegel and Kant.

Chapter Two examines how IPE scholars like Strange, Tooze, Murphy and Augelli deal with ethics. Whereas IR tries to be analytical and synthetical in a philosophical sense and plays with political philosophical thought at random, IPE produces a lot of critical questions, but without supplying answers. Strange's deep analysis of power structures in a newly globalized world helps me to understand the circumstances of a new theory. Murphy and Tooze question the validity of IPE theory which - as they argue - cannot supersede the common orthodoxy of thinking. In particular Murphy and Augelli use a Gramscian critique in order to provide some hope for changes. Without relating their research to a philosophy of morality, Murphy and Augelli discuss the non-rational theoretical element of the so called 'social myth', a meta-cognitive phenomenon, which commits IPE to an awareness of knowledge outside the otherwise 'naturally' accepted scientific discourse.

Chapter 1

Search for normative theory

Main points of this chapter

Global Political Economy and its relevance within the process of globalization

International Relations discourse on Kant

Frost: an attempt to construct a constitutive global society

Conclusion

Main points of this chapter

- *Political Economy needs to develop within a global environment; GPE strengthens these aspirations*
- *A silencing of the normative issue decreases the importance of theory*
- *Limitations are caused by self-imposed barriers of Western rationalist thought*
- *Still we can learn from IR to include a philosophical framework, and attempts are made, no matter how unsuccessful, to formulate a theoretical construction*

1.1. Global Political Economy and its relevance within the process of globalization

Global Political Economy (GPE) was invented as a new theoretical term in order to cope with the changes in the world since the 1980s, called 'globalization'. Globalization is a concept of understanding relating to the global diffusion of political, economic, social, cultural and technological phenomena such as transportation, communication, production, financial flows, technological and weapon transfer, including almost everything that has reached global dimensions, such as population, migrations, environment, poverty, underdevelopment, etc. According to Steans and Pettiford, "globalization implies increased travel, the growth of media and communication and a generally 'smaller' world. In a globalised world, therefore, cultural encounters and mixings are likely to become the norm."²² The origin of the term Global Political Economy lies in the discourses of International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE), and was created in the 1980s. The purpose was to meet the need to understand the increasing global interactions, which could not be explained any longer by existing Social Science theories, because of their narrowness of approach and discriminative tendencies towards non-Western dialogue, the incapacity of coping with anything other than the established Western norm.²³ The need became first apparent, in particular with the expanding global reach of industry and technology and intrinsically created a new perspective at the end of the 20th century. First of all, I would like to refer to this development in order to show its significance.

According to Frieden and Lake

international political economy is the study of the interplay of economics and politics in the world arena; [whereby], the economy can be defined as the system of producing, distributing, and using wealth; politics is the set of institutions and rules by which social and economic interactions are governed.²⁴

At the beginning of the 21st century we deal with an apparent new, re-emerged

²² Jill Steans and Lloyd Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*. Harlow: Longman, 2001, page 145.

²³ See Stephen Chan, (ed.), *Towards a Multicultural Roshamon Paradigm in International Relations*. Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1996.

²⁴ Jeffrey A. Frieden and David A. Lake, *International Political Economy, Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*. London: Routledge, 1995, page 1.

understanding of the connection between economics and politics, which is similar to the understanding before 1900. There used to be a common-sense understanding that politics and economics belonged together, "virtually all thinkers concerned with understanding human society wrote about political economy. For individuals as diverse as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx, the economy was eminently political and politics were obviously tied to economic phenomena."²⁵ Scholars would not have taken it seriously enough to describe politics and economics in separation. Since the turn of the last century until the 1970s²⁶, academics treated the studies of economics and politics as divorced from each other. Frieden and Lake describe the movement where economists thought of more elaborate and sophisticated models of how economies work, and "other social scientists spun out ever more complex theories of political development and activity."²⁷ This development of separation led to considerable dissatisfaction and a more obvious gap between "abstract models of political and economic behaviour, on the one hand, and the actual behaviour of politics and economies, on the other."²⁸

In order to understand international political economy one has to look at the development of three fields of social science. Two social science disciplines, economics and political science, developed earlier in Britain as separate entities "on the assumption that national frontiers divided different political and economic systems so they could be studied and analysed for all practical purposes in isolation from each other, or else comparatively, as they were distinct species of animal."²⁹ A third discipline, International Relations (IR), developed after WWI and focused on war and peace, "in which the main 'actors' or protagonists were nation-states"³⁰, concerned with questions about world order. During the course of academic growth the disciplines formed barriers between themselves which made it very difficult to study interrelated problems.

Since the 1970s a new political economy arose in order to understand how politics and economics interact in modern society, leading up to the statement by Frieden and Lake: "Just as in the real world, where politicians must pay close attention to

²⁵ *Ibid.*, page 3.

²⁶ The change started when Richard Nixon ended the gold-dollar standard that had formed the basis for postwar monetary relations, in 1971.

²⁷ Frieden and Lake, *ibid.*, page 3.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, page 4.

²⁹ Susan Strange, *States and Markets, An Introduction to International Political Economy*. London: Pinter Publishers, 1988, page 35.

economic trends, and economic actors must keep track of political tendencies, those who would understand the political process must take the economy into account and vice versa."³¹

Due to the recognition of this inadequacy, Strange, an outstanding academic personality in the field, helped develop an interrelated discipline of international political economy. The study of international political economy was defined by Susan Strange:

it concerns the social, political and economic arrangements affecting the global systems of production, exchange and distribution, and the mix of values reflected therein. Those arrangements are not divinely ordained, nor are they the fortuitous outcome of blind chance. Rather they are the result of human decisions taken in the context of man-made institutions and sets of self-set rules and customs.³²

IPE relates to theories of social science which had first been dominated by American academics, reflecting value judgements and assumptions based on American experience. Strange calls them West-West issues. They concern "the rules of the game in trade, the terms on which investments are made across international frontiers" and credits are made available through international capital markets and by international banks.³³

Since the mid 1970s the so-called North-South issues were added, thereby widening the perspective upon world affairs. These include the capital flow from the West to developing countries as much as "the ways in which technology can be required by governments and enterprises in poor countries from governments and enterprises in rich ones; the ways in which new and insecure states can insulate themselves from the pervasive dominance of Western ideas and values purveyed by wealthy and powerful Western media - films, television, radio, newspapers and wire services, not to mention advertising."³⁴ According to this development, socio-economic trends at a global level were pushing toward international trade liberalisation, reinforced by newly independent Third World states, demanding a fairer division of global wealth

³⁰ Strange, *ibid.*, page 35.

³¹ Frieden and Lake, *op.cit.*, page 4.

³² Strange, *op.cit.*, page 18.

³³ *Ibid.*, page 12.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, page 13.

and power.

The rise of internationally integrated financial markets and global corporations changed the previous perspectives in international political economy. A previously inexperienced global geostrategic and diplomatic environment, according to Frieden and Lake, "fundamentally transformed the very nature of economic policy making of all nations" and stressed "global socio economic factors rather than political ones."³⁵ These changes in practice encouraged the new term of "global" to be introduced instead of "international". The word "international" relates to the understanding of politics based on the theory of the anarchy of independent nation-states, whereas the term "global" incorporates the structural development in politics and economics in a newly emerged international system since 1970.

An important step was made by Gill and Law, who put forward an understanding of 'global' political economy.³⁶ They claim a global political economy field of study, arguing that former limitations had to be overcome; they suggest that there should be a discussion "of long-term questions concerning the interaction between the ecological and the military, political and economic structures."³⁷ Gill and Law stress also the need to look at perspectives themselves, which are "interacting forces in the political economy, as well as a basis for theories which seek to explain it."³⁸ They further stress "... the need to take a conception of the global political economy as the key ontological entity, that is the object to be theorised and explained", and that "this case for a global perspective is reinforced by examination of some ethical aspects of the contemporary global system."³⁹ These attempts are based on the fact that towards the end of the 20th century the global reach of industry and technology has intrinsically created a new perspective, and more so the changes since 1989 included a large part of the world which had been previously excluded. Even East-West issues became globalised.⁴⁰

³⁵ Frieden and Lake, *op.cit.*, page 8.

³⁶ "Global" is a new word coined to express a new phenomenon. It is common practice in theory to coin new expressions in order to describe new phenomena. In the preface to an English translation of *Capital*, Engels felt compelled to apologise for the introduction of new terms of expressions: "Every new aspect of a science involves a revolution in the technical terms of that science." Friedrich Engels, "Preface to the English Edition," in Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974, page 14.

³⁷ Stephen Gill and David Law, *The Global Political Economy, Perspectives, Problems, and Policies*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988, page XVIII.

³⁸ Gill and Law, *ibid.*, page XVII.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, page XXIII.

⁴⁰ This remark refers to the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the East and the West were the two confronting blocs for the policies of deterrence. The fall of the Iron Curtain initiated a process of globalization as defined above in the East.

Within this complex global arena, it is difficult to show how relational power can be translated into structural power, and difficult to distinguish between political and economic power in practice. The foundation of GPE theory has been essential, because, until then, as confirmed by Strange, "so much writing in the social sciences today has failed to adjust mentally to the 'globalization' ... of economic, political and social affairs."⁴¹

Global politics is intertwined with global economy and social currents. "Global" stands for the features of globalization, the shrinking of the world's physical and social dimensions: politically, economically, military, and even ecologically. "Global" is a process of compactness. With the end of the Cold War the world has witnessed the victory of international liberalism, the victory of market capitalism and liberal democracy. International political economy rested on the realist assumption that all power rests on the nation state. GPE rests instead on the belief that the concept of the anarchy of states is insufficient to cope with the demands of global competition for world power. According to Spero, greater international interdependence and dependence "will require states to relinquish some national control to international management, which is difficult for sovereign states to do."⁴²

The speed of change and its unpredictability asks for new management mechanisms and understanding. As Gill and Law observe: "The present is not like the past. Today the security, trade, money, direct investment, communications and cultural dimensions are of *global political economy*, whereas in the past, there was a less complex *international political economy* (and before 1500 a series of regional political economies)."⁴³ The Western value system is inherent in the international political discourse and a long overdue alternative is needed to capture the global context.⁴⁴

In my interpretation of the work of Chan, this writer has contributed greatly to the advancement of theory, when adding cultural awareness as a vital contribution. Theory building is always for some person and some purpose. The purpose in the 21st century should allow for the different needs of other cultures (and others in our

⁴¹ Strange, *op.cit.*, page 34.

⁴² Joan Edelman Spero, *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, London: Routledge, 1990, page 354.

⁴³ Gill and Law, *op.cit.*, page 378.

⁴⁴ See James Der Derian, "Mediating Estrangement: A Theory for Diplomacy", in: *Review of International Studies*, vol. 13, April 1987, pp 91-110; *On Diplomacy*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1987; *Antidiplomacy*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1992.

own culture) struggling for a new awareness, because globalization demands it. Chan makes the statement that "what we draw from all this is that we need to use different tools (linguistic, philosophical and practical) when approaching different problems."⁴⁵

Globalization requires a theory which is well equipped with adequate tools to be able to analyse and to synthesise the new correlations and dangers for the people of the world. The theory of global political economy, which I want to suggest, represents a 'moral turn' for IPE. It studies not only economic globalization but the social and other consequences of globalization. This is imperative, because there is no common ethical codex giving guidance in the grey areas outside the nation states.

One could wonder why there should be an ethics for GPE, because there is no need for it by those big players in power who sit around the bargaining tables and lead the world in global matters, relating to their personal profit margin. The so called 'have's' can do without, but the so called 'have-nots' cannot. Globalization needs an ethical codex of conduct to protect all those, and this is the majority of the world's population at the beginning of the 21st century, who have no bargaining power, but only a natural right to ensure their survival.

Despite the fact that these ethical demands are responding to contemporary needs, history tells us, that ancient societies maintained moral rights *per se*. Classical political thought included the ethical aspect, just as economics derives from the understanding of household management based on care and consideration. The Greek word *oikonomia*, which means household, described, for the ancient world, a typical and rather patriarchal settlement of an extended family with its slaves, living off the crops and flocks of the surrounding land. This management included what we would call today administration, education, welfare and also guarding an ethical codex of rules.⁴⁶

Industrialisation brought about the greatest and most devastating changes to the system of *oikonomia*. The dependence on money and the loss of agricultural land led to the advent of capitalism, as observed by Marx. Social restructuring and loss in confessional faith disconnected the understanding of an ethical codex with ethical

⁴⁵ Stephen Chan and Andrew J. Williams, (eds.), *Renegade States. The evolution of revolutionary foreign policy*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995, page 9.

practice. Karl Polanyi observes how the Industrial Revolution did not only bring about profit-seeking capitalism, more so the "social devastation of an uncontrolled system, the market economy. Men failed to realise what the cohesion of society meant. The inner temple of human life was despoiled and violated."⁴⁷ Stress on self-interest and maximisation of profit became major goals for social conduct. Therefore, Polanyi asks for the re-creation of the principles of individual freedom from such tyranny in the 1950s without anticipating the development of globalization as we witness it nowadays.⁴⁸

John Kenneth Galbraith and Fred Schumacher observed in the 70s the disproportion of private affluence and public squalor in America.

How could there be public squalor in the richest country ... If economic growth to the present American level has been unable to get rid of public squalor - or, maybe, has even been accompanied by its increase - how could one reasonably expect that further growth would mitigate or remove it?"⁴⁹

At the end of the 20th century, Ellen Meiksins Wood confirms the "evidence that mass unemployment or under employment, poverty, homelessness, racism and violent crime seem to be permanent fixtures in the world's richest countries."⁵⁰ If Galbraith, Schumacher and Wood relate their observations to the conditions in the West, how would their concern sound if transferred to global circumstances. The lack of moral conduct has confronted us with devastating results and challenges us to open up the debate on ethical values on a global level.⁵¹ Otherwise there will only be the "academic values of neutrality, objectivity, detachment, rigour, propriety, loyalty", and made us all the victims of the process, described by Weber as '*Entzauberung*'.⁵² As argued by Pettman, the present time witnesses a journey of change, where "in practice, the search for alternatives means paying greater attention

⁴⁶ See Strange, 1988, Part 1: The Conflict of Values and Theories, page 19.

⁴⁷ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation, the political and economic origins of our time*. Boston : Beacon Paperback, 1957, page X.

⁴⁸ Polanyi, *ibid*.

⁴⁹ E. F. Schumacher, *Small is beautiful, a study of economics as if people mattered*. London: Vintage books. 1973, page 230: See also John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial Estate*. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1967.

⁵⁰ Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Democracy against Capitalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, page 285.

⁵¹ Stephen Gill and David Law are referring to Kant's concept for 'perpetual peace': asking for a more positive approach and more global in nature, assimilating that the present world necessitates "a more far-reaching concept of the good society at the international level." page XXIII.

to emotive, subjective, unconventional accounts of the subject."⁵³

GPE is a basic ingredient of world affairs⁵⁴ and includes, according to Murphy and Tooze "the possibility that beliefs and values are themselves just as real as the material structures and powers of the global political economy."⁵⁵ In comparison, IR and IPE theory have created a 'convenient fiction' of neglect "that fits well into the professionalisation of global knowledge, the assumptions and values supporting mainstream academic IR and IPE, and, significantly, the core values of societies where market authority and market power are regarded as superior to other forms and sources of social power."⁵⁶ The GPE which I want to establish in my research will be challenging conventional knowledge and lead to a different understanding based on the ethical conduct of social forces demanding fairer conditions for a more just way of life.

The demand for ethics in political economy is first of all a natural demand of adequate knowledge. Politics and economics deal with the behaviour of actors and the consequences of actions afflicting socio-economic or socio-political outcomes. But what seems natural is neglected when it comes to the politics of power and economic profit margins. A silencing has taken place and a major task is to speak again, and in new languages which create the links between theory and practice.⁵⁷

The silence in current IR and IPE theory and the limited critical debate on ethics is caused by a paradigm of Western rationalist thought. According to Krasner, the reconstruction of scientific inquiry within IR and IPE is based "exclusively by the canons of ... the Western Rationalistic Tradition. ... International political economy is deeply embedded in the standard epistemological methodology of the social sciences which ... simply means stating a proposition and testing it against external evidence."⁵⁸ The rationalist framework facilitates the silencing, making invisible,

⁵² Philip Allott, "Kant or Won't, Theory and Moral Responsibility." Opening Lecture, BISA, Southampton, 18 December 1995, page 13: "Entzauberung", means 'the unmagicking, the unmystifying'.

⁵³ Ralph Pettman, *Understanding International Political Economy, with readings for the fatigue*. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1996, page XI.

⁵⁴ Stephen Gill and David Law, 1988 *op.cit.*; Here Gill and Law "illustrate the need to take a conception of the *global* political economy as the key ontological entity, that is as the object to be theorised and explained." page XXIII.

⁵⁵ Craig N Murphy and Roger Tooze eds., *The New International Political Economy*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1991, page 18, in article: "Getting beyond the "Common Sense" of the IPE Orthodoxy".

⁵⁶ Roger Tooze and Craig N Murphy, "The Epistemology of Poverty and the Poverty of Epistemology in IPE: Mystery, Blindness, and Invisibility". In: Millennium, special issue, Winter 1996, vol. 25:3, page 681.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Stephen D Krasner, "The Accomplishments of International Political Economy", in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski (eds), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, page 108-109.

blinding of issues⁵⁹, issues which should belong to IR and IPE but which do not accord with the apparatus of perceived power.

Carr, one of the great pioneers of international relations discipline proclaimed the notion that politics cannot be divorced from power. The separated discourse of morality and the spheres of economy and politics is artificially attractive for those in power. Morality is only called upon if it serves as a justification for the use of force. Instead, the contrary is needed, the co-ordination of morality and power must form the basis, for political and economic action because there is a natural interconnectedness between politics, economics and morality.

Carr criticises realism for offering "nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible"⁶⁰ and proclaims that political action "must be based on a co-ordination of morality and power"⁶¹ because there is a natural interconnectedness between politics, economics and morality. According to Carr, politics:

Cannot be divorced from power. But the *homo politicus* who pursues nothing but power is as unreal a myth as the *homo economicus* who pursues nothing but gain. Political action must be based on a co-ordination of morality and power. This truth is of practical as well as theoretical importance. It is as fatal in politics to ignore power as it is to ignore morality.⁶²

The pillars of realism are based on power politics and the anarchy of states, IR theory has therefore great self inflicted problems in order to cope with globalization. War is still the widely accepted tool which provides apparent state security, guarding the "inside" of the security net and protecting it from the "outside", using the terms from the critical theoretical research by Walker.⁶³ Epistemological blinders justify the exclusion of the "other". In contrast, for Der Derian:

Ethics begins with the recognition of the need for the other, of the need for the other's recognition. It proceeds, in other words, from an independency of caring and responsibility that cannot be separated from the pluralism and

⁵⁹ See Polly Hill, who talks about the blindspots of economic theorists, "Market Places", in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman (eds), *The New Palgrave: Economic Development*. New York: W.W. Norton Press, 1989. More of this influence of RCT will be discussed in chapter four.

⁶⁰ Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*. Houndmills: The Macmillan Press Ltd, reissued second edition, 1981, page 87.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, page 92.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ See Robert B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993. The distinction is made of a field of relevance safeguarded against an outside world which is treated less relevant.

relativism of multiple identities. An ethical way of being emerges when we recognise the very *necessity* of heterogeneity for understanding ourselves and others.⁶⁴

Der Derian analyses the lack of ethics in IR theory as a restricted representational capability, due to the construct of theoretical models which are removed from practical reality. He establishes the claim that IR theory is suffering from the conventional idea "that theory and practice are distinct phenomena At a time when almost every other social as well as physical science has begun to consider how theory, practice, and language are inextricably linked through social construction and presentational practices."⁶⁵

According to Der Derian, IR realism depends on "an archaic sign-system in which words mirror objects and theory is independent of the reality it represents."⁶⁶ IR theory represents "the acts of theoretical enclosure and political neutralization that have been instituted" in North America, based on the assumption that "rational choice, game theoretic, or formal modeling are sufficient representations of world politics."⁶⁷ IR theory silences the practice-ethical injunction which is inherent in historical reality. Ethical questions are dismissed as parochial concerns or philistine conceits, and the dangers of systems of thought are denied. IR theory addresses the key realistic questions: What are the causes of conflict and war among nations, and what are the conditions for co-operation and peace among them? According to Buzan, realism "rests on the apparent durability of power politics as a feature of human civilisation."⁶⁸

Chan supports the aspiration to include a more comprehensive "otherness", and goes as far as demanding that the ultimate goal of peace "cannot be a single universal principle in international relations; rather it must be a compound principle involving the values of many cultures ... no longer morally hegemonic."⁶⁹ Peace is the ultimate aim when advocating ethical behaviour. The quasi-moral hegemony of political and

⁶⁴ Der Derian, *op.cit.*, page 58.

⁶⁵ James Der Derian, "Post-Theory: The Eternal Return of Ethics in International Relations", in *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, (eds.), Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997, page 62.

⁶⁶ Der Derian, *ibid.*, page 63.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Barry Buzan, "The timeless wisdom of realism", in *International Theory: Positivism & Beyond*. Steve Smith, Ken Booth & Marysia Zalewski, (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

⁶⁹ Stephen Chan, "Towards a Roshomon Paradigm in International Relations", Tampere Peace Research Institute, Research Report, No. 74, 1996, page 9. Chapter four will present more clearly the critique of Chan.

economic power systems is fostered by orthodox theory which justifies power *per se* and limits criticism.

Research in this field confirms what Carroll has already prescribed in the 1970s as a 'cult of power'. Carroll defines the larger syndromes in IR as 'cult of power', because it involves: "1) uncritical acceptance of prevailing conceptions of power;

- 2) preoccupation with institutions, groups, and persons conceived to be powerful;
- 3) identification with institutions, groups or persons conceived to be powerful."⁷⁰

Despite attempts made within the disciplines, changes seem out of reach. The theorising of poverty within the centre of a rationalist framework simply does not happen. The silence on the issue becomes also a mode of conduct. The issues of globalization of environmental and ecological concerns, the impact of capitalist economies the world over and the just distribution of wealth per global capita, are truly paradigmatic and at the roots of our work in GPE. Everything else is derivative. If we do not care to wonder about the significance and validity of a moral standpoint, our scholarly products remain unconvincing and hopelessly entangled in the finitude and facts and myriads of theory. They will remain built on quicksand and not achieve to taking on responsibility in practice. These global developments affect the whole of humankind and therefore, their understanding is intrinsically philosophical. In the following statement I analyse IR and its philosophical ties. IR, its moral or normative concern, is underpinned by extended philosophical investigation. But here of course I will not survey the whole spectrum, but look at Hegel and concentrate on Kant, because it is Kant who wrote the key ideas on morality.

For the time being, I will hold back on my own revealing reading on Kant and merely demonstrate how IR scholars have treated Kant or Hegel. It will be my endeavour later in Chapter Five to expostulate a view of Kant in its original complexity and note IR's inability or reluctance to grasp the full rigours of philosophical work. First of all I shall seek to survey recent IR literature and to outline some of its philosophical underpinning.

⁷⁰ Berenice Carroll, "Peace Research: The Cult of Power", in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol.16, No.4, 1974, pp 585-616.

1.2. *International Relations discourse on Kant*

Kant and Hegel throw light on our awareness of the international relations of socio-historical life in a way observations alone and simplistic common sense cannot accomplish. The works of Kant and Hegel are classics of greatest profundity. In particular Kant teaches us to think through our ideas; and not merely to record and report on ready made theories; to seek safety in uncontroversial facts, or to escape into relativistic and dogmatic scepticism.

I give here a few passing examples of the mere sketch by Kant that IR has drawn. Kant's writings are about the ethical conduct of politics on different levels of human interactions - the domestic, the national, the international and the universal. Kant's concept of freedom and his development of thought for ultimate and permanent peace constitute international relations in the way of peaceful conduct based on good will.

The main subject of the IR discourse is the pursuit and the avoidance of war between states. This brings normative concerns to the heart of the study of IR. As Mark Hoffman puts it, normative concerns have "become readily evident as a consequence of both real world events and the theoretical debates which have animated the discipline."⁷¹ Hoffman expresses here a renewed normative interest, which apparently had been lacking, as Steve Smith explains, in a 'forty years detour' due to the dominance of realism in IR.⁷² The questions posed range between the use of description and prescription: What is? What ought to be? The latter was strongly considered before WW1 destroyed much of the hope for a Kantian peace; WW1 drowned in blood many such expectations. After two world wars atrocity and cruelty had destroyed the optimism of many people for a better world, and gateway to a Machiavellian will. The question of morality in international politics, at least in the sense of moral rights which restrained states in their relations with one another, was not to be at the theoretical forefront. Smith argues that an orthodoxy grew which "meant that normative concerns were marginalised and deemed illegitimate, as the real' (value-free) analysis marched on."⁷³

⁷¹ Mark Hoffman, "Normative international theory: approaches and issues", in *Contemporary International Relations, A Guide to Theory*, eds. A. J. R. Groom and M. Light. London: Pinter, 1994, page 39.

⁷² Steve Smith, "The Forty Years' Detour: The Resurgence of Normative Theory in International Relations", in: *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1992, vol. 21, No. 3. pp 489-506.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, page 489.

The danger of such teaching was to result in imperialism, and even the great 'realist', Morgenthau himself, "expressed concern about the system in that it is uncertain in its measurement of relative power capabilities, unreal, since the aim is superiority rather than co-operation, and inadequate, because it depends on a value consensus reflected in an understanding of, and belief in, the rules of a game that no longer exists in a more rigidly ideological second half of the twentieth century."⁷⁴ IR theory faces striking changes in order to cope with the developments in the real world of the political and economic arena of the 21st century. Normative theory tries to assert the meaning of ethical obligations and moral truth within any context of knowledge.⁷⁵ According to Smith, normative concerns, even in shadow form, "have always been at the centre of the subject. ... International theorists are now condemned to live in interesting times, and the thrust of the discipline in the last decade or so has been to re-establish normative concerns on the subject."⁷⁶

In the last quarter of the 20th century, on this side of the Atlantic anyway, a vast amount of analysis and interpretation has been invested in clarifying the vigour of the cosmopolitan or communitarian constructions of ethical values and moral behaviour. Authors who identify themselves as Hegelian try to counterpose the Kantian tradition of a cosmopolitan world. Frost, as will be suggested later in the chapter, draws on Hegel at the expense of a proper and full treatment of Kant. But firstly I want to present in detail the ideas of Linklater, who draws on the interesting combination of Kant and Marx. Linklater's argument relies narrowly and entirely on Kant's *ius cosmopolitanum*, "a universal 'constitution formed by the laws of world citizenship',"⁷⁷ leading to the entitlement for everyone to exercise his/her own freedom, which he fails to adapt to the 21st century. At the time when Kant wrote his agenda for Perpetual Peace, all he could imagine was a federation of republican states, an amazing forecast when considering the general acceptance of totalitarian states surrounding him. But for Kant this was only the first step towards a united political world. To exercise one's freedom in a Kantian sense means to embrace moral responsibilities based on the Categorical Imperative; a growing mindful

⁷⁴ William C Olson and A J R Groom, *International Relations then and now*. London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991, pp 147-148.

⁷⁵ Etymologically, the Latin 'moral' corresponds to the Greek 'ethical'. They both mean "concerning habits, etc." We call moral theories, arguments, outlooks, rules, reason, men, books, actions, intentions, desires and feelings. It was Hegel who made a distinction between morality (*Moralität*) - abstract, and based on conscience and the Kantian "goodwill"- and ethics (*Sittlichkeit*) - the concrete Morality, norms and customs of a particular community - and argued that the latter overrode the former. However, these definitions are specific to Hegel and his specific ethical thought. Within the presented context the meaning of ethics and morality is treated as equal.

⁷⁶ Steve Smith, "The Forty Years' Detour", *ibid.*, page 490, quotes Yosef Lapid, in "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era", in: *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 33: 3, 1989, pp 235-54.

awareness does not create the seclusion of one's own freedom but a shared responsibility for harmony.

Linklater aims to investigate, via critical theory, the

prospects for new forms of community in which individuals and groups can achieve higher levels of freedom. Its orientation towards existing constraints is shaped by the Marxian assumption that all that is solid eventually melts into air, and by the belief that human beings can make more of their history under conditions of their own choosing. It rejects the utopian assumption that there is an unchanging universal ethical yardstick for judging social arrangements.⁷⁸

Linklater orientates the choice of theory mainly on human needs and purposes, "which determine what counts as valuable knowledge".⁷⁹ Within the context of critical theory Linklater talks about 'discourse ethics' and practical politics, a new vocabulary which tries to achieve a universal equilibrium of rights.⁸⁰

In 1998 Linklater discussed the transformation of political community, as a result of which, under the process of globalization, new forms of political community and citizenship have become possible. New forms of political communities apparently contradict the orthodox status of the realist nation state, referred to as the Westphalian state. Linklater asks for new forms which are somewhat cosmopolitan, sensitive to cultural differences, committed to reducing material inequalities, based on dialogue and consent rather than power and force. He draws his apparently new forms of political community from the Hellenic concept of equal citizenship and according to the Greek *polis*. Linklater wants to reconstruct the critical project, despite the former realist or neo-realist objections, according to the contemporary social and political change. He aims at reconstructing the critical project by "preserving the strengths of the perspectives of Kant and Marx and cancelling their profound weaknesses."⁸¹ Linklater mostly quotes Kant and Marx together for their faith in the "progressive effects of globalization", and he uses both authors accordingly to confirm his claim that political communities should embody higher

⁷⁷ Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Economy*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998, page 205.

⁷⁸ Andrew Linklater, "The Achievement of Critical Theory", in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, (eds.) Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, page 279-280.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, page 281.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, page 291.

levels of universality, which should have moral purposes in mind and not "attach deep moral significance to differences of class, ethnicity, gender, race and alien status."⁸²

This is a very worthy idea. However, it can be seen that Linklater misinterprets Kant when he says that Kant undertook the "task of revealing that crucial moral deficits in modern capitalist societies could be eradicated by releasing existing potentials for enlarging the sphere in which human beings treat one another equal."⁸³ Kant could not have imagined modern capitalism as we know it at the start of the 21st century, and it seems difficult to discuss in a Kantian fashion what Linklater means under "existing potentials for enlarging" under a post-Westphalian umbrella. When Kant talks about a federation of states or a world state he does base his theory on the human potential of adapting knowledge to a given reality. Kant's way of thinking operates on the power of mind, whereby a given *a priori* potential of knowledge enables the individual to produce the will and the means for changes. This very internal process of the human mind and human potential is, in its uniqueness, timeless and not restricted to past, modern or future history. When talking of Marx one must have in mind that he called for the unification of the proletariat and the construction of the *Internationale* under conditions of revolution. After all Marxian Socialism was dictatorial.

While Marx was fighting for social change, Kant was inspired by peace: peace for all people, his praxeological concern being for a world federation. But Linklater observes rightly that Kant and Marx share the assumption that "there are no immutable structures which demand that human loyalties must stay confined within the limits of the parochial sovereign nation-state."⁸⁴ And it is in particular this communality between Marx and Kant which Linklater contradicts by using the realist vocabulary of sovereign statehood, even if he refers to a different, ethically developed state.

Linklater follows the idea of making citizenship the bearer of future universalism, an area envisaged out of the making of, as he calls it, a system of post-Westphalian states. He understands the post-Westphalian state as "a new kind of state which

⁸¹ Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 1998, *op.cit.*, page 5.

⁸² *Ibid.*, page 4-5.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, page 4.

internationalises the struggle against the tyranny of unjust exclusion. The post-Westphalian state transforms the dominant principles of association and disassociation which declare that citizenship only has meaning within the boundaries of the territorial state."⁸⁵

But Linklater's terms of citizenship are problematic because he seems not to redefine fully its meaning in a post-Westphalian sense and therefore clings on to the definition of citizenship as used in the Westphalian state. Linklater discusses "moral resources of citizenship"⁸⁶ and "moral capital"⁸⁷ which are again undefined and left to the imagination. He sees moral capital being based on the rights of citizens to bring about "new conceptions of community, and citizenship freed from constraints of national sovereignty."⁸⁸ But probably the greatest difficulty which I have with Linklater's ideas is that he places the transformation of political community only within the Western context and also, except by a casual rhetoric, does not reach out to those who inhabit the globe outside the Western hemisphere. Linklater aims at pluralist and solidarist forms of an international society based on the normative and philosophical resources of the discipline, relying on one hand on Kant and Marx, whom he often quotes together, and on the other hand Linklater disassociates himself from Hegel whose ideas of citizenship promote the policy of exclusion, as I discussed above in my comments on outsiders.

Apparently Linklater does not accept Hegel's claim "that it is foolish to turn conceptions of world citizenship against the nation-state since it remains the only mode of political organisation which is capable of concretising the civic ideal."⁸⁹ Linklater explains Hegel by arguing that "the boundaries of the modern state divided the harmonious realm of relations between fellow-citizens from the conflictual domain of relations between sovereign states and also marked the outer limits of effective close political co-operation."⁹⁰ Linklater does not want to discourse on citizenship in a Hegelian sense, with the complexities I have indicated; he only wants to pick up the idea of citizenship, which he calls "one of the main achievements of modernity" and use it as the provider of moral resources in order "to built still wider

⁸⁴ Linklater, *ibid.*, page 35.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, page 177.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, page 178.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, page 179-180.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, page 177.

frameworks of co-operation ... freed from the constraints of national sovereignty."⁹¹

To support the concept of the 'Westphalian State' on the one hand and to deny national sovereignty on the other, is a contradiction *per se*. His advocacy for citizenship in a Kantian or Marxian context is still flawed because he builds on the possibility of a traditional system of state monopoly, recognisable still as a construct of Westphalia, but merely widened. The dual identity between citizens, however defined, and human beings, is the real handicap for achieving the equilibrium between universal and particular obligations needed for the move towards a multicultural, transnational social democracy because Linklater's citizenship is still a national citizenship. What he wants to achieve can be compared with jumping from a slow train onto the Inter City while in transit. The jump is hard and one has merely jumped from one train to another.

The European Union acts for Linklater as the big example for the post Westphalian 'state'.⁹² As is often the case in world history, Europe is apparently the key by which to conquer or convert the world with humanitarian processes, not taking into consideration that Europe is part of what is called the West, and that the leading Western capitalist industries are still exploiting the rain forests and other natural resources from the Third World without consideration for the misery which they leave behind. Chan, accordingly, calls Linklater "provincial rather than cosmopolitan", because leading ideas from Chinese, Indian or Islamic cultures are not included.⁹³ Chan gives the example that "China and India, as two obvious examples, practised polyglot cultures of many religions and religious influences - whereas, throughout Western history in the last millennium, and with aggressive missionary work even as technology, modernity and capital stumbled forth, the West did not."⁹⁴ Concerned with the obvious exclusion of non-Westphalian cultures, Chan asks Linklater in vain to explain his "steps in the practice that unpack, enact, or systematically prosecute the programme."⁹⁵

Chris Brown gives a general account of the normative debate in his book about IR

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, page 178.

⁹² *Ibid.*, page 214.

⁹³ What does citizenship entitle one-quarter of Chinese inhabitants of the Peoples Republic of China, approximately 350 million people, who live below the poverty line, subsisting on less than \$1 a day, the international poverty standard, according to Samuel S. Kim, ed., *China and the World, Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium*. Oxford: Westview Press, 1998, p. 7.

⁹⁴ Stephen Chan, "Andrew Linklater and the New Rhetoric in I.R.", in: *Global Society*, vol 13: 3, 1999, page 372.

⁹⁵ Chan, *ibid.*, page 374.

theory, where he discusses normative approaches.⁹⁶ Here Brown almost seems to foster the importance of the cosmopolitan/communitarian divide. Kant represents the cosmopolitan, Hegel the communitarian background theory. Brown's examination of Kant argues that "Kant's principles of politics are normative (they tell us what we should do) and based on *Recht* [law and justice] ... The moral requirement of universality determines that the political order should be based on the rule of law; only thus can moral autonomy of individuals be reflected in social institutions."⁹⁷ Brown explores Kant's development of the role for cosmopolitan '*Recht*' and the idea of a world-state as a possible cosmopolitan solution to the threat of war.⁹⁸ Brown acknowledges Kant's attempts to be distinct from so-called 'sorry comforters', the classical international lawyers like Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel, as Kant's intention is not to "attempt to civilise behaviour within the existing order" and to justify military aggression but to achieve perpetual peace.⁹⁹ Brown agrees with Kant's idea of a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose based on a hidden plan of nature. Conflicts and antagonisms "exhaust people and states and ultimately will make them amenable to the dictates of reason, and lead them to republican constitutions and perpetual peace."¹⁰⁰ Brown welcomes the unification of IR theory with political and moral philosophy and explains that "communitarianism and cosmopolitanism can be best seen as background theories which provide the assumptions upon which those theories which attempt to give a direct account of how the world works are based. [The result] ... seems to depend more on the 'gut' feelings of individual authors than on the process of reasoned argument."¹⁰¹ But where does this complacency with communitarianism and cosmopolitanism lead us, definitely not out of the cul-de-sac of dichotomy. It is on these lines that Brown's book is a report on recent developments within IR theory. Brown does speak in general terms about possible alliances of thought with the communitarian, cosmopolitan, or the Aristotelian concepts, etc., without as yet giving directions towards one specific way of firmly directing the debate.

R. B. J. Walker, however, sees Brown's attempt to clarify the situation of normative

⁹⁶ Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory, New Normative Approaches*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, page 31.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, page 32.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, page 35.

¹⁰⁰ Brown, *ibid.*, page 38.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, page 75. Brown relates here to debates generated by M Walzer's "*Just and Unjust Wars*", in C.R. Beitz et al. (eds.) *International Ethics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.

theory in IR in the 1980s as an "impossible ambition."¹⁰² He critiques Brown for his narrow minded approach, because "his analysis encourages only a restricted repertoire of rather familiar, though nonetheless crucial inquiries."¹⁰³ Walker refers here to Brown's choice of the Anglo-American realm, which cannot be sufficient for a universal (or global) discussion of the moral problem, but more importantly he does not agree with Brown, that cultural traditions outside the modern West do not have much to offer. Because, according "to Brown, no alternative body of non-Western thought appears to come close to the level of sophistication exemplified by the authors considered in this book."¹⁰⁴ One has to ask the question as to whether Brown's devastating statement is based on scholarly research or on hasty conclusions.

According to Steve Smith, towards the end of the 20th century we can observe "a revival in moral philosophy, accompanying a perceived need within International Relations for a re-evaluation of the role of values following the failure of the behavioural revolution."¹⁰⁵

Smith supports the ambition of Brown to link the IR debate back to central discussions within political and social thought, which he considers to be 'background theories'. Brown gives such a scenario in his recent book, confirming the need for reviving 'normative matters' and supporting "the emergence of new agenda-setters as a feature of the new agenda of international relations."¹⁰⁶

Issues like global environment, transnational crime, mass unemployment, large-scale drug trafficking, have become modern threats which overturn the security provided by the old fashioned "state", the former guarantor of security. More so, the state has become a threat in itself to the individual possession of human rights and simple human needs. From deprivations, from famine and poverty, to political scandals of misuse of power and economic exploitation, the concerns are endless and ask for a new form of arbitration between those in power and those without it.

¹⁰² R. B. J. Walker, "Norms in a Teacup: Surveying the "New Normative Approaches", in: *The Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 38, 1994, pp 265-270.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, page 266.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, page 166.

¹⁰⁵ Steve Smith, "The Forty Years' Detour", *op.cit.*, page 500.

¹⁰⁶ Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations*. London: Macmillan, 1997, page 229.

In Brown's account of "The Future of International Relations Theory"¹⁰⁷, he expresses the need for, as he calls it, a more "emancipatory" discourse, and the need to establish "closer links with the wider world of knowledge."¹⁰⁸ But at the end Brown suggests no alternative. If anything he reduces IR into something which is better off within the broader category of Social Sciences, a kind of submerger, he even uses the word surrender. This opinion may well reflect his inability to find a united, persuasive core element in answer to the problematic questions raised within the discourse. In all his writings Brown has described and criticised the development of IR, but has never invented a very new and original initiative of transformation. The tradition of ideas in IR is philosophically shallow, for it is devoid of paradigmatic depth and coherent insight. IR cannot cope with the task of demonstrating the conceptual structure of international and global relations.

Mapel and Nardin's writings make an attempt to relate the issue of ethics to International Relations, based on a Kantian perspective. Mapel and Nardin's theoretical observations are based on a mutated form of legal positivism¹⁰⁹, which Nardin calls "rule of law positivism". It is his attempt to establish an "inner morality of law", described as the "principles which [are] inherent in the idea of legality itself, not moral principles that are external to the rule of law."¹¹⁰ Both authors criticise the present rule of law in international society for not being "concerned with the efficient generation or fair distribution of benefits or outcomes, but exclusively with constraints on the rightness of state conduct represented by diplomatic procedures, the law of treaties, the laws of war, and other parts of customary international law."¹¹¹ The search for law with inherent justice is viewed as the key to encourage international ethnic, religious, and ideological diversity towards a peaceful coexistence. Therefore an attempt is made by Nardin to give a comparative account of religious and secular perspectives when discussing the ethics of war and peace. Based on the standard lines of thought he widens the debate between political realism and natural law in respect of Judaism, Islam, Christian pacifism and contemporary feminism. Nardin picks up the oppositional idealism and realism debate, and assimilates it with political realism and natural law, because "it reflects the basic

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, page 244.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin, (eds.), *International Society, Diverse Ethical Perspectives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. For "legal positivism" law is an autonomous social practice, distinct from morality and religion. See Mapel and Nardin, *op.cit.*, Introduction, 4 pp.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, page 5.

¹¹¹ Mapel and Nardin, *ibid.*, page 5.

tension between deontological and consequentialist ethical concepts,"¹¹² expressing the ongoing tenet within the Anglo-American discipline of IR.

In contrast to Brown, Nardin's ethics belong with IR theory not as a subordinated appendix but 'as a branch of knowledge', which engages with making judgements and also with trying to understand them.¹¹³ This understanding leads Nardin to analyse traditions as expressions - or as he calls it -languages of ethical judgement. According to Nardin one "of the advantages of the idea of tradition in the studies of ethics is that it focuses attention on the interpretive dimension of ethical judgement."¹¹⁴ Judgement, Nardin explains, does entail interpretation. Human conduct is like a text: it must be interpreted to be understood, and it can be interpreted in different ways.

International ethics are multi-dimensional and therefore do not describe a coherent area of human knowledge. Nardin sees the problem of how an argument can be both normative and theoretical, because their definition is different and confused. Therefore the judgement to be used is reasonable consideration in order to reach the substance of an ethical conclusion. According to Nardin, ethics in IR poses three distinctions. First, the moralist poses the question of good or bad concerning the moral dimension of practical reality. Second, the historian asks the descriptive question, elaborating on the ethical impulse in historical tradition. And third, philosophy handles the question of definition and analysis. The ethical theorists examine how ethical questions are handled in different systems.¹¹⁵ In addition to these basic interpretations, Nardin believes in humankind's ethical tradition. What human nature is for Kant, is human tradition for Nardin. For him it is the study of these traditions that will help us to further our inquiry. He explains: "Ethical traditions are traditions of argument, not uniform and unchanging doctrines. ... While each tradition shapes ethical debate in different ways, all make room for a wide range of opinions."¹¹⁶

The subjects of ethics, law and religion are treated in many traditions without distinction. Distinction was created with the scientific development in the Western

¹¹² Terry Nardin, (ed.), *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, Introduction, page 4.

¹¹³ Terry Nardin, "Ethical Traditions in International Affairs", in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, *Traditions of International Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp 4-5.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, page 5.

¹¹⁵ Discussion and presentation, ISA, Annual Conference, Chicago, 24 February, 1995.

World and created a narrow understanding. Still, according to Nardin, the consequence cannot be avoided "that in making ethical judgements, we make use of the resources of inherited traditions of judgement - that ethical judgement is in one way or another judgement within a tradition."¹¹⁷

In his "*Ethics of War and Peace*"¹¹⁸, Nardin draws upon diverse philosophical and theological perspectives, and also debates the authority of international law and institutions, and the demands of international justice. He declares that "to understand a system of moral ideas requires neither a standpoint located wholly within that system, nor a single, indisputable standpoint that lies outside it. We can criticise one system using the ideas of another. We are members of many overlapping ethical communities, and our participation in each gives us critical distance on the ideas of others."¹¹⁹ This is something to which this thesis will return as its own original demonstration of Nardin's comment.

These various attempts show that within the IR discipline it is agreed that ethics are important, and should be part of global transformation, but a common standpoint is not found. Moreover, there are leading writers who are either wrong or, at least, under-read, in their treatments of Kant and Hegel. In so far as I have, thus far, sought to read over the lapses in IR, I have prepared the ground for an inter-tradition statement of Nardin's sort, without confining it to law as Mapel might wish. Nardin accepts ethics as an integrated branch of knowledge, multi-dimensional by nature.

With this information I wish here to be complete in my critique of existing work associated with the discipline. I seek to do this through a comment on the work of Frost who, in a way not undertaken by Brown et al., sought a detailed investigation of the work of Hegel.

1.3 Frost : an attempt to construct a constitutive global society

Here I am examining Frost's constituted international relations project with the

¹¹⁶ Terry Nardin, 1992, *op.cit.*, pp 1-2.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, page 2.

¹¹⁸ Terry Nardin, (ed.), *The Ethics of War and Peace, Religious and Secular Perspectives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, page 7.

criteria that the production of knowledge should be considered a social process where, ideally, theory creates an ethical practice. Is Frost's global society of rights holders the answer we are looking for?

Frost analyses civil society as "a social form of great ethical value."¹²⁰ Civil society exists, he claims, without most of the people being aware of its intonations. Civil society is an institution we belong to: it is "the society of rights holders."¹²¹ To "be a rights holder is to be a member of a society within which the rights which one claims for oneself are recognised by others of that society. To claim a right against others is to indicate that the others in question are fellow members of a common society, viz civil society."¹²² The membership to civil society, so Frost says, includes people of all races, genders or geographical locations. The society is open to all as long as they master the rules. The best way to understand the procedure is to compare it with the entry procedures of the Christian Church. One could probably add that, if Frost seeks such a comparison, it would be right to compare it with all the major world religions.

Like world religions, Frost sees his interpretation of a civil society as one transcending borders and not determined by border posts and gatekeepers. However, he supports a system of states as a necessity. But, contrary to Rosenberg, who attaches negative connotations to civil society when describing it as an imperial force, Frost sees the strength of civil society in changing set orders like the form of states, the inter-state system, international organisations and so on. Frost makes the point that he is not "presenting the liberal case that civil society is the pre-eminent ethical form, and that we would all be better off if we lived in a global society of rights holders"¹²³ without political organisations. Frost tries to explore the ethical significance of civil society seen in the global way as explained by Rosenberg.¹²⁴

"Civil society itself... is but one of the components of the hierarchy of institutions which is required for our ethical flourishing."¹²⁵ The system of states is still the structural background for Frost. He goes to great length in establishing his argument that states are not amoral, not admitting that states are moral, but settling for the

¹²⁰ Mervyn Frost, "Global Civil Society: Taking Rights Seriously", paper prepared to the Millennium: Journal of International Studies 25th Anniversary Conference, 17-19 October 1996.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, page 9.

¹²² Frost, *ibid.*, page 10.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 1996, page 3.

¹²⁴ Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society*. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995.

¹²⁵ Frost, *op.cit.*, page 3.

"whatever is useful" option, "the right conduct for a state"¹²⁶.

"What is being argued is that individuals and states must have *some* moral position, for having such a position is partially constitutive of what being a person or being a state is."¹²⁷ In order to develop his argument Frost needs to manifest a background theory, which justifies "the norms which assert that state sovereignty and the preservation of the system of states is a good, and those norms are premised upon the notion that individual human rights are a basic good."¹²⁸ Civil society is built within the hierarchy of the state, as well as within the challenges of acceptance by the establishment of 'rights holders'. How the various states guarantee the rights of the rights holders and govern access by those still outside the sphere of recognition is not explained. Frost does not address the outsider as such, only that an outsider has to show certain intrinsic criteria in order to be educated to become a rights holder. Frost makes this confusing statement: "Constitutive theory aims to bring to light the *internal* connections between being an individual rights holder of a particular kind and being a member of a certain kind of social or political institution, where both the rights and the institution are conceived of as being components of a wider practice."¹²⁹

For Frost it is a 'Hegelian' truth that "when we reason about normative issues we do so from within a standpoint defined by specific institutions such as the state and the inter-state system."¹³⁰ It seems that the state and the inter-state system are institutions of prior ranking compared to family and civil society. The family or/and the members of the civil society are in a vertical and horizontal dependency of prevailing norms which they need to recognise in order to be accepted and therefore not be an outsider.

This reading of Frost produces two outsiders. The first one is the outsider proper, the one who cannot be recognised as a rights holder for various reasons but mainly because s/he does not accept certain rights given *per se*, and the second form of outsiders are those belonging to another state system or in the extreme to the surrounding world as a whole. In times of conflicts outsider members of the civil

¹²⁶ Mervyn Frost, *Ethics in International Relations, A Constitutive Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, page 47.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, page 139.

¹²⁹ Frost, *ibid.*, page 140.

society are bound to the higher decisions of the state and the inter-state system and are therefore restricted in their initiatives. Constitutive theory limits the scope of action for outsiders, who are very much lost, because: "the external community ... cannot force people into establishing the systems of reciprocal recognitions required in a system of family life and civil society. ... They must confine themselves to the creation of the circumstances within which people may come through education, facilitation or by providing suitable inducements and disincentives."¹³¹ Frost does not explain how the reciprocal recognition is exercised without contradicting the overriding order of the state. The state is the "self-determining entity ...; within it citizens recognise one another as beings who through their reciprocal recognition jointly constitute a self-determining sovereign entity, viz. the state."¹³²

The sovereign entity - the state - is, so says Frost, a creation, a directive but also a territorial restriction. As well as people not being able to be forced to become rights holders in civil society, according to Frost, they will all want to participate if taught the right way, but which way? It seems that in the case of Frost it is not so much a matter of goodwill than recognising or coming to recognise the political benefits that are implicit in civil society and to do so in a rational manner.

Can Hegel help?

Frost's constitutive theory of individuality derives strongly from Hegel. Frost was originally drawn to Hegel in seeking to formulate a constitutive and communitarian vision for what was then apartheid in South Africa. He then applied it to IR as a normative theory –through still based on Hegel. In this section, however, I give my own reading of Hegel (done originally in German) to contrast it with Frost's work.

Hegel defines the individual in relationship to the state. The state is for Hegel "the actuality of the ethical idea. ... Since the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life. Unification pure and simple is the true content and aim of the

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, page 141.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, page 209. For a further more detailed critique, see Paul Bacon, "Settled Norms? A Critical Evaluation of the International Theory of Mervyn Frost", in: *Global Society*, vol. 10:3, 1996, pp 279.

¹³² *Ibid.*, page 210.

individual."¹³³ Hegel sets out a constitutional law, whereby "individuals have duties to the state in proportion as they have rights against it."¹³⁴ As much as Frost wants to see them as rights holders, Hegel's members of the state are defined by their acceptance of duties defined by the latter. The members of the state make up its 'organism', as Hegel explains in the following quote of § 267 of the "Philosophy of Right":

This necessity in ideality is the inner self development of the Idea. As the substance of the individual subject, it is his political sentiment [patriotism]; in distinction therefrom, as the substance of the objective world, it is the organism of the state, i.e. it is the strictly political state and its constitution.¹³⁵

Hegel elaborates on the deep relationship between individuals and the state as morality. Frost does not understand the significance of Hegel's affirmation. In particular, the 'national spirit of history' is, for Hegel, the "tenor of their moral life, of their government, their art, religion, and sciences."¹³⁶ The "world spirit" enables the division into organic members, and the full development of each is its own idea. "Universal history is exclusively occupied with showing how spirit comes to a recognition and adoption of truth: the dawn of knowledge appears; it begins to discover salient principles, and at last it arrives at full consciousness."¹³⁷ Hegel's *Weltgeist*, 'world-spirit', aims for its completeness, its essential nature, i.e. freedom; it is "the leading principle of the development."¹³⁸ It is further the absolute arbiter of things, "entirely unmoved by contingencies, which, indeed, it applies and manages for its own purpose."¹³⁹ But Hegel's terms 'world-spirit' and 'universal history' can only be understood in relation to Hegel's definition of the state, which is an almost single ethnic state, as his following example shows.

Nations are what their deeds are. Every Englishman will say: We are the men who navigate the ocean, and have the commerce of the world; to whom the East Indies belong and their riches; who have a parliament, juries, etc. The relation of the individual to that spirit is that he appropriates to himself this substantial existence; that it becomes his character and capability, enabling

¹³³ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, Sub-section III, The State, §257 and §258, translated by T. M. Knox. Wilhelm Benton Publishers, Great Books of the Western World, The University of Chicago, 1952, 29th print, 1987, page 80.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, § 261, page 83.

¹³⁵ Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, *ibid.*, page 84.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, page 178.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, page 179.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, page 17, regarding 'God and Divine truth', page 180.

him to have a definite place in the world - to be *something*. For he finds the being of the people to which he belongs an already established, firm world, objectively present to him, with which he has to incorporate himself.¹⁴⁰

Hegel's nation is a defined world, where "the spirit of the people enjoys its existence and finds its satisfaction."¹⁴¹

When Hegel relates to the universal he is referring to so-called world empires. In his *Classification of Historic Data* he refers to the Oriental World, the Greek World, the Roman World, the German World¹⁴², all seen as an enlargement of a particular nation at a particular time of history to make a significant impact on world history. Statesmen such as Alexander, Caesar or Napoleon are, according to Hegel, called upon in time by the World-Spirit (Weltgeist) to do their deed as 'Heroes of an Epoch', like 'soul-leaders'. With their master-passion they attain the object of renewing history but are not granted happiness or a long life.¹⁴³ When an empire is extinguished, national heroes die away and all individuals are degraded to the level of private persons equal with one another, possessed of formal rights, and the only bond left to hold them together is abstract insatiable self-will. This situation asks for a strong bonding again, which correlates with Hegel's notion of reality as a developing dynamic process, but Hegel's reality is always in accordance with the state. Hegel believed that the world could be understood by grasping its content by certain fundamental concepts and categories, because his fundamental belief was to understand history as "the group-concept" of the "nation", and the nation as the "idiosyncrasy of spirit", "which governs and connects the different aspects of its life - religious, political, moral, legal, scientific and artistic."¹⁴⁴ When discussing Frost it is important to point out that Hegel talks about world-spirit, nation-spirit, and the divine as the major pillars of his theory. Can Frost, therefore, successfully secularise Hegel?

Frost relates to Hegel's approach to the historical process. He depends in particular on Hegel's view of the state. This serves him as the background theory in order to solve "hard cases" in International Relations. It is important to notice that Frost

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Introduction, page 187

¹⁴¹ Hegel, *ibid.*, page 187.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 151pp.

¹⁴³ Patrick Gardiner, *Theories of History*. London: Oxford University, The Free Press, 1959; Hegel, *The Interpretation of the Historical Process*, page 63.

secularizes Hegel's theory and denies the component of outside guidance and spirit. Frost's Hegel is entirely communitarian, and is not concerned with a theory of history or a spirit of history. Thus Frost argues in terms of social rights, rather than historical rights.

As with Hegel, Frost claims that a Robinson Crusoe has no rights, a person can only be a rights holder when s/he claims a "certain kind of recognition from another person or set of people."¹⁴⁵ Frost argues that "it is only with the state that people may meaningfully be said to have citizenship rights. To be a person with the rights of a citizen is to be a person who lives within a state-like institution of some or another kind."¹⁴⁶ This makes the state a necessity, because the "state is an institution created and maintained by the people living in a particular territory, i.e. the state depends on there being citizens, and citizens exist only within the state."¹⁴⁷ Frost accepts people living outside the institutions of rights holders due to their incompetence in sharing rights with others and therefore being outsiders. How these outsiders fit within his concept now or in the future, he does not explain.

Therefore Frost refuses a Kantian view of individualism and he also refuses to give a reason why people as rights holders should behave as they are supposed to behave. For Hegel himself the matter is much more complex. Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" identifies and defines the family (PR §158-181), the civil society (PR §182-188), the state (PR 257-275), the police (PR 230 -250) within their functions, needs and duties. But Hegel also clarifies the situations of others, for example the criminals, the poor, the uneducated and those with a lack of means, as peasants in comparison with the pillars of society, the 'bourgeois' (*Bürger*). Hegel's ethical theory identifies the human good with the self-actualisation (*Selbstverwirklichung*) of the human spirit (*Zeitgeist*).

The individual life needs to be first of all in harmony with itself, accepting the self within; but this individual standpoint would be limited if not seen in the context of a larger vision, "which measures the subjective goals of individuals by a larger objective and collective good, and assigns to moral values a determinate, limited

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, page 60.

¹⁴⁵ Frost, *Ethics in International Relation, op.cit.*, page 138.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, page 139.

place in the total scheme of things."¹⁴⁸ Hegel's freedom (*Freiheit*) is a "kind of action, namely one in which I am determined entirely through myself, and not at all by anything external (PR § 23)."¹⁴⁹ Still the outcome is not particularity, but an objective and universal freedom based on the understanding, that 'being with oneself' is "actively relating to something other than oneself in such a way that this other becomes integrated into one's projects, completing and fulfilling them so that it counts as belonging to one's own action rather than standing over or against it."¹⁵⁰ Universality, as understood by Hegel, is not an abstract but a concrete substance of self-consciousness, its immanent and generic essence. This immanent idea, the concept of the free will, is the universal which overlaps its object, penetrates its particular determination through and through, and therein remains identical with itself. The absolutely universal is definable as what is called "the rational", but it can be comprehended only in this speculative way.

For Hegel there is no contradiction between 'rational' and 'speculative'. A misunderstanding rests in both cases on a misconception of the nature of the finite subject matter, which should be understood as a perennial approximation to completeness. In § 153 of *Ethical Life*, Hegel declares:

The right of individuals to be subjectively destined to freedom is fulfilled when they belong to an actual ethical order, because their conviction of their freedom finds its truth in such an objective order, and it is in an ethical order that they are actually in possession of their own essence or their own inner universality.¹⁵¹

Individuals accept a certain ethical disposition, called *Sittlichkeit*: 'sittlichkeit' is synonymous with a rational system of social institutions, translated into English as 'ethical life'. If our social life "is in harmony with our individuality, the duties of ethical life do not limit our freedom but actualise it."¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. by Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, page XI.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, page XI.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, page XII.

¹⁵¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right, Ethical Life*. Wilhelm Benton, Chicago University Press, translated by T. M. Knox, page 57. The following examples may clarify Hegel's notion of speculation: §224 Ethical Life, Wilhelm Benton, Hegel, *ibid.*, page 73: "Amongst the rights of the subjective consciousness are not only the publication of the laws but also the possibility of ascertaining the actualisation of the law in a particular case (the course of the proceedings, the legal argument, &c.) - i.e. the publicity of judicial proceedings. The reason for this is that a trial is implicitly an event of universal validity, and although the particular content of the action affects the interests of the parties alone, its universal content, i.e. the right at issue and the judgement thereon, affects the interests of everybody."

¹⁵² Hegel, *ibid.*, page XII - XIII.

Hegel demonstrates as the highest good the melting of the individual and the 'sittlichkeit'. A person cannot be free - in a Hegelian sense - unless s/he successfully pursues ends larger than his or her own private good. "Through co-operation, individuals in civil society acquire ethical ends which go beyond self-interest. These ends ... pass over in turn into the absolutely universal end: the state (PR § 256)."¹⁵³ For Hegel individual right, the right of the civil society and the rights proclaimed by the state are one. The state is the ultimate whole, the absolutely universal end, "because it has alone a self-sufficient individuality"¹⁵⁴, and is the only real entity. Humanity at large or a cosmopolitan world society are not real but only abstractions.

Despite our earlier description of Frost, which appeared to have him as Hegel's disciple, in contrast to Hegel, however, dualism is part of Frost's argumentation. Nor is the difference superficial as we shall see. Frost argues for the validity and competitiveness of two justifiable norms which assert that state sovereignty is a good, and individual human rights are a good. Individual rights as a good can only be acquired within citizenship. Only as citizens do people become "constitutive parts of the whole and they are conscious that the whole of which they are part is constituted by them together with their fellow citizens."¹⁵⁵ Hegel argued that changes to constitutions are executed, whereby people have to be educated into accepting them. The rights-holders' licence, which is essential for Frost's argument, is only given within the state; there are no rights-holders outside the state. Frost accepts that the state is Hegel's absolute power on earth (PR § 344) and therefore the fundamental vehicle of world history.¹⁵⁶ Frost does not admit to any devaluation of statehood within emerging globalization. Unlike Fukuyama or Hutton¹⁵⁷, to name only two, Frost denies any historic development within or without or beyond the pursuit of the world powers. He does not accept Hegel's theory of development and progress and the theory of the construction of a coherent and directional universal

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, page XXV.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ Frost, 1996, *ibid.*, page 148.

¹⁵⁶ In Frost's reply to Bacon, he does try to deny this statement, but Frost's explanation of "the architecture of this [ethical] structure", referring to the state, the individual, global civil society and the family does not answer the point. See "A Reply to Paul Bacon", in: *Global Society*, vol. 10:3, 1996, pp 307.

¹⁵⁷ See Will Hutton, *The State We're in*. London: Vintage, 1996. Will Hutton demands a new social theory which promotes a socially cohesive, inclusive society. He argues for a universal welfare state with minimal or no means-testing, resting "on a public ethic in which inclusion is recognised as the prime value." *Ibid.*, p. 340. In his example of British politics, he suggests the reinvention of town and city government, giving back their competence to their electorate. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*. London: Penguin Books, 1992; and same author, *Trust*. London: Penguin Books, 1995. Fukuyama believes that questions concerning ideology and institutions have been settled and the next historic development engages in the preservation and accumulation of social capital. Free markets, competition, and hard work are not any more the precursors for prosperity, another key ingredient that of trust must be added.

history of mankind.¹⁵⁸ For Hegel, the unfolding of Universal History could be understood as the growth of the equality of human freedom; in Hegel's world history the Eastern nations knew that *one* was free, the Greek and Roman world only that *some* were free, while in his time he believed that *all men* are free. Hegel's universal history is man's progressive rise to full rationality within what he termed the spirit of that history.

But what Frost does is to borrow Hegel's concept of historic relevance and argue for a universal development of civil society, applying his background theory to a system of sovereign states. He does not express it as *Zeitgeist*, but he does express the idea of historic development when talking about historically changing institutions.¹⁵⁹ Frost does not rule out the justifiability of a world state altogether, "a "world state" would be justified if it came about through the voluntary action of all autonomous parties to the agreement; it would have to be an arrangement arrived at through the voluntary action of all sovereign states ... an arrangement arrived at through a confederal or federal procedure."¹⁶⁰ Frost does not close the gap between the definition of free citizens and the meaning of citizens who are constituted as free. Short of that, Frost argues that within "the autonomous state all individuals are constituted as free citizens, but for their citizenship to be fully actualised their state needs to be recognised by other states as autonomous."¹⁶¹ Frost declares, therefore, that present history undermines the absolute power of the single state, for a state depends on the recognition of other states. Despite talking about a possible world state, in the Frost argument the link with Hegel is missing, due to the Hegelian fixation on individual state supremacy as a basic concept. Hegel's 'universal' is part of the state; it is within the ideal state that universal and subjective will unify. The state is what Gardiner calls "the object of history in a ... definite shape" and its vital principle, "as actuating the individuals who compose it - morality."¹⁶²

The first principle Frost demands is that of an essential and non-Hegelian secularity, and the second principle is the constitutional dependency on the state "within which

¹⁵⁸ Hegel understands history as phases developing in stages. Whenever one form of politics destroys itself, world spirit sets energies free for a renewal and betterment. The '*Zeitgeist*' changes the attitude from the individual to the masses in accordance with progress.

¹⁵⁹ Frost, 1996, *op.cit.*, page 143.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, page 157.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, page 151.

¹⁶² Patrick Gardiner (ed.), *Theories of History*. New York: Oxford University, The Free Press, page 68.

we are presently constituted".¹⁶³ Who or what constitutes the rights holders, is the open question Frost cannot answer, particularly when disregarding any 'higher self' or a schemata of a supreme intelligence, and particularly so if he refuses to accept that his argument proclaims the superiority of the state. In following Frost's argument there is nothing in the Hegelian sense which defines "our ethical standing" and nothing which defines "ethical institutions".¹⁶⁴

Kant's great achievement, by contrast, is the overcoming of Cartesian dualism, which strictly divided subjective reason (*res cogitans*) and the objective world of time- and space-related representations (*res extensae*); "the subjective, but pure reason is a necessary building bloc for objectivity. Subjectivity and objectivity have the same origin, the transcendental self-confidence which executes itself within the pure forms of connection, the categories."¹⁶⁵ For Kant, transcendental self-confidence¹⁶⁶ is a necessary and universal element, without which no human action is possible. Kant thus posited the crucial link between theory and practice. Kant's transcendental critique of reason¹⁶⁷, stresses the authority of the subject and gives it a more extensive explanation.

Kant confirms Descartes '*cogito, ergo sum*', accepting the individual as the thinking being (*res cogitans*), as the necessary condition, but he gives the transcendental '*cogito*' a different meaning (for Kant there is never only the "I", but the "I think"). '*Cogito*' is neither an object of the inner experience, nor substance and also not the opposite, an accident; it has no existence, but also no non-existence. Experience - accident and existence - and non-existence are categories of the '*cogito*'. But '*cogito*', as the origin of all categories cannot be categorically defined. Therefore the "I think" identity is supreme. There is no objective cognition of the self, therefore - to Kant - there is neither the possibility of the cognition of the soul nor a proof of immortality.

Kant frees or extends the most inner human attribute above all claims of rationality. Individuals are therefore already constituted as free, whether they are citizens or not.

¹⁶³ Frost, "A Reply to Bacon", in *Global Society*, vol. 10:3, 1996, page 309.

¹⁶⁴ Frost, *ibid.*, page 308.

¹⁶⁵ Otfried Höffe, *Immanuel Kant*. München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1996, page 101. Translation by the author: "Das subjektive, aber reine Denken ist ein notwendiger Baustein objektiver Gegenständlichkeit. Subjektivität und Objektivität haben denselben Ursprung: das transzendente Selbstbewußtsein, das sich in den reinen Formen des Verbindens, den Kategorien, vollzieht."

¹⁶⁶ See my discourse on Kant in this dissertation in chapter five.

¹⁶⁷ See, Kant's critique of rational psychology, in Höffe, *ibid.*, Chapter 8.2., pp139.

Only against this background are they able willingly to enter a constitutional order according to their free will. The family, citizenship, the state or any other definition of grouping are imposed restrictions, which set outer limits, but are independent of inner freedom and which can only exist as a form of social necessity. This cognition was revolutionary and Kant explains:

The "I" of the transcendental self-confidence is not the personal I of a particular individual. While the individual self is part of the empirical I, which lives on earth to a certain time, the transcendental "I think" is located methodically before all experience and manifests the origin of the unity coherent within every judgement. The transcendental self-confidence is the subject of consciousness *per se*, therefore it is one and the same in all consciousness and self-confidence.¹⁶⁸

Frost's rights-holder society is an illusion until he can explain how the individual can set itself free of the boundaries of the state and its state made reason (*raison d'etat*) and accepts freedom as something that can exist beyond boundaries and physical - meaning manmade - restrictions. Frost avoids encountering Kant, who has found a method whereby transcendental self-confidence is the origin of all synthesis, without which no unity of thought and therefore no cognition is possible. If a rights-holder society as defined by Frost could be possible, then it would be only due to two Kantian *a priori* principles, necessity and universality.

I have argued here that Frost's view of a normative universe is limited. Insofar as he derived it from Hegel, I have counterposed this against Kant and found that Frost's work would only succeed with a Kantian foundation.

IR's take up of Dworkin in the work of Frost

We look now at Frost's work within IR and his absorbing of the work of Dworkin. In his work "*Ethics in International Relations, A constitutive Theory*", Frost explores the possibility of introducing ethics into IR. He proclaims a social democratic view

¹⁶⁸ Höffe, *ibid.*, page 100. Translation by the author: "Das "Ich" der transzendentalen Apperzeption ist nicht das personale Ich eines bestimmten Individuums. Während das individuelle Selbst zum empirischen Ich gehört, das zu einer bestimmten Zeit in der Welt lebt und lebt, hat das transzendente "Ich denke" seinen methodischen Ort vor aller Erfahrung und bildet den Ursprung der in jedem Urteil gesetzten Einheit. Die transzendente Apperzeption ist das Subjekt von Bewußtsein überhaupt, daher in allem Bewußtsein und Selbstbewußtsein ein und dasselbe."

of a constitutive theory of individuality.

"Contrary to all rights-based theories," he argues, "that rights are not things which a person can be conceived of as having outside of or prior to any social and political institutions."¹⁶⁹ Frost wants to prove that there is no need for other wider moral perspectives in order to evaluate the modern state and interstate domain. For Frost the answers to the pressing normative issues in international relations must necessarily be "found within the modern state domain of discourse."¹⁷⁰ He refutes claims that the moral evaluation of the state system is only possible if we accept that there is a moral community of humankind. In order to argue his case Frost borrows the argumentation of Dworkin, who applied a special method for settling contested issues in the context of law. Dworkin uses for his argumentation Hart's concept of obligation and duty, and a specific application of that theory to the duty of judges to enforce law¹⁷¹. The expression "constitutive" originates in Hart's discussion of the duty of judges and the legislature when facing the issue of moral philosophy. Dworkin's answer to the problem would be summarized thus: "Duties exist when social rules exist providing for such duties. Such social rules exist when the practice-conditions for such rules are met. These practice-conditions are met when the members of a community behave in a certain way; this behavior constitutes a social rule, and imposes a duty."¹⁷²

Just as Dworkin developed a position against the orthodoxy of positivist jurisprudence, Frost wants to use the same argument against the background of orthodox teaching in IR, mainly the deficiency of normative theory. He criticises that normative questions are apparently central in the discipline of international relations but that very little work is done in order to answer normative questions.¹⁷³

Frost challenges both positivism and extant social sciences, and he wants to refute sceptical and realist arguments against normative theory in international relations. Having argued his way through the need for his own views on the theory of IR, he depends on the work of Dworkin to justify his claim. A constitutive theory is for Frost an alternative to the contractarian approach, a way of thinking which dominated

¹⁶⁹ Mervin Frost, *Ethics in International Relations, A Constitutive Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1996, page 138.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, page 89.

¹⁷¹ H.L.A. Hart, *The Concept of Law*. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.

¹⁷² Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*. London: Duckworth, 1976, page 49.

the development of thought for centuries. Frost tries to distinguish his theory from contractarian rights-based theories because they "do not manage to justify and reconcile the norms relating to state sovereignty with those relating to human rights."¹⁷⁴ With signing the contract, as it were, free people give their power to the sovereign state. The limitation of power is self-imposed. This critique takes Frost to the point where he defines, as he sees it, a substantive normative theory, which he calls constitutive theory, as the process where individuals constitute "one another as moral beings through a process of reciprocal recognition within a hierarchy of institutions which include the family, civil society, the state, and the society of states."¹⁷⁵

Frost states that "the heart of constitutive theory is the notion of a complex reciprocity of recognition."¹⁷⁶ Frost considers outside help as crucial to create a framework within which people can constitute themselves as citizens in a state.¹⁷⁷ Frost's claim is limited to the freewill of the people being constituted. Constitutive theory asserts "that people can only establish themselves as free when they are self-determining, i.e. when they reciprocally constitute one another as citizens within a state."¹⁷⁸ Negotiations will help to facilitate the establishment of new states and institutions, the actual relationships between the groups of people themselves, and the relationships between these groups and their outsiders.

In order to manage these correlations, Frost again uses the theory of Dworkin. In the context of legal reasoning when dealing with so-called hard cases, Dworkin analyses first the circumstances relating to a particular kind of argument. Having done this research, he establishes a "background theory". The construction of the background theory is crucial when establishing equal norms for all individuals concerned within the sphere of conflict. Frost borrows this idea from Dworkin. For Frost, background theory:

involves an attempt to reconcile state sovereignty with individual rights but it involves a different mode of theorising to that pursued in the contract tradition. Constitutive theory, unlike contract theory, does not seek to show that the sovereign state is a device which protects certain pre-existing rights.

¹⁷³ Frost, *op.cit.*, page 12.

¹⁷⁴ Frost, *ibid.*, page 136.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, coverpage.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, page 206, See also Chapter seven "Who gets what state where?"

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, page 209.

... It holds that rights are not things possessed by individuals prior to entering into social and political relationships. Rather it contends that a person is constituted as a rights holder of a certain sort within the context of a specific social relationship.¹⁷⁹

What does this mean, however? Is it a form of communitarianism and, if so, does Frost have a philosophical as well as Dworkins' jurisprudential template for this? It is apparent that Frost has no freedom in having his/her moral imperative, instead s/he is not only bound within the state but also bound within his/her 'special social relationship'.

1.4 Conclusion

As outlined right at the beginning of this chapter, this dissertation relies on the theory of GPE and the research in this chapter showed that, by definition, GPE has the greatest capability to construct theoretical models which are close to the practical reality of globalization. The renaming of the discipline to GPE constitutes progress. It studies not only economic globalization, but social and other consequences of globalization. Therefore the discourse becomes valid and relevant.

The building of academic theory should not be too restrictive when dealing with real life issues. Otherwise it becomes a sterilisation of reality and not a support for the changes which take place in practice. In a recent critical discussion of globalization by Scholte, he observes that "globalization is not inherently good or bad; its outcomes are largely the results of human decisions that can be debated and changed."¹⁸⁰

What he indicates here, as I interpret it, is the need to fight the bad and to support the good. Theory already establishes power when selecting knowledge, ideas and claims of truth, and is fundamental to the future of the global political, economic and social society.

These various attempts show that within the IR discipline it is agreed that ethics are

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, page 138.

important and should be part of global transformation, but a common standpoint has not been found. Moreover, there are leading writers who are insufficiently informed in their treatment of Kant and Hegel. In so far as I have, up to now, sought to read over the lapses in IR, I have prepared the ground for an inter-tradition statement of Nardin's sort, without confining it to law as Mapel might wish. Nardin accepts ethics as an integrated branch of knowledge, multi-dimensional by nature. In order to familiarise the reader with the problematic; I discussed in detail the work of Frost as a case study. It demonstrates IR's flexibility in borrowing from related fields such as political philosophy, as mentioned before, but also on economy and law, a fact, which I will bear in mind when evaluating my findings. With this information I wish here to be complete in my critique of existing work associated with the discipline. IR has, at least, sought to have a view of ethics.

Chapter 2

Normative critical debate on ethics

Main points of this chapter

IPE scholars and ethics

The lack of ethics in Susan Strange

Tooze & Murphy's problem with orthodox theory

Murphy & Augelli's thoughts on hegemony and social myth

Conclusion

Main points of this chapter

- *There is a talk of ethical responsibility in IPE - however hidden*
- *From IPE we can learn to fight orthodoxy and critique the powers in place*
- *Strange concentrates on structural power analysis: her work highlights the need for ethics, despite the fact that she never names it*
- *It seems 'common sense' that, when a theory has outlived its purpose, it becomes orthodox according to Tooze and Murphy*
- *Murphy and Augelli criticise hegemonic politics and build on the phenomenon of the Gramscian myth*

2.1 IPE scholars and ethics

Here I examine the critical body of IPE, the discourse created in a first response to globalization. Unlike IR, its moral or normative concern is not underpinned by extended philosophical investigation. It could be said that, as a social science, it is also about the scrutiny of factual knowledge and theory acquisition, and the informative analysis of historical, contemporary, and current affairs, and the understanding of that knowledge and the justification of the presuppositions which are claimed to validate those analyses. But IPE misses out on the acknowledgement that knowledge is ultimately grounded in principles of philosophical comprehension. If the moral component is reduced or even denied we inexcusably deprive ourselves of a most fundamental imperative, namely, the necessity to get to the bottom of things.

Both Kantian and Hegelian ethical traditions highlight issues, problems and ways of thinking which are conspicuous by their absence in most IPE. In particular they are absent from those version of IPE which have grown out of a dialogue with realism. Gilpin, as an example, expresses in his writings the dominance of state and market, due to "their efficiency in the production of power and/or wealth."¹⁸¹ Gilpin's theory is based on the powerful innovative hegemony of the core of international economy, which "has a powerful incentive to encourage and maintain the rules."¹⁸²

Rule makers are located within the industrial superiority of the core nations which have competitive advantages over the periphery.¹⁸³ At the same time ethical concerns and problems are present in those versions of IPE which have developed as much more directly critical positions; critical, that is, of both conventional IPE and of conventional IR, as in the writings of Susan Strange, Robert Cox, Augelli, Murphy and Tooze. There is, therefore, a tension within IPE, which has different positions and quite different epistemologies concealed within the general label of 'IPE'.

However, even the critical variants of IPE do not reflect IR's concern for the Kantian/Hegelian schools of thought, as it was earlier exemplified with the recent

¹⁸¹ Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, page 10. See further page 11pp, *The Issues of Political Economy*.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, page 109.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, page 96. Meanwhile, problems between so-called core and periphery states have escalated and massive demonstrations took place during the WTO summit in Seattle in December 1999.

work of Linklater and Frost, as an example. Equally, of course, political economy is absent in the ethical work of Hegel and Kant and of their various intellectual descendants in IR.

Since the 1970s, IPE has taken on a format which has enabled this discipline to research questions beyond the anarchy of states, military conflict resolution, peace and war dialectics. The development of IPE¹⁸⁴ has become an accepted academic field.¹⁸⁵ Strange still describes how economists in America have taken over IPE, "at least by their way of looking at issues, and by their most favoured concepts and methodologies."¹⁸⁶ According to Strange, young "American scholars have come to believe that the one sure path to promotion, respectability and fame is to ape the economists by resorting to game theory as an explanation of behaviour, by subordinating - as they habitually do - realism to rigour, and consequently being prepared to make rather extravagant and even bizarre assumptions about motivations and objectives."¹⁸⁷

Therefore the American non-social democratic tradition is controlling IPE, showing indifference to the ethical concerns of the outside world. The "Who gets what" question becomes just an exercise in national public policy analysis.¹⁸⁸ But will introduce below some outstanding scholars who have tried to do more than following this popular idea. In the first part I pay homage to Susan Strange, who changed the low image of IPE from the former American style to a serious instrument of power analysis. Strange is a great analyst and pragmatist.

2.2 *The apparent lack of ethics in Susan Strange*

Initiatives have been taken by Strange and other political economists¹⁸⁹ to take research out of this realist cul-de sac. The aim is to further development of the study

¹⁸⁴ See Strange, 1970, 1972; Kindleberger, 1970; Baldwin, 1971; Keohane and Nye, 1972; Morse, 1976.

¹⁸⁵ See in particular, Susan Strange, "*Political Economy and International Relations*", in *International Relations Theory Today*, Ken Booth and Steve Smith, (eds.), Polity Press, Cambridge, Chapter seven, pp 154.

¹⁸⁶ Susan Strange, "*Political Economy and International Relations*", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, (eds), *International Relations Theory Today*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, page 164.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, page 164. Strange explains why game theory as a research method has serious weaknesses. "It is founded in the concept of bounded rationality which presumes that decisions are taken in a static world. The concept originated in the work of Herbert Simon, in the 1950s, who presumed that decision-makers could, and would, choose politics that would achieve, or satisfy, not one but a number of objectives, meeting certain (given) standards of acceptability in each one." See Strange, *ibid.*, pp 167-168.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, page 165.

¹⁸⁹ See Gill and Law, 1988; Cox, 1987, in particular chapter eight.

of IPE. To begin with she asks for a redefinition of politics.¹⁹⁰ According to Strange, the "purpose should be to arrive at a clear analysis of the outcomes in the global household and how they were brought about. ... [W]ho gets what - and those concerning the mix of values in the system as a whole."¹⁹¹ But nevertheless, Susan Strange argues that not enough has happened to allow a merger of international politics and economics. IPE still engages in the concern with the decline in the power of the US, questions of power being bipolar, multipolar or hegemonic. "Economic processes are conceived as taking place within the existing economic structure. It does not admit to the reverse process - of political processes taking place within the existing economic structure. It does not perceive the economic and social structures co-existing side by side with the political structure, the international system of territorial states."¹⁹² This at least is an urge towards more complex thinking. However, as I reveal below, even Strange concludes with an open question of how, ethically, to proceed next.

Strange recognised that the power of knowledge, as part of the nucleus¹⁹³ of global power, leads to the possibility of a meaningful manipulation of change. She points out that production, the main subject of capitalism, is not any longer the most powerful element but the production of financial power combined with knowledge. This power is forceful because the shifting of financial resources around the globe affects people's lives. Either they lose a job, or they find a job, only to give a simple example. The access to the knowledge industry and to the high-tech facilities, determine who is included and who is excluded. People are treated like commodities, in the same way as money, to give an example. These policies take place against the deeper understanding that knowledge is not an autonomous entity, it is accumulative and communicable. Knowledge is a public good¹⁹⁴ and deals with the past, the present and the future.

Strange writes of the Knowledge Structure as follows:

A Knowledge Structure determines what knowledge is discovered, how it is stored, and who communicates it by what means to whom and on what terms. Just as power and authority are conferred on those occupying key decision-

¹⁹⁰ Strange, *op.cit.*, page 169.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, page 171.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, page 165.

¹⁹³ The expression 'nucleus' is chosen in its meaning in physics as the positively charged centre of an atom, made of protons and neutrons, about which electrons orbit. Also of its meaning in biology, where it means the part of a cell that contains the chromosomes and associated molecules that control the characteristics and growth of the cell. Both definitions reflect the meaning of knowledge as the nucleus of power.

¹⁹⁴ Susan Strange, *States and Markets*. London: Pinter Publishers, 1988, page 118.

making positions in the production structure, so power and authority are conferred on those occupying key decision-making positions in the knowledge structure - on those who are acknowledged by society to be possessed of the 'right', desirable knowledge and engaged in the acquisition of more of it, and on those entrusted with its storage, and on those controlling in any way the channels by which knowledge, or information, is communicated.¹⁹⁵

Strange incorporates the importance of knowledge into political economy and her work leads to a deeper understanding of the politics of knowledge. Strange creates the image of a four-faceted triangular pyramid or tetrahedron in order to explain four power structures. "These four, interacting structures are ...: control over security; control over production; control over credit; control over knowledge, beliefs and ideas."¹⁹⁶ These structures of power interact, sometimes reinforce, and sometimes contradict one another. She identifies the accelerating pace of technological change (knowledge structure based), the rise in international production (production structure), and the greater mobility of capital (financial structure) as interacting with the new competition of states for world market shares (security structure). All structures have to be seen in the light of creating power. That explains why knowledge is a vital element in the structure on an equal ranking with finance, security and production.

The linking factor is the creation of power within states, and power within markets. Cox interprets Strange's forms of power twofold. The military-political and financial constitute the immediate or short-term forms of power and are, according to Cox, most determining of the outcome of events.¹⁹⁷

Knowledge creates power in its application of information, teaching and inventing, using the most sophisticated tools, such as information technology. Strange argues: "a knowledge structure determines what knowledge is discovered, how it is stored, and who communicates it by what means to whom and on what terms"¹⁹⁸, it becomes

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, page 117.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp 26-27.

¹⁹⁷ Robert Cox, "Take six eggs": *theory, finance, and the real economy in the work of Susan Strange* (1992), in Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, chapter nine. Cox explains the difference between longer-term and short-term importance of power structures. Knowledge has a longer-term importance.

¹⁹⁸ Strange, 1988, *ibid.*, page 117.

obvious that the knowledge structure includes various aspects of knowledge which can be selected. What is common to all kinds of structural power is that the possessor is able to change the range of choices open to others without apparently putting pressure directly on them to take one decision or to take one choice rather than others.

It could be here that Strange could have introduced moral principles, but chose not to. Strange, however, never speaks about normative values and moral obligations within the knowledge structure of power. The knowledge evaluated by Strange and concerned with GPE is largely to do with power and does not take into account the ethical dimension; her notion of knowledge omits its explicit consideration and certainly does not prioritise it. By not including the ethical dimension it leaves any normative obligation aside. When looking at Strange's definition from this point of view, we can suggest that at times other sources of power should have been considered.

Most important is the understanding that knowledge is not only a part of a power structure, it is also the source for what we might call non-material knowledge and truth. Instead of being a singular structural element, knowledge is a system itself incorporating many single structural elements. Cox argues that the task is both to realise this and to look at knowledge as a whole and make visible non-material structures, which can lead to powerful changes in the present power syndicates in global political economy.¹⁹⁹

Strange acknowledges social and political changes based on what she calls casino capitalism²⁰⁰ and mad money policies.²⁰¹ She means by her titles the sheer speed and size of economic change today. The advancement in information technology brought about political and social changes. In her latest book, *Mad Money*, Strange describes the fast technological changes since the mid-1980s, which are "enormous and very fast innovations in the way in which financial markets work, and in which financial traders, brokers and consultants operate"; new is the "sheer size of these markets, the volumes traded, the variety of possible deals to be done...", whereby formally traditional economic and financial functions and responsibilities are made diffuse and

¹⁹⁹ See Robert Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order, Social Forces in the Making of History*. Columbia: University Press, 1987, Conclusion, page 395.

²⁰⁰ Strange, *Casino Capitalism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

²⁰¹ Strange, *Mad Money*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998.

stretched to invisibility.

As Strange acknowledges, it is a very difficult issue to deal with. Therefore her closing remarks in "So What?", in Chapter Ten of *Mad Money*, give no directions for conduct, but merely observes the present dilemma. The lack of vision is demonstrated in the following quote:

Our problem in the next century is that the traditional authority of the nation state is not capable of managing mad international money, yet its leaders are instinctively reluctant to entrust that job to unelected, unaccountable (and often arrogant and myopic) bureaucrats. We have to invent a new kind of polity but we cannot yet imagine how it might work.²⁰²

I seek later to make exactly such an imagination. The discussion of Strange leads to her pupil Roger Tooze and his work with Craig Murphy. If Strange has not successfully confronted the question of ethics, have others? Below, I look at the work of writers such as Tooze, Murphy and Augelli, and introduce the possibility of myth, particularly normative myth.

2.3 Tooze & Murphy's problem with orthodox theory

Now I will look into the work of additional IPE scholars who work on a reformation of theory. Thus, the analysis of Tooze and Murphy tries to explain the problem when theory becomes 'orthodox', serving only, as Gramsci called it, a 'traditional intellectual's' view, ignoring how the practical environment will be affected.

Tooze and Murphy assert that if "power is about the contestation of knowledge, ideas, and claims to truth, then questions of epistemology, ontology, and methodology are fundamental to all matters of international political economy, however immediate and policy-directed they might seem to be."²⁰³

As in the case of world poverty, Tooze and Murphy claim that the issue of poverty is "not relevant to the prime concerns of IR/IPE."²⁰⁴ What Tooze and Murphy call 'new' IPE, marks a development of contrasting efforts to 'orthodox' IPE. 'Orthodox' IPE has constructed "a very particular form of IPE knowledge, which may be adequate

²⁰² *Ibid.*, page 190.

²⁰³ Strange, *ibid.*

and legitimate on its own terms, but which ... is both limited and partial."²⁰⁵ Here they recall what Strange calls the "conventionally accepted paradigm of the Politics of International Economic Relations."²⁰⁶ 'Determinants of Choice' vary between 'no power' and 'total power' in theory but only 'total power' in reality.²⁰⁷

This behaviour of limited choice challenges the scholarly community to recognise that "work actually is truth seeking and not just a strategic attempt to persuade others (or itself) of a preconceived position" and to construct a new IPE "by recognising and reflecting multiple "interested" points of view, by giving voice to many voices."²⁰⁸ In the case of Third World issues, orthodoxy reduces enquiry to the understanding of "rational individuals' in neoclassical economies."²⁰⁹ Tooze and Murphy criticise Krasner's conception of IPE which manifests a "totality of IPE with rationalist empiricist methodology."²¹⁰

Tooze and Murphy's achievement lies in combining research by Strange and in particular her development of the notion of structural power and Alker's critical theory of political economy²¹¹, both looking at the outcomes of IPE when based on economic precepts grounded on the assumption of power as a resource. In this light, theory demands an empiricist problem-solving practice which "seems to demand a measure of power that will provide the sort of 'rankings' needed to understand the 'structure' of an international order presumed to be 'anarchic'."²¹²

Tooze and Murphy observe that "global poverty and the social fact of 'the poor' do not present themselves as a problem. ... They are, instead, questions inherently on the periphery. They are questions about the least powerful, questions about people whose actions - individual and collective - are assumed to place little constraint on

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ Tooze and Murphy, *op.cit.*, page 682. See Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, page 88, in order to deepen the understanding of the idea of a "problem-solving orthodoxy in IR".

²⁰⁶ Susan Strange, "An Eclectic Approach", in Murphy and Tooze (eds.), *The New International Political Economy*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991, page 34.

²⁰⁷ Strange, *ibid.*, page 39

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, page 28-29.

²⁰⁹ Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze, (eds.), *The New International Political Economy*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991. Tooze and Murphy, *op.cit.*, page 682.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, page 683. See comments on Krasner, Chapter One, page 19.

²¹¹ See Hayward R. Alker, *Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, articles "Can the End of Power Politics be Part of the Concepts with which the Story is told?: A Leibnizian Reply", pp 184-206, and "Beneath Tit-for-Tat: The Contests of Political Economy Fairy Tales with SPD Protocols", pp 303-331.

²¹² Tooze and Murphy, *op.cit.*, page 686.

the rational pursuit of self-interest to the powerful."²¹³

Murphy's work, as far as this research is concerned, has two aspects. His work with Enrico Augelli is very much in the realm of a systemic Gramscian discourse, which tries to reassess the importance of society's superstructure, the influence of ideology, and the creation of common sense as an essential element of policy making. In his work with Roger Tooze on the other hand, he relies also on Gramsci, albeit more loosely. However, his research is directed at the overcoming of IR orthodoxy, a search for theory-making, that establishes first of all a 'set of questions', the idea being that the rephrasing of questions will lead to the rephrasing of answers. Here their concern is with the break-down of traditional distinctions between the international and the domestic, between politics and economics in IPE, and "to shed light on new questions raised by unforeseen changes in the world political economy."²¹⁴ Murphy and Tooze are concerned with the Gramscian approach as an epistemological and ontological critique of the empiricism and positivism which underpins the prevailing theorisation in international studies. But they wear the formal bases of Gramscian theory relatively lightly, whereas Murphy and Augelli practice a more formal and self-conscious Gramscianism.

According to Tooze and Murphy, this "orthodoxy is constituted by a particular set of methodological preferences and a specific agenda issue. 'Orthodox' IPE relies upon a methodology which is positivist, which utilises an empiricist epistemology, and which encourages methodological individualism. The results of enquiry are often presented in the form of different accounts that represent different ideologies of political economy: 'liberal', 'realist', and 'radical'. These, in turn, are either implicitly constructed as 'incommensurable' within the 'standards of science', or are reduced to a simplified form that allows comparison on the basis of a single set of positivist, empiricist standards."²¹⁵

Gramscian historical materialism builds upon and extends aspects of the Marxist critique of classical political economy, but, as Stephen Gill argues, "Gramsci's historicism might be said to have three main components: (a) transience, (b)

²¹³ *Ibid.*, page 690.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, page 6.

²¹⁵ Roger Tooze and Craig Murphy, "The Epistemology of Poverty and the Poverty of Epistemology in IPE: Mystery, Blindness, and Invisibility", in: *Millennium*, Winter 1996, vol. 25:3, page 682.

historical necessity, and (c) a dialectical variant of (philosophical) realism.”²¹⁶ Gill describes transience as:

that history and social change is a cumulative, endless, yet non-repetitive process, with different rhythms and tempos, applying respectively to structural developments and to patterns of apparently discrete events. ... [Historical necessity] implies that social interaction and political change takes place within what can be called the 'limits of the possible', limits which ... are not fixed and immutable but exist within the dialectics of a given social structure. ... [Philosophical realism] identifies the intellectual process as a creative, practical, yet open-ended and continuous engagement to explain an apparently intractable social reality.²¹⁷

One such effort to explain such an intractable social reality was by rational choice models as such are central to present-day neo-classical economics, but while they are sophisticated, they still cannot grasp key aspects of consciousness. The Gramscian approach, in Tooze and Murphy’s work, instead, emphasises the absence in orthodox IPE of the non-rational, the non-material, the ethical dimension which is part of human society, but which has been suppressed since the beginning of industrialisation and during the growth of capitalism. According to Murphy and Tooze there should be “the possibility that beliefs and values are themselves just as real as the material structures and powers of the global political economy.”²¹⁸ Here, Murphy and Tooze follow Gramsci’s ethical dimension of analysis, where questions of justice, legitimacy and moral credibility are integrated into the whole social critique. Similarly, Gill observes that the normative Gramscian goal “is to move towards the solution of the fundamental problem of political philosophy: the nature of the good society and thus, politically, the construction of an ‘ethical’ state and a society in which personal development, rational reflection, open debate, democratic empowerment and economic and social liberation can become more widely attainable”.²¹⁹

²¹⁶ Stephen Gill (ed.), *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, page 22.

‘Transience’ is one of the main components of Gramsci’s historicism. Thus the critique of political economy for Marx and Gramsci begins with the concept of the historicity, or historical specificity of the capitalist market system, rather than seeing it as natural or eternal. See also Enrico Augelli and Craig N Murphy, “*Gramsci and international relations: a general perspective with examples from recent US policy toward the Third World*”, and Mark Rupert, “*Alienation, capitalism and the inter-state system: toward a Marxian/Gramscian critique*”, both in Stephen Gill, (ed.), *ibid.*, 1993, regarding the defence of the capitalist market system as something natural or eternal.

²¹⁷ Gill, *ibid.*, page 23.

²¹⁸ Murphy and Tooze, 1991, *op.cit.*, page 18.

Knowledge is what can initiate change. According to Murphy and Tooze, the root of the problem is that orthodox "IPE is firmly based in positivist thought and as such sees knowledge production as purely an intellectual process."²²⁰ Gramsci calls this a 'traditional intellectual's' view. It is a view which ignores how others might be affected. Instead, to Murphy and Tooze, "the production of knowledge must always be more appropriately considered a social process linking subject and object."²²¹

Gill would explain it in terms of historical materialism, that a "change in thinking is a change in the social totality and thus has an impact on other social processes; a change in the social totality will provoke change in the process of thought. Hence, the process of thinking is part of a ceaseless dialectic of social being."²²² The changes which progressively occur take place for Gramsci as 'passive revolution', which "combines the notions of (a) a 'revolution from above', without mass participation..., and (b) a creeping, 'molecular' social transformation, in which the progressive class finds itself compelled to advance in a more or less surreptitious, 'compromised' fashion."²²³ Cox describes these two tendencies inherent within the existing global economic order as two new levels of participation, "one above and one below the level of existing states", and gives them the name of "macro- and micro-regionalism."²²⁴ Cox observes, that globalization "is generating a more complex multi-level world political system, Structures of authority comprise not one but at least three levels: the macro-regional level, the old state (or Westphalian) level, and the micro-regional level. All three levels are limited in their possibilities by a global economy which has the means of exerting its pressures without formally authoritative political structures."²²⁵ Despite the emergence of a multi-level world political system, Murphy and Tooze would argue that theory in IPE is dominated by one and the same "orthodoxy" which is "legitimate knowledge" and means positivist methodology.²²⁶ This prevailing methodology, they hold, cannot illuminate all the hidden aspects of human co-existence, for example poverty.²²⁷

²¹⁹ Gill, *op.cit.*, page 25.

²²⁰ Murphy and Tooze, *op.cit.*, page 14.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, page 14, my underlining.

²²² Gill, *op.cit.*, page 28.

²²³ Kees van der Pijl, "Soviet Socialism and Passive Revolution", in Stephen Gill, (ed.), *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, page 237.

²²⁴ Cox, *op.cit.*, page 262.

²²⁵ Cox, *ibid.*, page 263.

²²⁶ Roger Tooze and Craig N. Murphy, "The Epistemology of Poverty and the Poverty of Epistemology in IPE: Mystery, Blindness and Invisibility", in *Millennium, Journal of International Studies*, 1996, vol. 25:3, page 706.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.681-707.

Tooze and Murphy try to look beyond the 'intrinsic nature' of 'social reality' and again formulate a set of questions, claiming the need "to direct attention to the kinds of conditions necessary for fundamental theoretical change and re-appraisal: what conditions, what configurations of power make such change possible."²²⁸ Their main statement is that 'epistemology matters' in both the theory and practice of political economy and that "IPE raises questions about the ethical bases of IPE theory and the link between epistemology, morality, and power."²²⁹ Tooze and Murphy further rely on Cox's statement, which has a Gramscian source, that "theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose. All theories have a perspective."²³⁰ Tooze and Murphy's question undermines the motivation and impacts behind policy making, "the conditions of knowledge production and reproduction: knowledge for whom and for what purpose."²³¹ Common-sense making in a Gramscian sense is one of the tools used to allow orthodoxy in general to nurture "divergent views only to either incorporate them into prevailing explanations or to ignore them, thus marginalizing the heterodox analysis and/or its author(s)."²³²

They further claim that the orthodox IPE "can say nothing more than common sense can about the pursuit of the ethical life because that is not constructed as an issue of IPE", and little more can be said about the primary questions about the global political economy raised by most people - questions of dependency, fundamental insecurity, powerlessness, and, above all, the question of how to identify opportunities for fundamental change."²³³ It is therefore that they proclaim the Gramscian need to move towards the 'ethical state', if not beyond to the Coxian levels. The changes in the world political economy over the past twenty years have been reinforced, so for Tooze and Murphy there is the recognition that power "is not just 'power over', it is embodied and exercised at every moment of social life through the reproduction of mutually supporting structures of language, ideas, institutions, and concrete material reality."²³⁴

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, page 706.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

²³⁰ Cox, *op.cit.*, page 127.

²³¹ Murphy and Tooze, 1996, *op.cit.*, page 13. my underlining.

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ *Ibid.*, page 27.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, page 703.

2.4 *Murphy & Augelli's thoughts on hegemony and social myth*

The work of Murphy and Augelli deals with questions of hegemony. America is portrayed in its quest for supremacy in general and in the Third World in particular. American destiny and the legitimation of American foreign policy is considered to be based on the ideology of being missioned as world-wide and a political force of 'crusaderism'. Both authors aim to use Gramsci's inspiration for revolutionary strategies to implement programmes for a more "just international community concerned with meeting human needs and expanding human aspirations" and to help, as Gramsci said, "educate politically ... those who are not in the know."²³⁵ Augelli and Murphy extract Gramsci's understanding of 'ideology' and 'supremacy' as the core of their analysis, because it explains the American relationship with the world and what seems important to Augelli and Murphy, the relationship with the Third World. For Gramsci ideologies are not mere illusions, but he "asserts their real existence and points to the evidence of their vitality and their influence over historical events."²³⁶ According to Gramsci, "ideologies are alive in the minds of people even if they do not realise the extent to which their desires, choices, and actions are influenced by them. And the active ideologies of a powerful people can do much harm, or good, in the world."²³⁷ He claims therefore that ideology fosters a so-called common sense thinking within the general public, based on American destiny, isolationism, evangelism, and crusaderism.²³⁸ "Colonial religion", say Augelli and Murphy, "can be understood as the source of the three sets of ideas that are common sense to most Americans. One idea has to do with identity, with who Americans are, ... the idea of Americans as a chosen people. The second has to do with how to deal with dissent, how to deal with people whose views differ from your own. For many Americans the only way ... is to isolate yourself from them (or them from you), convert them, or destroy them."²³⁹ Since the late nineteenth century, the philosophy of Social Darwinism has given Americans a 'scientific' basis for the assumption of competitive individualism, "because life is a struggle and people only have duties to themselves; native Americans could be eradicated and black people enslaved."²⁴⁰ Consciousness can cease if Social Darwinism has the "means of explaining the rightness of the

²³⁵ Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, *America's Quest, for Supremacy and the Third World, an Essay in Gramscian Analysis*. London: Pinter Publishers, 1988, page 6.

²³⁶ Augelli and Murphy, *ibid.*, page 13.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, page 111.

²³⁸ See Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1991, Chapter three, pp 277 - 316.

²³⁹ Augelli and Murphy, 1988, *op.cit.*, page 37.

inequality created in a market society and the acceptance of an extension of the market metaphor to the creation and evaluation of ideas."²⁴¹

Gramsci's concept of 'supremacy' is a broader concept of 'hegemony' and is used to understand the consolidation of power. "According to Gramsci, hegemony is the ability of a class or social group to exercise a function of 'political and moral direction' in society."²⁴² Based on a 'common sense' phenomenon, a relatively wide political consensus usually supports the hegemon's policy goal. In respect of international political economy, America would use such tools as an instrument to create 'common sense' power; and once the supremacy is established, the economic primacy can be exploited, as has been enjoyed by the US since the Second World War.²⁴³

Augelli and Murphy rely on a Gramscian notion of 'international civil society' (the realm in which politics first emerges from the international economy) for help because Gramsci explains "that all of these private groups 'work through ideology', they work by building consensus, not by using force. Therefore ... intellectuals play a central role in these institutions, articulating new visions and defining a new basis for consensus."²⁴⁴ The force of consensus established within the international civil society leads to reform in international institutions. As the best example Augelli and Murphy name the United Nations system, where in their opinion, innovations in the system took place "when the notion of the responsibility of wealthier nations to aid poorer ones began to gain wide acceptance. Officials of the UN system have long attempted to establish a single world view shared by all their members. As a result, the UN system itself has become a champion of the interests of those governing elites in the world economy excluded from the American post-war historical bloc; the UN has become a sort of transnational interest group of the Third World."²⁴⁵

Having used the Gramscian theory, where all private groups work through ideology and consensus building, Augelli and Murphy extend their research to parties "as the

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, page 46.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, page 49.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, page 122.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, page 154.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, page 179.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, page 180.

expression of concrete social groups."²⁴⁶ In order to grasp the non-explicable aspects of consciousness, Augelli and Murphy use in the continuation of their work, the Greek '*telos*' borrowed by Gramsci, to make sense of the inexplicable within historicist theorising about fundamental social change. '*Telos*' reflects Sorel's²⁴⁷ concept of a motivating social myth and draws on the emphasis by Bergson and Jung on intuition and feeling.²⁴⁸

Sorel saw 'myth' as the cause of considerable moral progress.²⁴⁹ Sorel's social myth has a normative character and is an adaptation of the Bergsonian psychology, "who saw men and women drawn to decision by an inner, rarely conscious model of a complex, true self that becomes manifest not merely through the faculty of rationalist judgement of things as presented to the senses, but also via profound emotional attachment and leaps of intuition about things as they might be."²⁵⁰ Sorel's objective was to identify the fundamental progressive social myth of the industrial age and aimed towards the creation of an ethical state where the distinction between ruler and ruled is no longer essential. The Christian story of redemption was his ultimate model. Augelli and Murphy explain how "Sorel was convinced a new myth, that of the general strike - the moment when working people would rise together, expose their collective power within industrial society, and in doing so, transform it - would have the same historical function."²⁵¹ Augelli and Murphy borrow the very same concept in respect of social consciousness and add 'myth' as an attribute when explaining collective action, where change is initiated via a concept of 'passive' - sometimes also called 'silent' - revolution.²⁵² They use as an example the Gramscian

²⁴⁶ Enrico Augelli and Craig N. Murphy, "*Consciousness, Myth and Collective Action: Gramsci, Sorel and the Ethical State*", in Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman, (eds.), *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, page 32.

²⁴⁷ Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*. London: Collier Books, translated by T. E. Hulme and J. Roth, London, 1961 (1906, 1907).

²⁴⁸ C. G. Jung's (1933) concepts have become standard in mainstream cognitive psychology and organisational behaviour. The psychology of the economic man is the psychology of rational-choice analysis and assumes the existence of only two of the four dimensions of human cognition identified by Jung. "Economic man understands the world via what Jung calls 'sensation' and judges the world via what Jung calls 'thought'. ... [I]n terms of Aristotle's logic and rhetoric, economic man decides on the basis of *logos* and knowledge of immediate causes, while Sorel adopts the Aristotelian - more complete - man who is also moved by *pathos* and knowledge of ultimate causes. Thus, the core of Sorel's insight is that the most powerfully motivated decisions are those equally affirmed by everything and every way that human beings can understand and judge, including all the passion and the eschatology that disappears from narrowly rationalistic versions of social science" [Augelli and Murphy, 1997: 27]. Kant's ideas about two orientations of the Soul, one towards everyday concerns and the other toward the spirit world influenced Jung's own dualism. Jung himself believed he had two split personalities, No.1, which connected him with the ordinary, everyday world, and No. 2, which carried meaning in a mysterious manner.

²⁴⁹ Sorel, *ibid.*, 1961, page 35.

²⁵⁰ In contrast to rational choice, Vilfredo Pareto and his followers today, which reduced "the font of human action to individualistic, rationalistic judgement of the relative desirability of things apprehended by the immediate senses. Rational-choice man (sic) is a thinker and a calculator who knows what is and what is likely to happen on the basis of mundane experience alone." [Augelli and Murphy, 1997: 26]. See H. Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1995, translated by T. E. Hulme, 1903, page 26.

²⁵¹ Augelli and Murphy, 1997, *op.cit.*, page 26.

²⁵² Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1991, page 106, page 114, page 267.

analysis of parties and international relations.²⁵³

Therefore, according to Augelli and Murphy, the eventual unfolding of the logic and spirit of liberal democratic capitalism is guided by *telos*, which is a 'myth' or 'mythological system' that justifies or tends towards or legitimises an end.

A social myth is a 'concrete phantasy' which allows a group to 'organise its collective will'. ... Gramsci recognised the ways in which his endpoint mirrored the Hegelian ideal of an 'ethical' state in which ruler and ruled have become indistinguishable, or, even more narrowly, the left-Hegelian identification of the more ethical state (or party) as the one which acts to create the conditions for the abolition of class distinction, and, therefore, the abolition of the conditions which necessitated the institution in the first place.²⁵⁴

Gramsci would argue that one "should stress the importance and significance which, in the modern world, political parties have in the elaboration and diffusion of conceptions of the world, because essentially what they do is to work out the ethics and the politics corresponding to these conceptions and act as it were as their historical 'laboratory'."²⁵⁵ Social myth is capable of bringing about change; in Sorel's example of the general strike, the 'myth' becomes an actual historical function.

Cox also borrows the idea of 'myth' and defines it as follows: "Myth presupposes a psychic force, a compelling movement combined with a rejection of the prevailing norms (e.g., as hypocritical, demystified). It is a normative force but does not predict outcome. Thus the normative element is crucial but not as teleology."²⁵⁶ According to Augelli and Murphy, Gramsci describes complex human beings as rarely merely 'rational' with the "capacities of intuition and non-rational (however consistent) moral judgement" whereby "the consequence of a 'contradictory consciousness' assures that a central role of progressive political leaders is educative; it is to help people erase the irrationalities of their contradictory consciousness and to see their collective interests."²⁵⁷

²⁵³ Augelli and Murphy, 1997, *op.cit.*, page 31-32.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, page 29.

²⁵⁵ Gramsci, 1991, *op.cit.*, page 335.

²⁵⁶ Stephen Gill, "Historical Materialism, Gramsci, and International Political Economy", in Craig N. Murphy and Roger Tooze, (eds.) *The New International Political Economy*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991, page 57.

The Gramscian concept of myth, which describes '*telos*' as myth, is similar to the Hegelian '*Zeitgeist*', a power behind normative forces which apparently develops normative structures in society, initiating and conducting changes within the prevailing 'material forces' (such as technology, the forces of production).²⁵⁸ The observation of a phenomenon of myth is well argued and mirrors a reflection on the capacity of intuition and the non-rational, moral capability of judgement.

2.5 Conclusion

In Part I, chapters one and two search for an improvement of theory in IR/IPE discipline. It is a search for new approaches which include normative theory. The question is whether morality is part of the argument. Chapter one established the need to place theory within the context of globalization, a progress of multi-layered consequences regarding political, economic and social issues worldwide.

Chapter two examined the outstanding attempts of some authors in IPE to advance theory in order to accord with practice. Homage is paid to Susan Strange who revolutionised IPE with her analysis of power relations. A vital debate was delivered by Tooze and Murphy in order to signal the need for theory to advance away from orthodox deadlocks. Their major point is the need for theory to acknowledge the irrational, which finds support from Murphy and Augelli's explanation of '*telos*', the social myth phenomenon.

This section has argued that while orthodox IPE has a materialist and positivist basis which neglects - or even renders impossible - the discussion of ethics, critical IPE, and in particular the work of neo-Gramscian writers such as Cox, Gill, Murphy, Augelli and Tooze, seeks to facilitate the incorporation of ethical critique into a reformulating of global political economy. However, I feel this critique is not, in itself, a normative vision.

²⁵⁷ Augelli and Murphy, 1997, *op.cit.*, page 37.

²⁵⁸ See Stephen Gill, 'Epistemology, Ontology and the 'Italian School'', in Stephen Gill, (ed.) *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 21-48, and in particular, '*Beyond the intransigence of 'social reality'*', p. 27.

The following part examines a selection of critical writers in Economics and Development Studies in order to find out how their critique has led to a normative examination and ethical principles.

Part II

VOICES OF INTERRELATED CONCERNS

* * * * *

In Part I, I have stressed the importance of developing the discipline of GPE as the most suitable for future theory building and analysis.

The examination of IR and IPE literature in respect of an ethical critical debate resulted in some interesting and original attempts, and explored the validity and usefulness of Frost's concept of a constituted instead of a contractarian society. The findings were unsatisfactory as they do not answer to an ethical concept.

In Part II, I examine related disciplines for signs of ethical demands. I feel it necessary to demonstrate that in the discourse of Economics, in particular in Development Studies and in the debate about the significance of culture, more intense and more profound attempts have been made to include ethical demands in the discipline. Research in this field seems justified because the methodology of the reassertion of ethics outside IR and IPE can help to reform the discipline.

Chapter Three looks into economic theory to find efforts for an ethical debate in the works of Frey, Sen, Dreze and Dworkin. Frey tries to reform economy by accepting the influence of the socio-cultural systems. In this context, the reasserting of ethics in Development Studies brings into the research the ontological aspects of life outside the Western world. The investigation of systems of aid makes the work of Sen and Drèze touch the very issues of globalization. Harrell-Bond is cited in this respect, and Manor's cultural studies in order to highlight the need for multicultural discourse. Culture is as important as an interrelated building block to the global society.

Chapter Four develops out of Chapter Three with a deepening of the understanding of the Third World and the cultural context of rationality. The hindrance of rational choice theory is demonstrated in the context of dealing with the basic needs in the Third World. In this investigation I shall clarify which methodology could be accepted as useful for a new theory. In Chapter Three I have written on the importance of cultural concerns, but here I want to see how far this concern has been recognised in IR and IPE and if it, therefore, has led to some progress in theory, according to the demands of Dasgupta and the theoretical aspirations of Chan.

Chapter 3

The reassertion of ethics outside IR and IPE

Main points of this chapter

Bruno Frey and the influence of the socio-cultural system in economy

Outside IR, an ethics in the work of Sen and Drèze

A relationship between Sen and Dworkin

Harrell-Bond and the deprivation of choice in naming deprivation

James Manor and culture

Conclusion

Main points of this chapter

- *Frey teaches us that economy is interrelated with politics and with the socio-cultural environment*
- *Vital attempts have been made in Development Studies to integrate ethical aspects of life*
- *Globalization does not advance a monoculture but, ideally, the acceptance of multicultural co-operation*
- *Political order, economic or any social order must be accompanied by a moral order*

3.1 *Bruno Frey and the influence of the socio-cultural system in economy*

Frey's "*Modern Political Economy*"²⁵⁹ addresses the orthodox dilemma of economic theory; it is a theoretical and empirical analysis of the mutual interaction of political economy with the unorthodox. Traditional economics disregards the interdependence of the political process, because it concerns itself only with the functioning of the price system.²⁶⁰ "The price system is able to bring about neither a just income distribution nor an automatic stabilisation of business cycles. ... The economy is thus treated as a unit isolated from the political process. Politics belongs to the 'institutional givens' which lie outside of the scope of the science of economics. However, this is only an outside appearance. When normative analyses are undertaken, an authoritarian political order is taken as a starting point: a 'benevolent dictator' or élite maximises 'social welfare'. The state is a God-like institution with complete information over all the wishes of the population, with no preferences of its own and always capable of achieving its will. The democratic process in which individuals can reveal their wishes by participating in politics is not considered. The pursuit of one's own interests, the fundamental principle of market behaviour, is negated in the political area. This constitutes a breakdown in methodology."²⁶¹

Frey searches for an improvement of theory and wants a political economy "in order for it to be able appropriately to grasp and influence reality."²⁶² He proclaims the need for a new approach, guided by the unorthodox instead of the orthodox, and he demonstrates the need for social decision making as more relevant than decisions made by rational choice. Economic policy proposals are often ineffective because they are unable to understand political reality. This most revealing finding was the "Galbraithian view of the dominance of large enterprises and the interconnection between the military-industrial complex and the state is probably shared by the great majority of social scientists - except for economists, who often do not take it seriously or even express contempt for the idea."²⁶³ But according to Frey, the unorthodox is a movement. This observation is probably the most significant one in

²⁵⁹ Bruno S. Frey, *Modern Political Economy*. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978.

²⁶⁰ Frey defines economics as the science of the price system, following the tradition of Adam Smith and David Ricardo.

²⁶¹ Frey, *ibid.*, page 6.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, page 1.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, page 53.

Frey's research. A movement is an expression of a different view to the orthodoxy held at the time and a growing concern which manifests itself in the future. The scientific discussion in the abstract world of models does not force theoreticians to reconsider basic assumptions which form the foundation for models, whereas the "unorthodox considers such assumptions to be completely unrealistic, and to give a wrong perspective of modern industrial society."²⁶⁴ The political economy of the unorthodox is based on the following assumptions:

- 1) The economy is part of a socio-cultural system. It is formed by it and at the same time it influences culture and society. The economy can, therefore, be understood only in a trans-disciplinary way. In this sense, the Unorthodox are political economists.
- 2) Institutions play a major role in economic life. One of the most important of such institutions are large enterprises or trusts: they dominate economic activity.
- 3) Power and conflict are central elements in economy and society. For this reason income distribution is considered very important.
- 4) Economic development is evolutionary; i.e., it takes place over time. It is characterised by cumulative processes. Disequilibria are able to bring out creative forces and are, therefore, welcome. The major determinants of economic growth are technology and knowledge, as well as preference changes.
- 5) Problems of developing countries and disadvantaged regions within rich countries are the subject of intensive analysis and political engagement.
- 6) Relevance is taken to be of greater importance than rigour from the point of view of methodology. An attempt is made to grasp the large problems even if they are beyond formal analysis.²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, page 54; As basic assumptions, Frey mentions examples out of the neoclassical economic thinking: perfect competition between small firms, the steering of production by the all-powerful consumers, unchanged preferences of economic men, etc. p. 54.

²⁶⁵ Frey, *ibid.*, page 55.

Frey's claim for a more unorthodox theory is also based on the recognition that people have problems when dealing with what Adam Smith called the 'invisible hand' and Albert Hirschman called the 'notion of the 'hiding hand'.'²⁶⁶ They realise their "power for innovation only when the solution has already been found."²⁶⁷ Instead, Frey raises the opinion that people should welcome inherent difficulties to solve future problems. Only with difficulties are creative forces required. Strength of analysis lies in the suggestions of new perspectives. I seek in this thesis to do exactly that. For now, Frey seeks a more deliberately 'human' focus for economics.

Frey approves of Kenneth E. Boulding as the best example for suggesting new perspectives. According to him, the "assumption of complete selfishness of traditional welfare economics constitutes a misinterpretation of man"²⁶⁸, which interpretation should include the factor of benevolence but also the factor of malevolence. According to Boulding mutual goodwill is an important human characteristic for analysis but so is human malevolence. Boulding develops a trinitarian social system of love, exchange and threat. As these components are not static, he understands economic development as an "*evolutionary* process, the essential elements of which are learning and the increase of knowledge."²⁶⁹ Social learning is different from individual learning - "there is a much greater outcome of pathological outcomes. In economic development information and communication are important. Knowledge is interpreted as a structured *loss* of information, i.e. a concentration on the essential aspects."²⁷⁰ Economic development is an evolutionary process, due to the human capability to adapt to changes, analysing the pros and cons of knowledge selection. Any loss of information creates a vacuum which becomes responsible for the restructuring process. Therefore Boulding considers *dissatisfaction* with reigning conditions to be the prerequisite for progress. Individual reactions consist of adjustments within the existing system; political reactions consist of a change of the system itself.

Political processes differ markedly, depending on whether they occur in a growing, a stagnant or even a shrinking economy. Economy and polity may not be looked at in

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, page 59.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, page 59.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, page 59-60, see Kenneth, E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory*. New York: Harper and Row, 1962. Important articles are collected in *Beyond Economics. Essays on Society, Religion and Ethics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968.

²⁶⁹ Frey, *ibid.*, page 60.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, page 60.

separation; allocation (the traditional political sphere) is intimately connected with distribution (the traditional political sphere). Political organisations must use the crisis system to survive; a large part of transfers, namely taxes, rely on this principle."²⁷¹ Allocation and distribution are the two vital elements of political economy. Both elements can, according to Myrdal, be theoretically assets for institutionalism, trans-disciplinarity and evolution.²⁷² Frey aims to show that both content and the methodology of the orthodox, the neo-classical theory of his time, have to overcome their narrowness and open up to the three characteristics he gives to the unorthodox the - "orientation towards reality, trans-disciplinarity and the sense for dynamics."²⁷³ Frey bases his claims on the following observations:

- economic development is an evolutionary process;
- disequilibria are able to awake creative forces; big corporations and managers have strong power and are, to a large extent, able to determine the economic process; and
- technology and consumer preferences are the result of the interdependence of economy and society.²⁷⁴

According to Frey, great attention must be paid to the criteria of public choice. Public choice is expressed within the aggregation of individual preferences for a social decision. It is within this correlation that public choice manifests itself as an expression of the political, the economic and the cultural surroundings. Frey's concept of a new political economy starts to discover some interrelated issues which nurture a more effective theoretical analysis and stress the interdependence of socio-political-economic manifestations.

In a later work Frey makes a plea to search for a more democratic, responsive and effective way of making economic policy. His book "*Democratic Economic Policy*"²⁷⁵ is a radical departure from the traditional ideas on economic policy, and expresses his belief that in a democracy, economic policy should conform to the will of the people. Frey asserts that rules must be established whereby political pressure can be brought to bear upon governments to ensure that the preferences of

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, see also Gunnar Myrdal, *Against the Stream, Critical Essays on Economics*. New York: Vintage Book, 1975. Myrdal received the Nobel Prize for deploring the irrelevance and sterility of neoclassical economics, where often a great theory is proved to be in retrospect a temporary aberration. He claims that values should openly be shown and should not be arbitrary; pragmatic standards should be relevant and practical.

²⁷² See Myrdal, *ibid.*

²⁷³ Frey, *op.cit.*, page 64.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, page 64.

individuals are taken into account. In order to develop concepts for contemporary analysis, Frey uses an interdisciplinary methodology which enables him to use research tools from political science, sociology and psychology.

According to Frey, rules and institutions are accepted by individuals if they can increase their welfare. A group of individuals whose lives are not regulated in any way would necessarily live in poverty and chaos. A large part of their activity and innovative potential would have to be directed towards defending themselves against the attacks of others, and there would be little time and energy left for more constructive forms of activity. Therefore productive economic activity presupposes a consensus about the fundamental rules and institutions of a society. A consensus about fundamental political rights and institutions is advantageous for all individuals in a state of uncertainty. Once the rights and collective (governmental) institutions are defined, the course of the political and economic process is largely determined. They thus constitute the heart of the social consensus and express the ethical nature that lies at the heart of Frey's work.

Frey concludes that no economic policy undertaken by a government and its administration will closely follow the wishes of the population if the individuals do not possess basic political rights, and if the fundamental institutions of the state do not allow the people's preferences to be expressed. Therefore, one of the most important tasks for individuals and groups is to reach agreement on the democratic decision-making procedures to be used. One piece of evidence that suggests that many individuals are dis-satisfied with the present mixture of taxation and public supplies is the rise of an 'underground', or 'black' hidden economy. It seems a global phenomenon at present, not only a Third World or an Eastern European issue: Italy may be a case in point.

According to Frey, the " 'political suppliers' in the current politico-economic process - namely, the government, political parties and the public administration - consider only that information which is useful for their own purposes"²⁷⁵ - except if there is enough political competition to force a consideration of the population's preferences in order to win elections. This leads Frey to conclude:

Economists have few incentives to do serious research on matters of practical

²⁷⁵ Bruno S. Frey, *Democratic Economic Policy, A Theoretical Introduction*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1983.

²⁷⁶ Frey, *ibid.*, page 242.

economic policy. This is because the criterion for economic research is not the relevance of solving practical issues but rather the rigour of the analysis: a contribution is considered competent when the mathematics and statistics are handled well, when the scientific literature is known and quoted, and when the arguments are logically coherent and stringent. In order to become known and prominent, research must propose results. Required is a radical change in perspective.²⁷⁷

Important for my research is Frey's demand for a new perspective. New rules and regulations for the global economy are essential and new perspectives should look for moral underpinnings.

3.2 *Outside IR, an ethics in the work of Sen and Drèze*

If, however, IR and IPE have not advanced into the full field of ethics when it comes to the poor, have other disciplines? Neither Tooze's and Murphy's reflection on world poverty, nor Frost's communitarian vision ever attained as clear a position on individual economic and entitlement rights as in the work of development specialists dealing with international systemic aid, such as Harrell-Bond, as I will explain later; or looking at the recipient end of systems of aid, such as Amartya Sen. Therefore I examine work outside IR as an exemplary alternative. I introduce an economist who – so it seems – managed to introduce a radical change in perspective. In the footsteps of economic thinkers like Frey, Sen and Drèze are paths leading to a new thinking.

Let us remind ourselves of Peter Drucker who said in 1993 that, despite the fact that two-thirds of the world's population live in the Third World²⁷⁸, and around the years 2010 or 2020, the Third World will house three-quarters of this population, the “challenges, the opportunities, the problems of post-capitalist society and post-capitalist polity can only be dealt with where they originated. And that is the developed world.”²⁷⁹ Drucker argues that it will become a must for the developed nations to find a social development solution for the Third World because their investment stake is enormous, and it will be beyond the developed countries'

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, page 267.

²⁷⁸ See a detailed definition of the term “Third World” in Jeff Haynes, *Religion, Globalization and Political Culture in the Third World*. Houndmills: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999, page 25.

economic, social and cultural capacity to absorb the human flood of Third World immigrants. Drucker touches here upon an ongoing problem as to how the discrepancy between rich and poor can become not equalised but sufficiently reduced in order to accommodate people with the minimum of livelihood, the minimum relating to the basic requirements for the functioning of a human household, enabling its members to have nutrition, shelter and be contented.

It is in this search for development that the work of development specialists Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze is unique. Sen and Drèze devote their study to the analysis of the enduring problems of hunger in the modern world and of the role that public action can play in countering it. Instead of just looking at the need for feeding those who are hungry, they attempt to provide a coherent perspective on the complex nutritional, economic, social and political issues involved in the causation of hunger and deprivation.²⁸⁰ Drèze and Sen introduce an ethical concern to development economics. Economic inequality is responsible for the death of some members of society and the survival of others. The cases presented are treated within their own context, as well as by economic analysis and normative thought. The network of prevailing distribution command has to change in order to advance the eradication of poverty and starvation. Sen argues that the ethical approach to economics is more productive; economics "can be made more productive by paying greater and more explicit attention to the ethical considerations that shape human behaviour and judgement."²⁸¹ The distance that has grown between economics and ethics is unfortunate because there is the "methodological point that some of the insights used in economics in tackling problems of interdependence can be of substantial importance in dealing with complex ethical problems even when economic variables are not involved."²⁸² The concept of rights is a substantial part of economics, and "indeed the basic economic concepts of endowment, exchange, contract, etc., all involve various types of rights. [But no] intrinsic importance is attached to the existence or fulfilment of rights, and they have been judged by their ability to achieve good consequences, among which the fulfilment of rights have not figured."²⁸³

Drèze's and Sen's promotion of a research with action to banish both the threat of

²⁷⁹ Peter F. Drucker, *Post-Capitalist Society*. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 1993, page 13.

²⁸⁰ Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, *Hunger and Public Action*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.

²⁸¹ Amartya Sen, *On Ethics & Economics*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987, page 9.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, page 10.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, page 49.

famine and the reality of hunger is today as important as when Sen wrote his book on entitlement and deprivation in 1981.²⁸⁴ Sen argues in his book that the traditional analysis of famines, focusing on food supply is fundamentally defective. This view is even dangerously misleading in its traditional method of analysis. It is theoretically unsound and empirically inept. Sen stresses the complexity of the issue and paints a picture which goes beyond just identifying the poor. The causation of poverty is multifaceted.

Sen's approach opens up new avenues of thinking as he breaks down the main issue into approachable parts. He calls his analysis the 'entitlement system' and encourages further research. "While the 'immediate' antecedents of poverty may be too obvious to need much analysis, and the 'ultimate' causation too vague and open-ended a question to be settled fully, there are obvious intermediate levels of useful answers that are worth exploring."²⁸⁵

Sen's 'entitlement approach' is based on the recognition that a "person starves either because he does not have the ability to command enough food, or because he does not use this ability to avoid starvation."²⁸⁶ The entitlement approach concerns the ability of the starving individual to command food, using legitimised means within the legal system of operation in that society.

"Ownership of food is one of the most primitive property rights, and in each society there are rules governing this right. The entitlement approach concentrates on each person's entitlements to community bundles including food, and views starvation as resulting from a failure to be entitled to a bundle with enough food."²⁸⁷ Entitlement relations concentrate on rights within the given legal structure in that society, which explain cases of starvation - for example the Bengal famine of 1943, where people died despite the known fact of well-stocked food reserves. The British imperial policy in India and official complacency were responsible for the refusal to permit more food imports to India. In the recent case of the Latin American disasters during 1997/98, for example, Colombia's government did little to prepare the population; in Brazil, local and federal rulers responded slowly and ineptly to the Roraima fires and ignored months of drought warnings. During the Ethiopian famine in 1972 the

²⁸⁴ Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famines, An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, Preface.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, page 45.

seriousness of the famine was systematically minimised by the government.²⁸⁸ Therefore, there is a need for "a mechanism for directly tackling the vulnerability through public institutions guaranteeing food entitlement. The last category includes not merely the distribution of food when the problem becomes acute, but also more permanent arrangements for entitlement through social security and employment protection. What is needed is not ensuring food availability, but guaranteeing food entitlement."²⁸⁹ Lack of entitlement leads to deprivation.²⁹⁰

The ability to command any commodity depends on the powers that govern possession, and therefore the control as to which group rather than another is allowed to acquire or retain food. The lack of food and the actuality of starvation is often the end result of economic decision-making which leads to a shortage of income and purchasing power.²⁹¹ This relationship between economic advancement and poverty has been made explicit in Sen's report of the drought and famine in the Sahelian region, where the collapse of traditional methods of grazing practices due to the loss of grazing areas to industry, make a long term recovery very difficult indeed. Over-grazing in the long term leads to more droughts and starvation. The question asked by Sen is "why didn't they have enough food?" The answer relates to "the totality of entitlement relations that governs whether a person will have the ability to acquire enough food to avoid starvation, [because] food supply is only one influence among many affecting his entitlement relations."²⁹²

Sen's revelations of need and necessities should gradually, if hopefully, lead to a change of method and attitude when confronted with the problem worldwide. In Sen's opinion, it is the liberal doctrine from Adam Smith's "*Wealth of Nations*" of 1776 that has produced basically non-interventionist famine policies, for example in India under British rule. Due to Smith's teachings, it was firmly believed that the market mechanism solves problems of this nature automatically, without any special policy-making or aid package. This belief was manifested in order to allow economic exploitation, as Teresa Hayter explains in "*The Creation of World Poverty*"²⁹³ and, after all, Adam Smith's theory was in accordance with British

287 *Ibid.*

288 *Ibid.*, page 87.

289 *Ibid.*, page 129.

290 See Chapter 10, Sen, 1981, *op.cit.*, page 154 pp.

291 *Ibid.*, page 155.

292 *Ibid.*

293 Teresa Hayter, *The Creation of Food Poverty*. London: Pluto Press, 1981, page 51.

capitalist needs in 1776. Smith argued for 'the obvious and simple system of natural liberty' as the method of increasing the real wealth and greatness of the [British] society."²⁹⁴ Hayter explains that such ideas, "still have a phenomenal amount of influence on people's thinking."²⁹⁵ Sen's revelation therefore is trend-setting for new policy developments without material acceleration. In moving outside statistics, he introduces a new element into the research.²⁹⁶

The element which he introduces is a relevant value of judgement. Entitlement is a relative human value based on the goodwill of social contribution, independent of the demanding market forces. The research based on his revelation opens the ethical evaluation of social science problems, unknown before, because something more than availability is involved. The real requirement is "a generation of food entitlement."²⁹⁷ Drèze and Sen advance the search for a remedy against starvation in a further analysis of strategies to deal with chronic hunger and deprivation within the hope for a greater awareness and motivation of the problem of world hunger. They identify the importance of the analysis of society, class and gender, based on the belief that all famines in the world are preventable by human action and "that when people die of starvation there is almost invariably some massive social failure (whether or not a natural phenomenon had an initiating role in the causal process); and that the responsibilities for that failure deserve explicit attention and analysis, not evasion."²⁹⁸ The social conditions in the genesis of hunger and deprivation are crucial. There is no need to make statistics more accurate, the facts have been given and the need to address some broader conceptual problems is what should be given precedence.

The coexistence of co-operation and conflict is endemic in social relations, "to be neglected often enough is the coexistence of conflicts as well as the congruence of interests in most forms of human interaction."²⁹⁹ Human interaction is often hindered by lack of equality. Due to a hierarchical order in society, 'the bargaining problem' is a type of 'cooperative conflict'.³⁰⁰ Mill's and Ricardo's pessimism, that lower orders of society have to die as a natural outcome of circumstance, have to be

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, page 51.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, page 52.

²⁹⁶ Sen 1981, *op.cit.*, page 164.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, page 165.

²⁹⁸ Drèze and Sen, 1989, *op.cit.*, page 47.

²⁹⁹ See Drèze and Sen, *ibid.*, page 48 and see Chapter one.

overcome with the effectiveness of public action. The so-called cult of 'the life boat ethics', a 'case against helping the poor', and the 'tough love solution' fostered until the end of the 19th century still need to be broken down.³⁰¹ Drèze and Sen's study of the strategy of public action against endemic under-nourishment and deprivation tries to dissect the plurality of influences affecting nutritional capabilities and achievements. In order to eliminate endemic deprivation, Drèze and Sen argue the need for broadening people's horizons of thought and experiences, to create social security, which guarantees not only food, but health care and medical attention. Basic education is a further need for eradicating both under-nourishment and preventable morbidity, because an "educated public can more easily participate in national economic growth - partly through the expansion of remunerative employment - making the fruits of growth more widely shared."³⁰²

Drèze and Sen believe that "both famine prevention and the eradication of endemic undernutrition call for leadership and co-ordination coming from inside rather than outside the country, but that does not imply that international help cannot supplement these efforts effectively."³⁰³ International reform and co-ordination will be a necessity. The eradication of famines, undernutrition and deprivation, relies on public participation, where the public is " 'the patient' whose well-being commands attention, but also is 'the agent' whose actions can transform society."³⁰⁴ In its aim and objective the task is universal and depends on the universal values of care and consideration for every human being's right to live. This is the key for meaningful research in the 21st century. On this basis, I now introduce the work of Sen and Dworkin. They claim that moral principles exist which lie above an apparent justified jurisprudence.

3.3 Relationship between Sen and Dworkin

I will now compare the works of Amartya Sen and Ronald Dworkin's *Taking Rights*

³⁰⁰ Sen, 1970, *op.cit.*, leaning on Nash, 1950. See Chapter four, in particular the statistics on 'missing woman' in Drèze and Sen, 1989, *op.cit.*.

³⁰¹ See Drèze and Sen, *op.cit.*, Chapter five. For instance, the failure of the relief system to prevent dramatic increases in mortality during the two famines which occurred in India at the end of the 19th century, is due to the colonial view, that "while the duty of Government is to save life, it is not bound to maintain the labouring community at its normal level of comfort, however low that level of comfort is in the first place", circular of the Government of India No. 44F, 9th June 1883. See Drèze and Sen, 1989, page 124.

³⁰² Drèze and Sen, 1989, *op.cit.*, page 267.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, page 273.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, page 279.

*Seriously*³⁰⁵. This is to show how amenable ethical thought and work, or a programme of work, is to philosophical reflection. Sen and Dworkin, after all, once ran a celebrated Oxford series of lectures on such issues. Sen develops an underlying theory to restructure the traditional analysis of famines, which were only based on food supply, and therefore inadequate for truly useful policy making. Sen's alternative method of analysis tries to incorporate the social and economic complexities which lead to starvation. He calls this an 'entitlement approach', based on the idea that every human being should be entitled to enough food in order not to starve, and that the command over entitlement has failed if people do starve. Technical economic analysis is useful to find the background information in general, but over-emphasis on detailed work on statistics distracts attention from the centre of the issue. The right of the individual to entitlement, in Sen's work entitlement to food, shelter, medical care and education, is an array of social rights in society as the whole. Instead of being isolated, it should also be built within the legal rights of the society as a whole. It is the question of law and society that links him with Dworkin.

Dworkin applies his own work to a number of pressing practical issues such as civil disobedience and political discrimination, while at the same time he continues a searching and detailed inquiry into general questions of social and legal theory. Complex arguments suggest that utilitarianism and legal positivism, that have dominated Anglo-American legal philosophy for centuries, are even incapable of dealing with clichés in political thinking. The questions - what is law, who must obey it and when - are again on the political agenda as uncertainty about injustice creates concerns for the public as a whole. Dworkin explains legal positivism and utilitarianism, the two ruling theories [of law] which insist on their independence.

The first is a theory about what law is; ... it is a theory about the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of a proposition of law. This is the theory of legal positivism, which holds that the truth of legal propositions consists in facts about the rules that have been adopted by specific social institutions, and in nothing else. The second is a theory about what the law ought to be, and how the familiar legal institutions ought to behave. This is the theory of utilitarianism, which holds that law and its institutions should serve the general welfare, and nothing else.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁵ Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*. London: Duckworth, 1976; and Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famines*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.

Dworkin criticises such prevailing theory as insufficient and proclaims the need for normative consideration. Its normative part must treat a theory of legislation, of adjudication, and of compliance. Only then can a normative question be looked at from "the standpoint of a lawmaker, a judge, and an ordinary citizen."³⁰⁷ Legislation becomes legitimate when individual circumstances are accounted for. The theory of adjudication "must contain a theory of controversy, which sets out standards that judges should use to decide hard cases at law, and a theory of jurisdiction, which explains why and when judges, rather than other groups or institutions, should make the decisions required by the theory of controversy."³⁰⁸ Compliance means to include in the discussion "the nature and limits of the citizen's duty to obey the law in different forms of state, and under different circumstances", responding with different categories of enforcement and punishment.³⁰⁹

Dworkin accepts that the interdependence of the various parts of a general theory of law are complex, but stresses that they need to be seen within an overall dependence. There may be different sorts of argument, depending on which point of view is reflected in the judgement. For example, a collective goal that normally provides a justification for a political decision does not justify a particular disadvantage to some individual, whilst economic rights for industrialists may not protect the most disadvantaged group of a particular population. Dworkin suggests that the rights of concern and respect are fundamental among human rights, "because it is the source both of the general authority of collective goals and of the special limitations on their authority that justify more particular rights."³¹⁰ Dworkin's greatest achievement is to show how "the same conception of equal concern that justifies the trade-offs characteristic of economic collective goals also justifies exemption, in the form of economic rights, for those who suffer most from those trade-offs."³¹¹

The link between Dworkin and Sen is based on the following. Dworkin asks for a conception of different levels of need which brings the sacrifices of the suffering into perspective. There are issues of moral principle that lie above an apparent justified jurisprudence. "Jurisprudence should respond to this concern by exploring the nature

³⁰⁶ Dworkin, *ibid.*, page VII.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, page VIII.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

³¹⁰ Dworkin, *ibid.*, XV.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*

of moral argument, trying to clarify the principle of fairness."³¹² Dworkin has in mind, in common with Sen, the manifestation of the dignity of the individual, which should in the case of law not be disadvantaged because of, for example, collective economic goals. The natural right of human dignity surpasses any jurisdiction including that of constitutional legality.

Dworkin and Sen each step out of the persistent context of prevailing political policies, and critique their outdatedness without destroying the legal political system in operation in any given society. The underlying legal legitimised structures need only revision in the case of Dworkin and Sen. Both speak universally of aiming at a method which is respectful of any society's structure. The operation of the legal system results a free space of normative judgement. Changes become relevant when the legal system in question loses touch, so to speak, with the actuality of circumstances, for example the need of the poor. Although each system may deal differently with problems of starvation and hunger, the essential question of Sen's entitlement depends on whether within any system there exists an entitlement made available by normative jurisprudence.

The international aspects of world hunger are extensive. The execution of entitlement is an international demand based on normative considerations, and as such a non-measurable factor unlike the measure of a quantity of food. For Sen there is no need for an plethora of statistics regarding quantities of food or deaths or shortages. The facts are given and independent of a quantitative assessment. The normative evaluation arises out of obvious cases of starvation. As Dworkin refutes a longstanding tradition of Bentham, Sen introduces a new way of thinking which repudiates the teachings of Smith.³¹³ The break with both schools of thought is essential when facing modern challenges, such as feeding the poor and advocating non-racial justice. Sen and Dworkin recognise the need to revise traditional thought in order to make progress with relevant problems of the present which need urgent attention. Both authors deal with the ethical question: "why do we not owe each other even the minimal accounts of positive sympathy and solidarity that would make

³¹² *Ibid.*, page 5.

³¹³ Utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham rejected rights-based moral theories in ethical literature, describing the various doctrines as 'simple nonsense' and other disfigurations; see Sen, 1987, page 48. Despite the dominance of utilitarianism in ethics, rights-based theories have been revived by Rawls, 1971, Dworkin, 1978, for example. Adam Smith's "*The Wealth of Nations*", 1776, is responsible for the exploitation politics of the imperial powers, which is still today. The Brandt report claims that it is responsible for the poverty in the Third World.

it hard for us to cultivate irresponsible complacency."³¹⁴ Generally, the reaction to the enormity of the tragedy is a "calamity to which the world has, somewhat incredibly, got coolly accustomed", but there is, "in fact, little reason for presuming that the terrible problems of hunger and starvation in the world cannot be changed by human action."³¹⁵ Sen and Drèze are concerned with exploring and clarifying what can be done and how, and so does Dworkin within the realm of legal philosophy. Sen does not use terms like normative or moral, but Dworkin asks for a moral behaviour based on two forms of social morality, which he calls "concurrent" and "conventional" morality:

A community displays a concurrent morality when its members are agreed in asserting the same, or much the same, normative rule, but they do not count the fact of their agreement as an essential part of their grounds for asserting that rule. It displays a conventional morality when they do. . . . The social rule must be weakened so as to apply only to cases of conventional morality. It must be held to apply only in cases, like some games, when it is accepted by the participants that if a duty is controversial it is no duty at all.³¹⁶

Sen, Drèze and Dworkin share in common the aim of a complementary, soft revolution in theory to prevent the gap between theory and practice to increase. After the study of these authors, the following question arises: Who, however, is this "starving individual"? Is he or she merely starving, perhaps in some way "entitled"? Or does this almost abstract person have personality? Here we look at Barbara Harrell-Bond's work on refugee assistance.

Harrell-Bond investigates the effectiveness of aid programmes organised by international agencies, which operate with large sums of money. To whom are these assistance programmes accountable? How will global practice mirror her theory?

3.4 Harrell-Bond and the deprivation of choice in naming deprivation

This study helps us to find out how we can address cultural considerations: the global environment consists of a multitude of different cultures.

³¹⁴ Drèze and Sen, 1989, *op.cit.*, page 276.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*

Barbara Harrell-Bond deals with international systemic aid, and concentrates on rural refugees and rural refugee relief work in Central Africa. By choosing a case study such as the refugees who came from Uganda into the Yei River District in Southern Sudan, beginning in 1979, she avoids the often urban and elite biases profiled in aid literature.³¹⁷ The research concentrates on the usually ill-considered, vast majority in Africa, who are rural, less well-educated and 'definitely' poor. Despite its sometimes shocking revelations, the book attempts not to feed destructive cynicism but to "augment and improve" aid assistance.³¹⁸ The focal point is aid for refugees, because Chambers predicted "that between now and the year 2004, another twelve to fifty million 'mass distress migrants' in Africa will require assistance, their movements caused by war, civil disturbance, persecution, food shortage, and famine. Meanwhile, relief budgets climb and humanitarian agencies proliferate."³¹⁹ The two types of international aid agencies considered are the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and non-governmental (NGOs) or international voluntary services. It is Harrell-Bond's objective to describe the actual situation, the impact of the assistance groups and their interconnectedness. The main focus is on the economic impact of the aid programmes, because the aim of such programmes is to help refugees to become economically independent. The research concludes with a questioning of effectiveness: "The development, the role of voluntary agencies and international organizations, and the impact of outside interventions and funds on the capacity of host governments to manage their own affairs."³²⁰

Whilst it is a study of emergency assistance to refugees, the book argues "that the very concept, refugee, may be an artificial category maintained more for the convenience of donors than for the people involved."³²¹ The managing and accounting of the large amounts of money is a central point of the debate. Large and bureaucratic UN agencies seem less effective than NGOs, but here again NGOs are competing among themselves for contracts provided by the UN (the UNHCR). There is great difficulty in assessing the capacity of the NGOs, because they are not accountable. Help is based on humanitarian ideology, proclaiming a moral

³¹⁶ Dworkin, *op.cit.*, page 53.

³¹⁷ Barbara E. Harrell-Bond, *Imposing Aid, Emergency Assistance to Refugees*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, see foreword by Robert Chambers.

³¹⁸ Harrell-Bond, *ibid.*, page IX.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, page XII.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, page XVI.

³²¹ *Ibid.*

supremacy which becomes undeniable. According to Harrell-Bond, "compassion overshadows logic and fact, ... the assumptions that lie behind compassion are often based upon false premises. Western notions of compassion tend to be inherently ethnocentric, paternalistic, and non-professional."³²² Humanitarian help therefore is a struggle for 'moral supremacy'.

The refugee cases discussed in Harrell-Bond are used like victims for the claim of virtue. Without the publicised fame of humanitarian aid cases no public claim for virtue can be made. The climbing of the ladder of fame as a moral entrepreneur - for example the motive of becoming a Nobel Prize winner - is based on the very same victims, who should instead be helped without selfish motives. The process of humanitarian help, according to Harrell-Bond, comes always too late and is insufficient. But a stage is set up where humanitarian actors can fulfil their role. In a way, it can be said, that the camps of the refugees are human arsenals, depending on their benefactors' will and manipulation.

Harrell-Bond proclaims a new way of participation in aid, which includes a more central role in decision-making by the host government and the people in need. There is a need to cut out the cynicism of agency workers concerning the capabilities of the refugees to be able to help themselves.³²³ Harrell-Bond wants research that is not based on theoretical discussions, so called in-house reports, "filled with jargon, terminology borrowed from policy-makers, but not re-examined."³²⁴ Western relief programme management often does not work in close partnership with the local administration, which is partially based on a lack of trust, but leads to an institutional degradation of the host governments, which are therefore left incapable of carrying on - or creating their own - programmes after the humanitarians have left.³²⁵ The top down approach is a colonial attitude which does not lead to any long term solution.³²⁶ It can be compared with the domestic welfare crisis where the system enables a dependency which in the end it is not able to maintain. Harrell-Bond sends out a warning: "*Imposing aid can never be successful.* And if this course is pursued further, humanitarian workers will only continue to contribute to the breakdown of

³²² *Ibid.*, page 26.

³²³ *Ibid.*, page 139.

³²⁴ *Ibid.*, page 365.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, page 67.

³²⁶ Barbara Harrell-Bond gives the example of 'expatriates' who get jobs in humanitarian agencies without appropriate qualifications and receive non-appropriate salaries; called the 'nomenclature expert'. Whites are kept abroad by the home government (Britain) in order to not further flood the domestic unemployment market.

societies, which in turn will call for greater and more terrifying methods of controlling them."³²⁷

Harrell-Bond argues that specific "prescriptions, actions, can only be determined when humanitarians are convinced through the logic of morality to become *facilitators*, to use their resources, money, skills, influence, and energy, to facilitate those changes in the circumstances of the poor which the poor themselves have determined as the next best thing for them to do."³²⁸ Harrell-Bond's report was published in the 1980s and it seems her revelation remained widely unnoticed. In a recent book by George Ayittey, an African writer in 1998, we learn that the situation between Africa and donor countries became worse instead of beginning to improve. Ayittey gives the following account:

Over the past two decades, helping Africa became a growth industry. A swarm of fly-by-night "experts" emerged who falsely professed vast knowledge of the continent after a mere one day stay at an African airport and returned to dispense expensive vile counsel. In 1989, for example, technical assistance/co-operation amounted to \$3.2 billion - or one-quarter of total official development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, according to a 1993 UNDP study. ... Much of what many Western experts know about African issues often tends to be pitifully shallow and naive. Needless to say, Western assistance programs, though laudable and well intentioned, often ended up as enormous and costly failures because of faulty analysis.³²⁹

The IPE of aid analysed by Harrell-Bond and Ayittey demonstrates the subjective worth of 'refugees', counterposed against the manipulation of moral virtue for the sake of personal glorification of a Western individual, group or state. But is this to be caricaturised as a mere wickedness of the Western groups? Is there some matter of clashing subjectivities here, in short something to do with the presence of different cultural factors? This question leads me to engage in culture - related analysis, choosing primarily the studies of James Manor.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, page 366.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*

³²⁹ George B. N. Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998, page 273.

3.5 James Manor and culture

Never before was the recognition of cultures as important than under the process of globalization. Cultures are becoming as important as different craftsmen for a building site. James Manor explicitly calls for such recognition.

At first glance James Manor's study concerns Third World politics during the time of the Cold War, but in a wider context he addresses the greater problem of theory building and academic research in the political and social sciences. Since the 1960s researchers generated a large amount of empirical work which became increasingly difficult to analyse, and therefore paradigms were found to overcome the problem of sorting and analysing the material. The methodology of paradigm-setting produced a rational sorting system which could operate from a defined point of view. The study of Third World politics relied on two paradigms or schools of thought, one called political development, the other dependency theory. Ayittey explains: "The 'political development' school yielded plenty of important insights, but it tended to misperceive both present and past realities and future possibilities. ... It often emphasised stability at the expense of change and social justice. Many in this school made simplistic contrasts between 'tradition' and 'modernity', and tended to underestimate the diversity among Third World countries, the importance of political economy within nations and of the international economic order."³³⁰ The 'dependency' school saw primarily the economic dependency, dependency on economic, international forces, as the most valuable area to acknowledge when analysing Third World problems. Concentrating on this limited focus, the research did not consider politics and the cultural and historical particularities within nations.

The Cold War terminology was based on the dichotomy of two super powers, one the East and one the West. This was a primary issue because an artificial equilibrium diffused the fear of the WW III allegory. Third World politics were a shadow issue which served for propaganda purposes to demonstrate influence and alliance when needed.³³¹

³³⁰ James Manor, *Rethinking Third World Politics*. London and New York: Longman, 1991, page 1.

³³¹ See further, Gorm Rye Olsen, "Do Ethics Matter in International Aid? A discussion of morality as a determinant of European aid to Sub-Saharan Africa in the post-cold war era", paper presented at the Second Pan-European Conference in IR, Paris 13-16 September, 1995.
See also, Hamish McRae, *The World in 2020, Power, Culture and Prosperity: A Vision of the Future*, Harper Collins Publishers, London 1995.

Responsible for this artificial generalisation has been the term "Third World", which simply categorises a part of the world as being placed on a third rank of achievement.

The term 'Third World' was first coined by the French demographer, Alfred Sauvy, who used *tiers monde* the way the French have always used the term '*tiers état*', the 'third estate' of pre-revolutionary France. The first estate was the nobility, the second the clergy and the third everybody else, including the bourgeoisie, artisans, trades people and many others who were certainly not poor. After all, many groups made up society at large within any given system of order. Every group had its responsibilities and duties to fulfil in order to contribute to the whole of society. In particular the third category provided the first two with the means to exist.

It is a good distinction to keep in mind these days when the expression "Third World" tends to evoke indiscriminate misery. The First World consists of developed market-economy countries represented in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The "Second World" was sometimes used to refer to the former socialist countries of the North, the former USSR and its satellites.³³² The Third World became the synonym for deprived countries within the global categories of power. The general perception of the Third World as underdeveloped and dependent created a vicious circle in the configuration of truth.

The historic events in the late 1980s and the early 1990s have created a more complex world. According to McRae the "end of the Cold War has destroyed the uneasy balance between First and Second World, while great social and economic changes have blown away the concept of the Third World as a clear geographic identity. The Third World has moved to parts of Los Angeles and the First World to Singapore."³³³

Manor points out that in "their eagerness to set agendas for Third World regimes, members of the two schools were often distracted from learning what was actually happening within and around those regimes."³³⁴ According to Manor, paradigms are not only modes of analysis but are at the same time ideologies. As ideologies, they aim for monopolistic claims of truth and their own world-view. Once these

³³² Information taken from John Bennett, *The Hunger Machine*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987, page 5. See in addition, Jeff Haynes, *Religion, Globalization and Political Culture in the Third World*. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 1993, page 25.

³³³ McRae, *op.cit.*, page 269.

ideologies have settled down within the methodological process of research they become an un--questioned norm and the basis for analyses. The value of analyses becomes void due to false parameters set in the first place. Geoffrey Hawthorn explains how 'Third World politics' is not a single subject, where one set of questions deliver one set of answers. The lack of practical effectiveness and theoretical meaningfulness demonstrates that Third World Politics continue to escape any real conceptual net.³³⁵ Therefore theory needs renewal, and there is the need for a new analytical tack. According to Hawthorn:

One cannot simply extrapolate from conventional understandings of politics in the First (and perhaps also in the Second) World to the Third. But the bounds of the political are themselves changing in the First World (and in the second), and in so doing, are undermining what agreed understanding there has recently been even there.³³⁶

The Third World has the following common problems. Hawthorn explains how after their independence, countries had to construct themselves politically, they had to construct their 'state' by claiming control over a certain space and to claim a particular identity for the subjects living in that space. The method for the ideology of statehood was the sentiment of nationalism, which builds on pre-existing sentiments of ethnicity, language and religion. In order to maintain their political position they had to increase their national income. Apart from the political occupation of space and the assumption of unilateral 'imaginary communities', the second aim of Third World countries was the economic aspect of development. Modern liberty proclaims the independence of the individual within the community. In the Western free market economy the individual plays an integral part in economic growth and industrial entrepreneurship. The interests which drive modern liberty depend upon free commerce. But as Hawthorn explains, "in the Third World, commerce and industry and their conditions have themselves often been created by what can be seen as the violence of the state. This is why and how the two problems facing third World countries, the political and the economic, are connected."³³⁷ Modern economy coexists with archaic politics.

³³⁴ Manor, *op.cit.*, page 2.

³³⁵ Geoffrey Hawthorn, "Waiting for a Text?: Comparing Third World Politics", in: *Rethinking Third World Politics*, James Manor, (ed.), *op.cit.*

³³⁶ Hawthorn, *ibid.*, page 29.

³³⁷ Hawthorn, *ibid.*, page 28.

Furthermore, civil societies have not been established in many parts of the Third World. This is certainly of significance when examining social space. Those in power face less resistance from a weak civil society.³³⁸ Any analysis of the Third World, according to Hawthorn, should try to understand:

How those in power in each country (and those who seek it) have formulated their ambition; how they (or their predecessors) have framed constitutions and formed institutions to realise these ends; how, imaginatively and practically, they have actually used them; and what difficulties they have met in so doing.³³⁹

It would be wrong to consider the state in Africa or Asia as a simple product of the colonial powers. Bayart points out that Third World states rest in reality on their own social foundations and have structural roots.³⁴⁰ Instead of concentrating on analysing the political problem of occupying the 'social space' and then of the legitimising of that space, or of analysing the problem of engineering economic development, it is important to understand more of the actual people's terms for nationhood and development. Bayart suggests that "simplistic and univocal interpretations such as those of 'dependency' and 'modernisation' be dispensed with."³⁴¹ According to Kaviraj, modernisation theories give rise to a largely parallel illusion in the analysis of social change. "It is one of their serious drawbacks to encourage the notion that it is only modernity which has institutions, and it is only modernity which is rational."³⁴² According to Kaviraj, modernity does not build institutions in an empty space: there is always an existing structure to be undermined. In order to understand some of the present problems with Third World issues, "it is necessary to think in ways that are undetermined by the dominant myths and narrative strategies of nationalist historiography".³⁴³ In the case of India, society was subjected to a complete vocabulary of liberal rights in the economic and social fields in order to make the economic part of the social world tractable and amenable to modern control.³⁴⁴

³³⁸ *Ibid.*, page 31.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, page 33.

³⁴⁰ Jean-François Bayart. "Finishing with the Idea of the Third World: The Concept of the Political Trajectory", in James Manor, (ed.), *Rethinking Third World Politics*. London and New York: Longman, 1991.

³⁴¹ Bayart, *ibid.*, page 55.

³⁴² Sudipta Kaviraj, "On State, Society and Discourse in India", in James Manor, (ed.), *Rethinking Third World Politics*. London and New York: Longman, 1991, page 73.

³⁴³ Kaviraj, *ibid.*, page 73.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, page 79.

In the case of India, the impersonal nature of public power licenced a relatively small elite to impose their ideals on others who did not necessarily share them. Dependency theory remains, therefore, a partial and negative and residual description, indicating the West's 'other' and inventing a partial version of what is right and wrong.³⁴⁵ The aim is to deal "with an 'intellectual compass' rather than a single unified 'theoretical map' in which everything is already fitted into place and defined forever."³⁴⁶

The aim is also to go beyond a structural determinism of a universal type, in which individual or national histories are mere illustrations of general laws. Garreton asks for the development of "a flexible scheme of determinations among the economic model, the political model, the social determination or relation among these dimensions. Such determinations or relations vary for each national case and for each historical moment."³⁴⁷ There exists no 'one' alternative paradigm to those holding sway in previous decades, but rather only analytical frameworks and conceptual openings. The task is to undo the idea that a given economic system corresponds necessarily to a determined political or cultural form, or vice versa. Garreton concludes the problematic as it presents itself: "People are seeking adequate modes of participation, solutions to individual and collective problems, the reformulation of the state's role, the questioning of traditional forms of representation, the absence of global ideological frameworks, the need to belong (combined with individualism), etc."³⁴⁸

Not only is the crisis, as the former examples have shown, a crisis between Western political and economic dictates, which one could call a horizontal confrontation which takes place on the axis of one unilateral historic time frame, it is also a crisis in the sense of vertical historicity. Manor contributes to the process of rethinking Third World politics by examining the Tiananmen Square events in China. This example shows how formal rules of law and government are overruled by the execution of a symbolic but painful contest between the discretionary monopoly of the hitherto ruling group and the influence of Western liberal ideas, considered a "spiritual pollution". The confrontations derive from the invisible power structure of the centre, based on the feudal belief that common people are by nature greedy,

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, page 97.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, page 102.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, page 103.

egotistical and oblivious to national interests and therefore quite self-destructive if left to their own devices. China's governing body represents a paternal authority and uses, as shown in the massacre at Tiananmen Square, strict punishment as an educational advice. The "cleaning of the spiritual pollution" was explained to the public as a "loving act" of parental love towards their children. The core ideal of the traditional Chinese policy is the unification of thinking, which is by its very nature based on conformity. In the case of China, Wagner supports Manor's claim that dependency or political development theories cannot produce an adequate explanation of politics outside the First World sphere.³⁴⁹

Manor and others imply that research should concentrate on developing our comprehension of the nature of politics in the varied societies of the world, as, in most cases, it is evident that the most common problems connected to poverty are found at the beginning of the 21st century in Sub-Saharan Africa, countries which distinguish themselves in their indigenous rather than 'colonised' identities.

This is to make a case for cultural considerations. Within IR these have been either slightly tentative or completely absent. One exception has been the work of the Anglo-Chinese scholar, Stephen Chan. Although I am delivering the customary genuflection of student to master, I will be introducing some of his previous work in this field in the following chapter.

3.6 Conclusion

In chapter three I reassert ethics outside IR and IPE. Frey's concept of a new political economy, expressed already in the 1980s the interdependence of socio-political-economic manifestations. He initiates a critique which is taken seriously by Sen and Drèze, when they introduce an ethical concern to development economics. The reassertion of ethics in Development Studies is concerned with the following question. How can the discrepancy between rich and poor become sufficiently assimilated in order to accommodate people with the basic requirements of

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, page 110.

³⁴⁹ Rudolf Wagner, "Political Institutions, Discourse and Imagination in China at Tiananmen" in James Manor (ed.), *Rethinking Third World Politics*, *op.cit.*

livelihood, enabling them to have nutrition, shelter and be contentment? This concern should certainly more explicitly characterise the related disciplines of IPE.

It is in this search for development that the work of social scientists Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze is exceptional. The distance that has grown between economics and ethics is unfortunate because it has created over the past decades a growing gap between rich and poor. It has also created a growing misunderstanding of social, environmental and cultural circumstances, which should be accounted for in a theory which needs to be more than an intellectual play on words. Sen's 'entitlement approach' is an approach to life and Manor's studies on culture define the multifaceted layers of human existence, based on the recognition that a person is surrounded by an interrelated net of duties, rights, expectations, dreams. Dworkin's analysis of the importance of establishing relevant background theories before arriving at a judgement, clarifies the need for a similar methodology when talking about globally interrelated issues in the political, economic or social sphere. Ethics belong to economics in order to narrow the gap between theory and practice.

The next chapter returns to IR and IPE theory in order to search for methods of discourse. What can I expect from the most scientific method ever invented, the so-called Rational Choice Theory (RCT)? So much has been written about it. Is it still a method for the future or is it outdated? In Chapter Three, I have written about cultural concerns. Now I need to see if this concern was given consideration in IR and IPE, and if, therefore, it has led to some progress in theory.

Chapter 4

Search for methods of discourse

Main points of this chapter

Rational choice theory (RCT)

The understanding of rational choice, a homage to Michael Nicholson

Culture and its place in IR and IPE

The antidotes to problems of discourse, Dasgupta and Chan

Conclusion

Main points of this chapter

- *RCT succeeds in narrowing down the issue*
- *The elimination of cultural and personal bias simplifies analysis*
- *In contrast to RCT, which narrows the field of investigation for practical reason, some authors try to widen the issue in order to relate theory to practice*
- *The variety of culture is important as an interrelated building block of global society*
- *Chan's fight for the acceptance of the 'other'*

4.1 *The search for methods of discourse: Rational Choice Theory*

Having come this far in establishing the presence or absence, or insufficiently founded nature of ethics in IR, IPE and other disciplines also concerned with global issues, I wish now to return to IR. I do this via another genealogy: that of the rational as IR's prerequisite for the cultural – and culturally – acceptable ethical. Nicholson remains IR's main protagonist of rational foundations for thought on the international and global; but what is ethical, as others have argued, may not always be dominated by the rational, i.e. there may be, according to some of those presented in this chapter, no uncompromised hegemony of the purely rational.

IR and IPE share the difficulties within social sciences regarding the application of scientific method, and what for example Morgenthau faced after WWII, were problems of prediction and control, accuracy in observation, clarity in definition, elimination of cultural and personal bias - just to mention some of the scientific criteria for research - leaving him and others with the use of their imagination in creating hypotheses.³⁵⁰

Despite these 'failures', during Morgenthau's prime time of influence IR theory became a Cold War subject.³⁵¹ 'Realism', a political doctrine which might be debatable, became associated with 'realistic', which is a quality of judgement most people want to possess. Its success lies in the reliability of predictability, one could also call it its trustworthiness.³⁵² Power became the hallmark of the discipline in America. There was not much academic work done on diplomatic history, researching the reasons for wars; and economics played only a minor role in the analysis, while the hunger for power replaced the concern for peaceful change.³⁵³ The conditions of the post-war years, the so-called Cold War, became propitious for the concept of the anarchy of states and the balance of power strategy. This strategy created, by its very nature, a theory of future action, by way of deterrent. The so-called arms race determined future supremacy based on material accountability.

³⁵⁰ Regarding debates over methods, see Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (1969), includes the paper of Hedley Bull, 'International Theory: the Case for a Classical Approach' and Morton Kaplan's reply 'The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations'; see further, Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

³⁵¹ Writings on Morgenthau: Peter Gellmann, 'Hans Morgenthau and the Legacy of Political Realism', 1988; A.J. Murray, 'The Moral Politics of Hans Morgenthau', 1996.

³⁵² See, Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations*. Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997, chapter two.

³⁵³ President Dwight Eisenhower of Columbia University established with William T. R. Fox an 'Institute of War and Peace Studies' in 1950. This should have served as a reminder of the contribution IR might make to the prevention of the next war.

Jim George states that the making of Western modernity whereby Western modernity "is conceived of as emerging out of the darkness of primitive myth toward the brilliant light of the Greek classical age, out of the dark ages of Aristotelian and Christian speculation toward the dawning of modern consciousness in the European Renaissance and the age of science."³⁵⁴ It is in this sense that IPE uses rational choice theory to provide a scientific procedure of truth finding. RCT wants to forecast the decision making of an 'actor', which can be an individual, a group or an institution.

The method relies on constructivist fundamentals, where rules bridge agents and structure; according to Roberts, rules foster rational choice, they enable agency and "stable arrangements", because authors construct agents *a priori*, denying "the social, historical, cultural, and economic context of the formation of preferences"³⁵⁵ Rules are constituted, because by their very nature they always involve some manner and degree of domination and exploitation, denying "a socially and culturally defined rationality."³⁵⁶ IPE theorists use rational choice as a tool of wisdom in coming to terms with the problem of defining the complex interrelations of the international political and economic power apparatus. The method of rational choice reflects the research mentality of Western society, "a mentality conditioned and increasingly committed by its circumstances to expect and to look actively for problems to formulate to solve, rather than for an accepted consensus without argument."³⁵⁷

RCT is based on Western scientific understanding which relies on the following methods:

- 1) the simple postulation established in the mathematical sciences,
- 2) the experimental exploration and measurement of more complex observable relations,
- 3) the hypothetical construction of analogical models,
- 4) the ordering of variety by comparison and taxonomy,

although, as stated by Olson and Groom, in some other American contexts, it seemed designed more to help win the next war. Olson and Groom, *op.cit.*, page 121.

³⁵⁴ Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics: Critical (Re)introduction of International Relations*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, page 44; George refers to the following references: J. Findley, *Four Stages of Growth*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966; and Snell, B., *The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of Modern Thought*. Trans. by T. Rosenmayer. New York: Harper and Row, 1960.

³⁵⁵ James C. Roberts, The Rational Constitution of Agents and Structures, in, *Constituting International Political Economy*, Kurt Burch and Robert A. Denemark (eds.). International Political Economy Yearbook, vol. 10. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, page 163.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, page 164.

³⁵⁷ Ian Hacking, Language, Truth and Reason, in *Rationality and Relativism*, (eds.) Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, first printed 1982, page 50.

- 5) the statistical analysis of regularities of populations and the calculus of probabilities, and
- 6) the historical derivation of genetic development.

The first three of these methods concern essentially the science of individual regularities, and the second three the science of populations ordered in space and time.³⁵⁸

It is argued that the benefit of a scientific inquiry is the predictability of the result, and makes the exercise 'reasonable' when dealing, as in the case of IPE, with a complex interdependence of politics and the growth of transnational actors and decision makers. The adoption of neoclassical economics in the words of Ormerod is an "apparent mathematical sophistication, the core model of theoretical economics, that of competitive general equilibrium, is premised upon an entirely faulty view of the modern world."³⁵⁹

The Western tradition has systematically evolved systems of reasoning, which, once established, defend their position and oppose change. Hacking explains the problems with "arch-rationalist believers" and "right-thinking people", which have often been "narrow, blinkered and insensitive to foreign insights", which have "repressed our own deviant and original thinkers, condemning many to irretrievable oblivion", and have compelled people to reason in approved ways and therefore limited their potentialities for novelty.³⁶⁰ Hedley Bull endorsed the classical scientific approach with his critique: "My ... final proposition is that the practitioners of the scientific approach, by cutting themselves off from history and philosophy, have deprived themselves of the means of self-criticism, and in consequence have a view of their subject and its possibilities that is callow and brash."³⁶¹ The scientific rationalist approach holds that international theories should mirror the reality of world politics. As Der Derian puts it: "Rationalists cling to the faith that there is an objective reality out there that is waiting for the right method to come along and in the name of scientific progress make use of, make sense of, give order to it."³⁶² RCT fails to take

³⁵⁸ Hacking, *ibid.*, page 50.

³⁵⁹ Paul Ormerod, *The Death of Economics*. London: Faber and Faber, 1994, page 208.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, page 52.

³⁶¹ Hedley Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach", in *World Politics*, vol. 18: 3 April, 1966, pp 361-377.

³⁶² James Der Derian, "Post-Theory: The Eternal Return of Ethics in International Relations", in *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, (eds.) Michael L. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, page 57.

account of everything which cannot be framed by scientific definition; in particular in respect of non-static events such as historical change, where additional components of analysis are included. Doyle and Ikenberry observe that "political leaders, like all individuals, have complex motivations; moral values mix with numerous competing as well as compatible material concerns, both personally and politically."³⁶³

According to Scanlon's research, one other motive for RCT besides accountability, seems the drives for justification which are as strong as the increase of power, profit and prestige. Scanlon points out that there is "a desire to be able to justify our actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject"³⁶⁴, which leads to contest with our fellow citizens on the various levels of private and public life. For example, when representing our states, it leads to competition and co-operation with other representatives of other states. Rational decision-making is defined by Kegley and Raymond as an "idealized portrayal of decision making that assumes people have preferences and, when faced with two or more alternatives, will choose the one that yields the preferred outcome."³⁶⁵ Theorists assume that forecasts are quite successful, errors being random in character. But, as Gill explains in the case of GPE, this "assumption implies the existence of, and general popular access to a 'basically correct' model of politico-economic behaviour of expectations about governments, firms and households. In practice, economists and governments disagree over what this model is! Since much investment is international in nature and capital markets are linked, such models need to encompass the behaviour of foreign governments, especially those where capital is to be invested, and more generally those whose economies are the largest and most important in the global political economy. Thus any adequate theory of expectations has to encompass both the 'national' and the 'international' level. Rational expectations theorists have so far done little to construct an economic policy model."³⁶⁶

What are rational choice authors trying to achieve? Within their framework of choice they try to achieve maximisation of certain values. The assumption is that the values are clearly stated and that there is not a problem about the hierarchy of values.

³⁶³ Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, *Introduction to New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, (eds.) Doyle and Ikenberry. *ibid.*, page 9.

³⁶⁴ Thomas Scanlon, "Contractarianism and Utilitarianism", in *Utilitarianism and Beyond*, (eds.) by Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 116. For discussion, see Michael Walzer, *Interpretation and Social Criticism*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987, pp 46-48.

³⁶⁵ Charles W. Kegley, Jr and Gregory A. Raymond, *How Nations make Peace*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999, page 259.

The priorities become specified; instead of maximising the value, rational choice theorists try to justify the minimum of value. The rational is part of human understanding but is not all human understanding. The rational paradigm prescribes a way of action which aims to maximize the achievement of a certain goal. The subject under study seeks the maximum of control over its environment in order that the minimum of value cannot be eroded. Out of the need for control boundaries are firmly established which divide spheres of conflicting interests. Haas explains this process by the example of organisation theory: "Boundary maintenance is therefore crucial, whether the environment is envisaged as being made up of customers, suppliers, competitors, political clients, or other bureaucracies. Although it is understood that the organisation must satisfy those environmental forces on which the organisation depends, maximum attainable control over them is seen as the best way to achieve autonomy. Autonomy, in turn, is valuable because it guarantees the survival of the organisation in a competitive setting."³⁶⁷ The overall purpose of the decision-making process is to improve, maximise or at least satisfy the actor's main mission. Max Weber called it "technically rational" and "efficiency-seeking".³⁶⁸ The overall value of the rational is that it relies on the boundaries of its rational environment. Haas calls it bounded rationality which dominates decision making. In respect of international organisations, Haas concludes that programmes "cannot be assessed and evaluated by masters and clients in a technically rational manner."³⁶⁹

4.2 The understanding of rational choice, explained by Nicholson

To write about rational choice in IR/IPE literature is no easy undertaking. The survey of literature leaves one with the impression that there is no definition, but only some vague description. Rational choice seems to be taken for granted in the literature leading up to the 90s. As an outstanding exception, Michael Nicholson dedicated a full chapter to rational choice theory in "*Causes and Consequences in International Relations*" in 1996. But since the 1970s Nicholson has taken a great interest in rational choice theory and written about it, until his very recent and sudden death in 2001.

³⁶⁶ Stephen Gill and David Law, *The Global Political Economy, Perspectives, Problems and Policies*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988, page 10.

³⁶⁷ Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge is Power*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990, page 29.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

The basic proposition in this programme is that social behaviour can be seen in terms of actors pursuing goals. ... Rational choice analysis leads to deductions, sometimes complex, which imply that various sorts of behaviour will occur which are not at all obvious from the initial assumptions. Whether the correct goals were attributed to the actors or not is determined by whether the conduct deduced from those goals takes place.³⁷⁰

Nicholson explains how rational choice analysis was first used in economics with the analysis of the behaviour of individual economic actors. Due to its advantage of measurability in economics, rational choice according to Nicholson, "penetrated almost every field of the social sciences from the structure of families ... to political theory. ... International relations theorists have used rational choice theory very effectively. It is now commonplace, particular among scholars of strategic studies."³⁷¹ Of particular importance has been the interpretation of issues in terms of concepts, with ambitions not just to explain but predict. This process was easy on the formulas of realism, which is by its very nature a decision-centred approach, where the state is a unit with one single utility function - the preservation of power.

The preferences of decision making, the so-called goals of the actor, are related to time and space, called environment, and rely on rules, "which are derived from the goals that dictate the choice of the act under certain conditions."³⁷² It is the factor of the "environment" which is scientifically difficult to fix as a reliable component. Howard used the expression of 'drama theory' to describe the forms of interaction leading to decision-making.³⁷³ Like a drama, actions are unpredictable, the quality of performances depends very much on the actor and the circumstances at one moment in time, the outcomes in a drama are tragic, depending on the targeted goals. Actors in the international system (individual tycoons - governments of the state) pursue goals as self-preservation "and choose accordingly in the light of the constraints which are imposed."³⁷⁴

A whole area of exploration would be appropriate in respect of either the conscious

³⁷⁰ Michael Nicholson, *Causes and Consequences in International Relations. A Conceptual Study*. London: Pinter, 1996. page 150.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, page 151.

³⁷² *Ibid.*, page 152.

³⁷³ Nicholson relates to Nigel Howard who suggested that 'drama theory' is a more appropriate metaphor than 'game theory'; see Nicholson, *ibid.*, page 166.

³⁷⁴ Nicholson, *ibid.*, page 162.

or unconscious articulation of goals. The level of consciousness does interfere with the prior perception of action. The observer's perceptions of the goals are different from those of the actor. "Thus goals determine the rules which are applicable to a given environment and dictate the acts. Given the goals and environment we deduce the acts. This does not mean we can go backwards along the logical trail."³⁷⁵ Often political and economic action is compared with a billiard game³⁷⁶, which creates a game-like attitude towards political and economic outcomes.

One can compare it to generals playing wars in a sand pit. Rational choice analysis creates a framework for explaining decision and choice behaviour, influenced by many variables which are non-rational. Therefore RCT has established an acceptance of variables which need further evaluation. In Nicholson's definition rational choice is designed as an aspect of reality. Whatever else there might be is not explained. Choosing only aspects of human behaviour leads to the question - what kind of human being does this construct? What constitutes social society, what constitutes politics and economics? The choice of RCT determines the narrowness of the outcome of investigation. The reasoning of rational choice is a purely scientific rationality born out of the hyper-allegiance to scientific truth evaluation.³⁷⁷ If we look at the methodology of testing in physics, we observe that changes relate on material components. In a similar way RCT works on the assumption that it can only operate with a set of materialist ideas.

4.3 *Culture and its place in IR and IPE*

In order to talk about culture I adopt the definition of Giddens. He defines culture as follows: "Culture consists of the values held by a given group, the norms they follow and the material goods they create."³⁷⁸ The development and expansion of the West led to the conquest of many parts of the world, radically changing long-established social systems and cultures. Individual cultures are threatened by globalization, but according to Giddens, "cultures hold the key to global problems. ... Values are abstract ideals, while norms are definite principles or rules which people are expected

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, page 165.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁷ Social Sciences were founded on the belief that human interactions within the horizontal as in the vertical structures of society could be analysed like a chemical. Marx, Durkheim, Comte and others talk about social relations as if they were an analogy of physics.

to observe. Norms represent the 'dos' and 'don'ts' of social life."³⁷⁹ There is a wide literature but no consensus about culture. For the purposes of this thesis it can be taken to mean at least three things: 1) culture is a generalised system of values which shapes but also limits the scope of economic behaviour³⁸⁰; 2) it is a set of specific institutions and practices which can reflect a dominant and hegemonic group, i.e. a class or a class fragment as in Gramscian IPE³⁸¹; 3) culture is the actual beliefs, values, practices, the day-to-day ways of giving meaning to social life. Cultures are actually binding practices. According to Giddens, 'culture' "can be conceptually distinguished from 'society', but there are very close connections between these notions. A society is a system of interrelationships which connects individuals together. No cultures could exist without societies. But, equally, no societies could exist without culture. Without culture, we would not be 'human' at all, in the sense in which to express ourselves, no sense of self-consciousness, and our ability to think or reason would be severely limited."³⁸²

Inayatullah and Rupert sketch a corresponding account of the importance of culture in the face of universality. According to Inayatullah and Rupert each culture assumes it lives within a greater whole, to which we may refer as "the universe", and "there is a latent desire in all cultures for physical and temporal extension."³⁸³

In a similar sense the previous introduction into Third World problematic, exemplified by writings from Harrell-Bond, Manor and others³⁸⁴, expresses the significance of cultural differences when interpreting international issues in politics and economics. A collection of essays of Stephen Chan expresses an attempt to create a multicultural paradigm.

Chan chooses the example of *Roshamon*, a film directed by Kurosawa. In this film "several accounts of a crime are presented, each differing according to the involvement of the witness or participant. Each account is, in its own way, a truthful

³⁷⁸ Anthony Giddens, *Sociology*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993, second edition, page 57.

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, page 31.

³⁸⁰ This is how Karl Polanyi uses it and Max Weber in his Protestant Ethics. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. London: Allen and Urwin, 1976. (first pub. 1904-5). Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957.

³⁸¹ Gramsci, *Historical Materialism and International Relations*, Stephen Gill (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

³⁸² Giddens, *op.cit.*, page 32. See also Chapter three.

³⁸³ Stephen J. Rosow, Naem Inayatullah & Mark Rupert, (eds.), *The Global Economy as Critical Space, Critical Perspectives on World Politics*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, p.81.

³⁸⁴ James Manor, (ed.), *Rethinking Third World Politics*. London and New York: Longman, 1991.

one. The viewer may choose from among these subjectivities. If truth is not simply a matter of choice, then the viewer has more work to do. ... (T)he use of the title, *Roshamon*, is simply to summarise the idea of difference and otherness in International Relations, an idea achieved not through a postmodernism, but through the lens of subjective cultures."³⁸⁵ The aim is to establish a theory of IR theory for the future which includes the Third World as part of the analytical and methodological process, and does not treat Third World issues only as part of a superficial dialogue.

According to Chan scholars have started to reflect on the "open-endedness of history and various hybrids of thought in which cultural specificities play a large role."³⁸⁶ As part of the development in IR theory, cultural differences are "being written into Third World studies far more prominently than before."³⁸⁷

The need for a better dialogue with the Third World appears necessary in order to prevent the split between the First and Third World countries, based on the unwillingness of the emerging voice of Third World intellectuals to further accept the Western dictates of analysis. The Western approach to analysis and paradigm building has been based on a discipline towards a system theory which can be widely applied.³⁸⁸ According to Chan, some authors stress the emphasis on the importance of culture in international relations, and declare "that this is the only way by which the Third World might be adequately understood."³⁸⁹

We realise that this distinction has not taken place. It is not the first time in history that the dominance of one system means the relegation of other systems to a subordinate place. The difference is that in the past conflicting epistemologies were not considered, whereas today they would have to be acknowledged.³⁹⁰ A Third World scholar will know of the Cambridge-based Polity Press, but not many English students will have heard, for example, of the Indian publishing house Vikas. Chan

³⁸⁵ Stephen Chan, *Towards a Multicultural Roshamon Paradigm in International Relations*. University of Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, Research Report, No. 74, 1996, page 12.

³⁸⁶ Stephen Chan, "Culture and Absent Epistemologies in the International Relations Discipline", in *Towards a Multicultural Roshomon Paradigm in International Relations. Collected Essays by Stephen Chan*. Tampere Peace Research Institute, Report, No 74, 1996, page 76.

³⁸⁷ Chan. *ibid.*, page 76.

³⁸⁸ For example, Olsen & Groom, 1991, *op.cit.*, despite the fact that the claim for a 'world society' constructs a sort of cobweb, it still is generalized. It is assumed that once a system is defined, it has universal validity. See detailed argumentation in Stephen Chan, "Culture and Absent Epistemologies in the International Relations Discipline", *op.cit.*, page 77.

³⁸⁹ Chan, *ibid.*, page 77.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, page 87, re list of institutes and journals little known of non-anglophon and Third World

delivers a valuable résumé. "In many parts of the world, apparatus and vocabulary have assumed syncretic qualities. The West has its impact - often an extremely large one - but this impact has been mediated by indigenous critique, and sometimes challenged by local epistemic systems, not to mention the local experiential version of International Relations. Their work incorporates ours, if only to refute it or find it insufficient or as a means of parading entrance credentials to the outer reaches of the metropole. Our work contains little or nothing of theirs. To repeat an opening point, the question is not, 'what do they think that is ours?', but 'why is what we think so little of theirs?'"³⁹¹ Chan is here supporting a completely different point of view to the orthodox establishment of IR theory.

In respect of IPE, theory has been persistent until the 90s in reflecting a realist way of thinking. The predominant way of thinking dealt with the traditional vision of state power, which decides who is able to participate in the international game and how. The Bretton Woods agreement of 1944 brought the International Monetary Fund and the first effort towards the World Trade Organisation on stage as tools of international management. The possibility that one country could gain at the cost of another intensified the call for extending the international economic order to the international trading system. Statistics demonstrate a one sidedness of First World dictate and financial success. Griesgraber and Gunter collected evidence, where the "value of world merchandise trade reached an all-time high of over \$3,7 trillion in 1992 [...whereby...] the industrialised countries dominate world trade, accounting for about 70 percent of world trade in recent years. ...[T]rade in manufactures accounts for over 70 percent of international trade, with the remaining amount consisting of primary products."³⁹² In particular the decline of primary products and the related decline in the prices of primary goods is of particular relevance to the developing countries and contributed through the 1980s to trade and debt problems.

Griesgraber and Gunter remark further on the pro First World profit margin established during the Uruguay Round, questioning whether the results "represent, on balance, a positive or negative set of trade arrangements for the developing

³⁹¹ Stephen Chan, "That the 'Other' Might Speak for Itself", in Stephen Chan, *Towards a Multicultural Roshamon Paradigm in International Relations*, 1996, *op.cit.*, page 107.

Recent books expressing a Third World perspective: Dawa Norbu, *Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism*. London: Routledge, 1992; E. Gellner, "The Mightier Pen?". *Times Literary Supplement*, 19 February 1993; E. Gellner, "What Do We Need Now? Social Anthropology and Its New Global Context", *Times Literary Supplement*, 16 July, 1993.

³⁹² Jo Marie Griesgraber & Bernhard G. Gunter, *World Trade, Toward Fair and Free Trade in the Twenty-first Century*. London: Pluto Press, 1997, p. xvii.

countries.”³⁹³ Often democratisation and human rights issues are tools or convenient blind spots with which to gain access to valuable raw material. Latin America could be named as an example, where the US has been backing military dictators since WWII for the sake of contracts to exploit the countries of so-called strategically important raw materials, i.e. zinc, nickel, cobalt, niobium.³⁹⁴

Already in 1944, the same year when the Bretton Woods conference took place, Karl Polanyi published “*The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*”, portraying a radical attack on the market economy as a means of organising economic life. According to D’Mello:

“Polanyi had a moral abhorrence of capitalism. He had a conviction that it would have to give way to some form of genuine socialism. ... Polanyi had a vision that 'habitat' and 'improvement' can be ensured through social control. The habitability and security of life and individuals in their natural and socio-cultural environments and compatibility of these with productivity and economic growth is thus possible.”³⁹⁵

Based on observations of the example of India and other Third World countries, D’Mello proclaims in accordance with Griesgraber and Gunter the need to renew Polanyi’s vision. At the end of the 20th century the European Union translates this theoretical concept into practice.

An attempt has been made in Europe to integrate the so-called “Social Action Programme”, also known as the European Social Charter, to integrate fundamental rights for workers as part of the statutes of the European Single Market. The then President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, with the full support of the European member states with one exception (the United Kingdom), declared:

The social dimension permeates all our discussions and everything we do: our efforts to restore competitiveness and co-operate on macroeconomic policy to reduce unemployment and provide all young Europeans with a working future; common policies to promote the development of less prosperous

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, page XVII: Agosin, Manuel R., Diana and Tussie and Gustavo Crespi, “*Developing Countries and the Uruguay Round: An Evaluation and Issues for the Future*”. In United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), International Monetary and Financial Issues for the 1990s, Research Papers for the Group of Twenty-Four, New York and Geneva, United Nations, 1995, pp 1-34.

³⁹⁴ Dieter Eich and Karl-L. Hübner, *Die Strategischen Rohstoffe, ein politisches Handbuch*. Wuppertal: Peter Hammer Verlag, 1988.

³⁹⁵ Bernard D’Mello, Underdevelopment After The Uruguay Round: India, in Jo Marie Griesgraber & Bernhard G. Gunter, (eds.), *World Trade, op.cit.*, page 72.

regions and the regeneration of regions hit by industrial change.³⁹⁶

The principles drawn up in the Charter, which have not yet been established, despite an European environment based on very similar cultures, could well serve to become a universal charter, as the demands are based on universal human rights:

- the right to freedom of movement,
- the right to employment and minimum remuneration,
- the right to improved living and working conditions,
- the right to social protection,
- the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining,
- the right to vocational training, and
- the right to worker information, consultation, and participation in enterprise decision making.³⁹⁷

The fact that total unanimity could not be achieved within the European Union shows the difficulty of developing social improvements. According to Mann, a social system has never existed in history, "societies have always been overlapping, intersecting power networks, open to external, transboundary, and interstitial, as well as internal, influence."³⁹⁸ But recent theoretical developments in IPE show small steps are being taken away from the realist paradigm of capitalist state supremacy.

The boundaries of states have become blurred. Some critical theorists are beginning to follow a critical strategy, exemplified in the collection of articles, edited by Rosow, Inayatullah and Rupert (1994).³⁹⁹ Their essays cross boundaries in several senses: territorial, disciplinary, social (gender and class), and historical. It is their aim and objective to:

Enhance tolerance for ambiguity and respect for difference. ... [The] essays deal with the traditional, truncated vision of who is able to participate, and how, in international relations. These essays cry out against the emptiness of realism's and neo-realism's walled city. Realist theories are empty in a double sense: in the sense that they are empty of people - people with their self-

³⁹⁶ Stephen R. Sleight, 'The Social Dimensions of Economic Integration, in, Jo M. Griesgraber & Bernhard G. Gunter, (eds.), *ibid.*, pp 42-43.

³⁹⁷ Stephen R. Sleight, *ibid.*, page 42.

³⁹⁸ Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power. vol 1.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, first published 1986, page 539.

³⁹⁹ Stephen J. Rosow, Nacem Inayatullah & Mark Rupert, (eds.), *The Global Economy as Political Space. Critical Perspectives on World Politics.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994.

understandings, hopes, fears, projects, learning capacities, histories, and social institutions; and in the sense that these works purify the philosophical ambiguities of their traditions and thereby leave their texts empty of nuance, context, and sensibility. This emptiness commits violence against the rich, textured, colorful experience of world politics, illuminated by boundary crossing.⁴⁰⁰

Why is this relevant? The authors open up a way of thinking which supports the complexity of theory of GPE. It is another example of attempted changes. The orthodox theory of IPE still relates in many non critical debates to what it takes to be the fundamental organising structures of the international system, which are within the competitive state system representing political and global capitalism. Burch explains that since "Morgenthau's time, a line of inquiry that questions fundamental propositions is absent from international relations' mainstream scholarship. Realists and neorealists typically do not question the origins and transformational possibilities of social institutions and practices."⁴⁰¹ In Burch's opinion the so-called non-issue must be challenged, because still at the end of the 20th century, most theorists:

have great difficulties explaining how the twin realms of the state system and global capitalism are related in comprising the global order. For those working in the mainstream tradition of political realism, the international system comprises a prominent, privileged state system. Finance, production, and exchange serve as background conditions, or as specific forms of broader conflicts over power.⁴⁰²

Burch continues here from Walzer's notions of ten years earlier. Walzer wrote once, that distinctions and separations which set up economics and politics, are socially constructed to serve a socially valuable purpose.⁴⁰³ He further explains that the issue is very troublesome and therefore a non-issue in Burch's sense of it. As soon as we question "how capitalism and the state system are related is to question our ontological assumptions about the global order: to question it as either a largely economic structure maintained by fully or partially capitalist dynamics; or as

⁴⁰⁰ Stephen J. Rosow, et al., *ibid.*, page 4.

⁴⁰¹ Kurt Burch, The "Properties" of the State System and Global Capitalism, in *The Global Economy as Political Space*. Stephen J. Rosow et al. (eds), *ibid.*, page 38.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, page 38.

⁴⁰³ Michael Walzer, "Liberalism and the Art of Separation", in *Political Theory*, 1984, No.12, pp 315-330.

a political structure of states competing for power.⁴⁰⁴

These authors have studied the process of globalization, and have sought to rethink the theory and they have established their critique. They call it “crossing boundaries”, the courage to consider new ways of thinking.

The global conditions and practices of international political economy are changing and subject to change and challenges, as is also the discipline of IPE and its mainstream theories.

4.4. *The antidotes to problems of discourse*

If Frey has spoken of the need for public opinion to be incorporated into a new political economy, it is at this moment we can begin to argue how a-cultured are the public opinions of the world. By this I mean simply Chan's idea of a multicultural globe and, here, the discourse of GPE, as I introduced at the very beginning of my dissertation. My research has shown so far that neither IR nor IPE has sought to combine moral underpinnings with cultural considerations drawn from non-Western, not-immediately-apparent rational systems of thought. The economist, Dasgupta, has made a bold attempt to combine moral underpinnings and cultural considerations, but still within rational calculations; whereas, for IR, Chan has said that the rational project should itself be questioned in the name of international cultures.

The problem here is the accusation of relativism and, indeed, of having to deal (yet again) with what may seem irrational, and these are major residual objections on the part of the econometricians and rational theorists and realists. There is a way, however, of meeting their concerns. Dasgupta, the author here represented, is a noted econometrician, famous theorist, and rational social scientist. In his latest work, however, he combines all these in a culturally and normatively sensitive expedition into development and the international political economy of assistance.

⁴⁰⁴ Burch, *op.cit.*, page 39.

Dasgupta and the cultural context of rationality

Examining the work of Partha Dasgupta, what first comes to mind is the determination to search for the non-conventional. As an intellectual he has moved from being an economist pure and proper to the challenging task of co-ordinating ecological and environmental issues. In "*The Control of Resources*" from 1982, he attempted to integrate the meaningfulness of natural resources in terms of ecological sustainability in one body of economic theory, claiming that differentiating characteristics can be ignored due to the emphasis on unifying characteristics, such as the general prescription of exploitation and the central common characteristic of these resources, which is their regenerative power. For Dasgupta and his compatriots, as early in the 80s until the beginning of the 21st century, one "finds it [still] difficult to believe that environmental problems have in recent years grown as rapidly as the concern that environmentalists have shown about them"⁴⁰⁵, meaning that there is still a large amount of ignorance towards environmentalist warnings. Dasgupta tries to encapsulate the problems of resource exploitation with strictly mathematical formulae. As the time factor is void, he borrows the use of 'external diseconomies and non-convexities' and other complicated modes to draw up matrixes and vectors.⁴⁰⁶ But gradually his work becomes more transparent for non-strictly economic readers, and he succeeds in opening up an avenue of thought which addresses the bargaining subject of rationality from a revolutionary point of view in comparison with orthodox economic thought.

The judgement of the rational is executed by those with executive power. Not only are 'market prices', and 'import and export issues' dictated by the ruling capitalist world, but also by the interpretation of the rational. The Western rational in economic terms is that of defending industrialisation and the market economy as the real key to people's enlightenment, and the only key to overcome destitution in the world. Industrialisation, the use of material and human resources, established the basis for an industrial power apparatus. The world of industry promised mass employment and prosperity. Destitution belonged to the non-Western world, the Third World. Only since the end of the Cold War destitution has become part of both the First World and the Second World.

⁴⁰⁵ Partha Dasgupta, *The Control of Resources*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, page 19.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.* for example, Chapter 2.2. The following example shall give an idea of the invented outcome. See page 19. "Pollutants reduce catch from the fishery. When $\sum_{i=1}^n Y_i$ is total output, the loss in foregone catch to each country due to this pollution is assumed to be given by a damage function $D(\sum P_i) = (\sum y_i)$."

Facts and values in the phenomena of destitution differ according to various experiential states; if destitution seems far removed from the day-to-day reality of the examiner, the premises of understanding resonate as the limitation of one's imagination.

The prevalent Western view is thus more easily that of a bystander. Rationality therefore is used as defined within the codex of Western thought. Western rationality expresses itself in a view appealing to reason as a source of knowledge or justification. This definition is then extended so that it fits all people, whether Western or not. Dasgupta uses – as a demonstration - the RCT in Third World situations, which leads superficially to the assumption that the poor make irrational choices. Dasgupta recalls the example of Indian women in one village who spent 3-4 hours a day for the transport of water to their homes. Aid workers dug a well and enabled the villagers to have water at their direct disposal. This action seemed for the aid workers rational - from their point of view it seemed a desirable and great achievement. But, according to Dasgupta, from the women's point of view, the village well took away the exercise of the walk which they enjoyed in the company of their friends. The walk was not a burden but a few hours of socialising among women without being under the strict obedience of their husbands was a source of joy. The walk for the women provided some freedom which they had now lost. The time saved was filled by the claims of their husbands, involving more duties in the house and fields. This example shows that the action of the aid workers was based on their rationality which did not understand an equal rationale underlying the disapproval of the local village woman.⁴⁰⁷

Dasgupta sees two "distinct, but related, sets of issues in both utilitarian and rights-based ethical theories: what are the indices that go to reflect a person's utility or interest, and how should the indices of different persons be weighted and aggregated to fashion public judgements on social and economic policies? ... Most development economics, when studying international data on these matters, have addressed the issues from an unnecessarily restricted point of view."⁴⁰⁸ Dasgupta aims to highlight the unnecessary restriction by applying a not 'suitable' rationale. He asks for transparency: "It isn't always clear how certain distinguished kinds of freedom are related to one another and how they are in turn related to welfare and preference

⁴⁰⁷ Partha Dasgupta, *An Inquiry Into Well-Being and Destitution*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, page 13.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, page 7.

satisfaction."⁴⁰⁹

In his investigation into the concept of a person's well-being and the broader notion of social well-being, Dasgupta explores the phenomenon of destitution as an extreme form of ill-being. The perception of 'ill-being' as a state of affairs takes Dasgupta away from the realm of explanatory theory to the actual heart of the matter, the physical suffering of those who are destitute. The result will lead to "an extensive empirical literature into the nature and extent of the phenomenon in the world as we know it. But description isn't explanation, and no account of destitution can get off the ground unless it includes an analysis of the forces that bring about states of affairs where a large proportion of people can be destitute."⁴¹⁰ Therefore he aims at using a "resource allocation theory". Instead of concentrating on people's different needs, the focal point of development theory, Dasgupta relies on the "commonality of the human experience: that for example we all have similar needs - for food and care and shelter, for friendship and love and a communal life, and for freedom to develop our talents and to pursue our ends."⁴¹¹ There are nevertheless differences in cultural norms and social practices, but Dasgupta points out that it "is a common failing of modern social commentators to regard differences in cultural practices as reflecting differences in primary ethical values. ... It seems ... that there is less danger of an eventual error in ethical reasoning were we to start from the communality of the human experience and to show how and why people and societies differ, than to start from an assumption of complete differences and to then narrow them down by admitting commonalities."⁴¹² Destitution, according to Dasgupta, is a problem of the allocation of resource; a person is bereft of fundamental commodity needs and lacks a communal support system.

Dasgupta questions the role of the state in the protection and promotion of human interests and the provision of social security. "The economic theory of common property resources informs us that an elaborate network of mutual controls on resource use needs to be in force. Otherwise, human well-being will not be served."⁴¹³

409 *Ibid.*

410 Dasgupta, *ibid.*, page 8.

411 *Ibid.*

412 *Ibid.*, page 8-9.

413 *Ibid.*, page 9.

The most fundamental of needs is that of sheer survival, which in turn confronts the issues of nutrition, shelter, sanitation and health care. The allocation of resources requires agencies, institutions and governments for the protection and promotion of negative and positive freedom, negative and positive rights.⁴¹⁴ "The concept of positive freedom, with its emphasis on our ability to undertake motivated activities and to exercise our realised capacities (our innate or trained abilities), and on the recognition that the exercise of our natural powers is a leading human good"⁴¹⁵, has strong historically intellectual tradition. So, for example, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle much attention is paid to the connection of enjoyment in the sense of well-being and the exercise of our capabilities. General well-being is an aggregate of individual well-beings, whereby a "person's prospects for flourishing are dependent upon the nature and extent of the freedom she enjoys."⁴¹⁶ Dasgupta also quotes Aristotle for his understanding of the state. Aristotle saw the state as the perfect community, in fact a partnership. Society as partnership reflects the idea of existing not for the *sake of living* but for the *sake of living well*.⁴¹⁷ Dasgupta states: "There is a related task before the State, which is at the centre of discussion whenever economists study social organizations. It is in co-ordinating the activities of individuals and groups in an interrelated world."⁴¹⁸ By co-ordination Dasgupta does not mean a resolution of conflicts, but the "need for some kind of balance among various activities, for example production and consumption activities, so that shortages do not occur in some commodities and surpluses in others."⁴¹⁹

According to Dasgupta the quality of life in today's poorest nations cannot only be measured by assessing the standard of living, but also by the indices of political and civil liberties. These indices are grass root indicators, and provide a ranking of the world's poorest countries in terms of an aggregative measure of well-being.⁴²⁰ Universal rights and wrongs carry with them no cultural or technological

⁴¹⁴ See, *ibid.*, page 15, page 40 pp. Here Dasgupta uses the definition by Isaiah Berlin, who disentangled two concepts of liberty. In contrast with the idea that a person can be said to be free to the degree to which no person or body of persons interferes within the area in which he could otherwise act (in other words, 'negative freedom'), Berlin identified 'positive freedom' with the ability to be somebody, not nobody. In being somebody, the person is a doer and can decide. The person is not being decided for, but self-directed, she conceives goals and policies of her own and realises them. A person of positive freedom has the ability to be conscious of herself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for her choices and able to explain them by reference to her own ideas and purposes. See for more detail, Berlin, 1969, p. 131.

⁴¹⁵ Dasgupta, *ibid.*, page 43.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*, page 68.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*, page 23. Aristotle saw the State as comprising various functional parts, agricultural, artisan, military, financial, priestly, and judicial or deliberative.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*, page 15.

conditionality.⁴²¹ What is referred to as 'social evaluation function', or often simply as 'general well-being', assumes a unified global space. Dasgupta points out that societies are similar in many respects, and that they are similar because human motivation regarding survival and maintenance is universal. He explains, that

Of all resource allocation mechanisms, the one driven by markets has received the greatest attention from economists and modern political philosophers. The 'market' has been much admired for its ability to allocate resources efficiently and has been much criticised for its inability to allocate them equitably. Putting it in near-vulgar terms, the 'market' has most often been seen as having an eye on the aggregate output of an economy and as displaying no sensitivity to its distribution.⁴²²

It is a tragedy that recent intellectual economic and political theory still has to rely on the report of the World Bank from 1986, where the statement was made that the progress in the battle against malnutrition and poverty could be sustained if, and only if, there is satisfactory economic growth.⁴²³ World Bank recipes are easier said than put into practice. The lack of availability of another "category of goods, such as roads, electricity, cables, ports, irrigation canals, and portable water supplies, whose availability is a precondition for the growth of anonymous markets, and for the production and distribution of raw materials and outputs"⁴²⁴, is the biggest handicap for Third World countries which seek to escape paucity. The whole apparatus of change and improvement depends on the interplay of the private and public realms and the transfer of knowledge. According to Dasgupta, "knowledge is a non-rivalrous good. It is also durable (the wheel does not need to be invented twice). But the transmission of knowledge isn't uniformly easy. In addition to the absorptive capacity of the recipient, it depends on the language in which knowledge is transmitted. By *information* we usually mean knowledge reduced and converted into messages that are easily communicable."⁴²⁵

The informing of knowledge is a floating process and crucial for the co-ordination of the public and private spheres of interest. For example, "income guarantees are a means of ensuring that citizens have an access to those basic needs (e.g. food and

⁴²¹ Dasgupta underlines: "That a tradition might not even acknowledge, let alone condemn, the violation of certain individual or group or gender rights does not make the violation right, and it is an error to think that it may." See. *ibid.*, page 25.

⁴²² Dasgupta, *ibid.*, page 16.

⁴²³ World Bank, *World Development Report*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986a, page 7.

⁴²⁴ Dasgupta, *op.cit.*, page 147.

clothing) falling within the private realm."⁴²⁶ The private realm refers to the social environment, within which private markets control private goods, whereby the public realm controls collective goods. Nutrition, for example, is a private good *par excellence*. Dasgupta means by the public realm the state and "institutions at "lower levels, including religious organisations, village communities, charities, non-governmental agencies, and so forth. Collective goods include public goods (e.g. laws of contract, a community's non-material cultural heritage, the institution of government), non-competitive goods (e.g. knowledge, and cultural artefacts), merit goods (e.g. schoolbooks), natural monopolies (e.g. general infrastructure), goods involving significant externalities (e.g. common property resources, public health)."⁴²⁷ Of course, in practice, a number of commodities will co-exist in the two realms.

In this context, it is important to observe that the destitute are not destitute by their own choice. Despite being people without ..., they do own potential labour power. According to Dasgupta, conversion "of potential into actual labour power can be realised if the person finds the means of making the conversion, not otherwise."⁴²⁸ But how to convert potential into actual labour if involuntary unemployment is an endemic phenomenon in the Third World, and the reason for a large fraction of the population to be assetless? Dasgupta observes that on "the other hand, were the distribution of assets sufficiently equal, the labour market would be capable of absorbing all, and no one would suffer from malnutrition."⁴²⁹ The formal construction of Dasgupta's analysis leaves many 'ifs'. The retardedness of economic theory relies always upon a magical and therefore hypothetical market mechanism, in which it is believed that an initial distribution of assets determines whether or not all citizens have their basic needs met.

Dasgupta combines the idea of equality in the social evaluation function. His concern is about the distribution of individual well-beings being treated from a pluralist conception, for example income, utility, welfare, opportunity, basic freedoms, and, "more loosely, those objects that are implied by an equal respect and

425 *Ibid.*, page 152.

426 Dasgupta, *ibid.*, page 151.

427 *Ibid.*, page 150-151.

428 *Ibid.*, page 474.

429 *Ibid.*, page 476.

concern for all persons."⁴³⁰ Dasgupta asks for the problem of moral hazard to become central "to any reasoned conception of political philosophy, and thereby to a defensible political economy. To ignore it is to build a conception of the organization of life that makes no contact with life."⁴³¹ The costs have been gigantic and projects have proved singularly inept and intrusive and "have not been charged with performing vital functions (e.g. supplying collective goods, health and food security)."⁴³² Dasgupta expresses the requirement of a state to achieve better performance, based on its moral commitment. He tries to show that human well-being depends on the 'right balance' between the public and private realms of a poor society.⁴³³ In order to achieve the right balance it is Dasgupta's ambition to produce more guidelines for a 'better state behaviour'.

Dasgupta tries to suggest an impetus for models capable of accommodating notions of effective means for eliminating destitution, but he admits that it "won't provide the impetus for much else."⁴³⁴ It is strange that he expresses confidence in the singular responsibility of the State to be an active participant in the allocation mechanism.⁴³⁵ He will probably not advance much further because his concept of numerical assessment with the aid of models will always be insufficient in expressing the complex reality of those who are hungry and starving. But his research highlights the dependence of poor countries and their natural resources, the link between acute poverty and environmental degradation, and the problems associated with the management of local communal property.

Dasgupta establishes an awareness of resource degradation and economic disenfranchisement among the poor, combined with unreflective public policies and predatory governments. He stresses that economic and environmental resources should not be treated in contra-position, the rights of the polluted should be recognised as much as those of the polluters.⁴³⁶ The task is to discover to what extent the lack of care is responsible for the international failure and the erosion of global commons on one side, and the public failure and the erosion of local commons on the other side. Both are complex fields of an economic and environmental system.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*, page 73.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, page 545.

⁴³² *Ibid.*

⁴³³ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, page 21.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, page 477.

Failure in both systems creates what Gunnar Myrdal called "cumulative causation".⁴³⁷

Dasgupta expresses the need to define a satisfactory economic growth of the market based on sensitivity to its distribution, in terms of an aggregative measure of well-being. He has made a bold attempt to combine moral underpinnings and cultural considerations as far as he could accommodate the two within his calculative method of discourse.

Chan, instead, asks for methodology not to be based strictly on Western cultures, but also on non-Western ones. In the face of globalization Chan wants to cross theoretical boundaries. Not only does he enter into the discussion (like Dasgupta) of the assessment of different cultures, but highlights their ability to formulate meaningful methodology.

The critique of Stephen Chan

Stephen Chan has said that the rational project should itself be questioned in the name of international cultures. He criticises IR theory of having "insufficient methodology, and not including the "richness of methodologies from other cultures".⁴³⁸ According to Chan multiculturalism has been excluded from sustained IR discourse. New canons need to be introduced to IR to lead to a more comprehensive approach to the possibility of universal thinking. The inclusion of multiculturalism is opening up for a wider intellectual project. IR as "a universal discipline requires a universal, or at least considerably expanded methodological base"⁴³⁹, which is not only based on the vocabulary of Western thinkers. The East was for centuries 'occidentalised' by the West and the West has been "subtly colonised by the East".⁴⁴⁰

According to Chan, there "is the notion that, declared cultural values

⁴³⁶ Partha Dasgupta and Karl-Göran Mäler (eds.), *The Environment and Emerging Development Issues*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, vol. 1. See Chapter 1.7. Markets and their Failure, page 16.

⁴³⁷ Partha Dasgupta, *Environmental and Resource Economics in the World of the Poor*, Lecture on the occasion of the forty-fifth anniversary of Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C., October 9, 1997, page 23. See also Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama, An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968, vols I-III.

⁴³⁸ Stephen Chan, *And so what would a Buddhist Ethics of IR look like then?* Paper delivered to the University of Wales, Swansea Gregynog Conference on International Relations, December 1996, page 1.

⁴³⁹ Chan, *ibid.*, page 2.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, page 2.

notwithstanding, states **have** to accept a certain international socialisation in order to function in the world. The socialisation and the norms it brings, practical or moral mean the constitution of a universality no matter what cultures say."⁴⁴¹ Chan wants to do better than metaphysics and natural law.⁴⁴² He wants to base his research on the "commonalty of international suffering and kindness", because "discourse does **not** construct the world; experience of evil and good should."⁴⁴³ Inquiry should not count the rational odds, otherwise it is only scratching surfaces. Chan sides up here with Islamic liberation theology, such as interpreted by Hanafi⁴⁴⁴, who believes that different thoughts can meet without the totalisation of one particular thought or text. Chan observes that thought "seeks a new world order as much as a new theory, but seeks certainly a freedom from dogma."⁴⁴⁵

In order to open up the debate, Chan presents one view of Buddhism, called Theravada Buddhism. Theravada Buddhism regards wealth in a dialectical manner. According to this teaching, "poverty is not the only righteous act. Rather, income - no matter how much, provided honestly earned - is unproblematic provided there is an outflow as well as an inflow."⁴⁴⁶ Chan treats Buddhism "from the perspective of the unled, but morally-informed and equal individual - who, because morally-informed, has to have a view of the community in which he or she morally exists and acts."⁴⁴⁷ Similar to the equal individual cultures, according to Chan, "interpret themselves against an international socialisation, but interpret themselves as individual selves."⁴⁴⁸ The moral equality of cultures should be studied, taking account of world religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism, etc.⁴⁴⁹ Webs of interlocutions become visible and create a restructuring of competing methodologies. Chan emphasises how far IR has to go, for at best "its thoughtful base is **very** narrow. ... In a rush to be philosophical and ethical, it has not looked very much beyond a mere two hundred years in a philosophically - active Europe half the size of Rwanda's Zairian neighbour, and has ignored huge, old and highly complex (as well as highly variegated and constantly reinterpreted) systems of thought from other civilisations

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, page 3.

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*, page 4.

⁴⁴⁴ Hassan Hanafi, "Cultures and Societies, social Justice and Liberation Theology in Dialogue", in Tuomo Melasuo, (ed.), *The Mediterranean Revisited*. Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, Research Report, 1994.

⁴⁴⁵ Chan, *op. cit.*, page 6.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, page 7.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, page 8.

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, page 11.

⁴⁴⁹ See Peggy Morgan and Clive Lawton, (ed.), *Ethical Issues in Six Religious Traditions*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, second reprint 1999. Morgan and Lawton give an account of how the various religions deal with global issues.

in, for example, near and east Asia."⁴⁵⁰

What Chan does not consider is the importance of time and space. In particular the history of thought shows that there was always the right time and space for the development of human thought and its application. We cannot make the past responsible for what we fail to establish for the future. In order to succeed scholars must think and come up with solutions. Chan is right in stressing the fact that a multiplicity of values are pursued by different societies, different individuals, and different cultures, but does not consider the relevance of time and space. If the need for reforming theory in this respect outweighs the natural hesitation to adapt to changes, his aspirations will become real. After all, IR is not dealing with the reality of the gods but the reality of human lives on earth, and within histories.

Nor does Chan answer Dasgupta's attempt to compose more carefully and considerately, not a normative universality, but a universal rationality. However, in his thoughts on Buddhism, he has suggested, but not followed up, an alternative possibility to view the world from outside the Western canon. In the final, central, part of the thesis, I will do this and, moreover, following not the literal possibilities of Dasgupta and Chan, but their spirit, i.e. to show how this Theravada Buddhism expresses something that is, in the process of my writing, also Kantian. If this joined force, particularly if it is a joined moral force, were available to IR and a true GPE then this thesis would have been both original and moral in its findings.

4.5 Conclusion

Chapter four viewed IR and IPE authors who criticise the prevailing theory for its hesitation in welcoming so called "non-issues"! The first part of the chapter explains why RCT has been successful as a method of discourse over a long period of time, because its scientific methodology justified the elimination of side issues, otherwise vital for the understanding of practice. RCT tried to eliminate the problem of prediction and control with 'iffy' definitions, cultural and personal bias. The method promised a scientific viable inquiry, suppressing a non-scientific aspect of political, economic and social life. Forms of RCT were of great importance in IR's

⁴⁵⁰ Chan, *op.cit.*, page 17.

development: the whole debate between Kaplan and Bull being a classic example; as were 'ladders of escalation' and a great deal of foreign policy analysis.⁴⁵¹

In contrast Cultural Studies want to advise on a method to include what has been eliminated as 'non-issues'. The evaluation of different cultures is seen as essential when discussing global, political and economic matters. The fact, for example, that some countries dominate world trade does not ensure that their cultures have a dominant status. Dasgupta's insights into the cultural context of rationality and Chan's proclamation of the emancipation of the 'other', contribute to an intellectual move forward for GPE.

If RCT authors can choose to exclude issues and scholars like Chan have the choice to include issues, is that just a matter of choice? And even if it is common sense, then who is right and who is wrong? These questions remain open, because none of the authors advocate an ethical system which could function as the basis for making decisions.

In the following chapter I will therefore seek advice from the political philosopher, Immanuel Kant. Kant's name is often referred to in IR literature, in the whole spectrum from security studies to environmental studies. I want to ascertain what the original Kant is saying about morality. How should we choose the right criteria for action? We learned a little about Kant in my earlier analysis, but I considered the Kant presented in IR theory very limited, a bit like a fish out of the water. Relevant questions do spring to mind, for example Kant's argumentation for the non-rational? After so much talk about the 'rational', surely a deeper study of Kant could provide some revelations. For example, according to Kant, we would have no knowledge without synthesis, the 'blind but indispensable function of the soul'. How would I be able to explain this to a American economist of the non flexible 'rational choice' school?

⁴⁵¹ See the two classics: The so-called 'Great Debate' see Morton Kaplan, *The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs Science in International Relations*, and Hedley Bull, *International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach*, in Klaus Knorr and James N Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, Princeton University Press, 1969, pp 39-61 and 20-38 respectively. Further: Herman Khan, *Ladder of Escalation*, in Karl W Deutsch, *The Analysing of International Relations*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1978, page 180.

Part III

EVALUATION OF MORAL-PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS OF THOUGHT

* * * * *

In Part III I search for discourses which help to formulate an ethical concept of thoughts in order to start a global ethical tradition. The aim is to make morality once again part of politics and economics, and to advance GPE into a theoretical framework which will be meaningful when analysing global developments.

In Chapter Five, I start off with Kant, a name always at hand when an author wants something to say about morality and politics. Reading about him and listening to what some IR and IPE scholars sought to know about him, made me anxious to explain what the original Kant is actually saying. I found Kant very much underestimated in the comprehension of his transcendental logic. Kant believes that pure moral laws exist which determine, with no consideration for empirical reason, action and non-action. The findings do not compare well with what IR scholars have to say about him. I take on the task to 'solve' the communitarianism versus cosmopolitanism dilemma with the help of Cooper, who termed it the solution of reconciliation.

*Still, I am not satisfied in offering Kant's moral concept, even the one which I managed to reveal here as the *summa cum bonum* to GPE. Instead I continue my research in Chapter Six in order to find a similar moral concept from a non-Western background, which outdates Kant, due to its elaborate moral views on distributive justice. Distributive justice is a key issue regarding globalization, the distribution of wealth is vital for the future global society. Theravada Buddhism helps to answer the prime question: How can each individual become free to choose his/her ends? Theravada Buddhism treats distributive justice as the prime concern. It is the basis for day to day life, the claim to equality conflicts with unequal possession.*

Chapter Seven explores Rawls and his critics and leads to a comparison with a Theravada understanding of distributive justice. What can we learn from Rawls and his critics when comparing a Western understanding of distributive justice with the Theravadin point of view? I recapitulate the observation of increasingly visible global distributive inequalities, and ask whether it could be possible that contractarian principles of social justice ought to apply globally? Rawls' definition of a society as a "co-operative venture for mutual advantage"⁴⁵² addresses the conflict of distribution as restricted to national boundaries and therefore cannot, according to Beitz, be considered as international justice. How can there be an international distributive justice if people are to have no relations of any kind with persons, groups, or societies beyond their borders?

⁴⁵² Rawls, *op.cit.*, page 4.

Since the writings of Beitz and Rawls, it is clear that globalization has created an even more massive interdependence in trade and investment and other forms of human exchange. The primary subjects of theories of distributive justice in contemporary Western moral theory concern the allocation of income and wealth. Western evaluations of right and wrong are based on the individualism of the person in the capitalist society. But how about those who are not part of wealth? In contrast to the Western understanding, Theravada Buddhism confirms a timeless universalism in ethical belief. Morality, in this context, means a non-coerced assent or free acceptance of the basic rules which are governing social interaction as a necessity.

I further proceed to create the new term of SPEG to make visible that we are dealing with a reformed GPE theory of the future. In accordance with Kūng I proclaim the need for a moral foundation of theory in order to deal with the commands of a changing global practice, because security and wellbeing in global cities and communities cannot be bought simply with money nor simply controlled by constantly devised new laws.

Chapter 5

The moral obligations of Immanuel Kant

The main points of this chapter

The ethics of Kant as pure reason or against pure reason

Perpetual peace and constitutional provisions within Kant

The Leitmotiv of Reconciliation and its consequences for GPE

Conclusion

The main points of this chapter

- *The autonomy of the will is the supreme principle of morality*
- *Moral obligations are a necessity, postulating a universal law*
- *Singularity and communality are linked by moral obligations*
- *Kant introduces a new view point of consciousness, the process of globalization needs just that.*
- *Hegel cannot deliver a useful concept for globalization*

5.1 *The ethics of Kant as pure reason or against pure reason*

I will now expound a view of Kant in its original complexity, and note IR's inability or reluctance to grasp the full rigours of philosophical work. IR uses a different Kant, according to my careful reading.

No discussion about morality and peace is complete without reference to Kant either supporting or criticising his views. I am therefore beginning by analysing Kant from a background of earlier German reading and study. This is to provide a deeper Kant that is usually selectively translated for IR.

In order to understand the ethics of Kant, it is crucial to understand the basic ideas of the whole development of his masterpiece *The Critique of Pure Reason*. It took a lifetime to write it. Kant was nearly sixty years old when he established his thoughts as "critical philosophy", and created a shrine of philosophy for the last quarter of the 18th century. It was his intention to investigate "pure moral philosophy"⁴⁵³ and to systemize his metaphysics of morals.⁴⁵⁴ Sincere philosophy, according to Kant, is concerned with the fundamental problems of people, as long as they declare a rational interest, leading to the three questions: "What can I know?", "What shall I do?", "What can I hope for?". Kant's writings constitute a highlight to the Enlightenment period. His key concepts of critique, reason and freedom were the same principles of the French Revolution, and they have occupied ever since the thinking of the socio-political world. Kant's thinking becomes important in times of change which are times of reflection, such as the present - the time since the end of the Cold War, an 'axis time' as once coined by Jaspers.⁴⁵⁵ An axis time indicates a time of searching for new orientations, bringing about even a possible re-balancing of world powers.

Only a hundred years ago it was said in German academic circles that one could philosophise with Kant, or against Kant, but that it was impossible to philosophise without him. The author shares this sentiment. This thesis bears witness to the above, and is presented initially in a non-speculative fashion, because the most

⁴⁵³ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, first published 1781.

⁴⁵⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, published in 1785, followed by the *Critique of Practical Reason* in 1788 and the *Critique of Judgement* in 1790.

fundamental aspect of Kantian thought is in fact missing in IR.

The ethics of Kant arise from pure reasoning, and as I shall elaborate, this is an *a priori* conception. Transcendental logic has lying 'before' ('beyond') it the manifold content of *a priori* sensibility. The process of synthesis responds to the spontaneity of thought, examines the given diversity, joins different representations to each other and forms a cognition out of it. "Synthesis is that by which alone the elements of our cognition are collected and united into a certain content, consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our attention, if we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge."⁴⁵⁶ Without synthesis, which is a "blind but indispensable function of the soul"⁴⁵⁷, we would have no cognition. Understanding is reducing synthesis to conceptions. The unity of the synthesis of different representations in an intuition is called the pure conception of the understanding. Pure conceptions of the understanding apply *a priori* to objects and are called categories of either quantity, quality, relation, or modality. The categories are the conditions which are originally within the subject, without which there is no conceptual unity of a given observation. Categories are the aim of evidence for the analysis of conceptions.⁴⁵⁸ Kant proves his thesis with two consequential steps, based on a process of abstraction, which is the isolation of the factor 'thinking' from all the other factors of cognition. As we can see, we are here entering a very different world to that of the Kant abstracted in IR.

The theory of cognition leads Kant to the metaphysics of morals, and the transition from the metaphysics of morals leads him to the critique of pure practical reason. In practice, just as in the field of theory, objectivity is only possible through the consciousness of the subject itself, the origin of morality lies in the autonomy of the will. The autonomy of the will is the supreme principle of morality. Autonomy of the will is that property by which it is a law to itself. The principle of autonomy is: "Always to choose in a way that the same volition shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as a universal law."⁴⁵⁹ Finally Kant reduces the definite conception of morality to the idea of freedom. Freedom must be presupposed as a property of the will of all rational beings. "For as morality serves as a law for us only because we are

⁴⁵⁵ Otfried Höffe, *Immanuel Kant*, page 15. Jasper's expression "*Achszeit*" is a time of re-co-ordination and re-construction of a symmetrical balance.

⁴⁵⁶ Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*. Wilhelm Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987, Preface and introduction to the second edition, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, 1787, page 41.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, page 41.

⁴⁵⁸ Höffe, *op.cit.*, page 89.

⁴⁵⁹ Kant, by Benton, *op.cit.*, page 277.

rational beings, it must also hold for all rational beings ... it belongs to the activity of all rational beings endowed with a will."⁴⁶⁰

The Copernican Revolution

Kant's revelations, the experiment of reason, have been called the 'Copernican revolution', because it is not so much the weight of the theoretical findings but the introduction of a new viewpoint of consciousness, a new relationship between the subject and objectivity. The keynote is that it "is no longer assumed that understanding orientates itself on the object, but the object assimilates itself on the understanding".⁴⁶¹ Here I find it important to quote Höffe in order to stress the importance of this new understanding:

Kant's Copernican revolution lies in the recognition that the objects of objective cognition do not appear by themselves but are made recognisable by the (transcendental) subject. Therefore they are not any longer addressed as objects on their own but as phenomena. Because the foundation of objectivity is therefore dependent on ontology, and ontology depends on the theory of subjectivity, autonomous ontology ceases to exist. It also needs an object. The same is valid for epistemology. The point of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* lies in the crossing over of both sides; a philosophy of the 'being' - which describes what an object really is.

Kant believes that an object can only be understood according to an epistemology of the object and an epistemology can only be understood as determination of the concept of the object.⁴⁶²

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is a philosophy of synthesis in contradiction to former prevailing methods of analysis. Kant does not treat metaphysics any longer as 'Vernunftssystem' - a system of reason, but as a science of the limits of human reason

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, page 280.

⁴⁶¹ Otfried Höffe, *Immanuel Kant*. München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1996, page 53.

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*, page 55. Translation by the author.

"Kant's koperikanische Revolution besagt, daß die Gegenstände der objektiven Erkenntnis nicht von selbst erscheinen, sondern vom (transzendentalen) Subjekt zur Erscheinung gebracht werden müssen. Sie sind daher nicht länger als Dinge, die an sich bestehen, sondern als Erscheinungen anzusprechen. Weil sich die Grundlage der Objektivität verändert und die Gegenstandstheorie, die Ontologie, von einer Theorie des Subjekts abhängt, kann es keine autonome Ontologie mehr geben. Dasselbe gilt für die Erkenntnistheorie. Die Pointe der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* liegt in der Verschränkung beider Seiten; eine philosophische Theorie des Seienden: dessen, was ein (objektiver) Gegenstand ist, kann nach Kant nur noch als Theorie der Erkenntnis vom Seienden und eine Theorie der Erkenntnis nur als Bestimmung des Begriffs von einem objektiven Gegenstand geleistet werden."

(eine Wissenschaft von den Grenzen der menschlichen Vernunft').⁴⁶³ The ultimate basis of experience seems to be beyond every experience. Therefore its research is called metaphysics, 'meta' meaning beyond physics, beyond the natural experience. That which is typical for metaphysics when going beyond every experience, that which makes it at the same time impossible as a science, is that which Kant, in his 'transcendental dialectic', undertakes as a fight between rationalism and empiricism. *The Critique of Pure Reason* is the examining of the self and its justification based on reason, independent of experience. In the end Kant refutes both rationalism and empiricism; he believes that there are pure reasonable thoughts and that these serve as regulative principles in the service of experience. During the process of critique it becomes clear that rationalism cannot understand reality. Empiricism will not do either. Kant does accept that all understanding commences with experience. But, contrary to the teachings of empiricism, Kant does not accept that all understanding explicitly flows out of experience. On the contrary, he concludes that the understandings of experience without being based on generally valid conditions of experience are impossible.⁴⁶⁴

An autonomous philosophy, the philosophy of rational sciences, requires that within the realm of human recognition and action, for example in law, history and religion, in aesthetical judgement, elements are valid independently of empirical sciences. This revolutionary cognition leads Kant to the recognition of 'pure reason'; pure reason is pure cognition in contrast to empirical cognition. The human intellect, even in an unphilosophical state, is in the possession of certain cognitions 'a priori'.⁴⁶⁵ Cognition *a priori* indicates another peculiar source of knowledge, which is a faculty of cognition *a priori*, characterised by a strict universality and a necessity.⁴⁶⁶ Knowledge *a priori* is independent of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, which is '*a posteriori*', meaning a knowledge through experience. If we have a proposition which contains the ideas of necessity in its very conception, Kant calls it a judgement *a priori*; if it is not derived from any other preposition, unless

⁴⁶³ Otfried Höffe, *Immanuel Kant*. München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1996, page 32.

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, page 49, "Im Verlauf der Selbstprüfung weist die Vernunft den Rationalismus zurück, da durch bloßes Denken die Wirklichkeit nicht erkannt werden kann. Die Vernunft verwirft aber auch den Empirismus. Zwar gibt Kant zu, daß alle Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung beginnt; doch folgt daraus nicht, wie der Empirismus annimmt, daß die Erkenntnis ausschließlich der Erfahrung entspringt. Im Gegenteil erweist sich selbst die Erfahrungserkenntnis ohne erfahrungsfreie Quellen als unmöglich." The proof of "erfahrungsfrei", means the proof of generally valid conditions of experience (allgemein gültigen Bedingungen der Erfahrung).

⁴⁶⁵ "*a priori*" is a form of understanding, which is independent of all impressions of the senses, free of all experience.

"*a posteriori*" is a form of understanding which has its origin within experience, caused by the impressions of the senses.

"*a priori*" is characterised by strict necessity, whereby something cannot be anything else than it is, and the unlimited generality, which does not accept any exception. Kant uses here two postulates used by Plato and Aristotle before in order to distinct "episteme" (science) from "doxa" (opinion).

from one equally involving the idea of necessity, it is an absolute *a priori*.⁴⁶⁷ Necessity and universality are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge, "and are inseparably connected with each other. But as in the use of these criteria the empirical limitation is sometimes more easily detected than the contingency of a judgement, or the unlimited universality which we attach to a judgement is often a more convincing proof than its necessity, it may be advisable to use the criteria separately, each being by itself infallible."⁴⁶⁸

Not only in judgements, but even in conceptions, is an *a priori* origin evident. Kant gives the following example: "For example, if we take away by degrees from our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous experience - colour, hardness or softness, weight, even impenetrability - the body will then vanish, but the space which it occupied still remains - and this is utterly impossible to annihilate in thought".⁴⁶⁹ Kant aims to introduce a philosophical science which can determine the possibility, the principles, and extent of human knowledge *a priori*. Kant considers that certain of our cognitions rise completely above the sphere of all possible experience with the means of conception, to which there exists in the whole extent of experience no corresponding subject. This sphere he calls transcendental or supersensible. "Where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the investigations of reason, which, on account of their importance, we consider far preferable to, and as having a far more elevated aim than, all that the understanding can achieve within the sphere of sensuous phenomena."⁴⁷⁰ The subjects of research are the fundamental problems of God, free will, and immortality. Kant would argue that it is a deficiency in people to speculate and to finish an imposing edifice of thought as quickly as possible, without first of all examining the validity of a solid foundation, which leads to the introduction of all sorts of excuses.

Kant explains that

a great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the business of our reason consists in the analysis of the conception which we already possess of objects. By this means we gain a multitude of cognitions, which although really nothing more than elucidations or explanations of that which (though in a confused manner)

⁴⁶⁶ Simplest example: "All bodies are heavy", but by far more complex in its validity.

⁴⁶⁷ Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Wilhelm Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica, Chicago: The University of Chicago press, 1987, Preface and introduction to the second edition *The Critique of Pure Reason*, 1787, page 14.

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, page 15.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

was already thought in our conceptions, are, at least in respect of their form, prized as *new introspections*.⁴⁷¹

The whole aim, according to Kant, of our speculative knowledge *a priori* depends upon such synthetical, that is, augmentative propositions, "for although analytical judgements are indeed highly important and necessary, they are so, only to arrive at that clearness of conceptions which is requisite for a sure and extended synthesis, and this alone is a real acquisition."⁴⁷² Therefore, in all theoretical sciences of reason, synthetical judgements *a priori* are contained as principles. Kant manifests a kind of knowledge which is given; metaphysics are not only a science but considered as a "natural disposition of the human mind (*metaphysica naturalis*). ... It will always exist, so soon as reason awakes to the exercise of its power of speculation."⁴⁷³

Kant called this system of conceptions transcendental, as it is less occupied with objects than the mode of our cognition of the objects.⁴⁷⁴ He recognises that the conditions under which the objects of human knowledge are given must precede those under which they are thought:

The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called *sensibility*. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuition; by the understanding they are *thought*, and from it arise conceptions. ... The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation.⁴⁷⁵

Kant's transcendental examination goes beyond experience. He wants to discover the conditions of experience which are happening before any experience.⁴⁷⁶

Kant's transcendental understanding (*transzendente Erkenntnis*) proves firstly that certain imaginations (*Vorstellungen*) are not of empirical origin, and secondly he establishes the possibility of how they can be at the same time related to the objects of experience; only a non-empirical understanding of the empirical is

470 *Ibid.*

471 Kant, by Benton, *ibid.*, page 16.

472 *Ibid.*, page 17.

473 *Ibid.*, page 19.

474 *Ibid.*

475 *Ibid.*, page 23.

476 *Ibid.*

transcendental.⁴⁷⁷ Kant operates from the basis that science or objective understanding is made of a general and necessary knowledge.⁴⁷⁸ It is, after all, our judgement which forms the proper test of the correctness of the principles, the science of the law of sensibility, a way of coming closer to the language and the ancient division of the objects of cognition. On this basis Kant affirms that "no object is given to us without sensibility, and no object is thought without reason. Thoughts without content are empty and views without concepts are blind."⁴⁷⁹

Space and time

Having established two interrelated ways of recognition - sensibility and reason - Kant crystallises two pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge *a priori*. One is space, and the other time. "Space is a necessary representation *a priori*, which serves for the foundation of all external intuitions. ... Space is no discursive, or as we say, general conception of the relations of things, but a pure intuition."⁴⁸⁰ Kant's interpretation of space is of great importance because it enables him to claim that "all things, as external phenomena, are beside each other in space", a rule which is valid universally and without any limitation. Like space, so is the representation of time a foundation *a priori*.

Time is not an empirical conception. ... Time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation of all our intuitions. With regard to phenomena in general, we cannot think away time from them, and represent them to ourselves as out of and unconnected with time, but we can quite well represent to ourselves time void of phenomena. Time is therefore given *a priori*. In it alone is all reality of phenomena possible. These may all be annihilated in thought, but time itself, as the universal condition of their possibility, cannot be so annulled.⁴⁸¹

Time and space are two sources of knowledge. They are the two pure forms of all intuition, and thereby make synthetical propositions *a priori* possible.⁴⁸² Space and

⁴⁷⁷ Höffe, *op.cit.*, page 67. "Wegen der zweiten Bedingung sind die Aussagen der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft zwar ein Gegenstand, aber kein Bestandteil der transzendentalen Theorie; transzendental heißen jene Voraussetzungen, die weder mathematischen noch physikalischen Charakter haben und doch immer "am Werk" sind, wenn wir Mathematik oder Physik betreiben.

⁴⁷⁸ See Höffe, *ibid.*, section 5, pp 70.

⁴⁷⁹ Translation by the author. "Ohne Sinnlichkeit würde uns kein Gegenstand gegeben und ohne Verstand keiner gedacht werden. Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind." Quoted from Höffe, *ibid.*, page 73.

⁴⁸⁰ Kant, by Benton, *op.cit.*, page 24.

⁴⁸¹ Kant, *ibid.*, page 26.

⁴⁸² *Ibid.*, page 68.

time are *pure* forms, and are 'cognized' *a priori*, "that is, antecedent to all actual perception; and for this reason such cognition is called pure intuition. The latter is that in our cognition which is called cognition *a posteriori*, that is, *empirical* intuition. The former appertain absolutely and necessarily to our sensibility, of whatsoever kind our sensations may be; the latter maybe of very diversified character."⁴⁸³

Having arrived at this point of clarification, this theory serves as an organon. The conception for something being right lies in the understanding, and represents a property, the moral property of actions, which belongs to them in themselves. Kant's transcendental philosophy leads with thoroughness and conscientiousness from the metaphysics of the concrete concept to a critical investigation which goes back to its source, the centre of humanity, the soul of man. Man in the totality of his being, is the object of this critique. It is from the function of perception, judgement, drawing conclusions that the critique of reason discovers the elements and laws of abstract knowledge. It is from the living deeds of man in the totality of his being by which he/she connects him/herself with him/herself and with the real world that the critique of the concrete laws of the human spirit will have to make discoveries.

The meaning of the 'categories'

Essential to this thesis is Kant's explanation of transcendental selfconsciousness. It is the origin of every synthesis and the regressive analysis of the categories. The pure conceptions of the understanding which produce the logical form of a judgement are called 'categories'. The composition of a multitude of intuitions, called 'synthesis', is applied *a priori* to objects, a result outside the power of general logic. Synthesis is the combination of a multitude of intuitions (*Vorstellungen, Anschauungen oder Begriffen*) into a unity.⁴⁸⁴

Kant's ethic cannot be understood without the basic knowledge of Kant's transcendental logic. Kant's transcendental logic searches for the content of the science of thought; he includes material logic next to the formal one, one which is valid *a priori*. Kant wants to examine the question of how it is possible that the concepts of thinking are not empty, but related to real objects. He wonders how the relationship between object and human thinking is possible, and therefore examines

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, page 30. "*A Posteriori*" means a proposition of experience; an empirical proposition cannot possess the qualities of necessity and absolute universality.

the origin, the capacity and the limits of the understanding of experience.⁴⁸⁵

The first step, the metaphysical deduction shows how the pure conceptions of reason are found and what they are, the second step is the transcendental deduction, which explains how the categories, although they result from the mere spontaneity of reason, are therefore subjective, but for the constitution of all objects essential and consequently objectively valid.⁴⁸⁶

Formal logic allows all kind of judgement. Reason has not only the ability to think but also to judge, every expression is the predicate for possible judgements. This is first of all the specific duty of reason, while the second step of the metaphysical deduction establishes that the way of judgement - exclusive of all empirical content - is an achievement of pure reason. The categories, the pure expressions of reason, are chosen through judgement. As the third effort, Kant declares a table of judgement, which is based on four points of view of judgement: of quantity, of quality, of relation and of modality.⁴⁸⁷ "This division is made systematically from a common principle, namely the faculty of judgement (which is just the same as the power of thought), and has not arisen rhapsodically from a haphazard search after pure conceptions."⁴⁸⁸

Indeed, the reason for reason's existence is the search for happiness, and happiness for all becomes a normative condition.

Kant's Glückseligkeit, called Happiness

The speculation of reason in its transcendental use aims finally at three objectives, which are free will, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God.⁴⁸⁹ The interest of all reason, either speculative or practical, results in the following three

⁴⁸⁴ Kant, *ibid.*, page 42.

⁴⁸⁵ See Höffe, *op.cit.*, Chapter six, "Die Analytik der Begriffe", 84pp.

⁴⁸⁶ Höffe, *ibid.*, page 89. Translation by the author: "Darauf zeigt der erste Schritt, die metaphysische Deduktion, wie man die reinen Verstandsbegriffe findet and worin diese liegen, während der zweite Schritt, die transzendente Deduktion, darlegt, wie die Kategorien, obwohl sie der bloßen Spontaneität des Verstandes entspringen, mithin subjektiv sind, dennoch für die Konstitution aller Gegenstände unentbehrlich, also objektiv gültig sind."

⁴⁸⁷ The table of categories, which contains four classes of conception, includes the following distinction:

1. Quantity: unity, plurality, totality (Einheit, Vielheit, Allheit); 2. Quality: reality (*realitas=die Sachheit*), negation, limitation (*Realität, Negation, Limitation*); 3. Relation: inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, community (*Der Relatio der Inhärenz und Subsistenz - Substantia et Accidens-, der Kausalität und Dependenz - Ursache und Wirkung-, der Gemeinschaft -Wechselwirkung zwischen dem Handelnden und Leidenden-*); 4. Modality: possibility-impossibility, existence-non-existence, necessity-contingence (*Der Modalität, Möglichkeit-Unmöglichkeit, Dasein-Nichtsein, Notwendigkeit-Zufälligkeit*). Kant, by William Benton, *ibid.*, page 42; Original text by Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft 1*, Werksausgabe Band III, Wilhelm Weischedel, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1995, page 118, 119.

⁴⁸⁸ Kant, *ibid.*, page 42.

⁴⁸⁹ Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft 2*, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 1995, page 672.

questions:

What can I know?

What shall I do?

What am I permitted to hope for?⁴⁹⁰

The first question is only speculative, the second question is only practical, and the third is both, because it results from 'if I do what I should' and 'what may I consequently hope for'.

The aim is happiness [*Glückseligkeit*], which results from the satisfaction of all our desires, extensive and intensive. Happiness is based on two rules; the first is pragmatic [*Klugheitsregel*], the second is moral [*Sittengesetz*]. The first suggests what we shall do if we want '*Glückseligkeit*'; the second commands us how to behave, in order to become worthy of '*Glückseligkeit*'. The first operates empirically, the second acts on inclination, based on ideas of pure reason which can be cognised *a priori*. Kant believes

that pure moral laws do really exist, which determine completely a priori (with no consideration for empirical reasons) action and non action, for example the use of freedom by a reasonable being, that further these laws command absolutely (not only hypothetically under the condition of empirical purposes) and are with all intentions necessary.⁴⁹¹

Kant calls the world a moral world, when it is functioning in accordance with all moral laws, resulting from the freedom of reasonable people and from the necessary laws of morality. The moral principles of reason are necessary in their theoretical as much as in their practical use, "that everybody has reason to hope for happiness equally to the amount of which his/her behaviour made him/her worthy."⁴⁹² This reiterates my earlier point to do with the normative dimension of happiness for all.

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, page 677: "Alles Interesse meiner Vernunft (das spekulative sowohl, als auch das praktische) vereinigt sich in folgenden drei Fragen: 1. Was kann ich wissen? 2. Was soll ich tun? 3. Was darf ich hoffen?"

⁴⁹¹ *Ibid.*, page 677, 678. Translation by the author:

"Ich nehme an, daß es wirklich reine moralische Gesetze gebe, die völlig a priori (ohne Rücksicht auf empirische Bewegungsgründe, d. i. Glückseligkeit) das Tun und Lassen, d. i. den Gebrauch der Freiheit eines vernünftigen Wesens überhaupt, bestimmen, und daß diese Gesetze schlechterdings (nicht bloß hypothetisch unter Voraussetzung anderer empirischen Zwecken) gebieten, und also in aller Absicht notwendig seien."

⁴⁹² Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft 2*, *ibid.*, page 680. Translation by the author; original text: "daß jedermann die Glückseligkeit in demselben Maße zu hoffen Ursache habe, als er sich derselben in seinem Verhalten würdig gemacht hat, und daß also das System der Sittlichkeit mit dem der Glückseligkeit unzertrennlich, aber nur in der Idee der reinen Vernunft verbunden sei."

The highest reason

This cognition is only possible with the understanding of a 'highest' reason (*höchste Vernunft*), which sets moral postulates at the same time as it is the foundation of nature.⁴⁹³ Kant calls "the idea of such an intelligence the ideal of the highest good, it is an intelligence in which the morally most perfected will in connection with the highest happiness establishes the foundation of all supreme happiness, as far as it is in the proper relation with morality [meaning: the dignity which enables happiness]."⁴⁹⁴

Kant calls practical laws 'maxims', as long as they are subjective causes for actions. The judgement of the standard of morality is made with ideas; the execution of its laws is achieved by 'maxims'.

The existence of moral laws is completely a priori and controls action and passivity, the use of freedom for every reasonable being in general. Kant believes that these laws generally -and not only hypothetically- reign and are unconditionally a necessity.

The metaphysic of morals - practical reason and moral action

Kant's metaphysic of morals establishes the practical reason of necessity and therefore moral action. The autonomy of the will becomes the supreme principle of morality. This development of thought is Kant's fundamental principle of the metaphysic of morals. The autonomy of the will is able to transcend self-confidence into new compositions of thought which are relevant according to developments in space and time. The concept of freedom is the key to morals which explains the autonomy of the will. Freedom must be presupposed as a property of the will of all beings.

Kant's critique of practical reason deals with "*Rechtslehre*", which is the manifestation of morals [*Sittlichkeit*] within human institutions of human co-existence, in particular in law, the state and the doctrines of morality [*Tugendlehre*], the manifestation in the acting subject, in the basic actions of the character, which are the virtues [*Tugenden*]. Practical reason is no different to theoretical reason, reason

⁴⁹³ See, Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft 2*, *ibid.*, page 681.

⁴⁹⁴ Kant, *ibid.*, page 681, translated by the author.

in both cases is the ability to overcome the sphere of the senses and of nature. Practical reason, according to Kant, "means the ability to choose one's own action independent of sensory grounds, instinctive urges, needs and desires, sensations of pleasure and unpleasantness."⁴⁹⁵ The will is nothing irrational, no "dark force out of some depth", but something rational, the actual reason responsible for action: "It is the will which distinguishes a rational being such as a person from natural beings such as animals, which act only according to laws given by nature and not by perception."⁴⁹⁶

As with his theory, Kant establishes for the practice a strict methodological differentiation between a will which is dependent on sensuous reasons of determination - *abhängig von sinnlichen Bestimmungsgründen* - and a will which is independent, which means independent between the empirically determined and the purely practical reason.⁴⁹⁷ Kant begins with a meta-ethical and not a normative ethical statement: "morally good - *sittlich gut*" means "to be good without exceptions - *ohne Einschränkung gut*". The conception of the unlimited good, is not relative but absolute and a necessity. The will judges for good or for bad, the conditions for being good lie in a good will, the absolute good is identical with the good will.

Because morality is not identical with duty, it cannot be judged on the same basis as duty, mainly rules and actions which can be observed. In contrast to legality morality cannot be defined by action alone but according to the will, the aim and cause for action.⁴⁹⁸

In contrast to utilitarianism and communitarians, Kant's ethic leads to the moral good, which is not a definition of what is right; Kant defines morality, not just legality.⁴⁹⁹ In contrast to legality, morality cannot be established within its action but only by its ultimate aim, the willingness (*das Wollen*). In this, we have a rather

"Ich nenne die Idee einer solchen Intelligenz, in welcher der moralisch vollkommenste Wille, mit der höchsten Seligkeit verbunden, die Ursache aller Glückseligkeit in der Welt ist, so fern sie mit der Sittlichkeit als der Würdigkeit, glücklich zu sein in genauem Verhältnis steht, das Ideal des höchsten Gutes".

⁴⁹⁵ Höffe, *op.cit.*, page 174; translation by the author, original text: "bedeutet die Fähigkeit, sein Handeln unabhängig von sinnlichen Bestimmungsgründen, den Trieben, Bedürfnissen und Leidenschaften, den Empfindungen des Angenehmen und Unangenehmen, zu wählen."

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.* Translation by the author, original text: Das Vermögen, nach der Vorstellung von Gesetzen zu handeln, heißt auch Wille, so daß die praktische Vernunft nichts anderes als das Vermögen zu wollen ist. Der Wille ist nichts Irrationales, keine "dunkle Kraft aus der Tiefe", sondern etwas Rationales, die Vernunft in Bezug auf das Handeln. Durch den Willen unterscheidet sich ein Vernunftwesen wie der Mensch von bloßen Naturwesen wie Tieren, die nur nach naturgegebenen, nicht auch nach vorgestellten Gesetzen handeln."

⁴⁹⁷ See Höffe, *ibid.*, page 175.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, page 179; "Da die Moralität nicht in der bloßen Übereinstimmung mit der Pflicht besteht, darf sie nicht auf der Ebene des beobachtbaren Verhaltens oder ihrer Regeln angesiedelt werden. Im Unterschied zur Legalität kann die Moralität nicht an der Handlung selbst, sondern nur an ihrem Bestimmungsgrund, dem Wollen, festgestellt werden."

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

different view of Kantian morality than IR has propagated, cognitive as well as normative, a necessity in terms of its nature rather than a duty without a nature.

5.2 *Perpetual peace and constitutional provisions within Kant*

My research here is important for the conduct of my thesis because it delivers a thorough understanding of a subject which is otherwise interpreted and misinterpreted in manifold ways. The constitution of Kant's "perpetual peace" relies on the understanding of transcendence.

The expression "perpetual peace" was formulated by Kant in 1795.⁵⁰⁰ Although IR has taken account of "perpetual peace", it has tended to treat it as a constitutional exercise alone, whereas this work partakes also of Kant's formulations raised earlier in this thesis. Kant's concept of perpetual peace combines theory with action. The difference between an illusion and a vision is that an illusion is contested by rational thinking as something which cannot be achieved under any circumstances. A vision is accepted as being an element within the realm of rationality and based on the executive power of our will. It therefore has the possibility of becoming reality. Every human individual has a will and therefore, according to Kant, is capable for behaving in a moral way. Kant thinks that this ability is based on our capacity for 'practical reason', one of two distinct aspects of the human mind, the second being 'theoretical reason'.⁵⁰¹ Practical reason is concerned with our aims and intentions in acting, and deals with our experiences as purposeful, moral beings. The reasoned conception of how to behave morally forms a necessary part of the human consciousness.

Kant acknowledges that all sorts of other considerations, such as expediency, personal gain, greed, revenge and jealousy all play their part in political life. Yet, he argues, the most important consideration for the politician himself must be the moral one. The politician is no different from the ordinary individual in this. The ordinary individual must seek to obey the dictates of his/her conscience if s/he is to be at one

⁵⁰⁰ Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), lived in Königsberg, in East Prussia, Professor of Philosophy. The original title of his Perpetual Peace is *Zum Ewigen Frieden*. Kant advocates a federation of free states, bound together by the covenant forbidding. Reason condemns war, which only an international government can prevent.

⁵⁰¹ See in detail: Howard Williams, *Kant's Political Philosophy*. New York: St. Martin Press, 1983, Chapter two, in particular: The Moral Law, p.29. See original text: Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten*, Band VII, Suhrkamp, 12. Aufl. 1992.

with him/herself. In trying to follow another path s/he can only destroy his/her well-being as a rational individual. The ordinary person must act according to his/her sense of duty, just as the politician is obliged to act according to a sense of justice.⁵⁰² The strength for moral acting is determined by the will. The will is the human faculty which raises mankind above determination by nature.

Kant's moral reasoning for the establishment of an eternal peace results out of his ethical deduction of the categorical imperative, mainly the postulate called '*Selbstzweckformel*'. Kant differentiates first of all between the person and the thing (*Sache*). A thing can only have a relative value, because it is always a means to an end. So, a computer has a relative value and can be exchanged for another. For Kant, people are reasonable beings and have an objective purpose. People's existence has a purpose within itself which cannot be exchanged by any other purpose. It is absolute. The purpose (*Selbstzweck*) of a person is based on good will and practical reason.⁵⁰³ He explains:

A person as well as every reasonable being does exist as means for its own, not only as means for any purpose to this or that will and should be considered as means in respect of all his/her action.

The practical imperative is a subjective principle of human action and at the same time an objective principle, because it concerns all people. As an objective principle it is the highest practical foundation to which all laws of the will relate.⁵⁰⁴

This understanding leads Kant to the following postulate:

Act in such a way, that you - being a person of your own as well as a person of every other - use humanity at all times as a purpose, never just as a mere means/method.⁵⁰⁵

Kant tells us that there are purposes, which are given to us by pure practical reasoning. This explains why purposes are objective and absolute, and not only

⁵⁰² Williams, *ibid*, page 29. Text in original: Immanuel Kant, *Zum Ewigen Frieden*. Reclam, 1994, p. 38. See original text, Immanuel Kant, *Zum Ewigen Frieden*. Reclam, 1994, Anhang II, pp. 49.

⁵⁰³ See Kant's *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 1998, page 59 pp.

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp 59-60. Translated by the author; original text: "Der Mensch, und überhaupt jedes vernünftige Wesen, existiert als Zweck an sich selbst, nicht bloß als Mittel zum beliebigen Gebrauche für diesen oder jenen Willen, sondern muß in allen seinen, sowohl auf sich selbst, als auch auf andere vernünftige Wesen gerichteten Handlungen jederzeit zugleich als Zweck betrachtet werden."

⁵⁰⁵ Kant, *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten, ibid.*, page 61. "Handle so, daß du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person eines jeden andern, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchest."

subjective and relative, and they own an absolute value due to them being good within themselves. All maxims, which are fostering war are therefore not in accordance with the categorical imperative because they instrumentalise people.⁵⁰⁶ For Kant no state has the right to send its citizens into war, risking their goods and their lives in a gamble, because every person has his/her own worth and cannot be owned by anybody else. People cannot be used as a means to an end in an instrumental way.

Kant is thus a founder of a jurisprudence of world peace. Peace becomes the ultimate goal of jurisdiction. Kant explains that it is in the interest of every state to support both inner and outer peace, to achieve it and to keep it. He quotes a pupil of his, Bouterwek, who said: "If one bends a reed too much, it will break; and he who wants too much, wants nothing."⁵⁰⁷ This means that the cognition of the idea of reason leads steadily to its practical moral implication but this cannot be done abruptly.

Kant defines war juridicially as the use of power in lack of jurisdiction in the *statu naturali*, as the "*medium necessitatis ius suum persequendi*", as the sad emergency kit in the natural state ... (lacking the existence of a court of jurisdiction, which could be able to have the authority to judge).⁵⁰⁸

Since ethical behaviour is constituted as a universal law a priori, perpetual peace is a responsibility for the people. Eternal peace is not a reality yet, it must be achieved (*'Frieden muß gestiftet werden'*).⁵⁰⁹ Accordingly, Kant undertakes the demonstration of preliminary articles and definitive articles which constitute an enabling process towards a perpetual peace.

The definitive articles

The definitive articles postulate that:

1. the civil constitution in every state shall be republican.
2. international law shall be based on the federation of free states.
3. the universal right to citizenship shall be limited to the general right to hospitality.

⁵⁰⁶ See Georg Cavalari, *Pax Kantiana*. Wien, Köln, Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 1992, Chapter 2.2.2., pp 43.

⁵⁰⁷ Kant, *Zum Ewigen Frieden*, *ibid.*, page 32. Translation by the author: "Biegt man das Rohr zu stark, so bricht's; und wer zu viel will, der will nichts".

⁵⁰⁸ Georg Cavalari, *Pax Kantiana*, *op.cit.*, page 194.

⁵⁰⁹ Kant, *Zum Ewigen Frieden*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1984, pages 55 and 56.

All people who live in a dependency upon each other have to belong to a somewhat civil constitution. Kant bases every definitive article on this postulate.

A lawful constitution for people is:

- a) '*Ius civitatis*', the civil law concerning people living within one state (*Staatsbürgerrecht*)
- b) '*Ius gentium*', international law concerning the relationship of states (*Völkerrecht*)
- c) '*Ius cosmopolitanicum*', cosmopolitan law (*Weltbürgerrecht*), concerning the relationship between people and states in an outer dependency, where the person is regarded as a citizen of a common state of people (*Menschenstaat*).⁵¹⁰

This correlation is for Kant essential for the establishment of perpetual peace, for peace will only be established within a given constitutional order. Legal freedom, according to Kant, cannot be defined with authority in the sense that everybody can do what ever s/he wants as long it does not harm anybody else. Legal freedom as defined by Kant, is the authority not to obey any outer laws, only those which the personal will can agree with harmoniously. In a similar way the legal equality in a state is expressed in the relationship of the citizens where no one can legally commit a violation to the other without submitting him/her self to the same laws and vice versa.

With this information, it is necessary for me to complete in my critique of existing work associated with this discipline. In so far as IR has been successful in its moral and normative concerns, it has been through the study of Kant. IR has, at least, sought to have a view of ethics. However, it has focussed rather narrowly on Kant, and not fully articulated the central and co-ordinating principle in Kant's work – to do with transcendence - and this principle of transcendence is a provision of great moral emancipation as well as individual moral responsibility.

5.3 *The Leitmotiv of Reconciliation and its consequences for GPE*

I will now discuss the Hegelian-Kantian dichotomy. Cooper urges us to come to an

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, page 11.

acceptance of theoretical reconciliation on these terms. The task is to attempt to solve the mystery of people either being a substance of the whole or an antithesis within nature. Global development advocates a Kantian cosmopolitan order to aspire to a universal ethical system. Hegelianism cannot cope with the process of globalization as we have seen. Globalization needs a theoretical framework which enables the inclusion of multicultural tradition, what Chan calls 'the other'.

One apparent thread running through philosophy over the centuries and an aspiration shared by the global multicultural society is the attempt to reconcile people with nature and the cosmos at large. The 21st century debates in politics and economics are founded on the same essential questioning of how people are fitting in the overarching movie of the non-predictable cosmos which surrounds us. How can people overcome their sense of alienation in all this? In particular in the 21st century, where the importance of sciences are accepted in producing leading technology for cyber communication, it is also commonly accepted that the destiny of people cannot be controlled by sciences alone. Hegel produced a definition of reality which arose out of a sense of history, but his history itself excluded the alternatively mythical, while Kant includes in his definition of reason the mystery of the quantum unknown.

Cooper explains how Hegel's philosophy endeavoured to overcome what he called 'alienation' or 'estrangement': "By these terms, they meant the sense which many human beings - all of them perhaps, at times - have of being 'strangers', of not being 'at home', in the world."⁵¹¹ According to Cooper this perception seems to be the central inspiration behind philosophical speculation. The task seems to reconcile the human being with its cosmos, a theme constantly recurring from earliest thinkers recorded in India to the twentieth century's questions of alienation. With increasing self-awareness and increasing freedom of choice, the fundamental question about the purpose lying beyond this world, is "an appreciation, in short, of the many ways in which a human being belongs, or seems to belong, to a unique order of life."⁵¹² After millennia of thinkers, the tension of the debate increased within globalization, the present global context of worldly political and economic affairs. It is not only, as Cooper points out, an intellectual debacle, but [will become] a human tragedy, if a sense of reconciliation is not achieved. The striving for reconciliation is here

⁵¹¹ David E. Cooper, *World Philosophies. An Historical Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell, reprint 1998, page 5.

⁵¹² *Ibid.*

synonymous with the aspiration for a universally accepted codex of ethics.

Hegel's answer opted, in contrast to Kant, for the concept of people belonging to a regulated community, based on unicultural conformity to the laws constituted accordingly. When looked at this concept under the light of Hegel's historicism and the development of what he calls *Zeitgeist*, Hegel anticipates a smoothly running system which creates the necessary security and reconciles people with their natural environment. Within this concept of thought, time and space become very significant, because time and space are Hegel's vectors for his historic process. It becomes easy to assimilate Hegel's thinking within the new global context without undoing his concepts by accepting his vision of the gradual intellectual growth of people, which is increasing in adapting changes like new technology, new social structures and new political manifestos. The present political society has taken away power and responsibility from the primary institution, family and clan. This development has been ambivalent in creating on the other hand a release of duties and responsibilities, which now become the resort of the secular political institution.

'Secondary institutions', as Höffe calls them, increased in importance as centres of compensatory duties and social responsibilities which secondary institutions took away from the historical primary institutions of the family unions.⁵¹³ Looking at the phenomena in this light, the present Western creation of the state is not - according to Höffe - a union of solidarity as Rawls would like to define it, but a system of bartering and agreeing reparation costs. What seemed a good idea when formulated by Hegel, proves to have outlived its usefulness because it has not reconciled people with their natural surrounding. The population of states are no longer mono-cultured; in Central Europe approximately 10 percent of the population are refugees who accept the host constitution because of lack of choice. Identification with the host population does not always take place.

Authors in IR and IPE are partially aware of the changes in economic and political structures as the former chapters have shown, but rather hesitant in thinking of more innovative themes instead of quarrelling about orthodox ideologies. Think again, for an instant, of my earlier critique of how Frost, in his Hegelianism, cannot cope with outsiders.

⁵¹³ Otfried Höffe, *Soziale Gerechtigkeit als Tausch: ein Neues Paradigma*, in *Politik und Ethik*, (ed.) Kurt Bayertz. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1996, page 243pp.

In order to overcome the limits of a narrow political economy approach, reconciliation between the competing (as it seems) philosophical expressions of communitarianism and universalism seems a necessity. Universalism sets an emphasis upon autonomy from certain political and economic structures. It is the autonomy of the individual to choose by his/her own will in a Kantian sense, which enables the universal goal of self definition (*Selbstbestimmung*), a human tendency of universal nature. The autonomy of the individual is not a hyper-good that people use to open themselves and their society "to a form of self-understanding that is delusive, arrogant and ultimately hubristic"⁵¹⁴, but a good which enables people to join with humanity worldwide. The value in a person's life is found within itself, in contradiction to the communitarian claim that the locus of value in one's life is often to be found outside the self. Communitarianism sets therefore limits to the will of the individual.

As a positive view, communitarianism is a perspective on ethics and political philosophy which emphasises the psycho-social and ethical importance of belonging to communities, and which holds that the possibilities for justifying ethical judgements are determined by the fact that ethical reasoning must proceed within the context of a community's traditions and cultural understandings. As a negative view, communitarianism is a variety of anti-liberalism, one that criticises liberal thought for failing to appreciate the importance of community. Communitarianism denies that ethical standards or principles are universal.

Kant's theory, however, postulates the freedom of each individual will, which must be considered as the evocative notion of humanity and as an end in itself. The essential basis of human rights is the respect of people as ends and not as means. Kant demonstrates that universality is the formal precondition of rationality and aims to derive a system of substantive, universal moral principles that are unconditionally valid.

Kant aims high into a sphere of global context unknown to his time, whereas his pupil Hegel deconstructs Kant's global vision to the community of man within a civil society and state, where according to Hegel, a

⁵¹⁴ See the full discussion on communitarians in Stephen Mulhall & Adam Swift, *Liberals & Communitarians*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992; quote from page 294.

single person, ... is something subordinate, and as such he must dedicate himself to the ethical whole. Hence if the state claims life, the individual must surrender it. ... But the fundamental question is: Have I a *right* to take my life? The answer will be that I, as *this* individual, am not master of my life, because life, as the comprehensive sum of my activity, is nothing external to personality, which itself is this immediate personality, thus when a person is said to have a right over his life, the words are a contradiction, because they mean that a person has a right over himself.⁵¹⁵

Reason, as Hegel understands it, is not some quality which is attributed to some human subject. It is, by contrast, the sum of all reality, meaning that reason and reality are strictly identical, whereby reason is thought of as a process which leads to a self-knowledge of reason, adding up to a historical, dialectic and infinite process. According to Cooper, natural and historical processes are, for Hegel, "concrete manifestations of the Idea or Spirit. 'History is the development of Spirit [*Geist*] in time, as Nature is ... of the Idea in space'."⁵¹⁶ When Hegel talks about history, it is the history of man, first of all; Hegel is the uniter of man at home with himself. Just as concepts cannot be mere mental abstractions from reality and their connections embodied in reality, according to Hegel, a person becomes embodied in its own history. According to Hegel, history "is the story of our becoming conscious of what we are, 'of finding ourselves in the world'... and recognising that we are not 'alienated' from the rest of reality, that 'everything in heaven and earth' is permeated by human thought."⁵¹⁷

According to Kant, the outer world causes only the matter of sensation, but our own mental apparatus orders this matter in space and time. Hegel's rejection of Kant's view "that reason's attempt to go beyond the understanding and to grasp reality as a whole results in irresolvable antinomies. Moral and aesthetic experience may, for Kant, intimate that reality is a purposive whole, but its nature remains 'incomprehensible'."⁵¹⁸ Kant denies that knowledge can be restricted to the testimony of the senses. There are crucial moments of personal experience which are difficult to put into words, and which could be characterised as authoritative for the person

⁵¹⁵ *The Philosophy of Right*, by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, translated by T. M. Knox, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, The University of Chicago Great Books, 29th edition, 1987, page 123.

⁵¹⁶ David E. Cooper, 1998, *op.cit.*, page 314.

⁵¹⁷ *Ibid.*, page 315.

⁵¹⁸ *Ibid.*, page 312.

concerned and irrelevant to anybody else. People can read and hear in the course of their lives enough truths to receive some wisdom, but this can have no effect on them if they are not receptive. People may think they have open minds, that a reasoned logical argument will lead them to a correct interpretation of reality, but they select the tools of understanding out of their own tool kit. The integral cognition of heart-mind-and-soul expressions of non-rational experience are truths which can be experienced directly, and accepted on the authority of that particular and individual experience.

Kant's debate is an enlightened view in contrast to that of dogmatism and scepticism. Dogmatism formulates shallow theories and insists on their validity. Scepticism insists on an answer to the question of whether the content of experience is objective or subjective, and turns out to be based on too narrow a view of reality. Reductionist scientific materialism on the other hand is simple-minded and naive. Kant stresses the importance of not denying "whatever lies beyond the sphere of experience, for this would be doing 'irreparable injury to morality. ... For Kant, to remain within the limits of what we understand is to deny the possibility of morality."⁵¹⁹ If by objective we mean that which exists in the external world and can be verified by the senses coupled with scientific instruments, if by subjective we mean that which forms part of our mental life and is dependent on us, then the content of aesthetic or moral experience is neither objective nor subjective, yet it affects people's lives more profoundly than anything else.

Kant advocates people in beautiful unity of infinite worth with themselves, with others and with the ultimate whole as the precondition for our existence. Just as Copernicus in astrology proved doctrines of belief wrong, and showed that our perceptions of the planets are due not to their motion, but to ours, Kant declared that objects conform to knowledge and not knowledge to objects. Therefore, moral action entails a freedom to transcend people's natural self and becomes useful only when directed by goodwill. Cooper explains how finally,

for an action to be moral, the law out of respect for which it is performed must be a self-imposed one. The good will displays 'autonomy'- 'that property of it by which it is a law to itself. ... Obedience to a law simply because it is the Pope's, the Emperor's, or even God's has no moral worth, for it is then inspired by a natural motive like love or fear. [Instead] the good will ... is

independent of empirical conditions and applicable to all rational beings.⁵²⁰

Moral law is, according to Kant encapsulated in universal law. Following the 'categorical imperative'⁵²¹, Kant's law is based on the belief that to violate one is to violate the other. Kant thus builds the bridge among people and their environment with the proof of reason, but also of reason linked to spirituality. Beauty and the purpose of the creation is unity. Nothing can be understood dissected from the other. Freedom, according to Kant, requires "that the supersensible can effect the sensible."⁵²²

Kant's philosophy does provide the content and context for reconciliation, because his theory is based more on personal spirituality than on *Zeitgeist*. Kant elevates a morality of individual duty [*Moralität*] over the ethical order [*Sittlichkeit*], interpreted by Cooper as "the public norms and principles which hold sway in a society" ⁵²³, because the ethical value of the society depends on the prejudices which people bring into a society. Schumacher quotes St Thomas Aquinas to explain this notion: "*Cognitum autem est in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis*"⁵²⁴, including the significance of *Adequatio* ... 'we can only know things we are capable of knowing'. And we can seek knowledge within our culture or outside; as expressed in Chapter One according to Nardin: '*We are members of many overlapping ethical communities*'. This is the key issue.

Schumacher was struck by the expression of 'organic wholeness' when studying Eastern philosophy. New possibilities of knowledge (and experience) were opened to him when reading a passage in Radhakrishnan:

The present crisis in human affairs is due to a profound crisis in human consciousness, a lapse from the organic wholeness of life. There is a tendency to overlook the spiritual and exalt the intellectual. ... The business of the intellectual is to dispel the mystery, put an end to dreams, strip life of its illusions, and reduce the great play of human life to a dull show, comic on

⁵¹⁹ *Ibid.*, page 296.

⁵²⁰ *Ibid.*, page 303.

⁵²¹ "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law."

⁵²² Cooper, *op.cit.*, page 305.

⁵²³ *Ibid.*, page 318.

⁵²⁴ Translates as: 'the slenderest knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things'.

occasions but tragic more frequently.⁵²⁵

Kant's success lies in developing a concept of ethical thinking within the 'organic wholeness of life', the beautiful unity of infinite worth. One of Kant's profoundest claims is, "that restricting knowledge to the testimony of the senses is incoherent. ... Reason should not be dogmatic, but nor so modest as to confine its scope to the data of the senses."⁵²⁶ Just as no person is reason alone by nature or senses, Kant advises a moral philosophy which fits the wholeness of human life. The history of people is the history of life. Without the constellation of life there would be no history. Moral conduct is essential in the determination of lives. Life is the carrier of thought and action. Consciousness, concepts, rationality and intellect, judgement and spirit are always related to the facts of life.⁵²⁷

The Western Christian background, which forms the basis for Kant's intellectual discovery, limits Kant's morality to the finite life of the individual being responsible for his/her actions. I ask the question: Why, however, should an IR or any increasingly global discipline be concerned with only Western thinkers? Why just one example of the principle of transcendence?

An analogous explication of transcendence lies in Buddhism, particularly as articulated in the Theravada school of Buddhism. This is not the only such analogous explication, but it is chosen in this thesis for its exemplary nature. The Buddhist revolution in ethics consists of the perfection of one's morality, devoid of any other aid which results in the realisation of *nibbāna*, the *summum bonum*, the end of all craving, the Highest Good which is beyond time and space.⁵²⁸

In the following chapter I am therefore going to consider the ethical reasoning of Theravada Buddhism in order to find a background moral concept to offer to a new GPE. Global political economy is concerned with the wholeness of life bound into a universal context, the infinite worth of Buddhist ethics can be now discerned and recognized as a further development of Kant's universal concept of morality.

⁵²⁵ Peter France, *Journey*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1998, page 136.

⁵²⁶ Cooper, *op.cit.*, page 296.

⁵²⁷ See Volker Gerhardt, *Lebensführung und Politik*, in *Politik und Ethik*, (ed.), Kurt Bayertz. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1996, page 13.

⁵²⁸ See S.G.M. Weerasinghe, *A Comparative Study of Early Buddhism and Kantian Philosophy*. Colombo, Sri Lanka: S. Godage & Brothers, 1993.

5.4 Conclusion

With the exception of Chan, authors in IR and IPE relate to Western theories. Kant is used as a background theory, but seems to be only partially accepted, based on some misreadings and therefore misinterpretations. To reinstall Kant, as I have tried to expound his tenets in this chapter, seems a difficult undertaking. In the face of globalization, Kant still advocates a Western colonial concept, with a morality which pays tribute to a Higher Being, a concept unfamiliar to some other cultures. His moral philosophy arises out of Western enlightenment philosophy.

Despite the claims made for interdisciplinary and multicultural considerations, theory remains a Western construction, originated in Western thought and proclaiming Western-based arguments in an omnipotent Western style. Kant's morality is sufficient to open up the potential for a new GPE theory. Kant's deontology, rightly understood, is the basis for the re-introduction of morality, a major step in advancing theory. Kant's morality is an *a priori* knowledge, an absolute principle. And, if we understand Kant, it is only a small step to understand Theravada Buddhism

IR has sought to use Kant, but I have argued insufficiently so. What IR has done, however, is to attempt an extended philosophically-based normative theoretical foundation for ethics; and GPE has not attempted this. I am not, however, proposing a Kantian GPE; rather that GPE should make a 'quantum leap' and 'transcend' Kant himself. This is why I shall propose Theravada Buddhism in my next chapter.

I have found the Theravada ethical system as a result of posing the following questions. What moral system can I find which is unconditionally a necessity, is universal and which can be accepted as neutral enough to serve the needs of a multicultural global society? My research led me to the Eastern ethical discourses of Theravada Buddhism, because it is a non-Western ethical system, universal by its very nature and interconnected with all strands of life. For Kant, to do good is a matter of will; Theravada Buddhism proclaims morality as a matter of being.

Chapter 6

The ethical framework of Theravada Buddhism

Main points of this chapter

Buddhist ethics and its relevance for Global Political Econom

Buddhist ethics: The value of Kalyānamittatā and Yonisomanisikāra

The acquisition and distribution of wealth

Conclusion

Main points of this chapter

- *Buddhist ethics are incorporated in all strands of life*
- *Singularity and communality are interdependent*
- *There is no renunciation of wealth but the right use of it*
- *Right action is the maximising of the welfare of all beings*

6.1 *Buddhist ethics and its relevance for global political economy*

Why something Buddhist⁵²⁹ for a multi-confessional world? I am seeking to propose something exemplary, not necessarily definite and binding by it. Buddhism is inherently atheistic by not proposing an absolute creator-god. It does not compete with other godheads. It's spiritual world, with its spiritual forces, is not unlike the world-spirit of Hegel, or the sense of a Kantian moral universe – both of which IR has applied to the world, albeit through selective readings. Buddhism is, at least, here an antidote to that mono-cultural foundation for normative thought. Having said that, I do hope to indicate how persuasively universal it can in fact be.

I am going to introduce a tradition of ethical thought that can, from an Eastern point of view, aid GPE to overcome the chasm between theory and practice. The thesis postulates the need for a global political economy as a body of discourse which incorporates ethics as a given factor, not as a matter of exercise or choice. The significance of this difference of understanding can be made explicit when drawing upon research from a non-Western cultural discourse, which is Buddhism. An understanding of Buddhist ethics demonstrates ethics as implicit in all walks of life - public and private - as much as rational and non-rational. Misra explains how Buddhism proclaims implicitly the immanent divinity of man. Buddhist ethics do not rely on any conventional authority, it deals with a "universal morality free of all religious dogmas, class distinction or convictions."⁵³⁰ The total framework of Buddhist morality comprises two basic factors: "the first is the spiritual experience of the Buddha which can be shared by anyone who is intent upon its realisation and makes right efforts therefore; the other is the analysis of human mind. In Buddhism, an attempt is made to give a psychological basis to ethical consciousness. ... The attainment of higher knowledge is inevitably and directly related with the nature of consciousness."⁵³¹ Buddhism therefore doesn't limit the notion of experience only to knowledge "which is made available to one with the help of the various sense-organs in companionship with the mind."⁵³² Buddhism is positivistic, but at the same time mystical in its approach. Buddha "believed in two levels of reality, the phenomenal and the absolute. Whereas phenomenal reality can be a matter of objective

⁵²⁹ In the following Buddhist words are expressed in Sanskrit, or in Pali, depending on the origin of the references.

⁵³⁰ Girija S.P. Misra, *Development of Buddhist Ethics*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Ltd., 1984, page 54; see also Chapter three, Psychological Analysis and Moral Life, page 54 pp.

⁵³¹ Misra, *ibid.*, page 55.

⁵³² *Ibid.*

experience and verbal communication, absolute reality cannot be so experienced and communicated. It can only be "transcendentally" experienced and is, therefore, beyond logic (*atakko*)."⁵³³ Buddhism has the conception of an integrated social order. Buddha was a spiritual and religious teacher, but social, economic and political consequences follow from his teachings either directly or indirectly.

Saddhatissa examines Buddhist ethics as part of the general character and habits of people, based on the following definition of ethics: "Ethics is usually confined to the particular field of human character and conduct so far as they depend upon or exhibit certain general principles commonly known as moral principles. Men in general characterise their own conduct and character and that of other men by such general adjectives as good, bad, right and wrong, and it is the meaning and scope of these adjectives, primarily in their relation to human conduct, and ultimately in their final and absolute sense, that ethics investigates."⁵³⁴ In Buddhist thought "the highest state is one which lies beyond good and evil. In the second place, according to Buddhism there is no break between moral teaching and that which pertains directly to the ideal state; humanity, sufficiently advanced in the practice of the moralities, risers and continues to rise above the common limitations of time and space whether these terms are interpreted from the point of view of the physical sciences or with reference to historical and geographical location."⁵³⁵ The ultimate ideal aim relates, according to Buddhist thought, "to the supra mundane or *lokuttara* state ... which is entirely covered by the Buddha's teaching. It is, in fact, that which is known to Buddhists as *mārga*, *magga*, the Path, the Road, along which each person must travel for him[her]self beginning with the practice of the common moralities up to the supra-mundane state beyond good and evil. From this point of view Buddhism can be said to provide the complete ethical study."⁵³⁶

As Buddhism has throughout the centuries split into various schools of thought and undergone various interpretations, one particular scholarly branch, called Theravada Buddhism, is here chosen to anchor our ethical study.⁵³⁷ This was the Buddhism of

⁵³³ *Ibid.*, page 55. Absolute reality is beyond logic which explains why some questions cannot be answered.

⁵³⁴ H. Saddhatissa, *Buddhist Ethics, Essence of Buddhism*. London: George Allen & Urwin Ltd., 1970, page 15. The definition is taken from: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1926 ed., vol. 9, page 809. Article: Ethics. Rev. H.H. Williams (Fellow, Tutor and Lecturer in Philosophy, Hertford College, Oxford).

⁵³⁵ Saddhatissa, *ibid.*, page 18.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*, page 19.

⁵³⁷ About 340 BCE, at the Second Council the split took place between the *Śhāviras*, meaning 'the Elders', and the Great *Saṅgha*, the *Mahasāṅghikas*, today known as the *Mahāyānistas*, the Great Vehicle Buddhists. 'Elders' became the Pali word 'Theravada', the Way of the Elders. (The *Mahāyānistas* began to refer to the Theravadans as *Hināyānistas*, which means Small Vehicle Buddhists.)

the monks and monasteries/universities of India and Tibet and, to the extent that it arose in cloisters of learning, it established, more than other schools, an intertextual and discursive tradition. I have, here, made use of the inheritors - in English - of this tradition, not being able to read Sanskrit, the foundation language of the Theravada scripts.

Theravada's study is thus a scholarly study. The greatness of its scholarly achievement lies in its sense of unity, whereby action is interwoven into a practical discourse and not separated with theoretical development of ideals on one side and a separated practical reality on the other. The Theravada body of knowledge is expressed in stories. Parables use familiar situations to illustrate an ethical point. Wisdom is transmitted in these lively stories which are nevertheless used to convey abstract concepts.⁵³⁸ Theory and practice become one by way of meditation towards an ultimate wisdom. In Buddhism this is known as the teaching of conditioned co-production: "The way in which everything in the universe is determined by causes and conditions. There is nothing, according to this teaching, whether in the material or mental sphere, that exists independently of conditions."⁵³⁹ The regulative value for human conduct and the source of prescription and prohibition is *karma*. Misra explains how "the doctrine of *karma* points out that the entire life of egoistic action is one of bondage and man should seek to reach beyond the polarities of pleasure and pain, right and wrong, to spiritual freedom expressing itself in peace and compassion. ... The *karmic* law ... lays down that a morally good volitional act brings about a pleasant result whereas a morally bad volitional act would always result in misery for the doer."⁵⁴⁰ The principal aspects of the *law of karma* are: moral, causal and spiritual, the nature of cause and effect.

According to Lovin, Theravada Buddhism is a "doctrine of interdependent co-arising, the complex and interdependent relationship between monk, laity, and king, and the nature and function of the *sangha* (religious community) in Buddhist society."⁵⁴¹ Buddhist social ethics are not based on renunciation, but rather on the understanding and assessment of society's achievements "in relation to the uncompromised

⁵³⁸ For example, the stories of Aoka, the Buddhist model of a ruler. The Indian Emperor Asoka lived 274-236 BCE. In the Asokan ideal, the *Saṅgha*, the worldly society, and the state are interdependent. For Asoka, the ideal Buddhist ruler, the state is conceived not as an end in itself but rather a means to an end higher than the state itself, namely *dhamma* or morality. For Asoka the state is an educative institution and he tries to solve the dichotomy between force and morality. See more to the Asokan Ideal in Misra, pp 112-117.

⁵³⁹ Abhaya, *Living The Good Life*. Birmingham: Windhorse Publication, 1996, page 9.

⁵⁴⁰ Misra, *op.cit.*, page 53.

⁵⁴¹ Russell F Sizemore and Donald K Swearer, (eds.), *Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation, A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990, page 150. *Sangha* means community or assembly.

*dhamma*⁵⁴², the fundamental law of individual development and perfection."⁵⁴³ Material prosperity is valued, but it is not an unconditional good.

It is important for me to re-state the main points of Buddhist ethics. Buddhist ethics have nothing to do with any outside authority or with keeping rules. Ethics is not an imposed set of moral laws. When judging ethics it is more the question of how the prevailing moral climate is affecting the collective psyche. Abhaya calls Buddhist morality "natural morality", because "it is not imposed from outside, but springs quite naturally from an inner, spiritually wholesome state of being, just as unethical action follows quite naturally from a spiritually unwholesome state of being. It is a question not of reward or punishment for having kept or broken the rules, but of the natural consequences following from actions based on good or bad intentions."⁵⁴⁴ Theravada ethics are part of a broad pattern of inter-relatedness, or conditionedness; according to Abhaya "everything in the universe is determined by causes and conditions."⁵⁴⁵

In particular, the following words of Buddha highlight the significance of modern global environmental and ecological problems:

All beings are the owners of their deeds, the heirs of their deeds - their deeds are the womb from which they sprang, with their deeds they are bound up.

Their deeds are their refuge. Whatever deeds they do - good or evil - of such they will be the heirs.

The Buddha, from the Anguttara-Nikaya

Living a good life is living an ethical life, where by behaving within a certain codex of morality is not a dictate by someone mortal or by someone divine, the acceptance of a command and therefore the status of resentful duty, but the consequences of a healthy state of mind. Abhaya gives an example:

in Buddhism, there is no God, no Lawgiver, but a direct flow from positive energy to positive energy and negative energy to negative energy; ethics is not an imposed set of moral laws, but the reality of experience, action and reaction simultaneously. The opening verses of the *Dhammapada*, an early Buddhist text, put the underlying principle very simply: 'If one speaks or acts

⁵⁴² *Dhamma* means truth, reality, natural and moral order, comprising the teachings of Buddha. It is also the law of how the cosmos works from a meditator's point of view.

⁵⁴³ Sizemore and Swearer, *op.cit.*, page 151.

⁵⁴⁴ Abhaya, *op.cit.*, page 9.

⁵⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

with an impure mind, suffering follows him even as the cartwheel follows the hoof of the ox. ... If one speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness follows him like his shadow.⁵⁴⁶

A pure mind is constituted out of guidance to overcome three unpure roots, which are greed, hatred or ill-will, and delusion or ignorance. According to Buddhism ultimately all our unhappiness, all evil, and all suffering result from these three poisonous roots. The opposites of these three negatives, are contentment, love, and a clear understanding of how things really are. Buddhism gives guidelines, training principles in order to become 'skilful', in the meaning of 'good' instead of bad, or 'right' instead of bad. Morality is not presented separately and practised in the abstract, but is skilful action and the interwoven ingredients of the Buddhist path to the ultimate wisdom, also called the 'Opposite Shore' or the 'Enlightenment'.⁵⁴⁷ Non-ethical actions will lead to an impure mind and with this state of mind negative effects of unskilfulness will block positive advancement. Until misconduct is acknowledged and dealt with, further progress along the path is barred. In particular, five precepts should be followed by everyone, monk or lay person alike:

- I undertake to abstain from taking life.
- I undertake to abstain from taking the non-given.
- I undertake to abstain from sexual misconduct.
- I undertake to abstain from untruthful speech.
- I undertake to abstain from taking intoxicants.

These fundamental ethical principles are integral to the proper life. According to Abhaya, the "purpose of following the precepts is rather to remove all the defilement obscuring our innate purity; a more appropriate image would be that evoked by Neoplatonist philosopher Plotinus in his discussion of ethics - the sculptor hacking and chipping away at rough, moss-covered stone to release the lovely image deep inside."⁵⁴⁸ In harmony with the metaphor of the sculptor, one understands that the Beauty of the Virtuous Life is not a hidden imprint within a stone to be discovered. It is something growing towards completeness, the perfect goodness. It is the work of changing human actions "of body, speech, and mind- from bad to good, from good

⁵⁴⁶ Abhaya, *ibid.*, page 8. *Dhammapada* is a *sutta* text (Sanskrit: *Sutra*: Pali texts often in dialogue format), summarizing the ethical ideals of the Theravada tradition. *Dhamma* means truth, reality and moral order, the teachings of the Buddha.

⁵⁴⁷ The Buddhist meaning of 'enlightenment' refers to the transformation from Siddhattha Gotama, the man who became the Buddha (563-483 BCE). The word 'buddha' is not a proper name; it is a Pali word meaning 'awakened'. Siddhattha became the Buddha, the Awakened One, the Fully Enlightened One.

to better."⁵⁴⁹ The proof lies in actual practice, an ethical practice based on the knowledge that all life is interconnected.

Looking at the development of Western civilisation, it can be observed that morality is rather less appealing. The commonplace reduction of ethics to the status of resentful duties has diminished natural morality. An apparatus of law and commandments has created an exterior judicature which impoverishes the intrinsic nature of ethics. This is not to say that a central judiciary has not its place as long it recognises its interdependence with the people, the interdependence between communality and singularity. According to Abhaya, when "the authoritarian view of ethics is in force, rules are often kept to avoid punishment and not from a healthy desire to do good. People react against this and, in the absence of any attractive alternative, resort to a rather cynical amorality, the chilling philosophy of 'anything goes': anything, that is, that you can get away with."⁵⁵⁰ Therefore the prevailing moral climate affects the collective psyche. Misra claims that in "Buddhism, an attempt is made to give a psychological basis of ethical consciousness. ... The training of consciousness is the indispensable antecedent condition of higher knowledge, because consciousness is the vessel upon whose capacity depends the extent of what is to be received."⁵⁵¹ When discussing the importance of ethics within the field of global political economy the major problem is the inequality of wealth and poverty. Buddhism teaches that it is one good of karma to be wealthy but that it is wrong to be stingy or to squander one's money.

6.2 *The value of kalyānamittatū and yonisomanisikāra*

The whole of Buddhist ethics is based on the Noble Eightfold Path. The Noble Eightfold Path, or the Eightfold Way, is known as the *magga*, based on two requisites of the path, the *pre-magga* factors. The eight *magga* factors are segments of the individual's path to perfection, and the two *pre-magga* factors are the means by which the individual deals with the world and its environment.

⁵⁴⁸ Abhaya, *op.cit.*, page 14. See Plotinus. *The Enneads 1.6*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991, p. 54.

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, page 43.

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, page 8.

⁵⁵¹ Misra, *op.cit.*, page 55.

Kalyānamittatā represents the individual's association with good people. This external and environmental factor is a precondition to all further development together with *yonisomanisikāra*, which is the systematic attention and reflection of the self. *Yonisomanisikāra* is the internal and personal factor. The consciousness of both forms the basis for the development of *magga*, the individual's path towards perfection. Rājavaramuni gives an excellent account of Buddhist social ethics. He explains that Buddhism does not lack concern for social and material welfare, despite its fame for its metaphysical and spiritual teachings, associated with the mind and meditation. According to Rājavaramuni, although "Buddhism does emphasise the cultivation of certain mental states, it teaches that human existence consists of both mind and body, and it states flatly that a necessary degree of material and social well-being is a prerequisite for any spiritual progress."⁵⁵² Buddhism is not one without the other: the *dhamma*, or the doctrine deals with ideals and principles whereas the *vinaya* is the discipline which deals with rules and circumstances in which these ideals and principles are practised and realised. "The most basic point to be made about Buddhist social ethics is that in keeping with the Buddhist doctrine of dependent co-arising, individual betterment and perfection on the one hand and the social good on the other are fundamentally interrelated and interdependent."⁵⁵³ Without *dhamma* and *vinaya*, no adequate idea of Buddhist ethics could be grasped. According to Buddhist teaching, all people should have the opportunity to be trained and educated, and they should be allowed to develop according to their training or education and their individual effort toward attainment and perfection. Individual perfection and the social good are interdependent. Every person is at least responsible to society for his or her own well-being and perfection in order to make himself or herself a good constituent of a good society. The virtues of a ruler are charity, high moral character, self-sacrifice, integrity, gentleness, austerity (or non-indulgence), non-anger, non-oppression, tolerance, and non-derivation from the norm-or normative. It is especially noteworthy that a ruler is required to see to it that there is no poverty. Poverty is regarded as the main source of crime and disorder as well as greed. According to Rājavaramuni, "this absence of poverty, the accumulation of wealth or economic sufficiency, is a prerequisite for a happy, secure, and stable society, favourable to individual development and perfection. It is required of the ruler to see to it that this desirable state of affairs prevails in his country."⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁵² Phra Rājavaramuni, "Foundations of Buddhist Social Ethics", in Sizemore and Swearer, (eds.), *ibid.*, pp 29-30.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*, page 31.

⁵⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, page 39.

Buddha proclaimed that poverty is a remedial suffering in the world, monks are not told to be poor, but to be content and to have limited desires (*santutthi* and *appicchata*⁵⁵⁵). Possessions by a king and the ordinary lay person are encouraged according to their acceptable acquisition. Items not encouraged are greed or gain, stinginess, clinging, attachment to gain, and hoarding of wealth. "Thus, good and praiseworthy wealthy people are those who seek wealth in a rightful way and use it for the good and happiness for both themselves and others."⁵⁵⁶ Individuals as members of society are responsible both for their individual perfection and for the good of society. It is their duty to practise such virtues as the "Four Bases of Social Harmony or the Four Principles of Social Integration (*sanghavatthu*): giving, distribution, and charity; kindly and beneficial words; rendering of services; and equality, impartiality, and participation."⁵⁵⁷

Rājavaramuni gives a valuable account of the distinction between the mundane and the transmudane on the basis of the Buddhist principles of the Noble Disciples, based on the ancient scripture of Theravada Buddhism.

Mundane

1. Seeking wealth lawfully and unarbitrarily,
2. Making oneself happy and cheerful,
3. Sharing with others and doing meritorious deeds.

Transmundane

4. Making use of one's wealth without greed and longing, without infatuation, heedful of danger and possessed by the insight that sustains spiritual freedom.

A person is an Ariyan or Noble Disciple, who has made great progress toward individual perfection. The compatibility between the mundane and the transmudane spheres of life is very significant; both "combine to form the integral whole of Buddhist ethics in which the transmudane acts as the completing part."⁵⁵⁸ Basic needs for living are essential; and people in poverty are disadvantaged in striving for perfection.

"Wealth as a resource for achieving the social good can help create favourable circumstances for realising individual perfection, but ultimately it is mental maturity and wisdom, not wealth, that bring about the realisation of this

⁵⁵⁵ *Appicchata*, means contentment, frugality; *Santutthi*, means contentment.

⁵⁵⁶ Rājavaramuni, *ibid.*, page 44.

⁵⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, page 40.

perfection. Wealth mistreated and misused not only obstructs individual development, but can also be detrimental to the social good. A wealthy man can do much more either for the better or for the worse of the social good than a poor man. The wealth of a good man is also the wealth of the society. It is, therefore, conducive to the social good and thus becomes a resource for all the members of that society. But if one's wealth grows at the expense of the well-being of the community, that wealth is harmful and becomes a problem to be overcome."⁵⁵⁹

Magga, the Noble Eightfold Path

After the establishment of Pre-*magga*, the two prerequisites essential for the basis of *magga*, *magga* becomes the individual path toward perfection. Rājavarāṃuni explains the importance in the following way.

The *magga* factors are classified into the three categories of *paññā* (wisdom), *sīla* (morality), and *samādhi* (mental discipline). The category of *paññā* includes especially an enlightened view based on insight into the permanent, conflicting, and not-self nature of things, and the dependent origination of all phenomena, that is, that all changes are subject to causes and conditions. Buddhist ethics is rooted in knowledge and effort based on this knowledge, not accidentalism or fatalism. This *paññā*, or wisdom, serves as a keystone. The category of *samādhi* consists in the development of mental qualities and is responsible for the earnestness, resolution, and steady progress in treading the ethical path. The category of *sīla*, or morality, is an expression of social responsibility on the part of the individual. The two pre-*magga* factors indicate the conditions for the arising and the support for the development of all *magga* factors. Though the *sīla* factors of Right Speech, Right Action, and Right Livelihood are directly concerned with society, they are of the character of social responsibility of the individual toward society rather than vice versa.

The two pre-*magga* factors, on the contrary, deal with the influence and effect the world and society can have on the individual. They stress what one can get from one's

⁵⁵⁸ Rājavarāṃuni, *ibid.*, page 45

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

environment, natural and social, through one's dealings and relations with it. Of these two pre-magga factors, emphasis is here placed on the first, that is, association with good people.

Foundations of Buddhist Social Ethics

Pre-magga

1. Association with good people (*kalyānamittatā*)
2. Systematic attention or reflection (*yonisomanisikāra*)

Magga

<i>Paññā</i> (wisdom)	1. Right View (<i>sammā-ditthi</i>)
	2. Right Thought (<i>sammā-saṅkappa</i>)
<i>Sīla</i> (morality)	3. Right Speech (<i>sammā-vācā</i>)
	4. Right Action (<i>sammā-kammanta</i>)
	5. Right Livelihood (<i>sammā-ajīva</i>)
<i>Samādhi</i>	6. Right Effort (<i>sammā-vāyāma</i>)
(mental discipline)	7. Right Mindfulness (<i>sammā-sati</i>)
	8. Right Concentration (<i>sammā-samādhi</i>)

Rājavaramuni sees a total Buddhist social philosophy here. Buddhist ethics as a system can be summarised as *dhamma-vinaya*, the doctrine and the discipline. The *dhamma* is a natural law and as such enters directly into the development process of the individual. *Dhamma* consists in the domain of ideas, ideals, truths, and principles. The *vinaya* covers the domain of legislation, regulation, and social organisation. *Vinaya* is human law, being laid down for the good of society.

As far as social ethics is concerned, the *vinaya* is of great importance, as it deals especially with social life and the putting of ideas, ideals, and principles into practice. ... The *vinaya* is consistent with the *dhamma* as the social good is compatible with individual perfection; the rightful *vinaya* has to be based on the *dhamma* just as what is good for society is favourable also to individual development and perfection.⁵⁶⁰

⁵⁶⁰ Rājavaramuni, *op.cit.*, page 49.

Buddhism's central system of dhamma in relation to wealth and renunciation

Reynolds gives an account of specific dhammic norms associated with the acquisition and use of wealth. He explains how in the Buddhist perspective "the law of kamma ensures that religious piety, moral behaviour, and material prosperity are mutually supportive and that the accumulation of merit will at some point in the future be rewarded with the possession of wealth."⁵⁶¹ When trying to understand the essence of the whole tradition of Theravada Buddhism, one has to accept that there is no defining and enduring "essence". The whole tradition cannot be grasped because of the complex nature of Theravada Buddhism. Nevertheless, reticence should be overcome when considering the mythological foundation of the very complex and dynamic reality of *dhamma*. The *dhamma* is central to Theravada ethics. According to Reynolds,

the *dhamma* (variously translated as *truth, norm, law, etc.*) provides a religio-ethical "centre of gravity" for Theravada Buddhism. Within the context of the classical Theravada orientation it is the *dhamma* that constitutes the structure and the dynamics of all reality, including both the phenomenal world and salvation itself. The *dhamma* is also the normative truth that establishes guidelines for all forms of action that Theravadins approve or commend. All other Theravada norms for action are expressions of *dhamma*, are subservient to it, or are in one way or another correlated with it.⁵⁶²

Buddhist moral arguments are a consequential tilt forward, whereby wealth is an instrumental value on an individual as well as on a societal level. There is no renunciation of wealth but the right use of it. Theravada Buddhism highlights the positive valorisation of wealth, including material resources, monetary resources, goods, and services. The value of wealth is highly provisional and instrumental; wealth is the opportunity to express selflessness. *Dhamma* is normative truth that establishes the guidelines. According to Reynolds, the "first principle affirms that all dhammic norms commend actions that are intended to express and cultivate non-attachment, including non-attachment to wealth."⁵⁶³ After all, the goal of the attainment of *nibbāna* (or nirvana) is relevant to the monastic order, the *sangha*⁵⁶⁴, as

⁵⁶¹ Frank E. Reynolds, "Ethics and Wealth in Theravada Buddhism", A Study in Comparative Religious Ethics, in Sizemore and Swearer, *op.cit.*, page 57.

⁵⁶² Reynolds, *ibid.*, page 61.

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*, page 63.

⁵⁶⁴ Within the monastic order the basic orientation toward wealth was established very early, probably during the lifetime of Buddha himself. This was embedded in the canonical monastic rules and guidelines, called *vinaya*. *Vinaya* contains the rules

much as the lay people. On the path to *nibbāna*, the right action consists in maximising the welfare of all beings. Theravada ethics "have traditionally maintained that those who earn their living without killing, stealing, or lying facilitate the dhammic ordering of society and will be personally rewarded in accordance with the kamma. Conversely, those who earn their living in ways that do involve killing, stealing, or lying will undermine the dhammic ordering of society will suffer for their misdeeds, if not in this life then in the next."⁵⁶⁵ Reynolds observes, that honest economic activity and the virtue of generosity are encouraged.

Wealth always provides both an opportunity for a new expression and cultivation of non-attachment and a temptation toward the kind of antidhammic self-indulgence that leads to increased entrapment in the web of worldly existence. To put the same point a bit differently, the problematic presented by the possession of wealth has remained for Theravada practitioners a primary locus for religious and ethical decision.⁵⁶⁶

Ethics in the Western academic tradition has to accommodate practical experience within a cultural context, and to acknowledge the historical complexity of religious traditions. In particular the increase in secularism has prevented even serious minded people from looking into religious tradition. Sizemore suggests how a narrow point of view has led some ethicists to "reconstruct a code or systematic ethic from a single text, or material drawn from a single type of source, divorced from its world view, historical context, and communal embodiment."⁵⁶⁷ The attempts made to characterise whole traditions has led to major discussions among theologians, historians, political philosophers, in the search for clarity and focused definitions. The problem is the translation of ethics within any concept of hermeneutics, given the Western bias of insurmountable interpretative categories which narrow the field of reason. According to Sizemore, any appearance of unanimity is deceptive, and for example the "gap between the historians and the ethicists is not really about insufficient allegiance to the virtues of clarity, or even about the cultural imperialism of using categories provided by Western thought. The problem is that they have different questions to put to their material. They disagree over what it is that they

for guiding the behaviour of the individual monks and the section that sets forth the procedures for managing affairs of the community. The monks' privilege and responsibility is to practice the path the Buddha has taught and in so doing to maintain the purity of the community he has established. What the monks need in terms of food, clothing, and shelter is to be provided by gifts freely given by lay supporters.

⁵⁶⁵ Reynolds, *ibid.*, page 71. Kamma is the Pali expression for karma, which is Sanskrit.

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, page 69.

⁵⁶⁷ Russell F. Sizemore, Comparative Religious Ethics as a Field: Faith, Culture, and Reason in Ethics, in Sizemore and Swearer, (eds.), *op.cit.*, page 88.

should be clear about, over the sorts of categories that are required for the studies they want to do. They disagree over the object of the field as a discipline."⁵⁶⁸

Sizemore explains how on one hand the historians try to uncover the relationship

between conduct and religious faith or, more broadly, between *faith and culture*. Here, the content of a tradition's faith, particularly its behavioural guidance, is compared with its cultural context. By contrast, the ethicists conceive of the field of religious ethics primarily as the intersection of moral philosophy and the philosophy of religion. The general object of the field as they see it is to illuminate the relationship between *faith and reason*, within religious traditions, as these have guided conduct.⁵⁶⁹

The interest in different issues causes a fundamental methodological divide which reduces the status of moral reasoning to a disagreement over epistemology. Both sides mirror the empiricist and the formalist epistemological orientations, whereby ethicists regard morality as an epistemologically autonomous human enterprise.⁵⁷⁰ *Nibbāna*, by contrast, is the complete expression of *dhamma*, the maximisation of the welfare of all beings.

The study of Theravada Buddhism indicates divergent interests.⁵⁷¹ Little's ethical translation of Theravada Buddhism is based on primarily scrutinising and describing the "form of reasoning or practical justification employed by a tradition rather than the tradition's moral content or underlying religious ideas."⁵⁷² Significant is the extent to which he is drawn beyond such limits in trying to demonstrate the value of his method.

"Buddhist ethical reasoning, he notes, was qualified by the religious belief that attainment of *nibbāna* eclipsed any ultimate value for the material world, and of course wealth, and was qualified by the belief that religious giving - giving to religiously elevated persons and institutions - is superior in spiritual and material benefits produced."⁵⁷³ Little demonstrates the usefulness of this conclusion; he stresses the importance of the combination of religious belief with other aspects of

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, page 91.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁰ See a more detailed explanation at Sizemore, pages 92-94.

⁵⁷¹ See David Little, "Ethical Analysis and Wealth in Theravada Buddhism: A Response to Frank Reynolds", Chapter II, 3. in Sizemore and Swearer, *ibid.*

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*, page 97.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*

the Buddhist world view. The type of debate about which form of teleology to use therefore becomes secondary. According to Little, "Buddhist reasoning is teleological because all prescribed attitudes and actions are justified on the basis of their furthering the goal of attaining *nibbāna*. It is extra-personal because this goal extends to maximising the welfare of all beings, not just the agent alone. And it is of the intrinsic sort of teleology because the means toward this goal (attitudes and action in accord with the *dhamma*) are intrinsically related to the goal (since *nibbāna* is, in a sense, the complete expression of the *dhamma*)."⁵⁷⁴ Theravada Buddhism provides a source for global political economy which harmonises worldly giving with spiritual enhancement. It is not so much the need for an ethical translation into formal categories made suitable for a multicultural audience as the soteriological impact of a system of belief. Categories of ethics may bring about logical tensions leading to further epistemological debates but Little would stress that studying Theravada Buddhism "leads us back to the content of the tradition's beliefs about salvation and its vision of cosmic order. ... When the method is doing its job, it uncovers diverse forms of reasoning, which, rather than calling for some singular resolution, are clues to a tradition's internal options and determinative ambiguities."⁵⁷⁵ Soteriology is not about a singular resolution, it is within the context of teaching which involves cosmic guidance that resolutions are found. The most fundamental questions concern the autonomy of reason as it has developed in the West, and the role of religion and culture in the West as much as elsewhere in the world. Whether this is a debate between historians, philosophers or other professional distinctions, the source of inquiry is a universal concern.

If, as in Theravada Buddhism, wealth and generosity are reciprocally related, it is a natural duty to help others in an unstinting manner without regard to personal reward or benefit. The contextualisation of moral ideals and action guides the view of wealth. Whereas giving to the poor is a clash with the pure principles of modern capitalism, Buddhist thought is that generosity allows the giver to capitalise on higher gains than those in the material world. *Dāna*, meaning generosity⁵⁷⁶, generates an ethical dialogue between the material and the spiritual world.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, page 95.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, page 98.

⁵⁷⁶ The concept of *dāna* means giving, charity, generosity, liberality. According to Sizemore and Swearer, "Like most seminal terms in religious and ethical thought, *dāna* in Theravada Buddhism possesses several different but related meanings. *Dāna* can refer to a character trait or *virtue*, a mode or type of *action*, or imply an esteemed cultural *value*." *Ibid.*, page 103. Such a moral ideal has practical consequences. Ideally a traditional Theravada culture would reflect the following, according to Sizemore and Swearer: "patrons are to take care of the clients who serve them; masters are responsible for the material well-being of servants; hospitality conventions are ungrudgingly generous; and, in particular, those who produce and possess, that is, the Buddhist monastic establishment (*sangha*). The monastic establishment reciprocates this material support (*āmisadāna*) with another form of *dāna* - *dhammadāna* - the spiritual gifts represented by the Buddha's path (*magga*) which monks convey as teachers and, ideally, as exemplars." Cited from Sizemore and Swearer, *ibid.*, page 103.

Dāna, the ethical dialogue between the material and spiritual worlds

Dāna bridges the two Buddhist concepts of *nibbāna* and *karma*. Sizemore and Swearer explain the importance of *dāna* as the facilitator that interweaves the moral and religious, monastic and lay dimensions of tradition. As such it covers all aspects of society. Sizemore and Swearer express the meaning of *dāna* in its literal sense as a material gift or donation, and as an ethical concept that condones the acquisition of wealth providing that it is coupled with virtue and generosity. Therefore, without "wealth generosity is limited, but without generosity the personal benefit of wealth, whether *karmic* or *nibbanic*, is lost. Ultimately ... a gift of small proportions outweighs the power of an entire royal treasury when it leads to "sovereignty over the mind."⁵⁷⁷ *Paticca samuppāda* represents a fundamental Theravada view, whereby things are differentiated and mutually interdependent. Sizemore and Swearer have succeeded in explaining the complexity of interaction:

Paradoxically, *dāna* also couples the religious ideal of selfless, uncalculating action with the assumption that generosity will be rewarded, if not in the present then in some future existence. In more specifically Buddhist terms, *dāna* not only combines aspects of virtue, action, and value, but also integrates two differing validation concepts, *nibbāna* and *karma*. *Nibbāna*, the Buddha's enlightenment, points to that which is beyond cause, calculation, reward; *karma*, by contrast, stipulates a moral law of cause and effect or reward and punishment. *Dāna* bridges the two concepts. The dimensions of selflessness and non-attachment associated with generosity are *nibbānic*, but the expectation that generous deeds will be rewarded is *karmic*.⁵⁷⁸

Defining these complex meanings is very important for the reader not familiar with Theravada Buddhism. According to tradition, the ideal of *dāna* was part of a popular oral literature. The narrative, oral format contextualised moral ideals and action guides, making them attainable rather than removed from everyday life. The epics of *dāna* exemplify the meaning of the ethical concept, a paradigm of perfect generosity and renunciation. In stories it is stressed that the effectiveness of a gift does not depend on its lavishness; an apparently worthless gift has a "royal" status. One of the most famous stories records the acceptance of as little as half of a *myrobalan*, a tiny, astringent fruit, which becomes the symbol of a king's destitution as well as of the

⁵⁷⁷ Sizemore and Swearer, *op.cit.*, page 105. [*Kamma*, in Pali, is the same as *karma*, *karmic*, in Sanskrit]

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, page 103.

ultimate vagaries of wealth and kingship.⁵⁷⁹ The gift involves a commitment of the self to the quest for enlightenment. As soon as it is given with faith, it establishes sovereignty over the mind. In Theravada Buddhism the quest for enlightenment and the operation of *karma* are interwoven by the act of *dāna*. Wealth creates a standard and is a symbol of power. Only in the act of giving it away, can the spiritual path of *nibbāna* be achieved. It is obvious that the achievement of wealth must be manifested before it can be given away. The paradigmatic life of Buddha gives the best example. *Dāna*, the gift of goods and the *dhamic* giving of oneself are inextricably interwoven. Thus, the giving of wealth is an expression of the giving of self and this is the girder that makes *dāna* a bridge. Human and divine bliss are emancipated by the command of an ethical concept.

Wealth and reformation in a changing world

Theravada Buddhist social ethics analyse the problem of wealth, not as a doctrinal ideal but as a catalyst for behaviour. The problem of wealth was never its possession "but how it was used; wealth should never become an end in itself but rather should contribute toward soteriological ends - the cultivation of non-attachment and the production of merit (*pūṇa*)."⁵⁸⁰ According to Kemper and Keyes, the Buddhist Middle Way does not reject wealth as inherently evil, "but seeks to balance wealth and non-attachment through justifying the acquisition of wealth - by either monk or lay person - and then enjoining that it either be given away or used in a disciplined and appropriate manner."⁵⁸⁰ The study of Keyes explores the transformation in Thai-Lao Buddhist villagers who have to change from an agrarian world to a world of trade.⁵⁸¹ The typical trader/merchant continues to hold a traditional attitude toward wealth. "This ethic combines the Buddhist ideal of non-attachment with the desire to improve this-worldly living standards. ... The ideal Buddhist trader/merchant becomes a person who works hard, saves, and lives an upright life, faithfully observing the traditional Buddhist moral precepts such as avoidance of gambling, stealing, and so on."⁵⁸² Traditional Theravada Buddhist belief continues to accommodate the changing cultural ethos. Keyes shows how the practical morality of Theravada

⁵⁷⁹ The stories of King Asoka, *Asokavadana*, demonstrate the powerful meaning of *dāna*. The king who had become powerless and poorer than the poor offers unhesitatingly the *myrobalan* to the *sangha*.

⁵⁸⁰ Sizemore and Swearer, *op.cit.*, page 148.

⁵⁸¹ Charles F. Keyes, "Buddhist Practical Morality in a Changing Agrarian World, a Case From Northeastern Thailand", in Sizemore and Swearer, *ibid.*, chapter 8.

⁵⁸² Sizemore and Swearer, *ibid.*, page 149.

Buddhism has been broadened and transformed to meet the cultural, social and economic challenges, an important step to take. Social ethics are not a removed theoretical concept, but mirrored "in the way people organise themselves to maintain and observe the precepts that mark their lives."⁵⁸³ Theravada Buddhism's moral judgement concerns the personal and local contemplation undertaking the path of righteousness. Despite global influence, the ethical evaluation of wealth does not depend on time and space. Wealth is part of the sacred histories, and wealth's "virtue rests in its potential contribution toward soteriological progress, the cultivation of non-attachment. ... One copes with the value of non-attachment and the fact of wealth not by eschewing wealth altogether but by having it and giving it away, or having it and using it wisely."⁵⁸⁴ Kings and lay people give material gifts; monks give the gift of *dhamma*. Gift-giving has therefore a contractual character.⁵⁸⁵ The power of the ruler and the power of the *sangha* are meant to complement each other. In the legends, the king's protection of the wealth and virtue of the *sangha* demonstrates his right to rule. Kemper explains how kings "establish and maintain sacred boundaries within monasteries to affirm this commonality. Landed wealth thus serves as the mediating vehicle by which the *sangha* and the state share political power and moral legitimacy."⁵⁸⁶ The issue is the disciplined use of property and status. One of the king's biggest responsibilities was the imposition of reforms which serve as an enhancement of his status as Buddhist leader. The ruler also acts as arbitrator in monastic disputes. Lovin specifies

that the king is a patron of the monks, but he is not one of them, and though he is respectful of them, he is not subordinate of them. Society is ordered by a king's commands, but a wise king attends carefully to the words of the monks. ... Ideally, the king plays a mediating role between the perfect transcendence of the *dhamma* and the rough and ready actualisation of *dhamma* in mundane society.⁵⁸⁷

Thus it is thought that the scale of merit does not come with a position. The core value of merit is living or even governing according to the precepts.

⁵⁸³ *Ibid.*, page 150.

⁵⁸⁴ Steven Kemper, "Wealth and Reformation in Sinhalese Buddhist Monasticism", in Sizemore and Swearer, *ibid.*, Chapter 7, page 153.

⁵⁸⁵ Kemper, *ibid.*, page 157.

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, page 159.

⁵⁸⁷ Robin W Lovin, *Ethics, Wealth and Eschatology: Buddhist and Christian Strategies for Change*, in Sizemore and Swearer, *op.cit.*, page 197.

The quintessence of Theravada practical morality is to serve to resolve problems of social co-operation within the actual social world. According to Little and Twiss, morality "provides a way of responding to what we call the 'problem of co-operation' among self-interested, competing, and conflicting persons and groups."⁵⁸⁸

The moral values of Theravada Buddhism are the pillars of a purification strategy based on world-transforming energies, with the intent to "slowing of a long-term process of decline."⁵⁸⁹ Theravadans are no mystics without a social ethics. They are "less suspicious of established wealth and power, more selective and less sweeping in what they legitimate and what they condemn."⁵⁹⁰ Thus, it provides not only a practical guide which is bridged towards the transcendent philosophies, it provides a means of assessment as well.

6.3 The acquisition and distribution of wealth

Sizemore and Swearer have studied Buddhist social ethics. Their main focus is the handling of wealth, in particular the specific moral issues associated with the acquisition and distribution of wealth, and its uses in various Buddhist texts and contexts, both lay and monastic. Sizemore and Swearer examine Theravada Buddhism.

The Pali word 'Theravada' means 'The Way of the Elders'. The Theravada tradition evolved from early Indian beginnings and went through a long process of change and transformation. Theravada is first officially recorded from the time of the Indian Emperor Ashoka at his reign in 274-236 BC, but its origin results out of the debates during the first councils after the death of Buddha, from approximately 483 BC onwards. The disciples had begun to separate in specialising, in studying the discourses of the Buddha (the *suttas*) and in studying the rules of behaviour (the *vinaya*), which were said to be formulated by the Buddha. Theravada Buddhism flourished in Sri Lanka, where it became the state religion in 250 BC, in Thailand in approximately 720 AD, in Burma in about 1100 AD, spreading over various Asian countries and coming to the West in the nineteenth century. Its success in the West is

⁵⁸⁸ David Little and Summer B Twiss, *Comparative Religious Ethics: a New Method*. New York: Harper and Row, 1978, page 27.

⁵⁸⁹ Lovin, *op.cit.*, page 207.

based on its analytical aspect in examining existence from every angle. Theravada Buddhism is a religion of personal experience. As a personal experience it can never be proven scientifically but presents a self-evident realisation. The goal is to understand that all beings are independent, and that pleasure and pain always go hand in hand, leading to a moral way of life.

Sizemore and Swearer emphasise the correlation between happiness and anticipated happiness in respect of well-being. The right and wrong are judged by the results of one's action as wholesome or unwholesome. According to Sizemore and Swearer, the "social philosophy of Theravada Buddhism in both its normative-doctrinal and its social-historical dimensions, exhibits certain tensions between the moral ideal of social and economic well-being and the religious ideal of individual salvation, which may imply an indifference to such well-being."⁵⁹¹ Distinction between politics, economics and the socio-multicultural background cannot be defined without the ethical dimension, necessarily underlying - in the studies of Sizemore and Swearer - attitudes towards wealth. The acquisition and distribution of wealth are key elements of the power of Western global market capitalism. Against the Western concept of capitalism, Sizemore and Swearer evaluate an Eastern system of thought which is noteworthy for its underlying ethical principles. As one of the major faults in respect of wealth accumulation is greed, one does not need to look only into the poverty of Third World countries.⁵⁹² As part of the study by Sizemore and Swearer, Green suggests that "Theravada Buddhist attitudes toward wealth are compatible with universal norms of distributive justice"⁵⁹³ and can be used as an inspiration. Reeder undertakes a difficult comparison between Western points of view of distributive justice, engaging deeply in the thinking of Rawls, MacIntyre, Gauthier, Sandel and a number of others⁵⁹⁴, and the approach to distributive issues in Theravada Buddhism. The historical roots of Western theories of justice rely on individualism, the theory of the self. Individualism is interrelated and has grown out of the model of the person in the economic theory that emerges from a capitalist society. According to Reeder, it is Gauthier who sums up the theses about the self which form the background of modern moral theory:

⁵⁹⁰ Lovin, *ibid.*

⁵⁹¹ Russell F. Sizemore and Donald K. Swearer, (eds.), *Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation, A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990, page XI.

⁵⁹² See Richard Koch, *The Third Revolution*. Oxford: Capstone Publishers, 1998, page 100.

⁵⁹³ Ronald M Green, "Buddhist Economic Ethics: A Theoretical Approach", in Sizemore and Swearer, *op.cit.*, page XIII.

⁵⁹⁴ John P. Reeder, "Individualism, Communitarianism, and Theories of Justice", in Sizemore and Swearer, *op.cit.*, Chapter 11.

The problematic of modern moral theory is set by three dogmas which philosophy receives from economics. The first is that value is utility - a measure of subjective, individual preference. The second is that rationality is maximisation: the rational individual 'will maximise the extent to which his objective is achieved'. The third is that interests are not real: interacting persons do not take 'an interest in one another's interests'. Modern moral theory determines the possibility of morality in relation to these dogmas.⁵⁹⁵

These three dogmas therefore become the basis for a moral and political framework for the so-called *homo economicus*, a synonym for the so-called civilised capitalist world. As such, *homo economicus* determines the possibility of morality. The determination of this morality was historically a Western project until the changes of globalization took place. As long as realism determined the borders of a State's society, morality was concealed within a certain and defined frame of ethical expectations guarded by a constituted law and order. Then it spread without any such constitution - which was surely Kant's implicit prophecy.

In "Living the skilful life" Abhaya explains how the Western world removed itself from the love of Virtue, from "learning how beautiful people's ethical life can be". With the development of Western civilisation, authoritarianism, the "Law of Thou-shalt-Not has intervened. ... Virtue is seen not so much as behaving beautifully, as doing what someone -or Someone higher up - has commanded In other words it has been reduced to the status of resentful duty."⁵⁹⁶ In accordance with the resentfulness of duty, people "resort to a rather cynical amorality, the chilling philosophy of 'Anything goes': anything, that is, that you can get away with."⁵⁹⁷ In contrast, Buddhist ethics is not an imposed set of moral laws; it is not about keeping rules contributed to an outside authority. Buddhist ethics includes the person as an insider and outsider of society, ignoring its national affiliation or cultural significance. The conduct of virtue is part of a prevailing moral climate affecting the collective psyche.

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, page 235.

⁵⁹⁶ Abhaya, *Living The Skilful Life*. Birmingham: Windhorse Publications, 1996, pp 7-8.

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, page 8.

6.4 Conclusion

Buddhism has the conception of an integrated social order. It is not an 'a man and his God' phenomenon. Ethical life is not formulating a behaviour which has to follow a set of constituted or contracted rules, but a path which has to be walked on and where every step is accounted for.

The collective is not state bound but universal. The proper conduct of an ethical life is self-explanatory, and does not need a theory of justice, for example as the one exposed by Rawls. It is only under the umbrella of Western authoritarianism that the construct of a theory or many theories of justice makes sense. Rawls, like Frost and even Linklater who try to adapt theory to global changes, base their theories on the pre-existence of authority. In the following it seems important, however, to understand first some of Rawls' arguments. If I talk about reform, we need to know what we are reforming, and we need to be able to compare the understanding of Western distributive justice with that of Buddhism.

Here I do restate that Buddhism is offered as an alternative, an antidote to purely Western thought. It is, of course, possible to offer several such antidotes and some are contemplated in the appendices. The contribution of this thesis, however, is very much to do with the exemplary alternative of Buddhism. This is illustrated in the next chapter.

Chapter 7

Ethics as distributive justice; a global demand

Main points of this chapter

Distributive justice, a Western understanding : Rawls and his critics

Distributive Justice and Buddhism

The chance of reconciliation: Infinite worth and Buddhist ethics

A Buddhist ethics of GPE, creating SPEG (the Social Political Economy of Globalization)

Conclusion

Main points of this chapter

- *Rawls' theory of justice does not apply outside the sovereignty of the state*
- *Distributive justice in a Theravada Buddhist sense is synonymous with a universal, integral and inherent morality*
- *Global ethics are maintained by an infinite worth*
- *Reconciliation is a necessity within the development of globalization*
- *The human mind is capable of overcoming the present predicament with his own efforts*
- *Buddhist ethics do not represent theoretical speculations, but encourage a person to fulfil his/her moral responsibilities*
- *It is therefore proposed that a so-called Social Political Economy of Globalization (SPEG) is considered, which incorporates the ethical system of Theravada Buddhism as its theoretical basis for a meaningful reform*

7.1 *Distributive justice, a Western understanding*

Chapter Seven explores the dominant Western understanding in order to compare it with the ideas of the acquisition and distribution of wealth in Theravada Buddhism. Based on the importance of this issue and the non spacial, timeless concept of the ethical system found in Theravada Buddhism, it is suggested that a Rawlsian style of distributive justice is to be replaced. It is therefore proposed that a so-called Social Political Economy of Globalization incorporates the ethical system of Theravada Buddhism as its theoretical basis, in order to be competent to deal with theoretical analysis of the future.

The presentation of Theravada Buddhism makes the study of Rawls consequential. Why does Rawls exclude the private individual? Rawls defines justice as the first virtue of social institutions. Its "primary subject" is "the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social co-operation."⁵⁹⁸ Rawls develops his ideas of distributive justice out of his understanding of domestic social justice, and tries to construct an implicit international distributive justice.

Rawls' main work "*A Theory of Justice*" presents the moral and liberal conception of 'justice as fairness'. His aim is to justify the institutions of a constitutional democracy. 'Justice as fairness' is a constituted axiom. According to Rawls, principles are agreed by free persons, equally situated and ignorant of their historical circumstances, and ideally result in an impartial social contract. People are led by their rationality to agree to contracts because they want to secure their equal status and interdependence, and to pursue freely their conception of the good. Rawls explains that "these principles are to govern the assignment of rights and duties in these institutions and they are to determine the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social life."⁵⁹⁹ But significant for Rawls' definition of institutions and formal justice is his claim, that the "principles of justice for institutions must not be confused with the principles which apply to individuals and their actions in particular circumstances."⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁸ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973, page 7.

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, page 54.

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.* See detailed definition of 'institution' on page 55.

Rawls defines an institution as "a public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties", which is the "basic structure of society". He declares that the "strategies and tactics followed by individuals, while essential to the assessment of institutions, are not part of the public systems of rules which define them."⁶⁰¹ In particular, this statement opens up critique, because a moral theory based on the effectiveness of political institutions cannot operate without the private individual as agent. The institution or the law, as Kliemt explains, does not hinder a person from acting in contradiction if he so wishes.⁶⁰² Rawls insists that the most reasonable basis for social unity is a public conception of justice based on shared moral ideas, including the citizens' common conception of themselves as free and equal moral persons. A shared consensus apparently guarantees the stability of the public conception of justice.

The principles of justice that free and rational - and non-contradictory - people would accept in an initial position of equality are set out by Rawls. The problem with this statement is that a condition of equality is assumed as the base. The question arises as to how people can claim a justification for equality before the law, when cases of inequality and an unjust balance of power are ignored. In particular, how about a greater equality of social conditions when viewed in a global context. Giessen finds it a Rawlsian contradiction when a universal minimal consensus is based on occidental liberalism.⁶⁰³

Rawls' theory is based on a certain political tradition and becomes outdated with the emerging global structures in the 21st century. Questions about transforming economic institutions in the face of global change and discussions about international political failures when intervening in Kosovo, make visible a terrifyingly complex global condition.

This recent observation of global conflict shows how difficult it is to make Rawls' theory fit into a global context. Rawls defines injustice as inequalities that are not to the benefit of all.⁶⁰⁴ The benefit of all is based on the chief primary goods, rights and

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid.*, page 57.

⁶⁰² Hartmut Kliemt, "Macht und Ohnmacht der Moral in der Demokratie", in *Politik und Ethik*, Kurt Bayertz, (ed.), Reclam, 1996, page 169.

⁶⁰³ Klaus - Gerd Giessen, *L'Ethique des Relations Internationales. Les Theories Anglo-Americaines Contemporaines*. Bruxelles: Établissements Émile Bruylant, 1992, see 287 pp.

⁶⁰⁴ Rawls, *op.cit.*, page 62.

liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, controlled by the basic structure of a well-ordered society.⁶⁰⁵

A well ordered society is “one effectively regulated by a shared conception of justice” with “a public understanding as to what is just and unjust.”⁶⁰⁶ Problematic for a global justice is that Rawls' theory of justice depends on a theory of society, which is set within traditional national parameters. Since the beginnings of the international community, the rules of 'immunity from jurisdiction' and 'immunity of state agencies' have been taken to uphold national sovereignty. Governments have been left to pursue their interest and limited distributive justice to their national boundaries. The effectiveness of distributive justice in the Western sense is limited by a prioritising of citizenship. Therefore the many attempts during the 1970s to reformulate morality and political or economic theory failed.

Beitz criticises Rawls' ideas of international distributive social justice in arguing that Rawls' concept only works on the "empirical assumption that nation-states are self-sufficient."⁶⁰⁷ Instead, Beitz argues that "a strong case can be made on contractarian grounds that persons of diverse citizenship have distributive obligations to one another analogous to those of citizens of the same state. International distributive obligations are founded on justice and not merely on aid", whereby according to Beitz "international relations is coming more and more to resemble domestic society in several respects relevant to the justification of principles of (domestic) social justice".⁶⁰⁸

Increasingly visible global distributive inequalities prove it wrong to limit the application of contractarian principles of social justice to the nation-state; instead to expand these principles globally.⁶⁰⁹

Despite rhetorical declarations, Beitz declares the lack of commitment that residents of relatively affluent societies show in respect of obligations to promote economic development elsewhere, and he claims that "the tradition of international political

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, page 56.

⁶⁰⁷ Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, page 128.

⁶⁰⁸ Beitz, *ibid.*, page 128.

⁶⁰⁹ Beitz, *ibid.*

theory is virtually silent on the matter of international distributive justice.⁶¹⁰ Beitz's critique becomes very relevant in overcoming issues that divide the morality of states from a cosmopolitan morality.

He suggests that wealthy countries are committed to increase substantially their contributions to less developed countries, and therefore the world economic system needs to be restructured radically.⁶¹¹ It is a call for institutions to act on principles of justice and care for a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens produced by "social co-operation", as Rawls calls it. Rawls' definition of a society as a "co-operative venture for mutual advantage"⁶¹² is restricted to national boundaries. Therefore, Beitz asks the question, "if societies are thought to be *entirely* self-contained - that is, if they are to have no relations of any kind with persons, groups, or societies beyond their borders - then why consider international justice at all?"⁶¹³

Since the writings of Beitz and Rawls, it is clear that globalization has created an inter-dependence in trade and investment, and aggregate economic benefits have been produced in the form of a higher global rate of economic growth as well as greater productive efficiency. The global reach of multinationals has been discussed in IR literature in the closing decades of the 20th century.⁶¹⁴

The most striking success during the last half of the 20th century was the pre-eminent power of *homo economicus*. The international distribution of gains from trade and investment depends significantly on the power of multinational actors which have influence over domestic governments and are therefore able to control behaviour. The economic market creates a vulnerability which leaves, for example, developing countries unsuccessful in winning concessions on trade policy from the industrial countries and allows industrial countries to dictate economic policies to some developing countries that rely heavily for credit on such sources as the World Bank.⁶¹⁵

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.*, page 127.

⁶¹¹ See UN Declaration, 1974: "Current Events have brought into sharp focus the realisation that ... there is a close inter-relationship between the prosperity of the developed countries. ... International co-operation for development is the shared goal and common duty of all countries." Quoted in Beitz, *ibid.*, page 126. taken from "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order." Resolution 3,201 (S-VI), 1 May 1974, United Nations General Assembly, Official Records: Sixth Special Session, Supp. No. 1 (A/9,559) (New York, 1974), page 3.

⁶¹² Rawls, *op.cit.*, page 4.

⁶¹³ Beitz, *op.cit.*, page 132.

⁶¹⁴ As for example: Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay*; C. Fred Bergsten, Thomas Horst, and Theodore H. Moran, *American Multinationals and American Interests*; Robert O. Keohane and Van Doorn Ooms, *The Multinational Firm and International Regulation*.

⁶¹⁵ Beitz, *op.cit.*, page 147.

The primary subjects of theories of distributive justice in contemporary Western moral theory concern the allocation of income and wealth. Western evaluation of right and wrong are based on the individualism of the person in the capitalist society, i.e. it is the theory of the self. The stress on the material wealth as a beneficial personal value justifies over consumption and hoarding. Distribution of wealth underlies profit margins but not the possibility of morality.

Held underlines in his recent work the importance of even fragile universal commitments which "signal the beginnings of a new approach to the concept of legitimate political power in international law."⁶¹⁶ He refers to the "decline in the efficacy of state sovereignty [which] is evidenced further in recent questioning of the traditional principles regulating the appropriation of territory and resources," stretching as far as considering the "common heritage of mankind" and regarding treaties about the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.⁶¹⁷ Treaties can be interpreted as a search for responsibility, leaning on one hand still on a sovereignty of states and on the other hand building on what Held calls "global interconnectedness", because "globalization and cultural diversity are not simply opposites. For global interconnectedness is already forming a dense web of relations linking cultures one to another. The issue is how and in what way cultures are linked and interrelated, through mutual accommodation, opposition or resistance, for example, not how a sealed cultural diversity can persist in the face of globalization."⁶¹⁸

The debate shows that in the political, economic and social domain, processes and structures question feasibility and ambition. For what is ambitious today might be feasible tomorrow. According to Held, the "growing interconnectedness between states and societies is generating consequences, intended and unintended."⁶¹⁹ Pettman in the 70s and Reeder twenty years later, describe the process whereby "human beings have become the victims of a technicised economy and a bureaucratic state, rendered, that is, progressively more alienated and anonymous, has become a sociological industry in its own right."⁶²⁰ Against this background, Reeder discusses Western individualism, communitarianism and theories of justice in comparison to

⁶¹⁶ David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Cambridge: Polity Press, reprinted, 1997, page 105.

⁶¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶¹⁸ *Ibid.*, page 284.

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid.*, page 285.

Buddhist reflection on wealth and economic justice. Despite the general lack of consensus, it is essential to continue the search for universal moral guidelines, in particular in the recurrent themes of wealth and economic justice.

Reeder claims that "modern theorists have tried to erect a moral and political framework for *homo economicus* " and that "the problem of modern ideology is to legitimate, to justify each individual in the free and equal pursuit of self-interest."⁶²¹ The individual is free to choose his/her ends, but says Reeder, it is often "a distorted view of freedom, a view that, if not the product of industrial capitalism, finds in that political economy its most familiar modern expression."⁶²² Reeder discusses Rawls's understanding of freedom. Rawls claims that the "human good is heterogeneous because the aims of the self are heterogeneous", whereby the subject self is ordered by its very nature. For Rawls "freedom of the self is its final end or goal" but what is the meaning of "free" when the environment does not leave much to choose from and when the basic requirements for life are not provided. Rawls would insist that the objector must show or explain why one should accept any other view of the self and its ends, asking for a therapeutic analysis of one's desires.⁶²³ No attempt is made to define the just distribution of goods and services on the basis of information about the preferences and claims of particular individuals.⁶²⁴

The accounts of distributive shares are merely related to the system of income and wages and a competitive prize system. In short, the capitalist political economy is its undeclared foundation. Rawls observes that in Western society the "distribution that results is a case of background justice on the analogy with the outcome of a fair game."⁶²⁵

Part of justice here is the compatibility of economic arrangements with the institutions of liberty and free association, and the feasibility of pure procedural justice. The appropriate conception of distributive justice is one based on the principle of fairness. Economy depends on supply and demand and the margins of profit making; the ultimate distributive justice may ideally correlate with a person's

⁶²⁰ Ralph Pettman (ed.), *Moral Claims in World Affairs*. London: Croom Helm, 1979, page 20.

⁶²¹ John P. Reeder, "Individualism, Communitarianism and Theories of Justice", in Sizemore and Swearer, *op.cit.*, page 235-236.

⁶²² *Ibid.*, page 239.

⁶²³ Reeder, *op.cit.*, page 238-239.

⁶²⁴ Rawls, *op.cit.*, page 304.

⁶²⁵ Rawls, *ibid.*, page 304.

moral worth. The former can be varied in time but the latter cannot - a person's moral deservingness cannot undergo similar shifts. In the Western society, a person willing to strive for greater good fortune is automatically rewarded within the precepts of the capitalist system, so are persons who are privileged by natural abilities, skills and alternatives open to him/her. As Rawls points out:

the equal moral worth of persons does not entail that distributive shares are equal. Each is to receive what the principles of justice say he is entitled to, and these do not require equality. The essential point is that the concept of moral worth does not provide a first principle of distributive justice. Thus the concept of moral worth is secondary to those of right and justice, and it plays no role in the substantive definition of distributive shares.⁶²⁶

What is considered the correct judgement depends in the West on 'relevant features', identified and tallied up by the complete Western conception of right.⁶²⁷ The relevant features of moral situations are taken as principles and then these are taken as examples to make, provide and support an ethical judgement. According to Rawls, judgement is based "only on the subpart of the larger scheme of reasons"⁶²⁸, the so called *prima facie* duty is justified, but not the principle of fairness. The principle of fairness is universal, and all obligation arises from stabilised co-operative agreements for mutual universal advantage. Reeder rejects Rawls's interpretation of fairness, which relates to a contingent equality, an "equality of opportunity to pursue one's own ends apart from the beliefs of others, and this, he claims, is an ideal not shared by Buddhism."⁶²⁹

What Rawls develops as distributive justice concerns the individual in society in the interplay with the institutions constituted. What we are dealing with in the future is a global system of distributive justice which is not restricted by national boundaries. As Beitz already wrote in the 70s about the basis of international morality, the justification of regulative principles for political and international life is based on rational self-interest, "because it can be argued that the state's right of self-preservation is based directly on its individual members' rights of self-preservation ... the national interest derives its normative importance from these deeper and more

⁶²⁶ *Ibid.*, page 312-313.

⁶²⁷ *Ibid.*, page 341.

⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁹ Reeder, in Sizemore and Swearer, *op.cit.*, page 20.

ultimate concerns."⁶³⁰

Domestic social justice is related to the idea of self-determination and economic dependence. Beitz explains that the "strongest moral argument for self-determination is that political independence is necessary for the elimination of social injustice and for the development of just institutions; the strongest moral argument against economic dependence is that the associated forms of international economic relations produce or support unjust domestic institutions."⁶³¹ Beitz develops the thought that a certain international "sense of community" is during his life missing in international relations and claims that there is in comparison to domestic society "no similar sense of community; nor are most people moved to act by any commitment to ideals like global justice."⁶³²

Reeder stresses the importance of motivation and association. In respect of Rawls's justice Reeder objects that "it unnecessarily accepts selfishness, a dominant orientation to self-regard. ... The human propensity to self-interest, now given play in capitalism, becomes the central motivation in human relations."⁶³³ For example, benevolence and comprehensive goods are, for Rawls, ranked as secondary. As a contractarian system, Rawls' principles of justice are based on one communal good."⁶³⁴ Reeder claims that Rawls misjudges the importance of the outcome of investigations into the understanding of various cultural traditions and their relationship to issues of distribution.

Space and time, as I explained in Chapter Five, are according to Kant, pure intuitions and not an empirical conception. Without our presupposition we could not represent to ourselves that objects exist together at one and the same time, or at different times, that is contemporaneously, or in succession. Kant's views parallel those of Theravada Buddhism.

⁶³⁰ Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, page 52-53. A more satisfactory normative theory of international politics, Beitz claims, should include a revised principle of state autonomy based on the justice of a state's domestic institutions, and a principle of international distributive justice to establish a fair division of natural resources, income, and wealth among persons situated in diverse national societies.

⁶³¹ Beitz, *ibid.*, page 122-123.

⁶³² *Ibid.*, page 155.

⁶³³ Reeder, *op.cit.*, page 243.

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*

Buddhist ethics share with Kant the importance of 'informed morality'⁶³⁵, based on the responsibility which the individual takes in respect of his own ethical conduct within a socially embodied moral agency. The Buddhist concept leaps ahead of what MacIntyre calls the "contemporary moral utterance". Buddhist ethics is powerful in combating the manipulative mode of moral instrumentalism, which characterises distributive justice in a Western ideological context. It confirms a timeless universalism in ethical beliefs. The following will provide a deeper reading into the principles of Buddhist ethics.

In particular, there is here the investigation into Theravada Buddhism, which, in Reeder's own words "can be interpreted as a complex ethic of virtues in which there is a hierarchy of goods and in which justice assigns various benefits and burdens according to merit measured by contribution to the common good."⁶³⁶ Reeder explains how Theravada Buddhism sets ethical demands based on similar basic needs and desires, and therefore norms of justice are and must be part of social existence.⁶³⁷ So is, for example, the wealth of a good man related to the wealth of society? Cooperation and sharing is part of the way to Buddhist enlightenment. In order to walk the right path, interests of the self and not in the self, held by oneself as a subject and not as an object, provide the basis for rational choice and action.⁶³⁸ These principles make Buddhism a powerful system of thought. If a Western view sees, according to the objectives of *homo economicus*, "wealth" as a primary good, which signifies "legal command over the means of satisfying needs and desires"⁶³⁹, Theravada Buddhism sees wealth in connection with a moral obligation to distribute. Theravada Buddhism is optimistic that the circumstances of a wider justice than that of Rawls will obtain. Reeder explains that "compassion and benevolence, for example, do not appear as mere options but seem to be part of what should and can be assumed about social existence. In the Book of Gradual Savings (Vol. I, Chap. 6) the king, no less than an enlightened *arhant* (one who has, in his lifetime, achieved grace or the possibility of Nirvana), is motivated by a concern for the well-being of all."⁶⁴⁰

This story explains that no individual has pre-social rights to political nor economic

⁶³⁵ Term used by MacIntyre to explain the "partial conceptual analysis of the relationship of an agent to his or her reasons, motives, intentions and actions, and in so doing generally presupposes some claim that these concepts are embodied or at least can be in the real world." See *After Virtue*. London: Duckworth, 1985, Chapter 3, page 23.

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*, page 240.

⁶³⁷ Cited by Reeder, *op.cit.*, page 247.

⁶³⁸ Gauthier, quoted by Reeder, in Chapter 11, Sizemore and Swaerer, *op.cit.*, page 242.

⁶³⁹ Reeder, *op.cit.*, page 244.

power. Individuals should not be seen as possessed of some context-free set of tendencies or characteristics; instead they have common capacities which are socially shaped - for example, the capacity to have desires and intentions, make choices, or develop themselves.⁶⁴¹ Even if a moral point of view is a moral assumption, there is no need to take a stance to disregard any conception of the good. The notion of the principles in Theravada Buddhism acceptable-to-anyone (regardless of circumstances and values) lies behind the norms of justice structuring familial, economic, and political relationships. People are karmic selves and experience the role of *anatta*, the not-self, which is a ground stone for a virtue of "love", able to fulfil but also transcend the ordinary compassion and benevolence. As Kemper says:

Where Hobbes sees society being held together and materially improved by honest self-interest, Buddhism sees society being held together and materially improved by the charity that follows upon the recognition of the non-reality of the self and its interests. While the compassion and benevolence which operates in *samsara* (the wordly, and ultimately illusory, environment) may not be directly grounded in *anatta*, but in the ability of one self to appreciate and desire to relieve the suffering of another, nonetheless ordinary compassion and benevolence are perhaps transmuted and fulfilled in non-discriminating love.⁶⁴²

It is probably the most important sentence of Reeder's research, that individuals "have the capacity to differ in their desires and hence their purposes; we have the ability to form widely divergent "plans of life",⁶⁴³ and "that we need an alternative normative structure to resolve the resulting conflicts of interest."⁶⁴⁴ Buddhist ethics offers a time-relevant and compatible commensurability. The Buddhist condemnation of pride and self-satisfaction and its admonition that one's wealth must be used selflessly both serve to assert a basic moral equality across all social lines and national borders.

⁶⁴⁰ Reeder, *ibid.*, page 245.

⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*, page 248. 'Abstract individualism' means to attribute persons with 'pre-social, context-free features'.

⁶⁴² *Ibid.*, page 252.

⁶⁴³ *Ibid.*, page 237.

⁶⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, page 244.

7.2 *Distributive justice and Buddhism*

Aspects of modernity have made a significant impact on the Theravada world, in particular with the rise of conceptions of human equality and egalitarian modes of social and economic justice. Therefore, Theravadins have affirmed their ethical responsibility and intend to take a more "direct role in the process of modernisation that presumably leads, in its own way, to the attainment of economic prosperity."⁶⁴⁵ Unlike Western thought, the Buddhist moral framework is not erected to legitimize the existing political framework for *homo economicus*.

According to Reeder's interpretation of Buddhism, the "beginning lies with each individual possessing a moral view that is equal to anybody else's."⁶⁴⁶ Modernist ideas of human equality and egalitarian justice have influenced Theravada Buddhism but has helped it see that it is now more important than ever to address the hierarchy of status and wealth. According to Reynolds, "Theravada reformers have gone on to formulate what they consider to be a specifically Theravadin philosophy of development that highlights the ideals of self-restraint, non-attachment, and social justice conceived in an essentially egalitarian mode."⁶⁴⁷ When analysing the process of globalization, claims are made that ethical obligation concerning 'the welfare of the many' should be fostered to displace the rich versus poor abyss. The solutions are universal moral principles able to govern the distribution of economic and financial resources.

Distributive justice as a prime concern

Green establishes with his research that moral rules transcend cultures and evidence themselves in the teachings of diverse religious and ethical traditions, of which he chooses Buddhism as an example. Within the cultural context and the spiritual teachings lies distributive justice as a prime concern. In his concern for distributive justice, Green proceeds in a "diametrically opposed direction", whereby he eschews "the descriptive task at the outset of moral discourse, [and] in this case the logic of moral reasoning about basic distributive questions."⁶⁴⁸ Green presumes "that all

⁶⁴⁵ Frank E Reynolds, "Ethics and Wealth in Theravada Buddhism", in Sizemore and Swearer, *op.cit.*, page 74.

⁶⁴⁶ Reeder, in Sizemore and Swearer, *op.cit.*, page 249.

⁶⁴⁷ Reynolds, *op.cit.*, page 75.

⁶⁴⁸ Ronald M Green, "Buddhist Economic Ethics: A Theoretical Approach", in Sizemore and Swearer, *op.cit.*, page 215.

human beings, as rational creatures, face common problems in the organisation of their social relationships and that these common problems, when approached rationally and morally, admit of reasonably common solutions."⁶⁴⁹ Green describes his method as the "'deep structure" of the moral reasoning process" and hopes to come to a better understanding of "the complex surface contours of a religious-ethical tradition."⁶⁵⁰ In bypassing the issue of whether there is only one or a plurality of ethical systems, Green arrives at a conception of morality which is neutral:

Morality ... represents fundamentally the effort to arrive at a reasoned, non coercive settlement of social disputes. To some extent all societies experience conflict when individuals or groups seek to assert their interests over those of other members of the society. In regulating and ordering these conflicts, however, two major methods of settlement present themselves. One method ... is coercion. ... The alternative method of social ordering ... [is] morality. The root idea that morality involves free assent to principles has powerful implications. It points to a method of moral justification that guides any moral reasoning process to some very common conclusions.⁶⁵¹

The deep structure of the moral reasoning process is the base point of equality. The idea of non-coerced assent or free acceptance of the basic rules governing social interaction are implicit in the understanding of morality and cannot be isolated. Implicit consent as base point creates the *non plus ultra* for an understanding that could be accepted by all members of the social group, and lead to the equality of possession and equal access to goods. Green explains "that equal distribution of scarce vital resources is not just one moral principle among others. Rather, it is the fundamental rule of choice in the most rudimentary situation of distributive conflict. ... We can say, then, that equal distribution represents the "base point" for thinking about matters of just distribution of scarce vital resources."⁶⁵² Equal distribution is the equilibrium point which needs no justification but is dependent on human effort, the decision to redistribute. The claim to equality opposes unequal possession. "nonproductive acquisition or possession (gain through chicanery and ostentatious personal consumption) will be brought under sharp criticism. Active sharing and generosity will be encouraged, especially when the survival of society's poorest members is at stake. Throughout, the underlying base point of equality will exert its pressure by generating a public sense of uneasiness over economic inequalities not

⁶⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, page 215-216.

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, page 216.

⁶⁵¹ *Ibid.*, page 217.

clearly related to the common good."⁶⁵³

Next to this theoretical assumption exists the reality of several societies, which "exist near the survival level with stocks of scarce vital resources."⁶⁵⁴

Buddhist social and economic ethics

The mode of qualified possession, i.e. possession qualified by publicly accepted equality, needs applicability across cultural lines. Green chooses the text of Aggañña Suttānta, the so-called "Buddhist Book of Genesis" in order to explain a Buddhist social and economic ethics. The doctrine of the non-self has been used to encourage the "selfless" compassion for others. "In the economic domain it is asserted that this teaching is meant to counter the sense of "mineness" that stimulates greed and the lust for material acquisition."⁶⁵⁵ The idea of individual spiritual salvation and the hope for political and economic reform are implicit in Buddhist teaching. The Buddhist monastic community serves as the conscious nexus for political and economic society, and the society itself "provides the moral and the material context for all of its members' eventual world renunciation and attainment of *nirvāna*."⁶⁵⁶ Buddhist teaching stresses specific moral rules for the employment of wealth, and a moral vision of an ideal economic order which further implies a critique of the existing society. *Dāna*⁶⁵⁷, the virtue of giving, is a function of the spiritual advancement of the recipient, not his/her economic need.⁶⁵⁸

Here, the community of monks becomes, in global conditions, a metaphor for the spirit of morality that superintends the work of these communities in the first place. This understanding is different from the rational normative structure based on allegedly Western notions of individualism and the value of material life. The prosperous "must be persuaded that it is in everyone's interests not to allow unregulated accumulation, possession, or consumption. These people must be made to see that absence of regulation imperils the prospect for a total moral settlement of

⁶⁵² Green, *ibid.*, page 220.

⁶⁵³ *Ibid.*, page 221.

⁶⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, page 222.

⁶⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, page 223.

⁶⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, page 224.

⁶⁵⁷ See chapter six, pp 171-173.

⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, page 225.

social disputes and threatens to drive society to continual strife and disharmony. What is rational under deliberative conditions of moral choice, however, is not always rational in the real circumstances of social life.

Prosperous individuals are always tempted to abandon the "social contract" as it bears on wealth and to opt for a social adjudication based on power."⁶⁵⁹ The ideal normative structure highlighted in the orthodox Buddhist teachings of Theravada, outlined in the *Aggañña Suttānta*, presents a "sharp criticism of human beings" in their lust for sensual pleasures and material satisfactions. In particular in the point of view that "human greed is its own undoing", and the view of disordered self-assertion "when individuals quest for more than their proper share, they invariably end up with less."⁶⁶⁰ The individual who engages in selfish hoarding is counterproductive in his society. According to Green, Buddhism judges them as follows: "those who try to buttress their positions by acquisitiveness or those who are greedy and lazy end by undermining their own positions and possibly jeopardising the welfare of the whole community."⁶⁶¹ The *Aggañña Suttānta* text reveals also the quality of the belief of the essential equality and autonomy of persons. These statements are very relevant in respect of societies who still tolerate the cast system. Green points out that for Buddhism, the "ultimate worth of an individual is a result not of his caste position, but of his moral integrity."⁶⁶² The ultimate worth of every person is the moral integrity based on a non-corrupted human nature. The ultimate worth does not use material advantages for arrogance and pride because in doing so people lift themselves out of moral equality. Righteous kingship is an institution created by consensus and represents a vital institution to halt the process of degeneration. Green explains how a "corrective power" is added to the cosmogenic process. A power "making for the best and economising the worst".⁶⁶³

Personal level and social level meet up within the responsibility for a justly ordered economic life. This responsibility is universal by nature and not "culture-bound", an expression used by Green. Moral reasoning, according to Green, "is a broadly human phenomenon," which exists as a deep structure "beneath a surface of apparent

⁶⁵⁹ Green, *ibid.*, page 225.

⁶⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, page 230.

⁶⁶¹ *Ibid.*, page 230.

⁶⁶² *Ibid.*, page 231.

⁶⁶³ Green, *ibid.*, page 232.

diversity"⁶⁶⁴ and interwoven in reality. Buddhist economic and social ethics are based on interconnectedness. Ethics examines the rightness and wrongness of moral action. In correlation to Green, Weerasinghe defines ethics as "the science of the customs or habits of men", because it "deals with the values relating to human conduct."⁶⁶⁵ Right and wrong behaviour within a society are mirrored in the right and wrong behaviour in economics.

Theravada Buddhism offers a revolution in ethics, because it consists, according to Weerasinghe, of the discovery that "one is responsible for one's deeds (*kamma*), ... one is the cause of one's own predicament. Hence one is the creator of oneself."⁶⁶⁶ Problems of social and economic despair and suffering are problems of oneself. The responsibility lies not outside. External forms of divine, political or economic structures cannot be blamed. The overcoming of suffering lies in reconciliation.

7.3 *Infinite worth and Buddhist ethics*

Theravada Buddhism was chosen here, however, amongst many other schools of thought – within a world of confessional differences- because it contains no totalitarian centrepiece. There is no creator-god, no diversion from the individual freedom towards good and the creation of good through individual efforts to construct the good community, including the good economic community. It is thus not a competitor against other confessional schools.

There is no meaningful future global political economy without ethics being contained within its structure. Theravada Buddhism is not a doctrine of searching for truth, but a symposium of being where the material and spiritual realms meet. In the Buddhist individual practice of ethical conduct lies the salvation and stillness of a well-ordered cosmos. Reconciliation between people and their cosmos are found in the Buddhist doctrine of *karma*, which links human misery with morality. The individual is responsible for his/her predicament and is still accountable as part of the creation as a whole. Morality is an infinite necessity; processes of being, becoming, enacting or acting vanish in the unimportance of time and space. Without upholding

⁶⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, page 234.

⁶⁶⁵ S.G.M. Weerasinghe, *A Comparative Study of Early Buddhism and Kantian Philosophy*. Colombo, Sri Lanka: S. Godage & Brothers, 1993, p. 58.

the idea of a creator or gods, who can be made responsible for human misery, Buddhism proclaims the freedom of the will. This free will declares a dislike of weapons and a dislike of the accumulation of material goods. The concept of morality is the basis of any human action, whether this be social, political, economic, public or private. According to Weerasinghe, the Buddhist *nibbāna* is similar to the Kantian notion of salvation, the "end of all craving, the Highest Good which is beyond time and space and causality."⁶⁶⁷ The Buddhist path of morality "is a study of man in relation to his greed (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*) and diluted infatuation (*moha*)."⁶⁶⁸ The end of the path is the end of craving, the *summum bonum*.

Buddhism was presented by a human teacher who attained enlightenment through his own moral perfection. Therefore Buddhist ethics is not only a theoretical construct, but is based upon an account of a practical realisation. Buddhist morality prescribes no political, economic or religious structure to justify its infinite worth. For Kant, morality "is something which one does not *make* but finds. It is a necessary truth, [just as in Buddhism, where morality] is discovered by people from epoch to epoch."⁶⁶⁹ Buddhist morality is implicit in the nature of things, which makes it accessible for a multicultural society. According to Kant the law of nature demands morality as a necessity. Both Kantian and Buddhist morality picture a person as capable of overcoming the present predicament with his/her own efforts. People, being subject to "avijjā or ignorance", what Kant called "transcendental illusion", practise morality in living "in accordance with what is implicit in the nature of things."⁶⁷⁰

Kant speaks of the two images of people, as 'specks in the universe' and as beings of 'infinite worth' to emphasise the need of wanting the good. People are enacting within themselves a decoded moral awareness. Theravada Buddhism is a discourse which teaches individualistic spiritual liberation to overcome delusion and greed for the sake of *nirvana*, the 'Saintlike' state of timeless 'nowhereness'. The individual and the cosmos are the same world. It is, according to Cooper, not any more the task "to allocate the moral self to a different world, with the consequent mystery of how to

⁶⁶⁶ Weerasinghe, *ibid.*, page 58.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, page 61.

⁶⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, page 63.

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, page 64.

throw a bridge between the two worlds,"⁶⁷¹ since freedom and morality are part of the envisaged future of humanity. According to Buddhist ethical teaching, liberation from the world of suffering is possible. The whole Buddhist faith rests on this conviction.

What is special to the Theravada ancient way of thought is the conviction that "the proper ambition is to become an *arhat* ('worthy one') bent on his own enlightenment."⁶⁷² The realist and atomist metaphysics of the Theravada discourse, which allows the external world as 'real' include therefore the practice of ethics as an intrinsic part of faith. The infinite worth of the individual is part of the infinity of *dharma*, the underlying law of reality. *Dharma* correlates with the teaching of the Buddha of just one, but extensive, world or reality.⁶⁷³ Cooper explains how liberation:

is no longer a matter of escaping from that world to another, purer one, a perspective which will carry in its train, for the person who can truly *live* it, a sense of the insubstantiality of things and selves. And when that sense goes deep with us, 'grasping' after the things of the world, for the supposed sake of ourselves, comes to look pathetic and futile.⁶⁷⁴

Theravada Buddhism presents a dignified view of people. There is nothing inherently bad in people. The human mind is pure by nature and capable of overcoming the present predicament with his/her own efforts. Weerasinghe's study of Kant and early Buddhism provides an excellent comparison on the question of: Why should man be moral? When comparing the passage from "is" to "ought", according to Weerasinghe, it is not at all clear as to how Kant could pass from 'is' to 'ought', because he "does not claim an enlightenment based on the practice of morality over a long period resulting in him a 'vision of things as they are'."⁶⁷⁵ In the Buddhist teaching "human suffering opens the door for ethics. ... The link between the human existence full of suffering (= is) and the moral life (= ought) is the individual *kamma*."⁶⁷⁶ After a moral struggle the realisation of the human predicament leads to the recognition that truth consists of the fourfold worldly facts -

⁶⁷¹ David E Cooper, *World Philosophies*, 1996, *op.cit.*, page 306.

⁶⁷² *Ibid.*, page 43.

⁶⁷³ *Ibid.*, page 46.

⁶⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷⁵ Weerasinghe, *op.cit.*, page 68.

⁶⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, § 6, page 66. *Kamma* is the same as *karma*, the expression refers to good and bad actions of body speech and mind whose pleasant and unpleasant results are experienced in this and subsequent lives. "*Karma*" is Sanscrit; "*Kamma*" is Pali.

the existence, the origin, the cessation of human suffering and the Path leading to the cessation of suffering.⁶⁷⁷ Important is the act of acknowledgement. According to Weerasinghe, "knowledge is developed on the basis of moral life, ... knowledge is never denied in order to pave the path for anything else", in contrast to Kant, for example, who replaces knowledge finally with what is really a form of faith.⁶⁷⁸

Kant's moral philosophy is based on the biblical struggle against evil for the Kingdom to come. Instead, according to Weerasinghe, Buddhist ethics, "practical and psychological, would not present theoretical speculations [but encourage] one "to do one's duty ... in relation to one's moral reasoning."⁶⁷⁹ Buddhist ethics present "moral imperatives" instead of the moral laws of Kantianism. In sum, it short-circuits the categorical imperative and locates imperatives in nature and in human nature. Weerasinghe explains how "Buddhist ethics is *persuasive* in character while Kantian moral propositions are of the nature of *demands*. ... Moral imperatives in Buddhism are neither laws nor commands nor injunctions. ... Different individuals in different circumstances may follow them according to their capability at a given time with the ultimate aim of following them in full in future. Buddhist morality is thus a step by step progress leading to perfection and resulting in *nibbāna*."⁶⁸⁰

Buddhist ethics prescribe a way of developing all good and noble qualities such as loving kindness, compassion, joy and equanimity, based on a non-theistic, natural law of morality. Buddhism therefore, as defined by Weerasinghe, "is a practical philosophy ... which lays emphasis on the mental attitude (*cetana*) of the doer in action."⁶⁸¹ A person acting with pure kindness cannot commit any moral offence, because the Buddhist ethical precepts are neither laws nor commands of any divine being. They are an intrinsic part of the infinite worth of a human being and his/her cosmos. The Buddhist goodwill is based on the acceptance of an element of "indeterminacy in nature", resulting in "an element of initiative" (*ārabha-dhātu*), which is expressed in "the free will of the people" (*sattānam atta-dhātu*).⁶⁸²

The Buddhist teaching of "free will" is rational and logical. Weerasinghe explains how Buddhism maintains that there is "an element of origination" (*nikkama-dhātu*),

677 Weerasinghe, *ibid.*, page 70.

678 *Ibid.*

679 *Ibid.*, page 73.

680 *Ibid.*, page 74.

681 *Ibid.*

an "element of endeavour" (*parakkama-dhātu*), an "element of strength" (*thāma-dhātu*), an "element of perseverance" (*thiti-dhātu*) and an "element of volitional effort" (*upakkama-dhātu*), which makes beings of their own accord act in various ways and that this shows that there is such a thing as "free will".⁶⁸³ The *summum bonum* is related to the initiative of people to do better. The *summum bonum* is the goal beyond all suffering for all people who strive for a moral perfection in the form of self-purification.

It is phenomenal, however, that Kant and the teachings of Theravada Buddhism recognise a universal moral code beyond modern scientific revelations and beyond time and space. The individual and his/her reality, disconnected from time and space create the moral environment by their own free will. The Buddhist concept of free will, however, is superior to the Kantian because it entails not only the freedom to will but also the freedom to execute will into the rightful moral action. Weerasinghe gives the example where a person A pursues B with intent to murder him. B takes refuge in the house of C. When A comes up and asks C whether B is in the house, Kant would maintain that it is C's duty to tell the truth, but the general Buddhist position would be different. Instead of pursuing the perfection of morality, Buddhist ethics stress the qualification of desisting from all immoral things "which paves the path for the development of "all moral activities" consisting of "self-purification" resulting in the *summum bonum*."⁶⁸⁴ The detachment from both materialism and self-mortification produces people who - according to Weerasinghe - realise *nibbāna* the *summum bonum* beyond (= unrelated to) this *impermanent* world, namely beyond *space, time* and *causality*.⁶⁸⁵ The end of craving is an individual realisation which is non-discursive. The necessity of the perfection of morality is the quintessence of reconciliation. Just as genetic modification adapts to changes in environment, Buddhist ethics can here unpick the deadlocks of GPE and generate, as it were, a third Copernican revolution.

Well, perhaps there is more to freeness than that. I thus conclude my little recapitulation and advance to my own view of how we might base our moral thought within IR and a true GPE.

682 Weerasinghe. *ibid.*, page 77.

683 *Ibid.*

684 *Ibid.*, pp 79-80.

7.4. *A Buddhist ethics of GPE, creating SPEG, the Social Political Economy of Globalization*

Let me recapitulate on some aspects of my analysis. Hettne expresses, in broad terms, that IPE is the connection between politics and economics in international relations. The connection is vital because no economic system can exist for long without a stabilising political framework of some sort.⁶⁸⁵ The images of the current global transformation in the realm of politics and economics, and the implications for the world society as a whole, is best approached under the term of GPE. GPE is an interdisciplinary social-science approach which is able to combine different types of variables concerning cultural, social, economic and political differences. The subject has become global. All theoretical propositions need to be seen in the context of global dynamics and in the context of pluralism. Supporting evidence for this ongoing transformation is found within IR and GPE literature, claiming to re-write theory in order to fit practice. Lacking is a truly embracing moral system to co-ordinate ethical communications world-wide.

The thesis presented here foresees a valuable role for the Buddhist system of ethics. Theravada Buddhism enables the next step in what I call the Social Political Economy of Globalization (SPEG), therefore moving towards a global practice of morality. Contending theories to date provide partial insights into the problems of ethics, but have mainly failed in arguing about the dialogue between Hegelian communitarianism and Kantian cosmopolitanism. Due to the over-emphasis of this, the central meaning of Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals* is under-represented. Kant clearly assumes that only willed actions, those which are based on a maxim, can be considered just or unjust. Maxims, so it is argued, connect reason (or motives) with decisions to act. Reason prevents people from pursuing certain antisocial ends, and rational ends include moral autonomy. Ethics require people to pursue socially valuable ends of active benevolence. The rethinking of development and the concern about world poverty are only a few topics which could be raised. But all examinations show, as Kothari expresses, that

the trouble with the dominant "economistic" model is not only that it is difficult to implement due to various roadblocks, but that it is inherently

⁶⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, page 85.

⁶⁸⁶ Björn Hettne, ed. *International Political Economy, Understanding Global Disorder*. London: Zed Books, 1995, first chapter.

flawed and mistaken. For too long, ... development has been fuelled by a faulty vision, namely, by the idea of a 'uniform end product to be achieved by all societies', a goal characterised by a state of urban, industrial affluence, managed by experts at the top running secular affairs through 'rational' bureaucracy, and backed by a capital-intensive technology.⁶⁸⁷

Considering the world at large, the debate about the diversity of cultures and the restyling of a Western-imposed conduct of political and economic behaviour is insufficient, if not founded on such hitherto unconsidered systems of thought, such as Buddhist social ethics. Universal norms (*adharma*), which have been taught by Buddhism, can be seen to be applicable for everyone, as they do not conflict with human nature. The universal norms of human life are constant, although the ways of applying them may vary. Therefore in each case each norm has its own solution. The general principles are adjusted to the infinitely varying circumstances of actual life. Purity lies in the mind: inner significance is stressed. The control of oneself is the starting point for altruistic activities and leads to *vinaya*, the regulated, disciplined and organised society.⁶⁸⁸ In Buddhism the entire emphasis lies on the mode of living, on the righteousness of life, and on the removal of vices. The general doctrine of the Buddha is not a system in the Western sense, but is rather a Path, consisting of the truth of existence. Life is something to be experienced, not something to be thought about and set in concrete.

Kant's fundamental principles of morality are based on his famous observation, which he wrote in the conclusion to his *Critique of Practical Reason* in 1788:

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: *the starry heavens above and the moral law within*.⁶⁸⁹

Theravada Buddhism understands the process of reconciliation depending on the individual and its continually intervening state of mind. In comparison to Kant, it is not the establishment of laws according to an enlightened morality and the legislation of laws as a consequence, but an infinite moral consciousness which can be

⁶⁸⁷ Rajni Kothari, in Fred Dallmayr, *Alternative Visions, Paths in the Global Village*. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998, page 223. Referring to Kothari, *Rethinking Development*, 1989; *Growing Amnesia*, 1993.

⁶⁸⁸ *Vinaya* results out of the teaching of *dharma*, for the benefit and the happiness of the many, out of sympathy for the world, for the good, benefit, and happiness of gods and men. See Rupert Gettin, *The Foundation of Buddhism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, page 87.

constantly achieved by everyone at any time and at any place. This difference makes the ethical codex of Buddhism more extensive than Kant's and other Western understandings of morality, and curiously more human. The present global society is not a homogeneously grown unity; a multifaceted, global, cultural and industrial development has created the need for a neutral binding of ethical relevance in order to overcome the gulf of differences based on ego-historical-fundamentalism.

At this stage it must be mentioned that the scholarly attempt made by Chan in respect of his research into religious and, what he calls, sacral history as part of IR is at least groundbreaking by its very nature. He claims that Western knowledge of Eastern systems of faith was for centuries basically primitive and still lacks recognition.⁶⁹⁰ The important point he makes stresses the importance of spiritual development i.e. faith which antedates scripture. The fact that knowledge has not been written does not justify its neglect. The importance of Buddhist ethics lies in its non-scriptural as much as its scriptural component. Whereas the text deals with the methodology - the matter of enactment - and becomes localised with the use of language, the unwritten faith of morality stays for ever universal, because it is a living substance of people's destiny. Chan observes that "the enactment of faith is as much an internal matter as an external one"⁶⁹¹, but this thesis goes further in declaring that this is a fact which evaluates the individual worth of a person who, despite a network of rules and regulations, can substantiate his/her inner faith of moral wrong and moral right. Having understood the importance of the primordial faith, the partially scriptural and partially primordial essence of the Theravada concept of ethics can be accepted as a theoretical contribution to a social political economy of globalization. After all, if Kant's thinking is used, why not accept something which I have argued as being more extensive in its spirituality and humanity?

All these angles of research come back to the need for a theoretical concept of ethics which can be universally accepted as the foundation for a meaningful advancement of people's development in social, political and economic terms. The reality of globalization highlights the ethical element as the hitherto missing structural element of global political economy. The task is to implement the ethical dimension of a

⁶⁸⁹ English translation from Wilhelm Benton, *Encyclopaedia Britannica, The Critique of Practical Reason*, University of Chicago, 1987, page 361.

⁶⁹⁰ The author refers here to discussions with Stephen Chan and a recent publication: Stephen Chan, Peter Mandaville, Roland Bleiker, (eds.), *The Zen of International Relations*. London: Palgrave, 2001.

⁶⁹¹ Stephen Chan. "Writing Sacral IR: An Excavation involving Kūng, Eliade, and Illiterate Buddhism" in *Millennium*, Vol. 29 : 3, 2000.

social political economy in the face of globalization, and this I call SPEG. The fact of globalization is not the issue at the centre, but the way people are treated. Apart from political treaties, tariff agreements and social contracts, the ethical contract among the world's populations is long overdue.

Life seeks an understanding in terms of SPEG. Globalization is no end-goal but a partially historic development of people's ambition to spread their technology and capital into the unlimited space of consumption without taking responsibility for the short and long term consequences.

This thesis is about the production of the end product of necessity, the moral conduct of moral action in SPEG, the social political economy of globalization. The rise of conceptions of human equality and egalitarian modes of social and economic justice, encourage a thesis like this to increase the intellectual development according to the new global reality as it unfolds. On the one hand, the seeming broadness of approach is needed when considering the vastness of Western and Eastern philosophical approaches on the subject of ethics, in particular when a lone attempt within IR is made to compare the beliefs of a universal ethics of Kant and the Theravada Buddhism. On the other hand, what seems broad can be reduced to a mere question of "what is life's value"? The question of ethics is not so much occupied with factual knowledge as with the value of human life, namely human conduct as it ought to be. Theravada Buddhism relies on the virtues of the individual who creates the virtues of society. The ways of doing good or making good things begin with giving. The wealth of a good man is the wealth of the society. Wealth has an instrumental value. The individual is the moral resource for all members of society. The individual and its society are the same as the wholesome and the unwholesome; the boundaries are floating. The external, environmental factor and the internal, personal one, are one. The association with good people (*kalyānamittatā*) and the systematic attention or reflection of becoming a good person within oneself (*yonisomanisikāra*) are prerequisites for the eightfold path of moral behaviour, as pre-*magga* leads to *magga*.⁶⁹² The law of *karma* (moral law of cause and effect) unites both ends, the individual and the social level. In Theravada Buddhism, wealth and generosity are reciprocally related, just as all life is interconnected, but wealth is never endorsed unconditionally. The Buddhist ethics are not about forsaking things which are forbidden, but embracing a positive and joyful way of living. The search for

salvation is radically individualistic but requires a society that is secure and peaceful.

As Lovin explains, Theravada Buddhism is "the way of life for a whole society. The nibbannic Buddhism of the monks and the karmic practices of the laity exist not as different religious systems, but as complementary elements in a Buddhist way of life that encompasses a whole society."⁶⁹³

Hans Küng, the founder of the World Parliament of Religions in 1993, appeals for a global ethic, the challenge for the New Millennium. It is both an aspiration and a necessity, global ethics is global responsibility. Küng supports my findings of the importance of Buddhist ethics because of its impartiality in respect of a divine superiority.⁶⁹⁴ This means that no divine being can be made responsible for what we do. It is entirely our responsibility to do good. The conduct of human life should be good because it enables a positive outcome, the goal of the way to redemption. Chan calls Küng the 'link man' for the intellectual work in constructing a global ethic among so many different schools of thought.⁶⁹⁵

7.5 Conclusion

The ethical discourse of Theravada Buddhism was introduced in Chapter Six as an example for a concept of thought that is moral, within rational explication and able to be globally appreciated. Chapter Seven draws on this knowledge and highlights the difference between a Rawlsian style and Buddhist distributive justice. The Theravada Buddhist understanding of the acquisition and distribution of wealth is a well balanced act of individual effort to construct the good economic community. The right balance between the acquisition and distribution of wealth is also a process of reconciliation between theory and practice, and between material and spiritual aspiration. The concept of Buddhist moral action is the basis for any human action, based on the concept that a morally good volitional act brings about a pleasant result.

⁶⁹² Rājavarānuni, "Foundations of Buddhist Social Ethics", in Sizemore and Swearer, *op.cit.*, page 46-50.

⁶⁹³ Robin W Lovin, "Ethics, Wealth, and Eschatology: Buddhist and Christian Strategies for Change", in Sizemore and Swearer, *op.cit.*, page 190.

⁶⁹⁴ Hans Küng and Helmut Schmidt, (eds.), *A Global Ethic and Global Responsibilities*. Munich: SCM Press Ltd., 1998, page 58-62. See also: Interview with Hans Küng, "Leitplanken für die Moral", in: Der Spiegel, No. 51, 20.12.1999. And: Hans Küng, "A Global Ethic: A Challenge for the New Millennium", London: Gresham College Special Lecture, St. Paul's Cathedral, 9.05.2000.

⁶⁹⁵ Stephen Chan, "Hans Küng and a Global Ethic", in: Review of International Studies, 25:3, 1999.

Theravada Ethics qualify to continue from Kant and offer to be an invaluable background theory for SPEG based on the following points:

- morality is an 'a priori' system
- morality is unconditional
- morality is a necessity
- morality is universal

In addition, Theravada Buddhism offers more. It proclaims morality as a matter of living, the choice is implicit in life, whereas for Kant it is a matter of willing and legislating. Theravada Ethics is convincing by its natural neutrality and impartiality. The introduction of the Eastern ethical system of Theravada Buddhism is a global reconciliation act. In this case, the subject in hand is the new GPE, called SPEG, the social political economy of globalization. It is here that this thesis introduces the classical school of Theravada. The reality of politics, economics and social security in the 21st century is global and, in this thesis, it is posited against an all-embracing moral system of thought and action. The fact that Theravada ethics are found within an Eastern school of thought is a valuable contribution to globalization by its very nature, because the control mechanism of globalization cannot, surely, be sustained only by Western thought and its imperial history.

CONCLUSION

A central challenge in contemporary global politics and economics evolves around the question as to whether it is possible to generate a synthesis of social and political forces that might promote new forms, ideally to create a normative basis for collective action. Kant's motto of the 18th century *Sapere Aude* is often used on the crest of English Schools. The Latin expression means that it is an attribute to education that we have the courage to think. This includes a moral responsibility as intellectuals, as masters of the world of "is" - according to Allott⁶⁹⁶ - to say not only what is but also what might be; it is essential to speak about the possibility of human progress, and of human self-perfecting. The mind of judgement is the mind in search of happiness, perfection, the ideal, a destination we will never reach, but without which there can be no human journey. Our mind consists in these things and in their inseparable co-presence in our minds, and in the minds of all humanity. Scientific inquiry did not stop with Copernicus and inquiries into our moral global responsibilities are as important as the discoveries of Planck. Just as energies are quantised so are our efforts. However, in order to move from an orthodox understanding which is insufficient to comprehend the new global practice our mind is able to do a quantum leap. Just as in order to move to an orbit further away from the nucleus, the electron must absorb energy to do work against the attraction of the nucleus.

My research leads me to offer a moral system of the nature of a Neo-Kantian Buddhism. It is the ethical system of Theravada Buddhism which offers to the theory of Global Political theory what appears to be the most valuable element of sharing. I still call it 'neo' because it resembles in its method of transcendence the original Kant I discovered for IR and GPE. Kant aimed for a pure moral philosophy, based on the three basic questions: "What can I know? What shall I do? What can I hope for?" All knowledge is ultimately grounded in principles of philosophical comprehension. In philosophical reflection we are dealing with ourselves as subjects, and the summa cum laudem question: "What is it to be human?" or "How can the three richest people in the world have more financial funding available than 600 million poor people?" Kant and Theravada Buddhism both teach the 'organic wholeness' of the universe, as Kant called it, 'the beautiful unity of the infinite

⁶⁹⁶ Philip Allott, *op. cit.*

worth'. Both share their teleological and soteriological aspiration.

However, whereas Kant restricts morality to the finite life of the individual, the Theravada Buddhist revolution in ethics consists of the performance of one's morality as a path to perfection. No other end leads to the end of 'summum bonum', *nibbāna*. Theravada ethics teaches the practice of ethical conduct, the salvation and stillness of a well-ordered cosmos.

My research led me to the conclusion that Theravada ethics qualifies to continue from Kant. They parallel one another in the following points:

- morality is an '*a priori*' system,
- morality is unconditional,
- morality is a necessity,
- morality is universal.

In addition, Theravada Buddhism understands morality as a matter of being; morality is an essential virtue. The choice is implicit, whereas for Kant it is a matter of willing. Theravada Buddhism teaches peaceful co-operation; it is not responsible to a higher being and it cannot be dismissed as a Western concept.

Essential for my investigation is the fact that it is more explicit when dealing with wealth. In the Theravada ethical tradition sharing is a moral obligation; to give materially is to grow spiritually. There is no measure on how much or how little, but it is fundamental. The ethical path is based on sharing. For Theravada Buddhism a necessary degree of material and social wellbeing as a prerequisite for any spiritual progress. Morality is essential for the circle of life.

It has been my intention in the course of this study to offer a pathway through a significant dilemma contained within the ethical discourse of IR and GPE. I have made acknowledgement of efforts already attempted to demonstrate ethical concern. My research shows the many attempts made to approach the dilemma from an IR and IPE and GPE standpoint, and from scholars of related disciplines such as Economics and Development Studies.

My research has always highlighted the question of what do we do in future. How do

we construct a GPE theory which can attempt to appreciate normatively global changes and to close the gap in normative visions? There is not much we know about the future with certainty, but we can still commence a process of reform. Just as globalization is an ongoing process, so should its theory constantly undergo challenge and modification. There are six billion people, living in more than 180 states, and spread across five continents having interrelated ties arising from food and information supply. But the shrinkage of the globe through communication and travel has made its inhabitants closer to one another than previously. Normative thought can also help in this shrinkage.

The theory of GPE needs to be adapted to globalization as a reality with many facets to it, in order to speak on behalf of the global society. It is the aim of this thesis to show that if a theory is to continue to be relevant, it must engage in a moral argument. The end result should be the formation of a whole which makes sense. In a globalized world cultural encounters and the mixing of people of different backgrounds are likely to become the norm, and are already accepted as such by the present generation. There is still, however, a need to share moral values.

In Part One

I have explained the discourse of GPE as a progressive development of IR and IPE. I have asked the question as to what extent GPE is based on moral concepts of thought. I have discussed IR literature because it is underpinned by philosophical thought. My research enabled me to establish the point that if philosophical underpinning is possible for IR, it is also possible for GPE. In so far as IR has been successful in its moral and normative concerns, it has been through the study of Kant. This outcome led me to consider the morality of Kant in order to learn more about the philosophical debate than that mirrored in IR literature. I looked at IPE, an earlier prodigy of GPE, and started in particular with the work of Strange, responding to the change in the world called globalization. Strange's work was of a pioneering nature in its discussion of power structures, revealing that world finances have overtaken production as more important when deciding world policies. The survey of IPE literature demonstrated a need to establish a more normative theoretical environment for GPE, and highlighted the main areas which needed to be addressed. GPE was created to cope with globalization, and one of its main issues is the need to cope with

the global distribution of wealth, as already highlighted by IPE scholars Tooze and Murphy. I asked whether it could deal with this issue in a satisfactory normative manner.

In Part Two

I provided more information about this aspect of global concern for the global distribution of wealth, and examined related fields such as Economics and Development Studies, in order to learn if the work of development specialists achieves a clear position on economic and entitlement rights, such as that discussed by Sen for example. Most important for the conduct of my investigation is the finding that the two concerns, morality and rationality, are also found in GPE. Dasgupta has gone even one step further with his attempt to combine rationally moral underpinnings and cultural considerations. He did not wish to avoid his rational calculations, but Chan did so for IR, and declared that the rational project should itself be questioned in the name of international cultures. I noted that culture is an important building block for global society.

In Part Three

I have continued to follow Kant, but in his original Text; and I noted that IR has focussed rather narrowly on Kant, and not fully articulated the central and centralising principle of Kant's work. Kant introduces a viewpoint of consciousness via transcendence; and this recognition is vital when trying to find an ethical global framework which is able to deal with globalization. This principle of transcendence is a provision of great moral emancipation, as well as of individual moral responsibility. The Kant I have presented is not found in any Anglophone text.

However, an analogous and deeper explication of transcendence lies in Buddhism. I chose the Theravada school of Buddhism in my thesis for its exemplary nature. I have chosen Buddhism because of its many similarities to Kant, and thought it was thus a sympathetic avenue for GPE to travel down in its steps towards appreciating other cultures.

Buddhist ethics possesses a universal perspective on justice and social order.

Theravada ethics is based on worldwide co-operation, a universally shared vision of the purpose of life. Life is not suffering, but achieving progress despite suffering. The morality applied provides a way of responding to the problem of global co-operation among self-interested, competing and conflicting persons and groups. Global and social interaction demands a way in which moral concepts are embodied in the real social world. What this means in practice is the tackling of the problems of the underdeveloped world, where social dislocation and material inequality diminish the worth of human life.

Theravada ethics is applicable for an individual as much as for multi-cultural groups of people. It teaches the most basic but most important ethical means for people to enable them to govern constructively their own lives, as much of that of any community. Here the global common good of sharing and preservation is big enough to unite all. Thus, this thesis has sought to provide theoretical bases for a world community to be powerful enough to create a global economic morality which will override national interests.⁶⁹⁷ The introduction of the Eastern ethical system of Theravada Buddhism is seen here as a global act of reconciliation.

This study has sought to overcome the Kant-Hegel dichotomy by offering an Eastern concept of Theravada ethics, and adds to the conceptual and normative framework of GPE. This new framework I have called SPEG, the social political economy of globalization which is merging pure reason and practical considerations to make this a workable reality. SPEG mirrors the special problems which globalization has brought about.

Does this concept work? This will have to be evaluated in further studies, according to the saying, "where there is a will, there is a way". And the way to success lies in the very first step taken!

It is significant for IR and GPE to make an effort to understand that morality is part of politics and economics, and ideally adopt the neo-Kantian-Buddhist ethical concept presented here. Morality is an inherent part of theory and should be part of practice. The theoretical division as it was, makes it only too easy for practitioners to ignore moral responsibilities, using theory as an excuse. The preoccupation of most

⁶⁹⁷ This sentence is leaning on an observation which Carr made in the Thirties, when he declared "the world community is not yet powerful enough ...", *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, *op.cit.*, page 150.

members of the academy have grown more specialised and technical. By professional training if not by inclination they have overlooked the values of community, mutual obligation and compassion and Galbraith's hope for intellectual leadership has so far not borne much fruit.⁶⁹⁸ IR and GPE theory should not be used for excuses for immoral and irresponsible action in the name of a false rationality.

Neo Kantian-Buddhist ethics offers theoretical guidelines for reform. In respect of matters of a more just distribution of wealth, the Theravada Buddhist ideal of sharing offers a milestone for reform. For example to support what Scholte calls the "supra-state anti-monopoly mechanism", i.e. schemes for "transworld taxes" and the abolishment of offshore finance centres, which have allowed some people to be free riders for their own benefit only, without giving assistance to those who are underprivileged.⁶⁹⁹ Scholte talks about humane global futures and enhancing global justice⁷⁰⁰ as an ambition for future reform, but does not suggest a moral framework as a basis.

The challenge for future research lies in including the mandate of a neo Kantian-Buddhism into the statutes of programmes of reform of globalization.

⁶⁹⁸ John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society*. London: Penguin, 1999, 5th edition.

⁶⁹⁹ Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. Houndmills: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000, page 298.

⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp 297-302.

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Appendix I Meeting with Buddhist Scholars

Interview 1 : Report of Meeting with Ajahn Munindo

The interview was arranged with Ajahn Munindo, Abbot of the Harnham Buddhist Monastery, 'Aruna Ratanagiri', on Tuesday 27th June, 2000, at 9 am. at the Harnham Hall Cottages. The Theravadin Buddhist Monastic Residence in Belsay, Northumberland, is called 'Aruna Ratanagiri', which means 'Dawn on Precious Mountain'.

The subject of the interview was the ethical directives of Theravada Buddhism. I raised questions regarding the usefulness of Buddhist ethics for the forthcoming economic and political globalization leading to the multiculturalism of the world.

Ajahn Munindo gave the following thoughts in reply.⁷⁰¹ He stated that the prevailing global changes in the world draw more and more Western people towards the teachings of Theravada Buddhism. He went on to explain that people experience an underlying sense of discontentment in their lives which does not seem to be allayed through habitual ways of seeking happiness, for example, through material comfort, worldly success, or personal relationships. The discontentment experienced by many people would be, in fact, an inner or spiritual need for understanding and peace.

According to Ajahn Munindo, Buddhist teachings offer a practical way to deal with this discontentment, by examining our thoughts, emotions and physical feelings, the essence of meditation. This engagement would therefore create an understanding of the discontentment, and lead to ways of how to deal with it more effectively, as the teachings are a reminder that taking refuge in worry, doubt, fear, anger, and greed lead us to delusion, dogmatism, hate, self-conceit and pride.

He explained that the ultimate truth or ultimate reality, which is *dhamma*, is impersonal. It is neither good nor bad nor anything that has any superlative or comparative quality. It is beyond the dualistic conceptions of mind.⁷⁰²

⁷⁰¹ The interview was not recorded, and in the report the author accepts responsibility if certain views are misrepresented.

The biggest advantage in the teaching of *dhamma* is that the awareness of habitual discontentment gradually submits to the wisdom of being aware and being alert. It leads to a presence of mind on which to reflect, to learn from life as we live it, independent of future material standards of living. *Dhamma* is not bound by any time condition. Our conceptual mind cannot conceive of anything that is timeless, because, as he explains, our conceptions and perceptions are time-based conditions, and *dhamma* is not bound by time. Therefore *dhamma* is beyond intellectual concepts, theories or beliefs of any sort and offers no escape in manmade doctrines. Instead, the immediate reflection initiates an immediate action in the present.

According to Ajahn Munindo, Theravada Buddhism teaches the mental attitude of the doer in action. The goal beyond all suffering is individual moral perfection.

Ajahn Munindo pointed out how ethical wisdom in the Buddhist sense relates to the use of what he calls 'conventional reality'; meaning that inner values and principles have to be used in relation to surrounding conditions. The central idea would be to use ethical principles to generate energies in accordance with the needs of the environment. Even money is an energy which can be used positively. Ajahn Munindo emphasises the importance of the fact that money has to be guarded constantly, as it is a dangerous force which can get out of hand. He underlines that this guardianship of energies demands a sensitive awareness. Skilful use arises out of growing awareness of the inner ethical principles, whereby one focuses on the reality of things beyond their material appearance.

According to Ajahn Munindo, the West has a problem with an overdeveloped will, which has turned technical knowledge into an idol, in order to use and manipulate the people in the world. The Western will pursues an aggressive domination of negative energies. Instead, Theravada Buddhism teaches the affirmation:

*Form serves the spirit,
spirit does not serve form.*

Ajahn Munindo explained that we should not get too attached to form, as it crushes the spirit. Coupled with the craving for personal gain, the craving for worldly power

⁷⁰² See for more detailed explanation: Venerable Ajahn Sumedho, *Now is the Knowing*. Hemel Hempstead. Amaravati Publications, 1996.

gives rise to the exploitation, nationalism and expansionism in the world with all its subsequent chaos. He pointed out further that one could say that the world has turned almost entirely to the satisfying of craving and pride. He commented further that if we looked more deeply into the processes taking place, we would see that the defilement which exerts the most influence is our own view or belief. This attachment to a certain way of thinking is responsible for our personal bias towards our personal gain. A sense of direction is governed by economic and political power, either on an individual or social bias. The behaviour of people is influenced accordingly.

Ajahn Munindo informed me that instead, if being aware and mindful by reflecting and observing, we begin to see that we are acting on impulses that are cruel and selfish, which only bring harm and misery to ourselves as well as to others. Disregarding what anyone else has done, or how unjust society might be, we should not spend the rest of our lives blaming others. We should each accept complete responsibility for our life, and live it. There should be no one else to blame but ourselves and our own ignorance.

There is wisdom in realising that even when scourged and humiliated, it is our self-pity, pettiness and selfishness that cause the suffering.

According to Ajahn Munindo, the key relevance of Buddhist ethics is their adaptability according to the surrounding reality of worldly conventions. For example, if we believe that happiness is to be found in the abundance of material goods, our actions and undertakings will tend to this end. This is a misconception, resulting from attempts at so-called progress which are misguided and cause problems. He explained that material progress is founded on two harmful views, that humanity must conquer nature in order to achieve well-being and true happiness, and that happiness is dependent on material wealth. Theravada Buddhism teaches the skill of recognising harmful thoughts, changing them into opposites and putting them into practice. Ill-devised beliefs are then disregarded, whilst goodness becomes established through discernment.

Positive energies are released when people manage to dissipate the inner division and enter a normative state. Ajahn Munindo confirmed that people have a very

sophisticated level of ambition, which, in conjunction with their thought processes, allows them to achieve things which would be otherwise considered as impossible. Intention is not only what fashions the thinking process, but also, through that, external conditions. It is here that Buddhist ethical intention becomes ethical action, by taking on responsibility for the social, economic and political environment.

Ajahn Munindo described three defilements, which play an important role on the social level as the craving for personal gain, the desire to dominate and the clinging to views. The way these defilements direct human activities can be seen more clearly on the social scale than on the individual level. Buddhist ethics teach the recognition that the social good is interrelated with the individual ethical perfection. The individual mind carries the knowledge of inter-dependence and inter-relation of all things in the form of a continuum, enabling it the flexibility to deal with changes in the world.

Interview 2 : Interview Report, meeting with Professor Karel Werner

Professor Karel Werner is a former Spalding Lecturer in Indian Philosophy and Religion in the School of Oriental Studies at the University of Durham. He is now continuing his research at SOAS (School for Oriental and African Studies), Department of the Study of Religions, University of London.

The interview was held at the SOAS, University of London, on Thursday, 29th June, 2000, at 10.30 am⁷⁰³. During the interview I presented the outline of my thesis to Professor Werner and asked him to comment. I chose to interview Professor Werner, because at 75 years of age, he is an icon of "an exemplary life" according to an article about his life in *The Prague Post*, September 8-14, 1999.

He was born in the former Sudetenland, now the Czech Republic. The study of Orientalism, Indian philosophy and religion carried him through all the worldly turbulent periods in his life. His knowledge of Sanskrit and Asian languages are exemplary, and do not only serve theoretical use, for he travels extensively to India, China, Korea and other Asian states to experience the current social, political and economic development.

He has practised Buddhist meditation since university and lectured extensively on Buddhism. During his academic life he had to defend the importance of oriental studies against the view that they were not really needed. In the upper echelons of the university prevailed "the bias towards scientific positivism", as he calls it. His insight of Orientalism was disregarded as even heretical ranging from Marxists in sociology departments to Catholics in theology departments. Professor Werner stood fast to his belief in the importance of teaching the knowledge of non-Western traditions and has a vast treasure of knowledge to offer.

Professor Werner followed my presentation with interest. I explained my approach to the possible function or application of Buddhist ethics in the political and economic context of GPE. He agreed that my ideas harmonised with his lifetime research. Despite his personal tragic wartime experiences and the uncertainty of occupation in his homeland it is with great optimism that he observes the changes in

⁷⁰³ The interview was not recorded, and in the report the author accepts responsibility if certain views are misrepresented.

Asia.

With optimism Professor Werner remarks that Buddhism is re-emerging in Asian countries with vehemence in recent years. He explained that the former communist straight jacket has starved people of their spirituality so drastically that the longing for spirituality and particularly Buddhism can no longer be suppressed by governments such as that in China.

Professor Werner predicts that Buddhism will play a major role in the establishment of a new form of global governance. He pointed out the difficulties of the practical application of Buddhist ethics. We nevertheless both agreed that no matter how difficult the task seems, a first stone has to be layed to ensure the foundation of future success. As Buddhist ethics teach us, practical progress is a consequence of the initiative of thought.

Appendices II and III

As a contribution to this workable reality, I will now present two papers I have written and presented in earlier years at ISA annual conferences. Both present initial thoughts of a model of governance and Global Political Economy.

The Makuhari Paper was selected and translated in Japanese for the publication of a special book to commemorate the Conference. *Japan, Asia and the Global System: Toward the Twenty-First Century*, The Japan Association of International Relations, 1998, Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin Co, Ltd.

Appendix II “A Search for World Order, The Global Battleground vs. Perpetual Peace”, paper presented at the IPSA (International Political Science Association) XVII World Congress, Seoul, Korea, 19 August, 1997

Appendix III “New Belief Structures for Global Political Economy: Confucianism as the Relevant Structure for Values”, paper presented at the ISA-JAIR (International Studies Association – Japanese Association of International Relations) Convention, Makuhari, Japan, 21 September, 1996

Appendix II

Presented at the IPSA XVII World Congress in Seoul, 19 August 1997

A Search for World Order "The Global Battleground vs. Perpetual Peace"

Contribution to:

MT5. Management of conflict and search for world order
MT5.1 Search for world order /recherche d'un ordre mondial

**Regina Watkin-Kolb
The Nottingham Trent University**

**Gothic House, Barker Gate, Nottingham, NG1 1JU
Tel: *44 115 9598314; Fax: *44 115 9598312**

Global Battleground vs. Perpetual Peace Abstract

The paper is concerned with the question of how we can bring order in a world where space and time are measured on micro chips, DNA tests have replaced finger prints and everybody is writing about the chaos.

Never was the world so small and never before were the diversities so obvious. New players, technologies, processes and rules are coming together to generate an economic form of super conductivity: globalisation, a much shorter trade and investment cycle and a greater level of uncertainty. The implications of increased co-operative competition and its often harmful consequences creates the frightening picture of a maelstrom.

We still live in a world full of states but states have lost their previous governing power to the control of the global market without whom it seems no state can claim its independence. In order to be an economic power, manufacturing companies and other investors have to be involved in the global scramble.

An increasing number of theoretical writers suggest that ethical questions are central to our understanding of international relations. But few carry that into practical argument or analogies, and far too few have developed this in international/global political economy. This paper intends to close this gap as the basis of applying an ethical argument to the execution of power.

The paper asserts the importance of alternative ways to a peaceful coexistence within the web of global political economy based on ethical networking. The paper claims first that a post-Cold War global order is emerging, presently obscured but with no doubt it will happen. Secondly, it is therefore more than adequate to evolve constructive thoughts of benign governance based on universal moral principles such as Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative and most relevant for us today Kant's concept of perpetual peace.

Kant's goals for perpetual peace are envisaged not as the perfect status quo to become reality but as goals of our aspirations for the future. As we live now with the consequences of the past, we need more than weather forecasts by satellites and future share price speculations, we need to aim towards something greater than our presently destructive political and economic environment which produces a very dis-illusioned society. Kant's concept of perpetual peace combines the idea of theoretical visioning with the visioning in action, in modern marketing terms to be called a "turn-around-program".

This continuous improvement leads to the necessary transformation. Human persistence is creating a scene set for change.

寻求世界秩序

环球战场与永久和平

论文提要

当前,我们居住的地球越来越小,各民族各文化间的差异越来越明显。现代技术的突飞猛进,世界舞台上新角色的出现,各种新力量、新势力之间的角逐,推化了一种以经济动因为核心的“超导体”——全球化。在全球化中,投资与贸易的循环极大地缩短,不确定性也随之大大地提高。合作性的竞争中潜伏着危机,其后果将是不堪想象的灾难。如何在这样一个新的世纪中建立新的世界秩序是本文将探讨的主题。

环顾当今世界,国家仍是不可动摇的主体单位,但在全球化的市场中国家已失去了对市场的绝对控制力,在市场面前没有任何一个国家敢于声称自己绝对的独立性。为了发展经济实力,投资商与生产商必须挤进全球范围内的角斗场。

越来越多的国际问题专家提出,伦理问题将是理解国际关系的核心,但只有极少数人在实践的层面论述了这一理论,而将其在政治经济领域中加以阐发的则更少之又少。本文试图在伦理问题的理论与实践之间构架一座桥梁,并以伦理观念在全球权力结构中的作用为切入点。

本文提出在以伦理为基础的政治经济框架中,各国间的和平共处应有新的模式。冷战后的世界新秩序正在形成,在这一过程中有必要将建设性的新思维纳入以仁慈为基础的国家管

理体系中。康德的永久和平理论可作为新思维的参照系。应用康德永久和平理论并非将其变成一成不变的现实，而是将其当作为美好未来努力的精神源泉。我们生活在历史长河之中，我们需要的不仅仅是用卫星预测天气或在股票市场中投机。我们需要更远大一点的目标，要超越目前极具破坏性的政治经济环境。这个环境在不断制造更深层的幻灭。人类不懈的努力会逐步改善我们居住的环境，并最终实现我们期待着的精神飞跃。

丽吉娜·沃特金-凯尔伯
诺丁汉特伦特大学
英国

国际政治学协会第十七次世界大会
汉城，1997年8月19日

A Search for World Order
"The Global Battleground vs. Perpetual Peace"
Regina Watkin-Kolb

Contents

1. The search for world order
2. Three basis of discontentment
3. The reality of globalisation
4. Globalisation needs governance
5. On the question of legitimacy
6. The Highest Political Good is the Highest Moral Good

The search for world order¹

This article is part of an emerging, new way of thinking which is manifesting itself in all fields of life. It is a constructive way of thinking which does not start in accounting the dilemmas of surmountable problems, but moves away from the fatigue of desperation and redefines achievable goals for the future. The global battle field of monopoly power, consumer exploitation, manipulation of the workers and the race for technological achievements, combined with the lack of responsibility for the protection of our natural habitat must be faced with achievable attempts of embetterment.²

This task is embracing all decision makers of all societies, East and West as well as South

¹ 'Search for World Order' is defined as the search for an alternative and more viable system of authority which aims to reduce the likelihood of international violence, creates acceptable conditions of world-wide economic well-being, social justice, ecological stability and participates in decision-making processes. It is explicitly normative in its approach. This definition has been developed by Saul Mendlovitz and Thomas Weiss, quoted in "World Encyclopaedia of Peace", Pergamon Press, Oxford, New York, Beijing, Frankfurt, Sao Paulo, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, 1987, page 569.

² see as example, Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power, Three Models of Change in International Organisations, University of California Press, London, 1990. Haas provides a rich theoretical framework for examining the ongoing roles of international organisation in addressing the 'crisis of multilateralism' in an increasingly interdependent world: "Territorial sovereignty imposes a rigid conception of space. Decisions are to be made for the benefit and security of a delimited area and its inhabitants. But since many problems are no longer definable in terms of solutions that are specific to the area under the state's jurisdiction, the very notion of delimited territorial space loses some of its organising vigour. Regional, global, and even outer space become almost equally salient for thinking about problems and solutions. Therefore, the symbolic and practical uniqueness of national territory becomes problematic." See further attempts by Louise Amoore et al. Overturning 'Globalisation': Resisting the Teleological, Reclaiming the 'Political', in "New Political Economy", Vol. 2, No. 1, 1997, page 192: "...we must develop concrete strategies and concrete forms of organisation to resist the damage inflicted on society and the environment by the expansion of capital accumulation and the market. It is time to overturn neoliberal globalisation, and by doing so to create a new world."

and North. "Our past histories may be separate but our future will inevitably be shared. If we make war we shall all perish, but if we make peace we shall all live and may all prosper."³

In theory a shift has taken place away from positivism in the sense that there is no need to limit enquiry and belief to what can be 'firmly' established. Positivists followed the empiricist tradition, dismissed metaphysics and theology and tried to assimilate ethics and aesthetics into scientific pattern.⁴ Positivists have always tried to limit enquiry and belief to what can be firmly established to give the discipline a scientific identity. "First, and perhaps most constructive, is the desire of an increasing number of scholars to connect international relations theory to developments taking place in the wider realm of social and political thought."⁵ The philosophy of western science itself has begun to disintegrate, as a result of the new scientific developments in relativity and quantum physics. It was the discovery of quantum physics, which finally made it clear that the world which the scientist observes is not reality in itself but reality exposed to human consciousness, to the mind and the brain of the scientist.

Kant who constructed an abstracted philosophy could rise above all the abstractions to acknowledge his awe in the presence of "the starry firmament above and the moral law within"⁶. Most relevant for us today is Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace of 1795*.⁷ Kant's goals for perpetual peace are envisaged not as the perfect status quo to become reality but as goals of our aspirations for the future. As we live now with the consequences of the past, we need more than weather forecasts by satellites and future share price speculations, we need to aim towards something greater than our presently destructive political and economic

³ Ervin Laszlo and Jong Youl Yoo, in: *World encyclopaedia of Peace*, Pergamon Press, Vol. 1, Preface, page Xii, 1987 "In the penultimate decade of the second millennium, our tenure on this small planet has grown a new dimension. In this dimension peace is not a dream but a necessity. To strive for it, and to attain and maintain it has shifted from the realm of utopia to the domain of hard common sense."

⁴ The scientific attitude stresses the observable. The doctrine of positivism is associated with Comte, who selected six features: being real, useful, certain, precise, organic, relative. His philosophy insisted to apply the scientific attitude not only to the sciences but also to human affairs. See A. Comte, *Discourse on the Positive Spirit*, 1844, translated with analytical table of contents by E. S. Beesley 1903. See further E. Mach, *Popular Scientific Lectures*, 1998; See for the recent debate over Positivism, M. Nicholson, *Causes and Consequences in International Relations: A Conceptual Study*, New York, Cassell Academic, 1996.

⁵ Brian C. Schmidt, *Further Ahead or Further Behind? The Debate over Positivism*, in *Mershon International Studies Review*, Supplement to the *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, Supplement 1, May 1997, Blackwell Publishers; page 108. See also Robert B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993. And also: Pauline Rosenau, *Once Again into the Fray: International Relations Confronts the Humanities*, in : *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 19, 1990; or: Steve Smith, *Positivism and Beyond*, in : *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, edited by Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Maria Zalewski, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

⁶ Bede Griffiths, *Universal Wisdom*, Harper Collins, London, 1994, page 11.

⁷ Some modern writers lean on ways of thinking, which Kant produced 200 years ago, e.g.: Johan Galtung, *The True worlds: A Transnational Perspective*, Free Press, New York, 1980; Ali Mazrui, *A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective*, Free Press, New York, 1977.

environment which produces a very dis-illusioned society.⁸ Kant's concept of perpetual peace combines the idea of theoretical visioning with the visioning in action, in modern marketing terms, it would be called a "turn around program", which leads to a revitalisation of an enterprise e.g. a restructuring of a firm. For visions to become successful to work, they have to make sense and become real between heart and head. A part of the strategy is to visualise a long term process in order to build a formula on a broad scale. The commitment to a long term process contradicts the present fashion of short term planning in particularly in the world of finances, but it represents a new honesty towards the achievements of valuable human goals, a honesty which is lacking in the present conduct in political and economic affairs. The continuous improvement leads to the necessary transformation. Human persistence is creating a scene set for change.

The discourse within which the argument works is thus based on Kant's critique of pure reason⁹, because pure reason is the faculty which contains the principles of organising any thing absolutely à priori. After the reign of scientific absolutism we ought to recognise the importance of knowledge à priori¹⁰ and not à posteriori.¹¹ Knowledge à priori and knowledge à posteriori are the two sources of human understanding, the former based on sense, the latter based on rational understanding. If we wait for the recognition à posteriori, the distraction of the planet will be irreversible. The highest principles and fundamental conceptions of morality are cognitions à priori.

No ethical responsibility is separated from the world. The abstraction of ethics is a rhetoric of words. As individuals, groups or governments we can deny the ethical components of our existence but we cannot get rid of it. Ethics are a part of knowledge.¹² This is the most fundamental part of knowledge, because ethics set rules of behaviour without which we could not coexist and no one individual would be able to survive. Ethical behaviour is partially

⁸ It is a Chinese proverb: "Observe what happened in the past, than you will know what is going to come."

⁹ Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, London, G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1924, translated from J.M.D. Meiklejohn. Page 15.

¹⁰ Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, London, G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1924, translated from J.M.D. Meiklejohn. Page 1. Knowledge à priori: Knowledge independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions. this kind of knowledge is in contradiction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience.

"In respect of time, therefore no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins within. But thought all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows, that all arises out of experience. for, on the contrary, it is quite a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that the faculty of cognition supplies from itself, an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. "

¹¹ Kant, op.cit., page 2, "Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only à posteriori, that is through experience."

¹² See further Regina Watkin-Kolb, "The historical phenomena of hunger, a responsibility for Global Political Economy", Paper presented at the ISA Convention, March 1997, Toronto.

constituted, Kant would call it categorical¹³. Certain ethical action is entrusted to us as caretakers for all life on the planet and the safeguarding of the planet itself. How can any greengrocer enjoy making money with the products from a contaminated garden. How can anybody eat in abundance in front of their neighbour who is starving? The picture of the garden is a good metaphor, the present 'garden' shows great neglect and violation, whereas the future picture should show a garden emptied of all rubbish and cleared of debris. The knowledge of sharing is substantial to our life. We share the knowledge of destruction but we share also the knowledge of construction. Therefore the question becomes dominant: what do we want as citizens of the one planet and what are our values? In following up this question, we reach out to encouraging goals and overcome the imposed inability of change by the stubborn wheels of market economy and an American hegemonist definition of democratising the world.¹⁴

In the light of historical development the antagonism between the good and the radical evil in human nature will be overcome only by ensuring right, i.e. law and justice. "Kant's principles are not part of an elaborate system of politics, but elementary principles which can help us to guide our actions. They can help us to orientate ourselves in politics if we wish to safeguard our freedom and that of others, they are analogous to the categorical imperative¹⁵ and require universal applications."¹⁶ Political practice cannot be based just on the "right" theory, prudence and practical skill are also needed in the conduct of political affairs.¹⁷ The way of conduct is based on the maxim accepted in his "Perpetual Peace": Be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves."¹⁸ The guiding principle outside experience, can be found in the moral character of people. Virtue is the highest good (bonum suprenum) of any reasonable will, happiness is the naturally desired end of all worldly desire and the congruence of virtue and happiness within one person and in the world is the highest good

¹³ Immanuel Kant, 1724, Münchener Lesebogen Nr.11, Münchener Buchverlag, 1942. Categorical Imperative: 'Act in a way that the maxim of your will can be at any time the principle for a general law'. Only man kind who can develop ethical principals autonomously from any exterior autonomy.

¹⁴ See Regina Watkin-Kolb, "The cultural roots and modern marketing of capitalism", in New Belief Structures For Global Political Economy: Confucianism As The Relevant Structure of Values, Paper presented at the ISA-JAIR Convention, Makuhari, 21 September 1996, page 9pp. *"In our present time we are dealing with the domineering way of an organisation, called Western Capitalism. Just like any organisation it is governed by a management, where nobody wants to accept personal responsibility or liability for destructive outcomes. ...The modern Americans still feel they have the responsibility to solve the problems of the world because it is from their point of view morally right to do so. This assumed logic dreaded the sanctified need for interference, observable in respect of aid to countries, military forces, etc., executed with access to first class communication networks."* (p.11).

¹⁵ The categorical imperative demands of a person to act in such a way that the maxim of his/her will could become the basis for a generally acceptable law. (*Handle so, daß die Maxime deines Willens als Grundlage einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könnte.*)

¹⁶ Hans Reiss, Kant, Political Writings, translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, 1991. page 38/39.

¹⁷ Hans Reiss, *ibid*, page 39.

¹⁸ Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Berlin, 1900ff. VIII, 370; cf. p. 116.

(bonum consummatum).¹⁹

The motivation which will bring about success comes from the knowledge that a solution must be found because we ought to²⁰, a maxim also pointed out by Kant. The moral obligation is holy, meaning non disputable. Mankind has its own problems but must regard humanity in itself as non disputable, otherwise it is self destructive and self contradictory.

The moral obligation is non disputable, because it is people who is the subject of any moral obligation through his/her freedom of choice. By putting oneself in the shoes of others, the exchange of perspectives usually leads to a sharing of aspirations, fears, and weaknesses that not only reassures the opponent but leads to a rediscovery of a common sociability.²¹

Only then does humankind become the true end of his/her existence instead of being just a means.²²

The solution to be found results out of the pool of knowledge. It emerges out of a willing attempt to do better and in the attempt to walk towards the goal of perpetual peace. It can be best made explanatory when imagined in the Asian sphere of yin and yang. For centuries now the western world has been following the path of yang, of the masculine, active, aggressive, rational, scientific mind, and has brought the world near to destruction. It is time now to recover the path of yin, of the feminine, patient and intuitive mind. The concept of one world, one human race and one global governance is based on the understanding of universal wisdom, which binds us together and makes us aware of our responsibility for the whole universe.

¹⁹ K. Düsing, Das Problem des höchsten Gut in Kants praktischer Philosophie, Kant Studien, Band 62, 1971.

²⁰ Immanuel Kant, Münchener Lesebogen, Walter Schmidkunz, 1942.


"Der Schlüssel zur Erklärung der Autonomie des Willens" ist seine Freiheit. Diese wird nicht bewiesen, sondern vorausgesetzt. Erstes Postulat der praktischen Vernunft: "du kannst, denn du sollst".

Translation: *The key to the explanation of the autonomy of the will, is its freedom. Freedom has not to be proven but is given. First postulate for practical reason: "you can because you ought to".*

²¹ See Human Development Report, James G. Speth, 1996, page V: *"(H)uman concerns should not be "added on" to an otherwise unchanged package of adjustment policies. Instead, they should be incorporated into a new, integrated framework of long-term, people-centred development."*

²² Regina Watkin-Kolb, op.cit., Toronto Paper, March 1997.

Figure 1 The balance between construction and destruction, or Kant's good and evil.



Dao De Jing, "The way and its virtue" interprets the changes of all things in the universe with its Tao (the Way).²³ It advocates contentment and a return of human society.

"Tao begets all beings,

And De fosters them.

The physical gives them forms,

And the vessels mark them accomplished.

Therefore all beings without exception venerate Tao and value De.

²³ The Tao Te Ching, the Book of the Way and its Power, is perhaps the most mysterious book ever written. Its author is unknown, and its meaning is uncertain, and yet it presents a very profound conception. "The earliest tradition is that it was written by Lao Tzu, a contemporary of Confucius. He is said to have been born in 602 BC, ... but many scholars today question his very existence and claim that the book was written in the third or fourth century BC... . It belongs essentially to that great breakthrough in human consciousness which occurred in the first millennium before Christ', and is an example of our mystical tradition." Source: Bede Griffith, Universal Wisdom, page 26.

*The veneration of Tao and valuing of De, is not out of obedience
to any orders, but is always like this.*

Therefore Tao begets all beings,

*And De fosters them, grows and raises them, makes them fruitful
and mature, breeds them and protects them.*

To give birth to them without taking possession of them,

To put them in motion without vaunting this as its merits,

And to be their sovereign without controlling them,

- These are called the profound De."²⁴

When secular powers take over they manifest their powers in ways which can be misleading. World order, dictated for example by capital flows is an extreme which has been developed by materialistic forces unable to have the 'good' for the world in mind but exploitation instead: exploitation of people and natural resources. Leading to an abundance of wealth in some parts of the world and to inhumane despair in others. Many people have lost their 'Way' and they have forgotten how to read the signs on the roadside.

Kant's ideas correspond with the Asian wisdom of yin and yang. None exists without the other, but the desired balancing act establishes an equilibrium of harmony. The malign influence of capitalism has in the sphere of yin and yang reached the point where it becomes contradictive and the power of the mind activates solutions to disempower the thread, turning power into directions of benign energies.

Kant's "Tao"²⁵ is human freedom. "He therefore assumes that a plan of nature must intend the education of mankind to a state of freedom",²⁶ it is "man's desire for a freedom which can be enjoyed by all members of a community equally, independently and consistently"²⁷. Freedom can be achieved by way of learning. One facilitator of freedom is the knowledge that the most

²⁴ Ren Jiyu, A Taoist Classic, The Book of Lao Zi, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1993, chapter 51, page 71, The Tao of being demonstrates no meritorious deed; the 'profound De' can not be explained and can not be described, and still it represents the full meaningfulness of action-non action, being and non-being.

²⁵ As a concept, "Tao" (the Way) was put forward the first time by Lao Zi. The Tao is nameless, it is the root of all things.

²⁶ Hans Reiss, op.cit., page 36.

²⁷ Ibid, page 272.

weak can break the most hard, expressed with the Lao Zi wisdom of the strength of water.²⁸ There is nothing weaker than water, but for overcoming things that are hard and strong, there is nothing that can equal it, nothing that can take its place,- it is the virtue of humility.

In Kant's treatise "Perpetual Peace" he indicates that it is a duty to work towards the establishment of a cosmopolitan society. The ideal solution would be a world state. It was very difficult for Kant to imagine the possibility of the creation of a world republic at his time. State governments then seemed to have unbreakable authorities. Within his political context Kant was not able to foresee that there should ever develop the necessity for all nations to agree to a form of corporate management for the protection of the planet.²⁹ The "ultimate alternative ... is the graveyard, the death of all, a possibility which has become only too real in this nuclear age of ours"³⁰ At the present we are in the process of experiencing Kant's wisdom of transcendence³¹ which has been written down 250 years ago:

"This investigation, which we cannot properly call a doctrine, but only a transcendental critique, because it aims not at the enlargement, but at the correction and guidance of our knowledge, and is to serve as a touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of all knowledge à priori, is the sole object of our present essay. Such a critique is consequently, as far as possible, a preparation for an organon; and if this new organon should be found to fail, at least for a canon of good reason, according to which the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, whether it extends or limits the bounds of that reason, might one day be set forth both analytically and synthetically. For that this is possible, nay, that such a system is not of so great extent as to preclude the hope of its ever being completed, is evident. For we

²⁸ Ren Jiyu, A Taoist Classic, The book of Lao Zi, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1993, see chapter 78. The Tao is compared to water, which is excellent in benefiting all things. The source of all fertility. (and always takes the lowest place). See also chapter 75 and chapter 38, where Lao Zi insists that any action, if it conforms to non action, will agree with Tao; "*with doing nothing, nothing will be left undone*". The value of non-action (also known by Ghandi and called *ahimsa*) indicates that a country should not be ruled by violence or by any action on the part of the ruler. "*The more the state is organised, the more resistance it encounters. A large kingdom must be like the low ground towards which all streams flow. It must be a point towards which all things under heaven and earth converge. Its part must be that of female in its dealings with all things under heaven. The female by quiescence conquers the male.*" Source: Bede Griffith, Universal Wisdom, page 27.

²⁹ Hans Reiss, op.cit., page 34.

³⁰ *ibid*, page 34.

³¹ See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op.cit., Part First, Transcendental Aesthetic, "*In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear, that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them, is by means of an intuition. ... But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility.*" page 21.

Kant explains the pure conceptions of the understanding, or categories in *Transcendental Logic*, Section III, 6. "*The same function which gives unity to the mere synthesis in a judgment, gives also unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition; and this unity we call the pure conception of understanding.*" Source: Critique of Pure Reason, *ibid*, 1924, page 63.

have not to do with the nature of outward objects, which is infinite, but solely with the mind, which judges of the nature of objects, and, again, with the mind only in respect of its recognition à priori. And the object of our investigations, as it is not to be sought without, but altogether within ourselves, cannot remain concealed, and in all probability is limited enough to be completely surveyed and fairly estimated, according to its worth or worthlessness."³²

Three basis of discontentment in the realm of politics, economics and social order

The search for world order is the greatest task of today and the most important.³³ A form of world order has to be created to survey all the interactions which take place within the borderless spheres of global interactions. A form of governance³⁴ has to be invented which helps to survey and guide political and economic actors on the world stage. The realisation of this theory is not just a vision but a practical task which needs an urgent pursuit.³⁵ Reasons here forth can be established in all realms of interconnections: the political, the economic and the socio-cultural sphere.

1. The present political order of the world is a mixture of democracies and totalitarian forms

³² Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op.cit., page 16.

³³ Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State, The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, page 14: "*At the heart of the international political economy, there is a vacuum, a vacuum not adequately filled by inter-governmental institutions or by a hegemonic power exercising leadership in the common interest. The polarisation of states between those who retain some control over their destinies and those who are effectively incapable of exercising any such control does not add up to a zero-sum game. What some have lost, others have gained. The diffusion of authority away from national governments has left a yawning hole of non-authority, ungovernance it might be called.*"

³⁴ "Governance" is here understood within the definition by Czempiel.: Governance is "*the capacity to get things done without the legal competence to command that they be done. Where governance can distribute values authoritatively,...., governance can distribute them in a way which is not authoritative but equally effective.*" Source: Ernst- Otto Czempiel, Governance and Democratisation, op.cit., page 250.

'Global Governance' is also defined as a consensus and participation, stressing the common interests, the collective responsibility and the willingness to solve problems. (original: "Global Governance" basiert auf Konsensus und Partizipation sowie der Betonung gemeinsamer Interessen und kollektiver Verantwortung und Problemlösung.)

Global Governance does not anticipate the politics of hegemonical intervention, based on threats of sanctioning and demands of accepting certain economic and political models. Source: Dirk Messner and Franz Nuschler, Globale Governance, Organisationselemente und Säulen einer Weltordnungspolitik, in same authors, Weltkonferenzen und Weltberichte, ein Wegweiser durch die internationale Diskussion, Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden, Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachfolger, Bonn, 1996, chapter 1 and in particular page 19.

³⁵ The realists assumptions of the world just being a world of states is discounted here. Waltz e.g. insisted that a theory of international relations should be written by leaving out most matters that are of practical interest in order to be "academic"(in the polemic sense of the word). Neorealists like Gilpin "*admitted that their original theory had neglected the importance of the economy and the capabilities of social actors to influence world politics.*" Source: Czempiel, op.cit., page 257. For details read Robert Gilpin, "The richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics, pp.303ff, 313. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist thought and Neorealist Theory", Journal of International Affairs, 44 (Spring 1990), p.37.

of governance. Despite various forms of governance all states face the need for co-operation in respect of "new emphasis on restraint and responsibility in the use of the world's finite resources, on population control and on prevention of environmental degradation; a new recognition of the primary importance of a sense of human obligations of world citizenship; and a new acceptance of an affirmative concept of mutual tolerance and understanding."³⁶ Globalisation demands the change of the inner structure of the industrial states which enables a new global political distribution of power.³⁷ Butros-Ghali explains how the power of influence of the singular states is more and more weakened as a consequence of globalisation.³⁸

"Das Erdbeben, das den Kommunismus zusammenbrechen und 1,9 Milliarden Menschen in die kapitalistische Welt hineintaumeln ließ, wird die Welt grundlegend verändern."³⁹

None of the old well established nations can any longer claim to have exclusive rights to process certain wealth for themselves. Globalisation is ambivalent and offers also the Third World⁴⁰ new chances to recover from their poverty ridden past. "The so-called developed

³⁶ L. M Singhvi, "A tale of three cities, the 1993 Rede Lecture and related summit declarations", Cambridge University Press, 1996, page VII.

³⁷ Lester C. Thurow, Die Zukunft des Kapitalismus, Metropolitan Verlag, Düsseldorf, München, 1996; Amerikanische Originalausgabe: The Future of Capitalism, How Today's Economic Forces Shape Tomorrow's World, Morrow, New York, 1996.

'Massive Strukturveränderungen werden erforderlich. Darin sind die Demokratien aber gar nicht gut. Wenn sich Demokratien bewegen müssen, nehmen sie nicht etwa radikale Änderungen vor mit dem Ziel, ein globales Optimum zu erreichen. Statt dessen entscheiden sie sich meistens für den Weg des geringsten Widerstandes zur Erziehung eines lokalen Optimums. Wenn eine Evolution normal verläuft, ist diese Strategie richtig. In einer Zeit gestörten Gleichgewichts ist sie jedoch falsch. Das Streben nach einem lokalen Optimum über den Weg des geringsten Widerstandes führt häufig weg von einem globalen Optimum.' page 457/458, original: "Massive structural changes will be required. That is of course what democracies do least well. When democracies are forced to move, instead of making radical changes and moving to the global optimums, democracies tend to move slowly along the line of least resistance to local optimums. With normal evolution, that is the correct strategy. In a period of punctuated equilibrium it is not. Local optimums, the line of least resistance, often leads away from and not toward global optimums. (page 312, original).

Further: Robert Misik, Mythos Weltmarkt, Vom Elend des Neoliberalismus, Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag, Berlin, 1997; Hans -Peter martin and Harald Schumann, Die Globalisierungsfalle, Der Angriff auf Demokratie und Wohlstand, Rowohlt, Hamburg, 1997.

³⁸ Interviews with Butros-Ghali, in Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, Die Globalisierungsfalle, Der Angriff auf Demokratie und Wohlstand, Rowohlt, Hamburg, 1997, page 254: "Als Globalisierungsfolge 'werden die Einflußmöglichkeiten der einzelnen Staaten geringer und geringer, während die Kompetenzen der Global Player etwa im Finanzbereich wachsen und wachsen, ohne daß sie von irgend jemandem kontrolliert würden'". Butros-Ghali regrets that some of the influentialist leader of states have still the impression, that they possess national sovereignty, and that they will be able to manage globalisation on a national level. (original: Staatschefs, "als Führer ihrer Länder stehen sie noch immer unter dem Eindruck, sie verfügen über nationale Souveränität, und sie könnten auf nationaler Ebene mit der Globalisierung zurechtkommen.")

³⁹ Lester C. Thurow, op.cit., page 67, translated: *The earthquake that ended communism sent 1.9 billion people tumbling into the capitalist world.*"(page 43 in 1996 original)

see further: Susan Strange, The retreat of the State, The Diffusion of Power in the world Economy, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1996, Part,1, The declining authority of states.

⁴⁰ The term "Third World" is used as a neutral category for parts of the world which have extraordinary political and economic problems due to their colonial past of exploitation.

world must develop a greater sense of ecological accountability. The highly 'developed' and the less developed world must cooperate to initiate and implement an equitable program."⁴¹ Political parties delay most needed social and environmental reform programmes in order to win the electorate. The majority of people are kept unaware about the consequences of overspending the national budget or industrial savings on environmental improvements.⁴²

Strange wrote her book "The Retreat of the State" "in the firm belief that the perceptions of ordinary citizens are more to be trusted than the pretensions of national leaders and of the bureaucracies who serve them; that the commonsense of common people is a better guide to understanding than most of the academic theories being taught in universities. The social scientists, in politics and economics especially, cling to obsolete concepts and inappropriate theories. These theories belong to a more stable and orderly world than the one we live in. It was one which the territorial borders of states really meant something. But it has been swept away by a pace of change more rapid than human society had ever before experienced."⁴³

2. The present economic system is dominated by the capitalistic free market economy. Thurow explains how capitalism had to defend itself within the state against socialism and against communism as an outside threat. But now where these ideologies are gone, capitalism has a sole stand.⁴⁴ The control over the market lies in the power of global firms who capture markets wherever it suits their profit margin best; the competition of the entrepreneurs is unlimited, no region can be sure to hold industries to stay for ever, localisation is uncertain. Global economy represents itself at the moment as a threat to traditional national structures and negatives like threatening, non democratic and inhuman actions. Communication technology, cheap transportation of information, goods and people created a world-wide net of economical and technological processes that never existed before. In particular the enormous increase in speed of the created destruction is the new component of the market

⁴¹ L. M. Singhvi, "A Tale of the Three Cities, The 1993 Rede Lecture and related Summit Declarations", Cambridge University Press, 1996, page VIII.

⁴² One example is the delay of the tax reform in Germany in spring 1997.

⁴³ Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State, The Diffusion in the World Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, page 5.

⁴⁴ Lester, C. Thurow, *ibid*, page 97, in original, page 64; " *Zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte der Menschheit steht uns eine globale Wirtschaft zur Verfügung, in der alles überall jederzeit produziert und verkauft werden kann. Für kapitalistische Volkswirtschaften bedeutet das, daß alle Produkte und Dienstleistungen jeweils dort hergestellt und erbracht werden können, wo die dafür entstehenden Kosten am niedrigsten sind. ... Schließlich sind die Minimierung der Kosten und die Maximierung der Gewinne das Herzstück des Kapitalismus. Sentimentale Bedingungen an einen bestimmten Teil der Welt sind darin nicht vorgesehen.*" (page 169), translated: "For the first time in human history, anything can be made anywhere and sold everywhere. In capitalistic economies that means making each component and performing each activity at the place on the globe where it can be most cheaply done and selling the resulting products or services wherever prices and profits are highest. Minimizing costs and maximising revenues is what profit maximization, the heart of capitalism, is all about. Sentimental attachment to some geographic part of the world is not of the system." (page 115 in original).

economy of today. Luttwak calls it "Turbo-capitalism".⁴⁵ National economy does not exist any longer without its internetting in global economy. "Patterns of consumption and models of economic growth have to be modified. Sustainable development is no longer to be regarded merely as a fashionable phrase; it has to be implemented as an immediate imperative. Wastage has to be drastically reduced. Resources must be renewed and recycled."⁴⁶ Galbraith continuously researches into new ways of living together, where the present economic conduct has to take on responsibility for an economic and social well-being for the global society as a whole. "Socially desirable change is regularly denied out of well-recognised self-interest. In the most important current case, the comfortably affluent resist public action for the poor because of the threat of increased taxes or the failure of a promise of tax reduction."⁴⁷ The strength of capitalism is based on the manipulation of people's worst vices: greed and material discontentment. People are used for work and sacked if not needed any more just as machines get replaced when new ones promise a larger profit.⁴⁸ Thurow suggests to reorientate 'Kapital' with human qualification, education and knowledge. Due to information technology 'human capital' can be interlinked on the electronic highways without belonging to a one in particular individual. The communication of this 'capital' will be more important than the static concentration of capital in the original sense.⁴⁹ In a high-tech economy human capital is increasingly the marginal factor which matters in sustaining productivity and welfare.⁵⁰

3. The socio-cultural spheres are globalised by information technology. The information flow has been faster than the theoretical capacity to work out a common consensus for social behaviour based on certain ethics, which can be of a compulsive nature to enable sustainable coexistence.

We seem to be able to sympathise with Dickens when he writes in "A Tale of Two Cities" in 1775: "It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring

⁴⁵ Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schuman, *Die Globalisierungsfalle, Der Angriff auf Demokratie und Wohlstand*, Rowohlt, Hamburg, 1997, page 250pp, one destructive example is the economic collapse of Mexico. Further detailed in Luttwak-Porträt und Zitate, *Die Weltwoche*, 31.8.1995.

⁴⁶ L. M. Singhvi, *ibid*, page VIII.

⁴⁷ J. K. Galbraith, "The good Society, The Human Agenda", Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1996, page 4-5. Galbraith defines the "good society" and develops achievable goals towards a more humane world. The aim can be achieved by defining what is possible and not what can be imagined in a utopian way. He rejects today's accepted economic practises, e.g. inflation, budget deficits, taxes, and he criticizes immigration politics, the game of the military establishments and foreign policy. The society will become 'better by intensified education on a global level and the realisation of shared environmental responsibility.

⁴⁸ Lester C. Thurow, *op.cit.*, page 413, in original page 281.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*.

⁵⁰ See Robert Reich, *The Work of Nations, a Blueprint for the Future*, Random House, NY, 1993.

of Hope, it was the winter of despair ...".⁵¹ The UN World Human Rights Conference was held in Vienna in June 1993 and nearly 180 nations declared the universality of human rights. "The Declaration provides in unambiguous terms that all human rights, civil, political, social, economic and cultural, are universal, indivisible and interrelated."⁵² All human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person and that the human person is the central subject of human rights and fundamental freedoms. "If development facilitates the enjoyment of human rights, lack of it necessarily denies enjoyment of human rights. Poverty and privation inexorably corrode and erode human rights and become an objective explanation if not a justification for the neglect of human rights and human dignity in a given society."⁵³

The new emerging global civil society demands the formulation of collective values instead of competitive individualism and respect for nature instead of general destruction⁵⁴. Only when the people of the world face their responsibility to reunite with the basic principles of human values, will they be able to interfere in the present global economical change creating international peace and political stability.⁵⁵ Moral values are elements of power and when recognised become effective.⁵⁶ Some Sanskrit verses read as follows: "It is the small-minded who trivialize this world by their preoccupation with many kinds of divisions and demarcations which separate the peoples of the world. Those who are generous of spirit and have a larger vision regard the whole world as one family."⁵⁷

The Rio Declaration stated that development and environmental processes are interdependent and indivisible. The Declaration "emphasises co-operation 'in a spirit of partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the earth's ecosystem'."⁵⁸ It is here where the West is interacting with the East, or "perhaps the West has rediscovered St. Francis of Assisi⁵⁹ after a long and tortuous journey."⁶⁰ Very much unsolved is still the North-South

⁵¹ L. M. Singhvi, *A Tale of Three Cities*, The 1993 Rede Lecture, Cambridge University Press, 1996, page 59.

⁵² L. M. Singhvi, *ibid*, page 70.

⁵³ L. M. Singhvi, *ibid*, page 69.

⁵⁴ Rigoberta Menchu, peace Nobel price for her exemplary work for the civil rights for the Indios in Guatemala.

⁵⁵ Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the opposition in Burma, peace Nobel price.

⁵⁶ Regina Watkin-Kolb, "Global Political economy and the problematic of hunger", ISA Conference paper, March 1997.

⁵⁷ L. M Singhvi, *op.cit*, page 61.

⁵⁸ L. M Singhvi, *ibid*, page 63.

⁵⁹ Francis of Assisi, 1181 - 1226, founder of the Franciscan Order, son of a rich merchant, 24 years old he goes in solitude and spends the rest of his life with the poor and needy. Famous for his composition of 'Il canticum di frate sole' ('Canticum creaturarum'). Francis of Assisi considered all nature, not merely man, as the mirror of God and called all creatures his 'brothers' and his 'sisters'. In his song he speaks of 'brother' sun, wind and fire, 'sister' moon and water, and 'mother' earth. See chapter 7 in James Goldsmith, *The Trap*, Macmillan, London, 1993, page 173 pp.

divide. The North acknowledges that it owes some care and initiative but true working partnership in the name of the common commitment has not yet begun. At the same time the rediscovery of St. Francis of Assisi is needed in the East just as much as in the West or in other parts of the world.⁶¹ The world community must demand that sciences should not be separated from the ethical or the spiritual when exploring the human thirst for knowledge. Goldsmith accounts all the downfalls of non restricted scientific research and in this context he reminds us of Taoism, as a religion were man is not elevated above other species. "Harmony with natural processes is man's proper relationship with the world, not the imposition of human will upon it"⁶² Of great importance for us today is the letter written by the American Indian chief Seattle, chief of the Dwamish, Suquamish and allied Indian tribes in the year 1854 to President Franklin Pierce. The letter explains the Indians respect for the environment and forewarned the first American settlers of the consequences of their destructive behaviour.⁶³ "Humanity was conceived as one with nature and with the universal Spirit pervading the human and the physical world, plants and animals, earth and sky and sea. This is the primordial vision of the universe reflected in all ancient religion."⁶⁴ However far we go back in time before the 16th century, when rational, analytical Western philosophy first begun to awaken and the distinction between mind and matter came to be important, we do find a common sense of the universe as an integrated whole.

The reality of globalisation

The most important claim for the possibility of interaction is the knowledge that globalisation is no natural phenomena compared to an emerging thunder and lightning⁶⁵ whom we have to accept with no means of interfering. There is no 'invisible hand of competition' and the power of the capital does not exist outside manmade financial structures and human context. Even George Soros, probably the most successful player on the global financial market demands of governments urgently the international regulation of the financial markets. In the past regulations were only made after financial crises had been occurred. The markets are presently governed by the emotional vices of fear and greed and need to become rationalised to effective instruments for general wealth creation for welfare contribution. Capitalism is no natural phenomena combining necessary natural processes but a form of living which is in

⁶⁰ L. M. Singhvi, op.cit., page 63.

⁶¹ It must be stressed, that many incidents of non humane behaviour could be reported from non-western parts of the world. But this article does not intend to judge any singular society.

⁶² James Goldsmith, *The Trap*, Macmillan, London, 1993, page 194.

⁶³ Goldsmith gives an extract, the full version can be attained by Saint Bernard Press, Mount Saint Bernard Abbey, Coalville, Leicester, LE6 3UL, UK, "The great chief sends words, chief Seathl's testament", 1994.

⁶⁴ Bede Griffith, op.cit., page 11.

⁶⁵ Hans Küng, *Weltethos für Weltpolitik and Weltwirtschaft*, Piper Verlag, München, 1997.

itself a development that can be influenced.⁶⁶ The only way of inner change of world affairs has to come from within the world, it will not come from somewhere outside.

Generally, as Roman Herzog has suggested, people feel threatened by globalisation because they cannot deal with the unknown. Instead of facing the challenge with courage and hope to overcome related problems, people withdraw with 'Angst' into clinging on the old-fashioned ways they seem to know and delay very important reforms.⁶⁷ The acceptance for change stumbles over the mental problem of willingness to confront the necessary restructuring of the now old-fashioned basics of economy and politics. The problem is to a lesser extent that of lack of recognition rather than of lack of conversion.⁶⁸ John F. Kennedy said once: Our problems are made from people, that's why they can be solved from people. Rosenau "indicates that any order which is judged as now emerging is also an imposed order."⁶⁹

Global problems reflect the inability of nations to guarantee law and order outside their realm of influence, the global grey areas. International organisations such as the UN are based on the system of states. As the authority of states in the global interplay is weakening⁷⁰, therefore I claim is the usefulness of international organisations like the UN because their structure is based on the power of the nation states. The question is if it needs any more mammoth gathering of nearly 180 nations in the future to declare their common will on world issues,

⁶⁶ Hans Küng, *ibid*: Es handelt sich um "steuerbare Entwicklungen", damit wir nicht einen Kapitalismus pur widerstandslos hinnehmen müssen.

⁶⁷ Roman Herzog, Bundespräsident, "Aufbruch ins 21. Jahrhundert", speech held in Berlin, 26 April, 1997; Bulletin No.: 33/ S.353, Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. "...zu leicht führt Angst zu dem Reflex, alles Bestehende erhalten zu wollen, koste es was es wolle. Eine von Ängsten erfüllte Gesellschaft wird unfähig zu Reformen und damit zur Gestaltung der Zukunft. Angst lähmt den Erfindergeist, den Mut zur Selbstständigkeit, die Hoffnung mit den Problemen fertig zu werden. Unser deutsches Wort "Angst" ist bereits als Symbol unserer Empfindlichkeit in den Sprachschatz der Amerikaner und der Franzosen eingeflossen. "Mut" oder "Selbstvertrauen" scheinen dagegen aus der Mode gekommen zu sein."

⁶⁸ Roman Herzog, *ibid*, "Wir haben kein Erkenntnisproblem, sondern ein Umsetzungsproblem.... Dabei leisten wir uns noch den Luxus, so zu tun, als hätten wir zur Erneuerung beliebig viel Zeit."

⁶⁹ James N. Rosenau, *Imposing Global Order: A Synthesized Ontology For a Turbulent Era*", paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (Toronto, March 20, 1997).

⁷⁰ Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State*, *ibid*, page 13: "...the authority of states, large and small, strong and weak, has been weakened as a result of technological and financial change and of the accelerated integration of national economies into one single global market economy. Their failure to manage the national economy, to maintain employment and sustain growth, to avoid imbalances of payments with other states, to control the rate of interest and the exchange rate is not a matter of technical incompetence, nor moral turpitude nor political maladroitness. It is neither in any direct sense their fault, nor the fault of other governments. They are, simply, the victims of the market economy." See also article by Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Governance and Democratisation, in Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, ed. by James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, page 137. Czempiel does not deny that the world is populated by states: but "they can no longer be treated as billiard balls without internal content. they are microcosms within which the configuration of actors and their movements are decisive for their "foreign policy". By not recognising these microcosms the realist theory of international relations misses the large picture and four of the five causes of violence."

e.g. the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, in June 1992⁷¹, the UN World Human Rights Conference in Vienna in June 1993. The preparatory process for Vienna included conferences in Tunis, San José, Bangkok and Strasbourg. This is not to argue the importance of the sheer existence of international organisations. Claude points out the manifold influences international organisations had in promoting and managing changes over the last 50 years.⁷² But a smaller executive governance could well be more effective.

Nations are afraid to lose some of their independence not recognising how dependent they already are; they fear military suppression not admitting how much they are already submitted by the nuclear threat; they fear to lose some of their autarchy, not visualising how much they have already averaged their importance on the global scale. Out of mode ideologies slow down necessary adjustments. Galbraith explains how in "the modern economic and political system ideological identification represents an escape from unwelcome thought - the substitution of broad and banal formula for specific decision in the particular case."⁷³

Talking about world order is a delicate subject because it implies the component of control. If there is an order there must be a form of law and justice. Even if law is established it is not certain that justice will be done. In the western democratic tradition, the constitution promises justice. The democratic system enables people to discover and debate cases of injustice, a very important criteria in order to survey the executive of the legislative. The single matter of fact is that at least the possibility of lawful interaction in order to create justice is something the individual can hope for. Market economy and democracy are not unilaterally proclaiming the welfare of the people. After world war II it was a great achievement of western politics to keep the two in balance, e.g. the West-German example of social market economy was a very successful example of well-balanced democratic freedom and driving market economy. But the system seems eroding, if not effective alternatives can be found. Experiences show that singular actions like re-engineering, out-sourcing, downsizing led to more harm than improvement. Defensive actions are counter effective.

⁷¹ The Earth Summit in Rio was concerned with Human Survival and the protection of the Planet Earth, The Vienna UN Conference on World Human Rights aimed to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the international human rights system and of the machinery for the protection of human rights in order to enhance and thus promote a fuller observance of those rights in a just and balanced manner.

⁷² Inis L. Claude, JR., *Swords into Plow Shares, The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, McGraw-Hill, Inc., NY at al, fourth edition, 1984. Page VII: "International organisations reflect the continuities as well as the changes in world politics. Indeed, disappointment in such agencies as the United Nations is largely a product of disappointment with the state of the world, and of the discovery that those agencies are less likely to transform the world than to be dominated in their own operations by rivalries, ambitions, and prejudices of their self-interested and short-sighted member states."

⁷³ J. K. Galbraith, *op.cit.*, page 16.

"The international system is not stable. Politics are running behind real happenings. We react like a fire engine brigade, which is drifting to the various fires in Europe and the world. We all react to late."⁷⁴ The multiple and synchronical changes in the world of politics and economics need urgently a new agenda introducing a new way of governance.

Globalisation needs governance.

In this article the attempt is made to articulate a effective form of global governance. Born out of the experiences with the large size of international organisations, e. g. the UN, a much smaller nucleus is suggested. Due to the growing uncertainty of power of the nation states, representation is not primarily based on the influence of states but on the natural existence of the five continents. This new assembly with the task of governing a world order based on democracy is called Global Senate. The responsibilities of the Senate are to survey the global financial markets, the nations human conduct of governance and to reach an understanding of the correlation of the global society in order to develop new ways of interference. It is the Senate which brings aspects of governance onto the global level. "The world needs techniques and institutions capable of preventing war and mobilizing human and material resources in a vast effort to create a good society which encompasses the whole world.... The essence of the problem is to identify and develop governing processes appropriate to the international system."⁷⁵ This governing body is an answer to Van Parijs pleas for a centralisation, which "would not be a damaging intrusion into the autonomy of particular political communities, but a necessary condition for protecting the latter's real freedom to make choices, in particular the choice of granting each of its members considerable real freedom. instead of being ruled by the iron laws of competitiveness."⁷⁶

The most important change in the structure is that representatives do not represent the nation they originate from but in a wider sense one of the five continents. The shift of representation from nation to continent opens a wider perspective of dealing with the concerns of global issues. "It will need to have a strong hold not only over fundamental liberties, the rules of international trade, and global environmental problems, but also over basic redistributive mechanisms."⁷⁷

Every continent (perhaps with exceptional arrangements for Australia) holds its own summit every five years to discuss their very own political and economic affairs and the presidents of

⁷⁴ Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, op.cit., page 262, interview with Michael Gorbatschow.

⁷⁵ Inis L. Claude, JR., ibid, chapter 19, page 434.

⁷⁶ Philippe van Parijs, Real Freedom for All; What (if anything) can justify capitalism?", Oxford University Press, New York, 1995, page 229.

⁷⁷ Philippe van Parijs, ibid, page 229.

the nations elect their representatives to the Global Senate.

Elected in the executive are one Senator, a Vice Senator and a Communication Facilitator. The chair of the council changes every half a year in a consequent fashion.⁷⁸ Every Continent further establishes a corps of staff, three posts for monitoring, research and strategy-development and one secretarial administrator. The elected have to present men and woman in equal terms.⁷⁹


The Global headquarters becomes Lhasa, the ancient capital of the 'roof of the world', due to its central location in Asia. It is important that the Senate's residence is in the East, because other organisations such as the UN, NATO and the World Bank are located in the West.

Twenty people of staff reside permanently. Meetings are called in quarterly for one day or longer, depending on the amount of issues to be discussed. Once measurements of interference are decided, it is the work of the communication facilitator to use the continuously more developed information technology links to distribute corrective measurements to the sources of misdoing, to national governments, international and non governmental organisations.

⁷⁸ The best example of modern co-operation is the European Union. The idea of the structure of the Senate takes its inspiration from the constitution of the European Council of Ministers, the Council represents the national governments of Europe and takes fundamental decisions about the community's future direction. The Council is chaired by each member state in turn for a period of six month in an alphabetical fashion; the system of rotating is relevant for the simple reason that each nation has different attitudes and priorities and therefore distributes equal influences to the member states

⁷⁹ The role of woman in governing positions become essential. Already in the Greek mythology, the goddess Hera was the guardian of home and garden. Her tasks were to make sure the fire would not go out and to provide nutrition. In these two capacities she accessed the possibility of life. The role of woman in the global senate will more than men be guardian of the world, due to their inherited obligations. It shall not further discussed why today woman are suppressed in public, social and political concerns. But it seems a misinterpretation of the ancient ideas of job sharing.

Figure one: A new model: The Pentagon of Global Governance



Africa	America	Asia	Australia	Europe
Senator	Senator	Senator	Senator	Senator
Vice-Senator	Vice-Senator	Vice-Senator	Vice-Senator	Vice-Senator
Communication Facilitator	Communication Facilitator	Communication Facilitator	Communication Facilitator	Communication Facilitator
Monitor	Monitor	Monitor	Monitor	Monitor
Researcher	Researcher	Researcher	Researcher	Researcher
Strategist	Strategist	Strategist	Strategist	Strategist
Administrator	Administrator	Administrator	Administrator	Administrator

On the question of legitimacy

The need for global governance makes the creation of a governing body indisputable. Political and economic literature is full of the critique of problems, the highlighting of problems and the attempts to find reasons to explain them.

"Scheinsachverständige mit Dokortitel äußern sich zu beliebigen Themen. Hauptsache, es wird kräftig schwarzgemalt und Angst gemacht. Wissenschaftliche und politische Scheingefechte werden so lange geführt, bis der Bürger restlos verwirrt ist; ohnehin wird die Qualität der Argumente dabei oft durch verbale Härte, durch Kampfbegriffe, und "Schlagabtausch" ersetzt, Und das in einer Zeit, in der die Menschen durch die großen Umbrüche ohnehin verunsichert sind; in einer Zeit, in der der Verlust von eigenem Erfahrungswissen durch äußere Orientierung ersetzt werden müßte. Ich mahne zu mehr Zurückhaltung: Worte können verletzen und Gemeinschaft zerstören. Das können wir uns nicht auf Dauer leisten, schon gar nicht in einer Zeit, in der wir mehr denn je auf Gemeinschaft angewiesen sind."⁸⁰

The main task within the globalisation process is the planning of the future. What do we [all citizens on this planet] want? Do we want the safe keeping or the destruction of the planet? And who gives those who do not care about distraction the right to behave as such?⁸¹ Post modernism has talked enough about problems.⁸² Now we need a scheme set for change. Instead of starting with "a" "problem" our time is ready again for the idea of visions, not illusionary visions, but visions in action, a turn around program. The process at work is a process of revitalisation, the aim is renewal. Therefore the first question is: What do we want, what are our values? These questions lead us away of the damaging short term thinking in politics and economics to the visualisation of a long-term process. We need to build a

⁸⁰ Roman Herzog, *ibid*, page 33. Translated by Watkin-Kolb: "*Apparent experts with a doctorate give their opinion on any subjects. What is important is that issues are treated negatively and fear is created. Scientific and political quasi debates are fought until the citizenry is completely disorientated; the quality of arguments is often replaced by rhetoric and by verbal duress through the use of metaphors of conflict and battle strategy. And this in a time where people are already made uncertain by radical changes; in a time, where the loss of one's own judgement of experience must be replaced by the dictates of others. I urge to more caution: words can injure and destroy the community. That we cannot afford permanently, in particular in a time where we are more than ever dependent on the community.*"

⁸¹ See recent news on the New York "Quality-of-life" project. On behalf of the initiative of the new Major, the city of New York has been cleaned up and inner city crime has been addressed.

⁸² Postmodernism is not criticised for some of the metatheories it discovered and the insides it made visible, but if one looks at it as a mind searching project it has exalted itself by now. We deal with cultures, identities, contingencies and ironies which postmodernists have written meters of books about it. The negativity of the media is partially rejected by the consumers. It is time for the twist.

formulation on a broad scale; continuous improvement of moral value based human interaction leads to the transformation we need to face the global challenges instead of losing ourselves in rhetoric.⁸³

"The nations of the world cannot but increasingly realise that they are subjected to the vagaries of the same markets, both for the factors they need to buy and for the products they need to sell. Moreover, they cannot but realise ever more vividly that they are polluting the same air and the same water and that their territories are vulnerable to immigration by the same world population. World pollution will not be kept at a tolerable level without systematic redistribution from the high polluters to the low polluters. Nor will one be able to contain the cost of defending the borders of the affluent world against the influx of economic refugees - and the cost of digesting the fraction that got through into the domestic population - without transnational redistributive policies that significantly and permanently reduce the pressure to migrate."⁸⁴ Strange reminds us that every world 'disorder' in history was overcome with people carrying on living, no matter what the risks and uncertainties of daily life.⁸⁵ It is here that Kant's first postulate for practical reason demonstrates itself: "you can because you ought to".⁸⁶ For Kant the fully developed civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft), and not the hypothetical state of nature is the source and origin of our freedom. The restrictions placed on our arbitrary freedom of action by civil and criminal law are entirely justified because these are the foundation of the individual's independence and autonomy. In the absence of civil society circumstances will decide for us how we shall act. The aim is to establish man's moral and rational condition to become superior to the anarchy of the primitive and pre-social level of being. Under the present urgency of achieving a beneficent form of world order Kantian thought provides us with the necessary framework. "It is not only necessity that drives man from the state of nature, but it is also the course of action that reason prescribes."⁸⁷

⁸³ W. M. Adams gives an example with the formulation of the "sustainable development", a phrase which was adopted by different actors and interpreted in different ways to suit their institutional needs and the views of their sponsors or constituents. Source: W. M. Adams, *Green Development Theory? Environmentalism and Sustainable Development*, in Jonathan Crush, *Power of Development*, Routledge, London and New York, 1995. Ibid, page 87: "Sustainable development seems assured of a place in the library of development truisms."

⁸⁴ Philippe van Parijs, "Real Freedom for All; What (if anything) can justify capitalism?", Oxford University Press, New York, 1995, page 228.

⁸⁵ Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State*, page 191. Strange mentions the troubled times, such as the 11th century AD in Europe, the thirty Years of war in the seventeenth century, and as an example the old pedlar in Bertold Brecht's 'Mother Courage'.

⁸⁶ See previous footnote, no 20.

⁸⁷ Howard Williams, *Kant's Political Philosophy*, St. Martin Press, NY, 1983, page 185.

The Highest Political Good is the Highest Moral Good

Kant regards perpetual peace as man's highest political goal, and he thinks the political leader can do him/herself and the people no greater honour than to make it his/her aim. Kant holds that the problems of internal order within states and the problems of external order amongst states are inextricably linked and, thus, the supposed division between domestic and international politics is an artificial one.

Kant points out how difficult it is for people in practice to live up to moral positions which they aspire in theory, and recognises that it is after all 'providence' that guards and links the various wrong doings into the advantage of peace at the end. This outlook is optimistic all right but where would humans take the strength to tackle the multitude of problems if there was not any hope.

These Kantian implications are of great importance for the time of change we are experiencing now at the end of the twentieth century. In this time where nuclear weapons can wipe out all our lives, we deal with health threatening results from mass production of nutrition, lack of respect for political governance, a frightening power of the money industry and so forth... and people are left in a vacuum of despair from which to recover s/he needs more substance than that produced by balance sheets and campaign pamphlets. The relevance of internal and external has been absorbed by the emerging global aspect. The global market is influencing the decision making in every state of this world. No state is any longer autarkic and even the leader of a state is judged by her/his ability to deal with modern foreign affairs. Kant demands a moral behaviour as part of the governing position. Kant's conception of the universal has in some senses been realised, at least as possibility, in the growth and extent of global interconnectedness in the late twentieth century. The weakness of politicians and economists in their decision making and their ability to forecast any tendencies in the future is related to their lack of global co-operation. This behaviour can be compared with the management of a large business enterprise where the various plants of the firm work autonomously without taking into consideration that the overall success would be much greater if the efforts were co-ordinated with the overall management. A typical analogy is the old parable of the body and its parts. How would a body function orderly if parts were not subordinated to its command.

Kant speaks of the "guarantee" of eternal peace and suggests this guarantee is provided by "no less an authority than the great artist nature herself". The authority of nature has presently submerged after the monopoly of sciences has been questioned. New revelation have proofed that Pasteur, the 'father' of modern medicine has fixed his experiments in order to prove his

theory. The "certainty of sciences", the "security of the Cold War", the "riches for all promised by capitalism", and the ignorance when exploiting natural resources have brought us back to what Kant was criticised for. The idealism in believing that the executive of power is not only a moral undertaking but also applies the knowledge that there are deeper levels of understanding, ways which are not able to become scientifically testable in any textbook. **This article has aimed to be provocative in suggesting some initial premises as to ordering the world with a new body of global governance. The nature of the emergent post-Cold War global order remains at present obscure but it is doubtless to deny it to happen. Therefore it is more than adequate to evolve constructive thoughts of benign interference based on universal moral principles, such as Kant's Categorical Imperative.**

Appendix III

**Presented at the ISA-JAIR Convention, Makuhari, 21 September
1996.**

**"Globalism, Regionalism and Nationalism,
Asia in Search of its Role
in the 21st Century."**

**NEW BELIEF STRUCTURES FOR
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY:
CONFUCIANISM
AS THE RELEVANT STRUCTURE OF VALUES**

Regina Watkin-Kolb

The Nottingham Trent University

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I am grateful for the encouragement of Stephen Chan, Charles Lean and Katharina
Westerburg-Cipriani

Gothic House, Barker Gate,
Nottingham, NG1 1JU

Tel: *44 115 9598314
Fax: *44 115 9598312

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JAIR & ISA CONVENTION
MAKUHARI, SEPTEMBER 1996

NEW BELIEF STRUCTURES FOR GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY:
CONFUCIANISM AS THE RELEVANT STRUCTURE OF VALUES.

REGINA WATKIN-KOLB, THE NOTTINGHAM TRENT UNIVERSITY

Abstract

Western democracy and capitalism have stressed wealth and strength at the expense of virtue. "Since the dawn of the atomic age, the brutality of the ambitious and aggressive has been immeasurably intensified, imperilling human civilisation; indeed the distraction of civilisation at any moment is a definite possibility"[Li Fu Chen, 1986].

The variety of governments - democratic, communist, constitutional monarchic - seem on a world-wide scale now to be directed by the dictates of global economy. The blueprint of the Western market economy is copied by every country, which wants to take a share of the profit to be made. To make profit means to capture the market; to capture the market means to outdo the competition. Despite the claims of market liberals like Fukuyama, this behaviour seems to lack any moral foundation, and needs a revaluation.

The above statement addresses a Western point of view, resulting from a Western mode of political, economic and social judgement, which rests on a Western cultural background. The paper presented will however search to find an Asian point of view resting on the evaluation of the Asian cultural background. The research takes mainly account of the cultural background of Japan and China based on the teachings of Confucius. The difference between the Confucian ethical system and its Western counterpart, is that Confucian wisdom stresses ways to safeguard human life, while the West emphasises ways to enrich human life. Both are important, but the 'Asian' approach is the essence; and the West's, the utility. Confucian wisdom teaches the harmony of both.

Western International Relations theory has in its present restructuring process started to integrate and to evaluate normative thinking. Absorbing insights from Asian sources are a stimulant to the rethinking process and facilitates the analysis of the global structure. They provide a distinctive moral basis for judgement drawing on existing recent East/South East Asian arguments. The paper will conclude in showing the necessary moral dimensions of IPE and the importance of understanding the relationship between conscience and action in the structuring of global community. And the paper goes further in establishing a mission for Asia. Asian people have still not lost their sense for spirituality. Japan should take the lead, followed by China to introduce Confucian wisdom into the practice of political, economic and social life. This mission can't be taken serious enough, the time is of the essence:

"For solitary *yin* (female or negative factor) cannot lead to birth, nor can isolated *yang* (male or positive factor) lead to growth. the stress of spirit at the expense of matter, and vice versa, are both characteristic of lifeless civilizations which cannot long endure."[Li Fu Chen, 1986]

Regina Watkin-Kolb, Gothic House, Barker Gate, Nottingham, NG1 1JU
Tel: *44 115 9598314, Fax: *44 115 9598312;

New Belief Structures for Global Political Economy: Confucianism as the Relevant Structure of Values.
Regina Watkin-Kolb.

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Introduction

The aims and objectives of this paper are to find a mission for Asia. The convention's title, "**Asia in Search of its role in the 21st Century**", is taken seriously. No matter how 'Regionalism' and 'Nationalism', or any other -ism will develop, all of us have no other choice than to face up to the one phenomenon we share and can not avoid: 'Globalism'.¹ Globalism has emerged with such a speed, that we are not ready with any form of governing its tasks. Nor have we agreed on a universal, moral code of behaviour.

This paper does not intend to engage in a theoretical discussion on belief systems in the orthodox sense as for example Little and Smith². Neither will the paper engage in the normative debate between Brown, Hoffman, Nardin, Frost and others.³ Instead the paper aims to create a new holistic aspect in looking at facts, figures, assumptions, perceptions, mis- and interpretations, intuitions and hopes in the realm of Global Political Economy and to innovate the use of Confucian spirituality in order to serve the obvious need for more active and responsible actions.

Therefore this paper is a contribution to the process of re-thinking world affairs and should ideally be welcomed as a "reading for the fatigued" in a Ralph Pettman sense.⁴

¹ Globalism is understood as the process of the changing economic market system which is connected with changes in the political domain. Changing patterns of order are reflected in the different institutions that manage the processes of co-operation and conflict in the international system. The most important tool for any world wide transformation is the high technical transnational communication network. See: Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*:1994; Peter Drucker, *The New Realities*: 1989; Philip Cerny, *The Changing Architectures of Politics*: 1990.

² Richard Little and Steve Smith, *Belief Systems & International Relations*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford: 1988. Both aim to define an understanding of how and why politicians assess and react to their given circumstances. Their concern are the means only.

³ Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory, New Normative Approaches*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1992, Mark Hoffman, *Cosmopolitanism and normative international theory*, *Paradigms: The Kent Journal of International Relations*, vol.2, no. 1 (1988), Terry Nardin and David Mapel (eds) *Traditions of International Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, Melvin Frost, *Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1986. All authors engage in a describing study of ethical traditions and deal with the central moral problems of international affairs.

⁴ Ralph Pettman, *Understanding International Political Economy, with readings for the fatigued*, Lynne Rienner, London: 1996.

The first thing the paper needs to express is that the responsibility we share is a universal responsibility, more than the many textbooks we read and the never ending dialogues we conduct. For too long we have falsely believed that we could live within the two dimensional aspect, physical facts and intellectual interpretations. What has been silenced for too long already is the third dimension, the realm of spirituality. Without the spiritual dimension we are not complete. Just as Hawking explains that complicated beings like us could not exist with two space dimensions, our two-dimensional being would fall apart and the orbits of planets, like the earth, around the sun would be unstable, so do we need the completeness and the harmony of a three-dimensional thinking.⁵ The lack of the spiritual results for the individual, or group, or community to be crippled. It has been believed and we have been made to believe that everything can be brought under control by the intellect, (physics and metaphysics), and in the many occasions when a problem could not be solved with intellectual means, strategic plans included the force of weapons to bring about 'a' solution.

Secondly the paper articulates the demands of a global network of economic and political dependence. We live, as Capra framed it, during the 'turning of the tide', "a crisis of a scale and urgency unprecedented in recorded human history. For the first time we have to face the very threat of extinction of the human race and of all life on this planet."⁶ That is why in the paper the nuclear destruction from Hiroshima/Nagasaki and Chernobyl are mentioned again, because 'again' can just not be enough. The 'turning of the tide' has been innovated with the emergence of a stronger spiritual reflection.⁷

We need to concern ourselves critically here with the marketing of democracy, the marketing of capitalism and how power over states and people is treated like a marketing project. With globalisation, regionalisation, universalism and the rebirth of local tradition, came the awareness to remember spirituality. Spiritual reflection is a joint effort of thinking which is universal and engages people of every colour and of every language. Sometimes people don't even need the medium of language to express that they are thinking alike. This phenomena is best to understand using the German word "Zeitgeist"; it is not just a coincidence, but a phenomena, we can not explain, at least not empirically. "Zeitgeist" is a changeable variable, combining the various influences of politics, economy and the contemporary philosophical assertions in a particular frame of time. It is the spirit of times, which attracts attention by a slowly increasing awareness that changes are taking place. At this moment in time it seems a universal opinion that political systems can not cope with their responsibilities in caring for the well being of their citizens. Feelings of frustration are expressed that there seems to be no method of preventing conflicts other than the military and that it seems impossible to change the conduct of economics. The system of Free Market Economy seems a completely anarchistic set-up, which has invented and maintained what Susan Strange calls "Casino Capitalism"⁸. Information technology has not only helped to spread the marketing of Western style Democracy and Western Free Market Capitalism, it has also spread the awareness of the dangers, discontentment and aroused critiques. When Weber wrote about modern Capitalism in America, he called it the "awakening of the giant". This "Big Brother" has never since stopped in pioneering and conquering the world outside the defined borders of the United States. The behaviour of the U. S. can be compared with the urge of the lost and neglected children, who run away from their motherlands, starving for food, greedy for the gold of the Inca's and with the dream to return one day and to show what they achieved. With the Cold War over, the theory goes, Capitalism has won the ideological battle. The debate has moved on to the role Capitalism has to play and most important, what ethical profile it will be able or willing to adopt. The first step will be the formulation of some type of ethical policy, a statement of principal values or simply a mission statement. Intellectuals from various realms of knowledge have started to search for universal values to be acceptable for all global inhabitants.⁹ Küng, Schumacher, Weber looked at world religion. Their

⁵ Stephen W. Hawking, *A Brief History of Time, From the big bang to the black holes*, Bantam Press, London: 1988, Chapter 10, The unification of physics, p. 164.

⁶ Fritjof Capra, *The Turning Point, Science, Society, and the Rising Culture*, Harper Collins, London, 1983, Chapter 1, page 1.

⁷ It can be generally observed in the West, that people come back to meditation, spiritual teaching and spiritual healing; e.g. Shrewsbury Hospital in GB included recently a department for spiritual healing. The natural healer engaged, a modern woman, no witch, helped already many patient, which were given up by medicine, to be cured. Her success was so great, that doctors work now with her on patients which are only at the beginning of an illness, so they can be cured without having to endure the long and sometimes not effective medical process.

⁸ Susan Strange, *Casino Capitalism*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986. "The Western financial system is rapidly coming to resemble nothing as much as a vast casino. ... They are just like the gamblers in casinos watching the clicking spin of a silver ball on a roulette wheel and putting their chips on red or black, odd numbers or even ones." page 1.

⁹ See Hans Küng, *Projekt Weltethos*, Serie Piper, München: 1992.

emphasis is universal, but too much discord happened and happens between religion.¹⁰ The world's religion have moved too far away from their centre of spirituality¹¹, they are serving the means and not the ends.¹² Faith and religion is not always the same thing, the latter is used for power and prestige and in particular to cover up human egocentricity. Group pride is a more dangerous thing than individual pride. Augustin said: The Church has many that God does not have and God has many that the Church does not have.¹³ Many wise man and women have from time to time asked for reflection. Some have been killed for it, because their critique always effected the top. The top is the privileged position in worldly affairs. In the spiritual space the privileged position is with the bottom.¹⁴ When Ghandi spoke about Christianity, he made the point, that all he needed to read for the understanding of Christian faith was the sermon on the Mount; 'the teaching is enough to believe the divine, there is no need for proof of wonders.'¹⁵ For too long we have seen a pompous worshipping of the messenger and the avoidance of the message. Richard Rohr calls America, the greatest country of the World yet stricken with narcissism and myopia. Jesus is used as a cover up for the worshipping of America.¹⁶ In the light of the American conquering behaviour, Japan is seen as manipulated into the attempt of being 'Americanised' and so is China, at least in the initiatives.¹⁷ Similar to the secularism in the West, a secularism very much needed to support the capitalisation of the world, Asian people also started to move away from their various religious beliefs and their ancestors spirituality. Spirituality does not conform with the consumer and catalogue society. The marketing of material possession creates greed and desire, a desire for which some are prepared to kill. Capitalisation and democratisation are seen as a continuous process, at least for the time being. Therefore it is time to search for values. What is left to do is to find a way to moderate and humanise the actual conduct and result. How can we implant a set of values which creates a softer capitalism and a more democratic democracy?

The paper is mainly concerned with the recognition of Asian values. The effects of the human rights charter is questioned, because e.g. China and other countries from the so called Third World object to it and see human rights as just another dictate from the so called developed countries. To withdraw value systems from World religions seems problematic, the issue is very complex, confrontational and a very private matter. The changes should come from outside the Western hemisphere; speaking from a Western perspective, things have just gone too far in the West. Asia as a whole, in particular encouraged by Japan, hopefully followed by China should implement a new moderated form of capitalism based on the experience of how devastating the industrialisation of the West has been to the environment, how drastically it has changed peoples lives, how badly it effected family ties and how much it silenced any kind of spiritual reflection. Many critics have emerged in the West, there is a widespread feel of discomfort and upset with the system resulting in action groups and foundations

¹⁰ At a recent conference on "Asian Values", Sulak Sivaraksa considered Buddhism, Norani Othman advocated human rights in Islamic terms. See article: Can East Meet West on Human Rights? by Donald K Emmerson, Los Angeles Times, 22 April 1996, p.B 5.

¹¹ Bede Griffith compares the five world religion with the palm and fingers of the hand: Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, Christianity, emerged out of one central spirituality, the palm of the hand and grew drastically apart. To get back to an universal harmony, we need to reach out for the central point of spirituality.

¹² The following remarks are inspired by the teachings of Richard Rohr, an American Franciscan Monk.

¹³ This can be said about all fanatics, either Christian, or Moslem, or Jew, etc., fanatics are individual egocentrics, or belong to egocentric groups, who try to play some form or another form of divine justice on earth.

¹⁴ For example the gospel tells us that Jesus spoke without a few exception to the people in the unworthy groups, the pagans, the beggars, the lepers, the prostitutes, etc. and they believed. The privileged group, the inner group of the temple, did not, but this very disbelieving group, the men, no women, became the ruling body of the church. The gospel is only interpreted by the people of power, of prestige and of possession.

¹⁵ Zen said, everything is a finger, a finger pointing to the moon. 80% of our time we spend defining the finger and fighting about the finger.

¹⁶ Recorded from Richard Rohr: What is first obvious when visiting Westminster Cathedral in London is a monument for England; Christianity misused as the protector of the empire and of the privileged class. Compare the recent speech by Bill Clinton at the funeral for the serviceman that died in June, 19, 1996, by a bomb in Saudi Arabia.

Richard Rohr OFM, The Prophets of the Old Testament, A Presentation from the Study Day at the Amigo Hall, Southwark, 22 Feb. 1990.

¹⁷ See: Robert C. Christopher, The Japanese Mind, Pan Books, London: 1994, Section 1, 1: The Oddest Couple: Japan and America. Further reading: William K. Tabb, The Postwar Japanese System, Cultural Economy and Economic Transformation, Oxford University Press, Oxford:1995; John Tomlinson, Cultural Imperialism, Printers Publishers, London: 1991.

who teach on the subject. But to interfere with the Western hierarchies of power is a difficult undertaking and it needs the help from outside.¹⁸ The basis for any new global understanding is the experience of transcendence and the wisdom that the parts are bigger than the whole. It is our greatest privilege to share the knowledge of universal conscience (*Bewußtsein*). It was therefore most unfortunate that the people in the West have tried to move away from our greatest inheritance and it is very fortunate that this conscience took us to a reawakening awareness (*Erkenntnis*).¹⁹ In the West the awareness has risen among many, but the inspiration and salvation needs to come from the East. Because Asia is awakening as a capitalist giant, it is in the privileged position to do better than just to copy all the mistakes made in the West. Asia should use its physical and mental dynamism to change the rules for a fairer game on the roulette tables of casino capitalism and to encourage some directives for the political 'Run-away-train' of politics.

This paper suggests that it is possible to find strength in the teachings of Confucius. For more than two thousand years, Confucianism was the dominant philosophical system of China, spreading to Vietnam, Korea and Japan. Confucius taught a moral code based on ethics, humanity, and love. Central to Confucianism is the idea that people should live in harmony, both with each other and with nature. Confucius taught his disciples five virtues of **courtesy, magnanimity, good faith, diligence, and kindness**. Only people with these qualities should have leading positions in government and commerce. This position is not a privileged position because through education, anyone could reach the high standard of acting out of the five virtues. Confucius considered himself a transmitter who consciously tried to reanimate the old in order to attain the new. He insisted that human beings are teachable and perfectible through personal and communal endeavour. The biggest virtue of all is to achieve the virtue to be human. Scholars, in particular in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore have already revived interest in the spiritual values of Confucian thought and the richness of its ethical contribution.²⁰

Finally, the key to this whole problem must surely be that, as a global society, despite our ethical, racial or religious differences we aim to achieve an orderly society, a balance between nature and humankind, a way of conducting oneself with kindness, charity, honesty, and faithfulness. It is a universal duty to aim to achieve the new establishment of universal values.

This is a mission statement for Asia and the world as a whole.

1. The responsibility for Global Political Economy

This paper deals within the complex structure of Global Political Economy (GPE). GPE is a basic dimension of world affairs.²¹ Therefore the paper presents an abstract thought about global politics in order to make sense of the rapidly changing world.²² Global Politics are intertwined with global economy and social currents. Stephen Gill and David Law claim in their account of 'Perspectives, Problems and Policies', that analytical "perspectives are themselves one of the interacting social forces in the political economy, as well as a basis for theories to explain them".²³ "This conception, from a political point of view, must be more positive and global in nature. In

¹⁸ For example, Green Consumerism, Centre for alternative technology (CAT) in Wales, the 'Business Council for sustainable development' and others.

¹⁹ 'Bewußtsein' and 'Erkenntnis' relate to the German philosophical context and express a much deeper meaning than the English translation.

²⁰ See: Thomas A Metzger, *Escape from Predicament, Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture*, Columbia University Press, New York: 1977; Chang, Wing-tsit, *Instructions for Practical Living and other Neo-Confucian Writings* by Wang Yang-ming, Columbia University Press, New York: 1963; *Confucianism* by Thomas and Dorothy Hoobler, Facts on File Ltd, NY, Oxford, 1993, page 119: "Throughout the Chinese-speaking world, ceremonies that include time-honored rituals and music are still held. In Hong Kong, Confucius' birthday (September 28) is commemorated at the city's Confucian temple. In Taiwan, where the seventy-seventh direct descendant of Confucius lives today, Confucius' birthday is Teachers' Day." South Korea also celebrates Confucius' birthday; Seoul's Sung Kyun Kwan University was founded in 1937 as a training school for Confucian bureaucracy and remains a center of Confucian scholarship in Asia.

²¹ Stephen Gill and David Law, *The Global Political Economy, Perspectives, Problems and Policies*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead: 1988. Here Gill and Law "illustrate the need to take a conception of the *global* political economy as the key ontological entity, that is as the object to be theorised and explained." page XXiii.

²² James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, *Thinking Theory thoroughly, Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World*, Westview Press, Oxford: 1995.

²³ Stephen Gill and David Law, *The Global Political Economy*, op.cit., page XVII.

a world where nuclear weapons, integrated capital markets, and global ecological threats have scant regard for national boundaries, a global concept is more and more needed to make sense of a world society, and purposefully to act to shape it."²⁴ Hiroharu Seki confronts us with the need that "[T]he total map of the torsional phenomena could not be easily clarified before we could be totally successful in creating the alternative new world order based on the creative alternative approach to international studies."²⁵ Jarrod Wiener, editor of the journal *Global Society*, illustrates that an extensive list of transnational challenges poses "interesting questions for International Relations which its conventional approaches alone cannot explain."²⁶

So far much has been said about the fact that we live in a time of change. Fritjof Capra's "Turning Point" in 1982 articulated the need for a fundamental change in our thoughts and perception, the need for "a new vision of reality". The present reality can no longer be explained with the mechanistic world view of Cartesian-Newtonian science. "The gravity and global extent of our current crisis indicates that this change is likely to result in a transformation of unprecedented dimensions, a turning point for the planet as a whole."²⁷

Already in the 70s, Fred Schumacher brought many disparate concerns within the same frame of reference. Everything he wrote then is just as relevant today: "the continuing absurdity of human societies pinning all their hopes on achieving exponential economic growth" and "the cardinal error of our whole industrial way of life...the way in which we continue to treat irreplaceable natural capital as income."²⁸

Within the discipline of GPE the opportunity is given to discuss world affairs not any longer in a segmented way. The segmented way of research has led us into blindness to see the whole picture. A scientist runs a particular test on one chemical but does not reflect on the sometimes extraordinary effects his testing and findings will bring about. Independent of the scientists intention or non-intention, the result of his testing can significantly change our knowledge and change in its extreme influence the world. In an associated way this example is a synonym for the academic research in International Studies. There are growing doubts that this kind of writing and thinking works.²⁹ "[B]eing hard to read does not in itself preclude the pursuit of "truth". Nor does being scintillating necessarily allow of superior insight."³⁰ Economy and politics are on a 'run-away-train', nobody knows where it goes and nobody knows where to stop. That is why planning is done under a short time agreement, a fact particularly obvious in the global money machinery.³¹ What is lacking is any guidance on moral grounding. John Kenneth Galbraith and Fred Schumacher observed already in the 70s the disproportion of private affluence and public squalor. "How could there be public squalor in the richest country [?] ... "If economic growth to the present American level has been unable to get rid of public squalor - or, maybe, has even been accompanied by its increase - how could one reasonably expect that further growth would mitigate or remove it?"³² Ellen Meiksins Wood confirms the "evidence that mass unemployment or underemployment, poverty, homelessness, racism and violent crime seem to be permanent fixtures in the world's richest countries."³³ The lack of moral conduct has confronted us with devastating results and challenges us to open up

²⁴ Stephen Gill and David Law, op.cit., page XXIII. Further reading: J.W. Burton, *World Society*, Cambridge University Press, London: 1972; Hans Küng, *Projekt Weltethos*, Piper, München, 1992; Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Weltpolitik im Umbruch, Das internationale System nach dem Ende des Ost- West- Konflikts*, Beck'sche Reihe, München, 1991; Zaki Laïdi, *L'Ordre Mondiale Relâché, Sens et puissance après la guerre froide*, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris: 1993. Lynn H. Miller, *Global Order, Values and Power in International Politics*, Westview Press, Oxford: 1994.

²⁵ Hiroharu Seki, paper presented at the 36th ISA Convention, Feb.1995, Chicago, end of section 8-6.

²⁶ Editor's Note in *Global Society, Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations*, Volume 10, No.1, January 1996, page 9.

²⁷ Fritjof Capra, *The Turning Point, Science, Society and the Rising Culture*, Flamingo, London, 1983, page XVIII.

²⁸ Fritjof Capra, *ibid*, Introduction by Jonathan Porritt, page VIII.

²⁹ Ralph Pettman, *Understanding International Political Economy, with readings for the fatigued*, Lynne Rienner, London: 1996, P.J. Allott, *Kant or Won't - Theory and Moral Responsibility*, Opening Lecturer. presented at the British International Studies Association, Southampton, 18 December 1995

³⁰ Ralph Pettman, *ibid*, page IX

³¹ Susan Strange, *Casino Capitalism*, op.cit.

³² E. F. Schumacher, *Small is Beautiful, a Study of Economics as if People Mattered*, Vintage Books, London: 1973, page 230; See also John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial Estate*, Penguin Books Ltd., London: 1967.

³³ Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Democracy against Capitalism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1995, page 285.

the debate on ethical values on a global level.³⁴

As Einstein's theory of relativity demonstrates, there is no concrete time interval which exists in no relation to the system. Not even the simultaneous moment; there is no 'now' if it is not related to a system.³⁵ World politics and world's economy happens within this relativity. In respect of results, results from political and economic decision making are effecting the whole planet. We have moved from the days of Jules Verne's *Around the World in Eighty Days* to the possibility of making the journey with Concorde in a fraction of time. The flow of information goes even faster and the transfer of information into a multitude of languages enables the use of knowledge and a great spectrum of interpretation. Despite the fast revelation of knowledge we have left behind the description (underwriting)... of human conduct of behaviour. The search for this concept is a very difficult and tiresome task.³⁶ People fear criticism when talking about morality, ethical codes, humanitarian issues. Many do not want to talk about it, because e.g. including a moral way of conduct into a business transaction, would mean in many cases losing out on profit. Nevertheless the situation has become desperate and we have to start somewhere.

What can we observe from looking at the time span of history 1492 - 1648, a time of great spiritual, political and economic change. (1492, Christopher Columbus landed in America and 1648, the Peace of Westphalia was ratified)? Humanism and Renaissance created a new understanding of world affairs. This 'new' understanding led to the 'Red Indian killing fields' in the New World, for man and buffaloes alike. The Christian conquerors misinterpreted Christian values and made them fit the gains their racist superiors wanted to achieve: Constituted personal freedom for some, accepted slavery for others, the confiscation of land and the creation of ghettos for the natives.³⁷ As well as in past times, the effects of the obsolescence of values and the indiscriminate destruction of nature are obvious today, even the blind are aware of noise pollution and the smells of chemical waste. Part of this time of change was a time of realisation and awareness. A time of acceptance, manifested in sayings like 'there is nothing I can do!', and a time of condemning but isolated critics must develop into a time of

³⁴ Stephen Gill and David Law are referring to Kant's concept for 'perpetual peace'; asking for a more positive approach and more global in nature, assimilating that the present world necessitates "a more far-reaching concept of the good society at the international level." page XXIII.

³⁵ Lincoln Barnett, *Einstein und das Universum*, Fischer 1952, page 54.

"Die Relativitätstheorie lehrt uns: es gibt nichts Derartiges wie ein festes, von einem Bezugssystem unabhängiges Zeitintervall. Es gibt in der Tat nicht einmal so etwas wie Gleichzeitigkeit; es gibt kein "Jetzt" außer Beziehung zu einem System. Nehmen wir zum Beispiel an, jemand telefoniert von New York nach London. In New York ist es sieben Uhr abends und in London Mitternacht, aber wir können sagen, daß die beiden Gesprächspartner "zur selben Zeit" sprechen. Doch das gilt nur, weil sie beide Bewohner desselben Planeten und ihre Uhren auf das gleiche astronomische System geeicht sind. Eine kompliziertere Situation ergibt sich, wenn wir zum Beispiel versuchen festzustellen, was auf dem Stern Arkturus (im Bärenreifer) "gerade jetzt!" passiert, denn der Arkturus ist 38 Lichtjahre von uns entfernt."

Translation: "The theory of relativity teaches us that an independent time interval outside a fixed system of relations does not exist. There is even no simultaneity; there is no "Now" only in the context of a system. Imagine the case where somebody telephones from New York to London. In New York it is 7 PM. In London it is midnight, but we can say that the two corresponding persons are speaking 'at the same time'. But this statement is only correct because they are both inhabitants of the same planet and their watches are calibrated within the same astronomical system. We have to deal with a complicated situation if we try to find out what happens "just now" on the planet Arkturus, because Arkturus is 38 light years distance from us."

³⁶ Philip Allot, op.cit., page 28: "Whoever undertakes it, it calls for a special sort of moral courage, a special sense of our moral responsibility as intellectuals, as masters of the world of Is."

³⁷ "The Great Chief Sends Word", published by & printed at the Saint Bernard Press, Mount Saint Bernard Abbey, Coalville, GB, 1977. The "Testament" of the Great Chief Seathl was an address given to the tribal confederation, probably at the time when the first Governor of the new Washington Territory, Major Isaac Stevens, was annexing Indian lands - mainly by exterminating the Red Man. The wisdom of the chief's word are timeless. Many of the things he feared would come about are with us today, and his words have a great relevance to our modern situation. "So if we sell you our land, love it as we've loved it. Care for it as we've cared for it. Hold in your mind the memory of the land as it is when you take it. And with all your strength, with all your mind, with all your heart, preserve it for your children, and love it... As God loves us. One thing we know. Our God is the same God. This earth is precious to Him." The termination of the Red Man is only one example where religion is used for the egocentrism of a few.

constructive research for alternatives, ideally on a conjunctive and confederate level.³⁸ Referring to the twentieth century, Philip Allott distinguishes between *malevolent* totalitarianism, Stalin, Hitler, Mao, Mussolini and other "notorious totalitarianisms", and our present *benevolent* totalitarianism. "But their [=the malevolent totalitarianisms] methods were not different in kind from the methods of the benevolent totalitarianism which is democracy-capitalism-scitechcracy [=science and engineering]. It's simply that, in benevolent totalitarianism, we truly believe that all is for the best in the best possible human world. It is benevolent because we believe it has as its goal the Good Life for All, and so what it produces must be the Good Life for All."³⁹ Allott calls this phenomena "totalisation through division", but as he points out "every society-member is a participant, everyone is a contributor, everyone is involved in the collective product - and no one is responsible for anything- all the good things and the evil things - war, social injustice, human indignities of all kinds, the criminal law, popular culture, the arms trade, drugs." The most significant aspect of his findings concerns the responsibility 'we' share, better expressed, the lack of responsibility 'we' do share. "Everyone is morally responsible for their own participation - if morally is a word you're inclined to use - but no one is morally responsible for the outcome, because social outcomes are systematic effects of totalling systems, and social systems are not moral agents."⁴⁰ It seems that this lack of responsibility has neutralised us in respect of human values and left us with nothing else then the "academic values of neutrality, objectivity, detachment, rigour, propriety, loyalty", and made us all the victims of the process, described by Weber with "*Entzauberung*".⁴¹ Using Weber's term, it is claimed, that our present time of change is a journey to "*Verzauberung*". "In practice, the search for alternatives means paying greater attention to emotive, subjective, unconventional accounts of the subject, It is time, however, to take an interpretative turn. Simply put, this means making a bid for experiential as well as intellectual knowledge, that is, for understandings of a subjectifying as well as objectifying sort."⁴²

2. The demands of a global network of economic and political dependence

What we already share together

*"The aggressive threats that have been made by men throughout human history are now being made with nuclear weapons; without recognition of the enormous difference in violence and destructive potential. Nuclear weapons, then, are the most tragic case of people holding onto an old paradigm that has long lost its usefulness."*⁴³
Fritjof Capra

During the Cold War, people were made frightened by the threat of wilful nuclear termination. After the Cold War the nuclear threat is not eliminated. Irrespective of nuclear bombs, the thread of a nuclear accident has become part of our day to day life. One could even say that 'we've got used to it'. As with danger in general, humans seem to adapt to circumstances. Panicky and worrying sentiments are neutralised if there is no alternative at hand. After concern and complaint has been theoretically debated to the full, the ordinary day to day life continues as usual; for many, nothing had ever happened. Even the terrible experiment of Nagasaki and Hiroshima did not give enough warning signals, which could have lead to the ceasing of nuclear scientific development.

In the night of April 26 (1986), ten years ago one of the reactors exploded in Chernobyl.⁴⁴ The senior

³⁸ Philip Allott, Kant or Won't, op.cit., page 8: "For the last centuries we have never lacked culture-critics condemning the philistining and detranscendentalising of human culture, the crude hegemony of the actual, the practical, and the economic."

³⁹ Ibid, page 8

⁴⁰ Ibid, page 9

⁴¹ Ibid, page 13, "*Entzauberung*", means 'the unmagicking, the unmystifying'.

⁴² Ralph Pettman, op.cit.

⁴³ Fritjof Capra, op.cit, page 257.

⁴⁴ The following information was extracted from the address given by Leslia Djakewska, Chair of the Association of Ukrainian Women in the UK, organised by Councillor Sylvia Parsons, the Lord Mayor of Nottingham, 26 April 1996. A public Christian Service "Chernobyl Remembered" was based on the following prayer:

" Our candles shine as Christ's light
in the darkness of the remembrance of Chernobyl
in the darkness of actions that led to such a disaster ...
in the darkness of a barren and deserted land contaminated and uninhabitable

technicians at the nuclear plant did not want to believe what their alarm indicators told them. They sent some juniors to go and have a look. Nobody of any official rank wanted to accept the reality of the severity of the disaster and when the catastrophe was known to a few insiders, the whole accident was silenced and denied to foreign investigations. The damage done by the reactor in Chernobyl was 900 times worse than the damage done to Nagasaki and Hiroshima.⁴⁵

Because no aid was granted by the then USSR and no aid was accepted from abroad, from America and other countries, the nuclear pollution eroded the lives of many thousands of people and changed people's genetic formula irreversibly. The nuclear clouds overcame not only the Ukraine and Belarus, but 2000 miles further north the Scandinavian countries and the Baltic states of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. Because of the silencing tactic of the government, the population was kept in the dark, children kept on playing in the street and farmers put their seeds over the land. The ordinary people in towns like Kiev became suspicious when the children of members of the *nomenclatura* were kept indoors. When finally the evacuation process started it was already too late for the victims health to recover.

News about the accident has long left the news room. And still it is time for reflection. In the modern Western way of life, people are made to believe that all that counts is material success.

Is it the desire to live in the riches of today, because we can't face the global environmental catastrophe of tomorrow? Living life to the full, because we do not know what tomorrow does bring?

With the example given above, the various powers behind the global mechanism in the struggle for political and economic prestige can be demonstrated. The accident in Chernobyl, was not just 'a' accident in the East. Accidents, maybe slightly smaller in scale, but do happen continuously around the world.⁴⁶ Nuclear energy provides the backbone for a successful economy.⁴⁷ Despite scientific uncertainty⁴⁸ nuclear power plants were built in order to produce the energy needed by the economies of the nation states. Modern environmental issues are technically complex and frequently obscured by scientific uncertainty. Science and technology have always had great difficulty dealing with ecological concepts. "The people responsible for its development and applications are all used to a fragmented approach and each group concerns itself with narrowly defined problems. They often ignore how these systems interrelate and how they combine to produce a total impact on the global system. Besides, most nuclear scientists and engineers suffer from a profound conflict of interest."⁴⁹

in the darkness of hidden consequences still to be revealed...
in the darkness of those who tend Chernobyl with inadequate protection
in the darkness of those who suffer following other silenced nuclear disasters.
Our candles shine as Christ's light for all people
affected by the disaster at chernobyl,
they shine
in the darkness of the dying and the dead
in the darkness of those who mourn
in the darkness of the sick and scarred
in the darkness of the traumatised and terrified ...
in our hope for world policies of care, consideration and respect
in our hope for no more disasters through humanity's invention
in our hope for healing of a broken world.

⁴⁵ see footnote 43, information by Leslia Djakewska.

⁴⁶ Fritjof Capra, *The Turning Point*, op.cit., page 261.

⁴⁷ Fritjof Capra, *ibid.* Please see Chapter 8 for a more detailed report, 'The Dark Side of Growth', pages 248-281. "The psychological background to this nuclear madness is an overemphasis on self-assertion, control and power, excessive competition, and an obsession with 'winning'- the typical traits of patriarchal culture." page 257.

⁴⁸ 'Scientific uncertainty' is a term critically analysed in *Environmental Studies*. Karrin Scapple discussed at the 37th Annual Convention in San Diego, 1996, the implications when uncertainty is created by scientist, even bought by industries in order to slow down or stimulate the development of certain products and to influence public opinion about, for example, an environmental threat like the Ozone Hole.

⁴⁹ Fritjof Capra, op.cit., page 259.

Albert Einstein wrote 1948 in Princeton, NY [Prologue for a book by Lincoln Barnett, "Einstein und das Universum", Fischer Bücherei, Frankfurt: 1952]:

" Die Beschränkung der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse auf eine kleine Gruppe von Menschen schwächt den philosophischen Geist eines Volkes und führt zu dessen geistiger Verarmung". He expresses his concern for the fragmentation of scientific knowledge and the insufficient explanation given to those who are not scientists.

At the British power station Sellafield visitors are shown round the plant by Public Relations people, who expound the virtues of nuclear power. At the same time the managers and the directors of the plant are aware of all the dangers and problems of nuclear power including near misses of plants blowing up and drenching the world's atmosphere with nuclear radioactivity.

Political systems are dependent on the increase of energy in order to develop their infrastructures and peoples life standards. Better life standards and better infrastructures are virtues, bargained for before every election in order to attract voters. The power of a successful political system is based on a powerful industry, independent on which ideology the political system rests. The nuclear industry is controlled by powerful political and commercial interests, which are moving the industries forward regardless of the potential hazards.

The nuclear industry is chosen here as an example only, other branches of industry are similar, but the outcome of accidents and the abuse of nature with the most toxic and long-lasting waste is not 'quite' so terminating. The buyers and sellers in the global market, are in for the maximum of profit, profit is alpha and omega for the modern Western market economy. Not much concern is given to environmental or human issues. In our "modern strivings for scientific rigor" humanist ideals and approaches get lost.⁵⁰ The condition for being an active player on the global market, is to have the right product to sell, to have enough capital to promote the marketing of the product, to have the power over distribution links and to have access to the market in which the product can be most profitably sold.

In respect of the lack of international political interference, one must raise the questions: Why do other nations not intervene when catastrophes as such emerge? International intervention has proved to be absolutely powerless whether when dealing with nuclear disasters or being able to act productively in political or humanitarian crisis. These are only a few examples, many more could be listed where international intervention lacked authority and interventionist measures were very difficult to enforce.⁵¹ Questions of governance and legal surveillance are vital issues of present global thinking in the economic and political web of activities.⁵²

'The' nation state as described by realism⁵³ seems powerless, international organisations, even those who are inaugurated for special purposes are ineffective. We seem lucky, that with all the trouble we are in, no Almighty dictator has yet been risen and decided to establish a totalitarian regime to bring everything 'under control'. The recent changes e.g. in Russia, the draining of central power and authority during the process of the dispersal through democratisation, brought about the drift into corruption and disorder: "as market capitalism is identified not with personal opportunity and material betterment but with extreme personal insecurity, not to mention unfairness and greed".⁵⁴ Right wing fundamentalist movements are present in every state. Therefore we are presented with an open question: Will the recipe of democracy in its present forms be strong enough to govern the world or do we need to change the ingredients? One factor has crystallised in particular since 1990 in the highly civilised countries in Central Europe and has given rise to uncomfortable concern. In America as in Europe, democracy has also failed to cope with the problem of the poor and underprivileged. Not just figures for unemployment are soaring high, the number for people without food and shelter increases alarmingly. The old-

Stephen W. Hawking continues this observation, "A Brief History of Time, From the Big Bang to Black Holes", Bantam Press, London: 1994, page 167,168.

"In Newton's time it was possible for an educated person to have a grasp of the whole of human knowledge, at least in outline. But since then, the pace of the development of science has made this impossible. Because theories are always being changed to account for new observations, they are never properly digested or simplified so that ordinary people can understand them. You have to be a specialist, and even then, you can only hope to have a proper grasp of a small proportion of the scientific theories. Further, the rate of progress is so rapid that what one learns at school or at university is always a bit out of date. Only a few people can keep up with the rapidly advancing frontier of knowledge, and they have to devote their whole time to it and specialize in a small area."

⁵⁰ Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "The Humanistic Moment in International Studies: Reflections on Machiavelli and Las Casas", *International Studies Quarterly*, 1992, No 36, page 347.

⁵¹ James N Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, University Press, Cambridge: 1992.

⁵² James N Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *ibid*.

⁵³ The term 'realism' is here used in its terminology framed by Political Sciences and International Relation Studies. Its origins are often traced back to the Peace of Westphalia (Westfälischer Friede zu Münster und Osnabrück, 1648); from this peace agreement result the growth of sovereignty of singular states in Central Europe: France, Brandenburg, Bayern, Rheinpfalz, Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain.

⁵⁴ Donald K. Emmerson. *Realism or Evangelism? Security Through Democratisation as a National Strategy*. Political Science Department, Wisconsin, paper held in Monterey, March 1996. Conference on "National Strategies in the Asia-Pacific".

fashioned soup kitchen has been rediscovered to help feed the beggars and tramps who hang about in the big cities and search through the litter bins at night for rubbish of any value.

"[M]en and women ... lose their jobs in one part of the world because of some event they know nothing about many thousands of miles away... market practices like this do sustain more people today than this planet has ever carried before, and for many of them at a standard of living once enjoyed by only a few, this does not mean that the market is beneficial for all."⁵⁵

The marketing of democracy

The variety of forms of governments - democratic, dictatorial, communist, constitutional monarchic - seem on a world-wide scale now to be directed by the dictates of the global economy. The blueprint of the western market economy is copied by every country, which wants to take a share of the profit to be made. Along with the spreading of western market economy, a process of democratisation has taken place. When the former communist countries of East and middle Europe ceased to be communist, they supposedly changed so to turn from one day to the next into 'democracies'. The people, who underwent the transformation, knew through the infiltration of Western media in the East which form of government 'democracy' was meant to be. The process of marketing democratisation was part of the Cold War. The media transferred the image of Western Politics either explicitly or implicitly as a liberal system of government in the non Western world. No medium was as effective as the radio. Between 1950 and 1975 receivers increased world-wide by 420 per cent.⁵⁶ Ernst-Otto Czempiel combines the process of democratisation with an active proclamation of human rights.⁵⁷ The marketing of democracy was not a process which just happened, but instigated with every tool marketing operates when selling a new product or overtaking a new market. This campaign did not only transform the former communist bloc countries into 'democracies', it reached also states, which had formerly ideologically co-operated with the Warsaw-pact states. It can also be observed that since 1990 waves of democratisation took place in Africa.⁵⁸ The China expert, Bette Bao Lord, proclaims an increase of democratic thinking in China.⁵⁹ The global democratisation process would not be possible without the present knowledge of communication technology. It could be assumed that depending on the power of the sender and the efficiency of the distribution

⁵⁵ Ralph Pettman, op.cit.

⁵⁶ Ernst - Otto Czempiel, *Weltpolitik im Umbruch, Das Internationale System nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, Beck'sche Reihe*, München: 1993, page 116.

"Der Weltmedienmarkt gehört zum überwiegenden Anteil den westlichen Industriestaaten und in ihnen wiederum einer kleinen Anzahl Transnationaler Korporationen, die zum größten Teil in den Vereinigten Staaten angesiedelt sind. ... Die Stärke ihrer Einwirkung [Informationen über westliche Demokratiepraxis], kann gar nicht überschätzt werden. 1975 hat eine UNESCO-Studie festgestellt, daß der Einfluß, den die Medien auf das menschliche Bewußtsein haben, nur noch durch die direkte elektronische Reizung des Gehirns übertroffen werden könnte. Dementsprechend haben die beiden Supermächte während der Periode des Ost-West-Konflikts vor allem Radiosendungen eingesetzt, um die Bevölkerung des Gegners gegen seine Regierung einzunehmen." For more details, see: Francis S. Ronalds Jr., *Voices of America*, in: *Foreign Policy* 34, 1979, pp 155.

Translation: "The majority of the World's media market belongs to the Western industrial states, and within it belongs to a small number of transnational corporations, which are mainly based in the U.S.A.. Their power of influence (Information of Western practise of democracy) cannot be over estimated. In 1975 UNESCO published a research which stated that the influence of the media over the human brain can only be increased by direct electronical irritation of the brain. With that knowledge the super powers used mainly broadcasting during the Cold War in order to influence the adversary population against the government.

⁵⁷ For more details, see: Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle. Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981*, New York: 1983; Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith. Memoirs of a President*, New York: 1982; Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Weltpolitik im Umbruch*, op.cit., Chapter III, pp 105. Also: Human Rights Watch World Report 1996, New York.

⁵⁸ Ernst-Otto Czempiel, op.cit., "Es erreichte auch solche Entwicklungsländer, die in der Existenz eines antiliberalen, antikapitalistischen und antimarktwirtschaftlichen Lagers die Berechtigung für die eigene Beibehaltung antidemokratischer Strukturen gesehen hatten." page 107.

Translation: "It also reached such countries, who had seen in the existence of antiliberal, anticapitalist, antimarket economy camps the justification for their own antidemocratic structures".

⁵⁹ Bette Bao Lord's own organisation "Freedom House", advocates, that even the Chinese peasantry understands freedom in the same way as the students from Tiananmen Square and are "equally passionately dedicated to bringing it about. See: Donald K. Emmerson's paper: *Realism or Evangelism, Security Through Democratization as a Nation Strategy*, Political Science Department, University of Wisconsin, 1996.

links, that certain information can reach every section in the world. Crucial for a distinction of knowledge, are the aims and objectives behind the reasoning for the transfer of intellectual products and campaigns. We are all very much aware of the quick and impressive delivery of bad news, which shows how efficient the communication system can operate. Already in Virgil's Aeneid is an extensive passage on this subject. Cees Hamlink's latest book tries to analyse the mechanism of the communicative system.⁶⁰ It is, so one of his observations, astonishing that most people in the world have never heard of "Human Rights". Cuba's President Fidel Castro said: "In a world where the rich are becoming richer and the poor are growing poorer there can be no social development. Where there is no human feeling there can be no human rights."⁶¹ We have a dangerous distinction of civil and human rights. Cees Hamlink makes us aware that it is falsely believed that everybody knows about "Human Rights". There are arguments that the West imposes its conception of human rights on other cultural areas. The *Beijing Review* claimed that the U.S. concept of human rights was endorsed 'by only 1 billion of the world's people, while the remaining 4 billion people disagree.'⁶² And it is falsely believed that the knowledge about the human right statutes are coinciding with democratic ideals. It can further be concluded that people who vote for a democratic system assume that with voting for democracy they are voting for the execution of human rights. This "Trugschluß" hinders the development of a world-wide communication initiative for educating the significance of a package of human rights. As with negligence in general, it has to be proven if neglect happens by chance or if it is a wilful act. Considering the fact that communication networks are based on the knowledge of marketing strategies, it is possible to integrate the contribution of human right's issues. But as with every product which needs to be marketed, the requirement must be there in the first place. The global information infrastructure relies on financial capital and therefore is restricted by the will of the investors, while on the other hand the market could be strong enough to dictate a change. The market is controlled by the Western Powers. Over 50 per cent of the world's population have never seen a telephone. In many countries technical knowledge is under developed; a lack of experience results in a lack of understanding and a lack of imagination. If a regime wants to represent itself as being democratic, -as an example the election of Hussein in Iraq springs to mind-, the mechanism of democratic election is put on stage. People are asked to vote, but they are not given the flexibility of choice through education to do so on behalf of their very own political belief and their own economic knowledge. In the Western World in countries with a long established tradition of democracy, e.g. America and Great Britain a certain choice is given. Election campaigns are run by professionals and with the power of money a certain image of the political candidate is produced. The costs for marketing and lobbying are horrendous. The true representation of the will of the people becomes questionable. In America so far neither a female nor a black candidate ever made it to the presidential election.

The cultural roots and modern marketing of capitalism

In our present time we are dealing with the domineering way of an organisation, called Western Capitalism. Just like any organisation it is governed by a management, where nobody wants to accept personal responsibility or liability for destructive outcomes. Governments and private shareholders are only interested in profit making. The spheres of interest have spread. The aim of successful industrialisation with increasing productivity has long outgrown the borders of the national market and operates now on a global level. The modern phenomenon of capitalism and the development of capitalist civilisation are in this dissertation understood on the lines of explanation by Max Weber. "Capitalism, as an economic system, resting on the organisation of legally free wage-earners, for the purpose of pecuniary profit, by the owner of capital or his agents, [is] setting its stamp on every aspect of society."⁶³ Weber is concerned with the development of capitalist civilisation. "Capitalism, in the sense of great individual undertakings, involving the control of large financial resources, and yielding riches to their masters as a result of speculation, money-lending, commercial enterprise, buccaneering and war, is as old as history."⁶⁴ But what created the capitalist system, as we know it today?

It was created with one of the key elements of modern history, the Reformation. Without the Reformation the 'project' America as we know it today would have not taken place. Latin America for example experienced a completely different development to the U.S. It was uniquely Catholicised, which meant obedience to the

⁶⁰ Cees J. Hamlink, *World Communication, Disempowerment & Self - Empowerment*, Zed Books, London: 1996.

⁶¹ Anthony Sampson, From "International Political Economy" to "World Political Economy", in Ralph Pettman, op.cit.

⁶² *Beijing Review*, 37, no. 22 (30 May-5 June 1994).

⁶³ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Unwin University Books. London: 1971, page I (c).

⁶⁴ Max Weber, *ibid.*, page I (c)

doctrines of the centralised Catholic Roman church, governed from the Vatican in Rome. Only after the second world war some Protestantism appeared. Therefore capitalisation and democratisation in Latin America did not take place until recently, if ever. Therefore the following review is essential in order to understand the roots of capitalism in America. The Reformation in Central Europe, was started by Martin Luther, a Augustinian Catholic monk. Protesting against some misuse of the Christian doctrine, Martin Luther exhibited 95 points of protest on the Schloßkirche in Wittenberg, just before people would arrive for the Sunday service, in 1517.⁶⁵ What made Martin Luther a rebel was his inspiration that God is a merciful God, full of grace, and not the terrifying, punishing God, the Catholic hierarchy tried to terrify the people with and made their life a misery of guilt. When we talk about the beginning of Modern History, we usually list the discoveries of the New World by the Portuguese and the Spanish, the reflections of Humanism and the Renaissance and the split of the European Christians by the Reformation. With the reformation began the liberation of the individual from its clerical and social ties. The old orders disintegrated more and more, and new thinking was born out of a free human personality based on rationality.

For the capitalist development in America is not so much that Martin Luther is important but that it was a man who followed his doctrines, Johann Calvin⁶⁶. Calvin's main concern was the organisation and administration of the church, he understood the constitution of the church as God given. The church represented for him the "chosen people" on its way to God and therefore the chosen people had to comply with the strictest moral conduct. Among the reformers was Calvin the 'systematiker'. The main concept of Calvin's theology is the power of God, the conflict between that which man and woman want and the obedience to God which man and woman ought to show. Calvin takes his interpretation as far as to say that it is God's sovereign liberty to predestine some to receive divine glory and some to be damned.⁶⁷ The result is man and woman's constant aim to work towards the one goal, which is to become successful. Unlimited activity towards success will bring about the signs for being one of the chosen ones. Calvinism is characterised by an active conscience of unity inside the church and an executive testimony of God's jurisdiction in all strata's of life. The Calvinists reformed Presbyterian belief in claiming that only certain people are predestined to be saved, allowing them to go to heaven.⁶⁸

During the catholic reign of Queen Mary (1553-58), many Protestants were martyred in England or forced into exile. Many people sent into exile found their way to Geneva, where John Calvin's church provided a working model of a disciplined church. From this experience resulted the Puritans, a religious reform movement in the late 16th and 17th centuries which sought to "purify" the Church of England. Through church reform they sought to make their lifestyle the pattern for the whole nation. Their efforts to transform the nation led to civil war in England and to the founding of colonies in America as working models of the Puritan way of life. Thomas Dale tried to establish the Puritan ideal of the Holy Commonwealth by the establishment of a covenanted community in the colony of Virginia. But the greatest community was founded in the Massachusetts Bay Colony under the leadership of John Winthrop.⁶⁹ Protestants belief in the faith of the individual allowing them to go to heaven. For the Puritans the good Christian is blessed with successes. Everybody, even the most ordinary crafts man needs to find out for himself. The individual needs to work harder in order to be more successful. Those people who are not successful are not the faithful ones. If they are not chosen, it is not God's will. Therefore no human being is responsible for the misfortune of others. The struggle to achieve through hard work has been achieved by many, two examples are Andrew Carnegie⁷⁰ and George Rockefeller⁷¹.

⁶⁵ Martin Luther, born 1483 in Eisleben, died 1546, 1505 Augustinian Monk in Erfurt, 1512 Professor in Wittenberg. We have to compare this act with modern media news coverage in order to understand the effectiveness of Luther's action. Nearly every member of society went to Sunday Church. It was every man and women's Christian duty. It was also the biggest social gathering of the week. Printing was not invented than and the school system was not established. A literate person read Luther's thesis and the news about spread by mouth to mouth.

⁶⁶ Johann Calvin was born Jean Cauvin, 1509 in the Piccardie and died 1564 in Genf (Geneva).

⁶⁷ Calvin's teaching is mainly based on Romans, 8: *Life Through the Spirit to Future Glory*.

⁶⁸ This belief is based on Romans, Chapter 8, Paul talks about predestination, which is a tenant in theology some belief in.

⁶⁹ Other variations of the Puritan experiment were established in Rhode Island by Roger Williams, and in Pennsylvania by the Quaker William Penn.

⁷⁰ Andrew Carnegie (1835-1919), left Dunfermline in Scotland with his parents and one younger brother in sheer poverty and emigrated to Allegheny in Pennsylvania. For more details , see Andrew Carnegie, by Joseph Frazier Wall, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989.

⁷¹ George Rockefeller, 1839-1937: oil tycoon, money-maker and philanthropist. The Rockefeller fortune was built up on ruthless systematic exploitation of the infant U.S. petroleum industry through the Standard Oil colossus. He was known as "the father of trust, the king of monopolists, the tsar of the oil business". As his

The Puritans in 17th century America did much to shape American thinking. Because of the fact that the Puritans were the first sources of control, American government was shaped around Puritan-Protestant values.

When we attempt to define the meaning of the word 'American', many problems arise. America itself has emerged throughout the last 250-300 years as a country in evolution. Although certain aspects of America (such as governmental policies and land composition) have remained more or less consistent, within America's relatively short history, government officials and land boundaries have changed greatly. Likewise, the term American has transformed from meaning a people highly dependent on European support to describing a nation of self-sufficiency. In the early 17th century, the word American did not even express a person who lived on the American continent. At that time, Americans had no unifying government, no common cause, and no cultural identification other than that of their respective homelands. John Winthrop saw his role as Governor in reforming the conditions which had deteriorated in England. For the Puritans, the journey across the Atlantic occurred not to separate from the Motherland but rather to develop an ideal society for the Motherland to emulate. This attitude of personal responsibility for England parallels his later sense of responsibility for the righteousness of New England. Winthrop felt that unity of religion and government would yield strong community, a paradigm of piety and hard work. The image of America presented was one of order, a place where the ruler and the ruled could live in unity. Unity emerges in "A Model of Christian Charity" as Winthrop's main theme. He recognised the need for order within his colony. Indian attacks, disease, starvation, extreme weather, and separation from the civilised world led to disheartenment and desertion from the colony. Winthrop wanted Massachusetts Bay Colony to succeed, to stand firm as an example to the English. He states that:

"God Almighty in his most holy and wise providence hath so disposed of the Condition of mankinde... some must be rich some poore, some high and eminent in power and dignitie; others meane and in subjection"⁷².

John Winthrop's and other Puritans importance in the founding of America rather than their impact on England seems their greatest achievement.⁷³ In their belief that they needed to be an example to others of how God wanted people to act and believe, they strongly set up the roles for the pioneering of the northern American continent. This feel of responsibility is carried on until today.

The modern Americans still feel they have the responsibility to solve the problems of the world because it is from their point of view morally right to do so. This assumed logic dreaded the sanctified need for interference, observable in respect of financial aid to countries, military forces, etc., executed with access to first class communication networks. After the second world war we registered a multitude of marketing the American way of life. During the Cold War the 'hegemon' America was easily accepted by the capitalist world as safeguarding their freedom. It was hardly questioned by those who feared the Communist threat. Since the end of the communist regime, we experienced a democratisation of the 'liberated' countries and the adaptation of the Western-style Free Market System. The Free Market Economy, based on capitalism and competition, is based on the struggle of the individual to achieve success. Because of this the communal good is not an issue for the businessman. Community good is something imposed on business, albeit with limited effect, by government. In relation to different cultural and social backgrounds, capitalism underwent a modification.

Will Hutton divided the world's capitalism in three sections: European, American and Japanese capitalism and he claims, that: "A prosperous market economy is not simply the product of atomistic individuals and firms competing fiercely in competitive markets with no state intervention. This is an intellectual and practical chimera."⁷⁴ For Hutton the world system is an interlocking of the political, economic and social dimension. The interlocking factor is a certain measure of co-operation, that gives enough room for competitive business.

fortune surged ever upwards in the wake of its 1913 peak of 900 million dollars, he started to give the money away; the most hated American gradually became a synonym for 20th-century philanthropy. More details, see: A study in Power: John D. Rockefeller, by Allan Nevins, Scribner, New York, 1953.

⁷² John Winthrop, "A Model of Christian Charity", in The Heath Anthology of American Literature, ed. Paul Lauter, Heath, Lexington: 1994, page 226.

⁷³ Puritan influences: The establishment of great schools such as Harvard were a direct result of their emphasis on the educated public. America's underlying Christian devotion is a result of Puritan roots and this devotion often manifests itself visually, such as the "In God We Trust" motto on the dollar bill. America likewise maintains an unconscious contact with its British roots which can be seen in American education. Modern American students learn more British history and literature than that of any other foreign country even though a large majority of the populous has no ancestral connection with England. In contrast to Puritan contributions, in response to the religious views of the people, the founding fathers of America established the freedom of worship and therefore separation of church and state in The Bill of Rights.

⁷⁴ Will Hutton, The State We're In, Random House, London: 1995, page 256. "Chimera" is a monster in the Greek mythology: a fire-breathing monster with the head of a lion, body of a goat, and tail of a serpent. But here Hutton uses the impression literally in the sense of 'a grotesque product of the imagination. Or is he using the word figuratively?

"The industrial strength of the world's great powers originated not because they followed the injunctions of Purist free market economists, but because they succeeded in combining vigorous rivalry between entrepreneurs with a measure of co-operation."⁷⁵ Within Hutton's models of capitalism, the American Model is the most individualistic of all, financing is planned on short term facilities, work forces are treated as an disposable item, social welfare is insufficient. The European Model, or as Michel Albert calls it, the Alpine Model, is founded on the basic principle: "the community of interests, both within the company as well as between company and consumer."⁷⁶ The Alpine System is based on the so called Rhine capitalism, inaugurated in 1959 by Ludwig Erhard, the father of the "*Marktwirtschaft*" in the by than *Bundesrepublik Deutschland*.

It is a capitalist system, which insisted explicitly on "the need to protect and promote private ownership of the means of production and gave full approval to open competition and free enterprise"⁷⁷, b u t, included was a social impetus, a concern for the poor people. "It includes not only the Rhine countries in the narrow geographical sense - Switzerland, Germany and the Netherlands - but also, to some extent, Scandinavia and (with allowances for the inevitable cultural differences) Japan as well."⁷⁸

These systems emphasise collective success, consensus and long-term concerns. The reflection on the cultural and social differences of these countries has recently been of great interest.⁷⁹ With the end of the Cold War era in 1989 the tension of conflict was absorbed by a vacuum. The marketing for the western conduct of politics and economics began. One could easily express it in a famous slogan, used for Nazi propaganda "Am "Amerikanischen" Wesen soll die Welt genesen". The American 'Pioneer-Spirit' registered a revival. It did not take long for "Mac Donalds" to open its first restaurant on the Red Square. The spread of Western market economy faced and still faces two problems. The first problem is that the Western market economy thrives on capital which was lacking in the Eastern communist bloc countries. In addition it is practically impossible to assume that the comprehension and the conduct of a system can be taught in a crash course, when it took the Western system at least 50 years.

Project 'Japan'

Particularly relevant to this discussion is the currently most dynamic capitalism, the capitalism of Japan, the East Asian tigers and the emerging Chinese giant. Hutton claims that: "East Asian and particularly Japanese capitalist structures emphasise trust, continuity, reputation and co-operation in economic relationships."⁸⁰ Do they?

'Kyoryoku shi nagara kyosa' means literally "co-operating while competing"⁸¹, the final aim is harmony, despite the struggle with the business conduct. How far has the aim for harmony being disconnected from reality? Japanese Social Structure in the Tokugawa Period was based on the principle that harmony must be maintained in the collective, otherwise "conflicts between the members would not only be disloyal to the head but would disrupt the smooth attainment of collective goals. Thus harmony, willingness to compromise, unaggressiveness, etc. are highly valued, whereas disputationousness, contentiousness, overweening ambition or other disruptive behaviour is strongly disvalued."⁸² Robert Bellah tried to apply a Weberian sociological perspective, explaining the raise of Japan as a great industrial nation in showing how the premodern cultural roots of Japan, in particular Tokugawa religion, help to account for that success. One could possibly agree, that the way was eased by the fact, that in Japan performance or achievement are primary values, that means performance is only a validated goal in the service of the system. "Appeals to loyalty to the head of the collective and to pre-eminent system goals could override concern for harmony and motivate the breaking through of old social forms, the disruption of old collectivities, and the abandonment of old forms of prescribed behaviour. This potentiality contributed to the dynamism and ability for fairly rapid social change without disruption of the central values which differentiates Japan from societies in which system-maintenance-integrative values have primacy and are

⁷⁵ Will Hutton, op.cit., page 258.

⁷⁶ Michel Albert, *Capitalism against Capitalism*, Whurr Publishers, London: 1993, page 88. Francis Fukuyama (1992), explains the Hegelian aspect of contemporary liberal democracy in respect of the Anglo-Saxons/American context. page XViii, see also page 143, the need for 'recognition'.

⁷⁷ Michel Albert, *ibid*, page 18.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*.

⁷⁹ Albert 1994, Hutton 1995, Meiksins Wood 1995, Fukuyama 1995 et al.

⁸⁰ Will Hutton, *ibid*, page 269.

⁸¹ *Ibid*.

⁸² Robert Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion, The Cultural Roots of Modern Japan*, Collier Macmillan Publishers, London: 1985, page 15.

ends in themselves."⁸³ The reason mentioned from Umezao and Murakami could be accepted, that "Europe and Japan experienced feudal age and absolute regimes which provided the social infra-structures necessary for the development of capitalism and industrialization."⁸⁴ But the real reason for the Japanese economic success lies in the frustration that was suffered after the terrible destruction of the country during the final year of World War II. Robert C. Christopher describes the "sea of rubble", "undulating heaps of debris", sometimes three feet deep; "It was the most melancholy and horrifying landscape imaginable."⁸⁵ When the bombing stopped, the travail of the Japanese people begun with no fuel, no raw materials for the few factories which had not been destroyed, the most terrible hunger and diseases.⁸⁶ In occupation times the Americans ruled Japan with the "Big Brother knows best" attitude. In a few short years "Ma shireibu" (MacArthur's headquarters), radically reshaped Japanese society. Even Americans with exposure to Japan and Japanese Culture, showed lack of elementary courtesy, a tutorial attitude and inexcusable ignorance, arrogance and disregard when dealing with Japan on a political or economic level.⁸⁷ Christopher makes also responsible the: "deeply ingrained superiority complex which makes it hard for a great many Americans to concede that we could ever be in error or at fault in our dealings with the Japanese."⁸⁸ Given these circumstances of distraction and humiliation, the achievement of becoming an economic world power is based on will power, determination and personal sacrifices. As in America itself and other countries following the American role model after the Second World War, the cost for materialistic growth was high. Old principals who included spirituality and the human factor were silenced so they would not interfere with the inhuman conveyor belt manufacturing of "throw away goods". The result was a so-called "Japanism". "Japanism" has substituted any religious aspect, and guaranteed the strong alliance between the industry, a high-qualified bureaucracy and a conservative government. Karel von Wolferens points out that aspects of universal truth and ethical demands from the original dogmas of Buddhism and Confucianism are kept apart from the socio-political reality. Transcendental values and universal principals were potential threats to the governing elite and were eradicated. The elite represented itself as the ultimate power. "That the individual could be involved with religion to his inner core is a strange idea to most Japanese. Religion is seen rather than a tool, as something you adopt because it will get you somewhere."⁸⁹ State Shinto, a ceremonial worship of nature and ancestors is sanctioned; different ceremonies are borrowed, e. g. birthday celebrations in Shinto style, weddings in Christian style, funeral in Buddhist tradition. "Shinto can be regarded as a two-sided phenomenon. On the one hand it is a loosely structured set of practices, creeds, and attitudes rooted in local communities, and on the other it is a strictly defined and organised religion at the level of the imperial line and the state. These two basic aspects, which are not entirely separate, reflect fundamental features of the Japanese national character as it is expressed in socio-political structures and psychological attitudes."⁹⁰ The company and the society act as church. This explains the phenomena that the moral possibility of individual resistance to the established socio-political arrangements has not been developed. Similar to other nations who underwent industrialisation and capitalist measurements, urbanisation and centralisation effected folk customs generally and caused the decline of folk religion in particularly. "Social mobility, especially immigration to cities, tended

⁸³ Bellah, op.cit., page 16.

⁸⁴ Masahiro Sakamoto, Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region, Paper presented at the ISA convention in San Diego, 17 April 1996, Page 2, 3; For more intensive reading please see Murakami, Yasusuke, Han-Koten no Seiji-Keizaigaku, Non-Classical Political Economics, Tokyo: 1993 and Umezao, Tadao, Bunmei no Seitaisikan, An Ecological View of the History of Civilization, Tokyo: 1967.

⁸⁵ Robert C. Christopher, The Japanese Mind, Pan Books, London: 1983, page 15.

⁸⁶ Christopher, *ibid*, page 20: "Food was so short that American G.I.s could -and did- buy anything from cherished family heirlooms to a woman for a few boxes of K rations or a couple of cartons of cigarettes."

⁸⁷ Christopher gives many examples, e.g. W. Michael Blumenthal's, then Secretary of the Treasury, dealings with Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, Jimmy Carter, the so called 'Nixon shocks'[impositions on the Japanese to give way and make all the concessions, in times of crises], Hermann Hickman: "Keep 'em sullen but not mutinous"; at a reception with the U. S. Senate, the then Japanese Minister of State for External Economic affairs, Nobuhiko Ushiba, was told: "...the United States doesn't need Japan, but you need us." page 23.

⁸⁸ Christopher, *ibid*, page 21.

⁸⁹ Harel von Wolferens, The Enigma of Japanese Power, Macmillan, London: 1989, page 276.

⁹⁰ Kodansha International, Japan, Profile of a Nation, Tokyo: 1994, page 213. Religious authority has always been subservient to political power; from the beginning of Japanese history, myth has sanctioned the unity of ritual and government (saisei itchi) through the notion that the sacred (kami) created the Japanese islands as a sacred land to be ruled by a sacred emperor who was a descendant of the supreme kami, the sun goddess Amaterasu Omikami. Cultural influence from China, especially Confucianism and Buddhism, strengthened and modified this basic pattern.

to weaken both local ties and family relationships, in turn impinging upon organised religion.⁹¹ The "God" of production demanded secularism in Japan as in the Western capitalist countries.

Due to immense sacrifices, Japan was the only non-Western nation to have transformed itself into a modern industrial nation, at times even thought to have the power to threaten the American claim for hegemony.⁹² After the second world war, it seemed a great aim to follow the American Way of hard nosed capitalism. Especially since the mid 1960s, when fiscal, political and international problems accumulated, many doubts are questioning the example set by the United States of America. Is there some other 'society' which could act as a role model and might show a way to follow.⁹³ If the 'American dream' surrogate keeps on to fascinate peoples imagination, maybe Albert's forecast is correct that we are facing a new confrontation: "But this time it will not be socialism or communism against capitalism; this time, the combat will pit neo-American capitalism against Rhine capitalism."⁹⁴ The battle field is the global market and it is a confrontation between whole value-systems, "on its outcome will be decided the answer to such issues as the individual's place within the company, the function of the market place in society, and the role of law and authority in international economic affairs"⁹⁵. Japan will have to decide if it will soften or harden its capitalist approach.⁹⁶ Japan's role could be in supporting the shift towards a softer capitalism which will co-operate with the laws of the ecological system, instead of further contributing to the present profit system which abuses the ecological global balance and might trigger of further catastrophes. Fukujama categorizes Japan a "high-trust society" and calls it "A Block of Granite" because of its "healthy endowments of social capital and spontaneous sociability".⁹⁷ Japan, "the society that displays perhaps the greatest degree of spontaneous sociability among contemporary nations"⁹⁸ needs to remember its profound duties towards nature and towards its ancestors, who believed the Island to be sacred.⁹⁹ Japan could help to play the role of the "Magister Ludi", Hermann Hesse's master of the 'Glasperlenspiel'¹⁰⁰ and encourage and maintain what Hartmut Kreikebaum calls the "Willensbildungsprozess", the essential mental development for new ways of

⁹¹ Kodansha, *ibid*, page 205.

⁹² Masahiro Sakamoto, Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region, Paper presented at the ISA 37th Annual Convention, April 1996 in San Diego, page 2: "Since the succes of the Meiji restoration, Japan has been ranked as a special country. ... In spite of the defeat in the WWII, in peculiar situation has not changed, as the Japanese economic miracle indicated. In 1970s, Japan achieved a giant economy, second only to the U.S.A.. Equipped with electronic technology and financial capability, Japan formed "economic bigemony" with the U.S.A. in the 1980s."

See also K. Calder Japanese Foreign Economic policy Formation, in *World Politics*, 1988, No.33: 881-912 and E.Vogel, *Pax Nipponica?* in *Foreign Affairs*, 1986, No.: 751-767.

⁹³ Robert Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion, The cultural Roots of Modern Japan*, Collier Macmillan Publishers, London: 1985, see introduction.

⁹⁴ Michel Albert, *ibid*, page 19.

⁹⁵ Michel Albert, *ibid*, page 19.

⁹⁶ The business network of "keiretsu", the vertical *keiretsu* and the horizontal or the intermarket *keiretsu* has in its power structure the enormous possibility of encouraging changes. "They are very large and play an extremely important role in the Japanese economy as a whole...the six largest Japanese intermarket keiretsu unite an average of thirty-one companies." See for more details Francis Fukujama, *Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity*, Hamish Hamilton, London: 1995.

⁹⁷ Francis Fukujama, *Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity*, Hamish Hamilton, London: 1995, page 150. See chapters 13 and 14.

⁹⁸ Fukujama, *ibid*, page 159.

⁹⁹ Japans Wirtschaftswunder wurde mit laxen Umweltgesetzen erkauf. Die Folge: riesige Mülldeponien, die Umweltskrankheiten boomen. Translation: Japan's economic success has been bought with relaxed environmental laws. The result are giant rubbish dumps in the bay of Tokyo. Report in: *Der Spiegel*, No 31, June 1996, page 76.

¹⁰⁰ The secret and the symbolic of the game is to strive for perfection for intellect, mind and spirit: "...der Gedanke der inneren Einheit aller geistigen Bemühungen des Menschen, der Gedanke der Universalität...". Hermann Hesse, *Das Glasperlenspiel*, Fretz & Wasmuth Verlag, Zürich, 1943, page 365. The original version is: "...non entia enim licet quodammodo levibusque hominibus facilius atque incuriosius verbis reddere quam entia, verumtamen pio diligentique rerum scriptori plane aliter res se habet: nihil tantum repugnat ne verbis illustretur. at nihil adeo necesse est ante hominum oculos proponere ut certas quasdam res, quas esse neque demonstrari neque probari potest, quae contra eo ipso, quod pii diligentesque viri illas quasi ut entia tractant, enti nascendique facultati paululum appropinquant.

thinking.¹⁰¹ Modj-ta-ba Sadria points out that the possession of military power and even the military super power status in the world beyond the 1990s "does not bring the necessary authority, nor guarantees in itself an alignment of other countries."¹⁰²

Japan was used as the first guinea-pig for atomic testing. This fact shouldn't just be seen as something which happened by chance in connection with the second world war. The contamination of the land and the killing of so many people for generations was a well planned and executed operation by representatives of a military super power. A positive consequence of this painful experience could be the encouragement of Japan to be a more active voice in declaring a humanitarian set of values to guide global politics and economics into the new millennium.

Project China

China is presently undertaking a capitalisation process. China specialists currently calculate that by the early twenty-first century the combined economics of "greater China" may surpass those of the European Union or the United States.¹⁰³ "[I]t will be the world's leading trader and in possession of the world's largest foreign exchange reserves; it will be a source of state-of-the-art high technology and scientific and medical advances; it will be the world's largest consumer, it will garrison the world's largest military establishment."¹⁰⁴ With the general election in 1991, Taiwan became a democracy of a kind recognisable in the West. This alliance of liberal democracy and Chinese culture is a challenging experiment and serves as a model for many people at the mainland.¹⁰⁵ In the 70s and 80s "the United States adopted policies designed to retard or undercut the growth in power and prestige of the PRC, refusing to trade, recognise, to allow to travel to the country, and preventing Beijing the UN seat." This left China to reinforce political links with the Third World "by stressing their common desire for economic advancement, their colonial experience, and anti-colonialist aspirations."¹⁰⁶ Due to global economic development the U. S. modified its China politics. China joined the World Bank (IMF) in 1980, in 1986 it scored \$1 billion investment. The economic contact did not come without pressure on China to open its market, to transform its trading practices, and to move towards the GATT norms of transparency and reduction of tariffs. The killings on Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989 retarded relationships. The massacre coincided with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and generated a siege mentality in Beijing.¹⁰⁷ China rejected the sanctions imposed and Li Peng initiated for a joint communiqué to be signed in New Delhi, in December 1991, which claims: "for the vast number of developing countries the right to subsistence and

¹⁰¹ More details in: Hartmut Kreikebaum, *Kehrtwende zur Zukunft, (Return to the future), Neuhausen-Stuttgart: Häussler, page 19.* See also Capra, 1982 and Drucker, 1989. Whereas Fritjof Capra talks about the phenomena of a 'new paradigm' being the "awareness of the essential interrelatedness and interdependence of all phenomena - physical, biological, psychological, social and cultural" (page 265), Peter Drucker describes this phenomena as the "butterfly-effect", (page 158).

¹⁰² Modj-ta-ba Sadria, *Japan as a New Superpower?*, paper presented at the ISA, 36th Annual Convention in April 1996 in San Diego. Sadria quotes Harlan Cleveland, *Birth of a New World* p.76-78: "The real-life management of peace world-wide seems bound to require a Madisonian world, a world of bargains and accommodations among national and functional factions, a world in which peoples are able to agree on what to do next together without feeling the need (...) to agree on religious creeds, economic canons, or political credos."

¹⁰³ David Shambaugh, *Greater China, The Next Superpower*, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1995. Greater China refers to mainland China's links with Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, and with Chinese overseas and associates the reunification of the Chinese state after a period of division. "Thus by 1949, what had been a single Empire under the Qing had been divided into five separate entities: the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China on Taiwan, the Mongolian People's Republic Hong Kong and Macao." page 26.

See also the paper: "Coming Japanese Roles in International Society", 37th Annual Convention in San Diego, by Masahiro Sakamoto, first part: "Rise of Asia" and third part: "Development of Asian Countries". Page 1: "The recent summit meeting of the APEC in Osaka also indicated the leadership of the Asian countries and the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum show the initiative of the ASEAN countries."

¹⁰⁴ Shambaugh, *ibid*, page 1.

¹⁰⁵ Steve Tsang, *In the Shadow of China, Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949*, C. Hurst & Co, London: 1993. See Chapter one and chapter four: Hung-mao Tien, *Dynamics of Taiwan's Democratic Transition*.

¹⁰⁶ Rosemary Foot, *The Practice of Power, U. S. Relations with China since 1949*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, Page 221. See also Samuel S. Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ: 1979.

¹⁰⁷ Foot, *ibid*, page 243.

development is a basic human right". The promotion of human rights could not take place through "confrontation or imposing one's values upon others".¹⁰⁸ U.S. relations have to be seen in the perspective that China is the U.S.'s fastest growing trade deficit, second only to Japan, \$2.3 billion in 1979, \$7.7 in 1985, \$17.8 billion in 1989.¹⁰⁹

China's growing status as a trading nation, noted that large numbers of jobs in the U.S. - some 1000,000 according to a 1992 publication - had already come to depend on Chinese purchases from the American market, and over 500 companies were investing in the country.¹¹⁰ The conduct of diplomacy should be based on the facts that one in five of the world's population lives in China, the Chinese population increases by 15 million a year. "The country possesses nuclear weapons and exports nuclear technology. It launches satellites and sells missiles. It represents a huge market and one of the world's richest civilisations. It holds a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. It is central to key regional issues like Indochina, Korea and disputed islands. It abuts the unsettled Central Asian region. It is salient in new challenges that require global action." Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, further declared in March 1993: "The U.S. needed a 'nuanced policy', one that 'condemned repression' yet preserved links with progressive forces".¹¹¹ But China's choice is limited; no state which wants to become part of the capitalist world cannot avoid being socially transformed in ways that are difficult to control or reverse. Adopting Western democracy with the package of capitalisation is probably not the solution. Donald K. Emmerson questions that democracy "is so omnipotent to alleviate or resolve so many different kinds of insecurity, and if democracy is so clearly and universally superior." What about "disastrous elections", the case in Algeria e.g., or "hollow elections", the case in the Iraq and other "failures of democracy"?¹¹² No wonder there are powerful reasons to doubt the reality of democratic progress, and in particular if democratic progress has not universally moral progress at heart. Reasons for the pushing of Capitalism and democracy are twofold. One, it is used to establish some sort of security in the clash of civilisations, second, it is used to control an effective economy.

During the cold war, global insecurity was managed under the umbrella of a bipolar world. "The broad outlines of global space were drawn with power immune to challenge and questioning - a circumstance which even the most perceptive minds obliquely endorsed through their astonishing failure to visualise the possibility of change."¹¹³ With the disappearance of the former cliché of threat, a new and more powerful insecurity emerged. The change emerged at the time of what is called the crisis of the nation state: "... of that wondrous contraption which for the last few centuries managed to tie together and 'homogenise' the process of cognitive, aesthetic and moral spacing, and make their results secure within the realm of its tribune - political, economic and military - sovereignty."¹¹⁴ Fukuyama explains that "in practice, liberal democracy works because the struggle for recognition that formerly had been carried out on a military, religious, or nationalist plane is now pursued on an economic one. Where formerly princes sought to vanquish each other by risking their lives in bloody battles, they now risk their capital through the building of industrial empires. The underlying psychological need is the same, only the desire for recognition is satisfied through the production of wealth rather than the destruction of material values."¹¹⁵ The underlying psychological need is the same for Asia. Modestly agreeing with Fukuyama's claim that culture lies at the root of China's success, the more obvious reason is desire. For countries like China it seems time to catch up with business. But one of the oldest and wealthiest dynasties on earth will find it impossible to become eagerly part of the 'Pax Democratica Americana', the "famously democratic and unipolar American 'city upon a hill'" by choice "or by pressure, as the people of that high city use its vast

¹⁰⁸ Foot, op.cit., page 249-250. The human rights debate would e.g. raise the argument that civil wars in so called "Developed Countries" (e.g. Ireland, former Yugoslavia) engage in more inhuman behaviour and actual killing in the so called "Third World".

¹⁰⁹ Foot, *ibid*, page 251.

¹¹⁰ See Guo Changlin, Sino - U.S. Relations in perspective, *Contemporary International Relations*, 2, no.7 (July 1992).

¹¹¹ Foot, op.cit., page 254, 255.

¹¹² See the paper submitted to a conference "National Strategies in the Asia-Pacific", Monterey, CA, March 1996, Realism or Evangelism? Security through Democratization as a National Strategy, by Donald K. Emmerson. Very interesting are his comments on Liberalism and Representation: Tension or Ambiguity. "Liberal democracy is the expression of liberalism in the political domain, just as market capitalism is the expression of liberalism in the economic realm. By "liberalism" I mean belief in the moral primacy of the rights of individuals" p. 9.

¹¹³ Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics*, Blackwell, Cambridge, 1994, page 230.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*.

¹¹⁵ Francis Fukuyama, *Trust*, op.cit., page 359.

leverage to implement their political philosophy in the lowlands, that is, abroad."¹¹⁶ In contrast to Japan who had no choice under American occupation, China has its free choice. In becoming industrialised and high tech, China should be non-American in avoiding all the negative effects the western capitalist system occurred. If American culture is criticised as insisting upon their individual rights at the expense of the greater good, China can avoid the same arrogance and concentrate in contributing to the greater good.¹¹⁷

"The Chinese people are proud of their spiritual civilization. The difference between the Chinese culture and its Western counterparts is this: China stresses ways to safeguard human life, while the West emphasizes ways to enrich human life. Both are important, but it is clear that China's approach is the essence; and the West's, the utility."¹¹⁸

3. The search for values

The search for values is so important, because the result must be a universally accepted set of virtues, a framework of rules and guidance which can be accepted by all citizens of the world.¹¹⁹ At the present moment in time the world is divided with different sets of values, based on different interpretations of social behaviour, different perceptions of truth and different evaluation of humanity. World religion: Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Judaism and Christianity, teach all independently their interpretation of divine commandments. There is probably already a minimal consensus among these religions, but not sufficiently for the basis for a global ethic, a "fundamental consensus concerning binding values, irrevocable standards and fundamental moral attitudes".¹²⁰ The disunity among the religions can not easily be dissolved.¹²¹ Religions have been and are still used as protectors of empires, protectors of the status quo, for power and for the privileged classes. Various forms of liturgy and rituals continue to repeat patterns as the mystery of faith, "but a people obsessed with progress, consumption, and the quick-fix no longer have the software to decode the message."¹²² Hans Küng's idea on global ethics is based on the project to unite all worlds religion. The progress has started with the foundation of the Parliament of the World's Religion and will be fruitful in years to come.

But in the speedy complexity of global political and economic affairs we can not wait for something to happen tomorrow, we need a program of action as soon as possible. It is no wishful thinking that 'in the end is the beginning', as Zygmunt Bauman puts it: "The maelstrom of the kind we are in - all of us together, and most of us individually - is so frightening because of its tendency to break down the issue of common survival into a sack of individual survival issues, and then to take the issue so pulverised off the political agenda. Can the process be retraced? Can that which has been broken be made whole again? And where to find an adhesive strong enough to keep it whole?"¹²³

The recognition of Asian values, Schumacher's dream of the kind and moderate economist.

Schumacher's economist is an ideal person in respect of kindness and charity. Buddhist economics is based on simplicity and non-violence. In the present capitalist market place s/he who would strictly follow the Buddhist doctrine would probably be an unfortunate loser. Weber sees Buddhism as less concerned with this-worldly

¹¹⁶ Donald K Emmerson, *Region and Recalcitrance: Rethinking Democracy through Southeast Asia*, The Pacific Review, Vol.8, No. 2, 1995, page 224.

¹¹⁷ Fukuyama, op.cit., p. 5.

¹¹⁸ Li Fu Chen, *The Confucian Way, A new and systematic study of 'The four books'*, translated from the Chinese by Shih Shun Liu, Routledge & Kegan Paul plc., London: 1986, page 592.

¹¹⁹ Presently 5 Billion people.

¹²⁰ Parliament of the World's Religion's, *Declaration Toward a Global Ethic*, September 1993, Chicago, page 4.

¹²¹ The Christian Churches started after the Second World War actively with an ecumenical program, aiming to unite different churches within Christianity. The project has been relatively successful, i.e. today ecumenical marriages can take place, while in the past a Catholic was excommunicated from the Church, if s/he did not marry into her own faith and in particular educate the children in the catholic sense. But still a Catholic priest is not allowed to share the Holy Communion with non-Catholics, an act which is against Jesus Christ's teaching, because he shared his life in particular with those outside of any system and he died for those who were powerless in a worldly sense. Christianity is only one example. The Islam of the Iran and Saudi Arabia is a very good example where religion is used for empire protection.

¹²² Richard Rohr, *Near Occasions of Grace*, Orbis Book, Maryknoll, NY, 1993, p. XII.

¹²³ Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford: 1994, p 247.

problems and more in the development of a special technique of contemplation and withdrawal.¹²⁴ In the Buddhist understanding, the 'ethical personality' is in itself passive, which means "a state of neutrality, divorced from all everyday concerns, indeed passive, and, because of its mystical nature, irrational when seen from the standpoint of an inner-worldly ethics, leading away from rational activity in the world."¹²⁵ In the 70s Schumacher signalled that men and women's pursuit of profit and progress in the West has resulted in gross economic inefficiency, environmental pollution and inhumane working conditions and his recognition made him looking for alternatives. Everything he wrote twenty years ago is just as relevant today, and as it was twenty years ago, "the refusal of contemporary economists and politicians to take it on board remains all but inexplicable."¹²⁶ The cardinal error of the industrial way, as it was then and is now, is the ignorance with which resulting social and environmental implications are treated. Endless critical reports have been produced but an organised, pro-active campaigning body is still lacking; therefore no really expert pressure is put on the politicians. Schumacher hoped Buddhist economics could be used to change the economics of the West: "Buddhist economics must be very different from the economics of modern materialism, since the Buddhist sees the essence of civilisation not in a multiplication of wants but in the purification of human character".¹²⁷ The purification of the human character means liberation from the attachment of wealth and liberation from the craving for materialistic goods. Contentment lies in the virtues of simplicity and non-violence. But these Buddhist virtues can not be classified as Asian alone, Christian Saints lived lives conducted by these virtues. Saint Francis for example lead an exemplary life according to these virtues. The Gospel teaches 'to turn the other cheek' "but nobody has ever been burned on the stake for not turning the other cheek".¹²⁸ Some Western literature reflects the same moral. For example a famous English children book tells the story of the master of Toad Hall who is very unhappily living in luxury; his misery gets only eased if he gets the latest technology. His desire is driven by his need of personal satisfaction irresponsible of the damage it may incur to the environment or his fellow humans. The virtues are known to all of us but are not a conscientious part of our practical behaviour. Politicians and economists operate with selective heresy and partial justice. The virtue of simplicity would have damaging effects for those who need the wasteful behaviour of consumerism to make money. Industrialisation changed the 'hand made-trade' into the production in the 'big' way. "Small is Beautiful " is therefore a real challenge.

"From an economist's point of view, the marvel of the Buddhist way of life is the utter rationality of its pattern - amazingly small means leading to extraordinarily satisfactory results. For the modern economist this is very difficult to understand. He is used to measuring the 'standard of living' by the amount of annual consumption, assuming all the time that a man who consumes more is 'better off' than a man who consumes less. A Buddhist economist would consider this approach excessively irrational: since consumption is merely a means to human well-being, the aim should be to obtain the maximum of well-being with the minimum of consumption. It would be the height of folly to make material so that it should wear out quickly and the height of barbarity to make anything ugly, shabby or mean."¹²⁹ Looking at our present reality, we have to admit that we have reached "the height of folly". Many consider "goods as more important than people and consumption as more important than creative activity". From a Buddhist point of view "[i]t means shifting the emphasis from the worker to the product of work, that is, from the human to the sub-human, a surrender to the forces of evil."

It is questionable how much of this great Buddhist value could be introduced into the present capitalist system. It won't be accepted very well, that only the "small is beautiful". For those people who live with the pleasures of materialistic achievements, it won't be easy to give it all up, and for those who never had it but live with the desire to possess it, it would be difficult to take their desire away. China shows continued "efforts to advance its market reforms, preserve economic and social stability and further integrate its economy with the global system."¹³⁰ China has started to transform from a rigid centrally-planned system to a market economy and to see the country in relation with the outside world. Jeannie Rujikarn reports that "Economic growth has exploded throughout Asia, dominated by what are often called the four "Asian Tigers" - Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Now, emerging second-rank economic powerhouses such as Indonesia and Thailand - dubbed the "Tiger Cubs" are staking their claims to the global marketplace. But in Thailand, relentless economic

¹²⁴ Robert J. Holton & Bryan S Turner, *Max Weber on Economy and Society*, Routledge, London: 1989, chapter 3.

¹²⁵ Weber, *Selections in Translation*, ed. W. G. Runciman, translated by Eric Matthews, page 199.

¹²⁶ E.F. Schumacher, *Small is beautiful*, Vintage Books, London: 1973, page VIII, Introduction by Jonathan Porritt.

¹²⁷ Schumacher, *ibid*, page 40.

¹²⁸ Richard Rorty, *op.cit.*

¹²⁹ E.F. Schumacher, *Small is beautiful*, *op.cit.*, page 42.

¹³⁰ China, *Financial Times Report*, Thursday, June 27. 1997, page 1.

expansion has exacted a price: tangled bureaucracy and widespread corruption". For example for Thailand the build up of a gigantic economy happened so overwhelmingly that many of the nation's social problems are neglected at the present moment.¹³¹ We can observe similar growing processes and teething problems all over the world. The Western Capitalist system encourages the growth because the success of their economies relies on a widening of the market. Just "to think small" will not be possible, but what could take place in particularly for the West at 'the height of folly' could be the process of thinking smaller: consuming less, throwing away less, wasting less energies, destroying less natural resources. This moderation is probably what Schumann had in mind when he originally wanted to choose the title for his book: "Small is Sometimes Beautiful" and his statement: "What I wish to emphasise is the duality of the human requirement when it comes to the question of size: there is no single answer. For his different purposes man needs many different structures, both small ones and large ones, some exclusive and some comprehensive. For construction work, the principle task is always the restoration of some kind of balance. Today, we suffer from an almost universal idolatry of giantism. It is therefore necessary to insist on the virtues of smallness - where this applies."¹³² The criteria of "Where this applies", is important for a dangerous aspect whom Schumacher could have not foreseen. Ary J. Lamme III call's it the new "malicious ethnicity" - "a trend that calls into question many moral and ethical assumptions we have made in aligning ourselves along ethnic lines." In recent decades ethnic pride was vigorously promoted but the danger of the negative impact of group-oriented thinking, of ethnocentrism. "Ethnocentrism not only focuses on the benefits of one's own ethnicity; it can also characterise other groups unfavourably."¹³³ The unfortunate example is the recent ethnic war in former Yugoslavia. As is mentioned earlier in the paper, the greed, enviousness, hatred etc. of an individual is a very painful and sad characteristic, but the greed, enviousness, hatred etc. of a group becomes a tremendous danger.

"During this reorganisation period in an increasingly chaotic, contentious, and nationalist world, it's time to think bigger, not smaller. Loyalty to groups or nations must be subordinate to higher loyalties. Global ethics and international law, which secure obligations and rights of all humanity, are worthy of the greatest degree of personal commitment. Individuals need to assume supranational loyalty to these ideals. This may sound hopelessly naive. But with the failure of group- and nation-oriented loyalties, where else can people turn but to universal ideals?"¹³⁴ Buddhism, as one of the five world religions will not be able to be the alternative. Buddhism, as a moral concept will find to many opponents from other religion which hinders it to become universal. And if a moral concept can not become universally accepted, it won't solve the problem. Schumachers Buddhist economist will not be able to play the present economic game successfully, as long as other players play with completely different rules. As in every game, players ought to agree on a set of rules accordingly in advance. The background of cultural and religious differences is no hindrance as long as all agree the moral elements of co-operation between the players. The first condition is to share values and the second condition is to show willingness for co-operation. Aspects must be taken from a multi - cultural background but the major base for a global agreement on political and economic ethics has to come from a neutral source which offers moral strength and an independent view. This source is found in the teachings of Confucius. It is neutral because it never took any religious nor political stand. Confucian morality can therefore be accepted by all religion and by all forms of state.

The recognition of Asian Values, Confucianism

The teachings of Confucius¹³⁵ are known throughout all East Asian countries which are under the influence of Chinese literary culture and has a profound influence on East Asian spiritual life as well as on East Asian

¹³¹ Report on: Thailand: Ethical Growing Pains for an Asian Tiger Cub", by Jeannie Rujikarn, Global Ethics, Vol.6, No.1, Camden, Maine: 1996, page 1,4.

¹³² E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, *ibid*, page X, by Jonathan Porritt.

¹³³ Opinion by Ary J. Lamme III, Beware of Malicious Ethnicity in Any New World Order, Global Ethics, Vol.6, No.1, Camden, Maine: 1996, page 7.

¹³⁴ Lamme III, *ibid*, page 7.

¹³⁵ Confucius, *551 BC, state of Lu, China, +479 BC, Lu. Chinese K'ung-Fu-Tzi, or K'ung-Tzu, original name K'ung Ch'iu, literary name Chung-ni. China's most famous teacher, philosopher, and political theorist, whose ideas have influenced the civilisations of all of Eastern Asia. The following information in the text is found in the following resources: Li Fu Chen, *The Confucian Way, A New and Systematic Study of 'The four books'*, translated from the Chinese by Shih Shun Liu, Routledge & Kegan Paul plc., London: 1986; Thomas Cleary, *The essential Confucius*, Harper Collins, New York: 1992, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Knowledge in Depts, Chicago: 1990.

political culture. The Western term 'Confucianism' is a world view, a social ethic, a political ideology, a scholarly tradition, and a way of life. Many people in the West quote the so called "Golden Rule" without knowing that this is a Confucian statement.

The story of Confucianism does not begin with Confucius. Nor was Confucius the founder of Confucianism in the sense that Buddha was the founder of Buddhism and Christ the founder of Christianity. Confucius was deeply disturbed by the political and social conditions of his times; therefore his passion was to reform. He was no religious leader, for his teaching was essentially a social ethos. Confucius considered himself a transmitter who consciously tried to reanimate the old in order to attain the new. He proposed retrieving the meaning of the past by breathing vitality into seemingly outmoded rituals. Confucius' love of antiquity was motivated by his strong desire to understand why certain rituals, such as the ancestral cult, reverence for "Heaven"¹³⁶, and mourning ceremonies, had survived for centuries. His journey in the past was a search for roots, which he perceived as grounded in humanity's deepest needs for belonging and communicating. He had faith in the cumulative power of culture. The fact that traditional ways had lost vitality did not, for him, diminish their potential for regeneration in the future.¹³⁷ He appealed to cultural values and social norms for the maintenance of interstate as well as domestic order.

Confucius took his wisdom from the ancient sages and worthies and his main issue was to **learn to be human**. In so doing he attempted to redefine and revitalise the institutions that for centuries had been vital to political stability and social order: the family, the school, the local community, the state, (and as it was then, the kingdom). Confucius did not accept the status quo, which held that wealth and power spoke the loudest. He felt that virtue, both as a personal quality and as a requirement for leadership, was essential for individual dignity, communal solidarity, and political order. He insists that human beings are teachable, improvable, and perfectible through personal and communal endeavour. Constant self-improvement and continuous social interaction, self-cultivation, defined learning not merely as the acquisition of knowledge but also as character building provides the process for the perfectibility of man.

Confucius was deeply concerned that the culture (wen) he cherished was not being transmitted and that the learning (hsüeh) he propounded was not being taught. His strong sense of mission, however, never interfered with his ability to remember what had been imparted on him, to learn without flagging, and to teach without growing weary. What he demanded on himself was strenuous: "It is these things that cause me concern: failure to cultivate virtue, failure to go deeply into what I have learned, inability to move up to what I have heard to be right, and inability to reform myself when I have defects."¹³⁸

The dual focus on the transformation of the self, away from opinionatedness, dogmatism, obstinacy, and egoism, and on social participation enabled Confucius to be loyal (chung) to himself and considerate (shu) of others.

His views on personality, social relations, and the human condition are more incisive today as history intensifies the gravity of the very concerns he voiced twenty-five centuries ago. The message of the "Golden Rule" can be applied to the realities of our own time:

"Do not do unto others what you would not want others to do unto you!"¹³⁹

Confucius' legacy, laden with profound ethical implications, is captured by his plain and real appreciation that learning to be human is a communal enterprise:

"A man of humanity, wishing to establish himself, also establishes others, and wishing to enlarge himself, also enlarges others. The ability to take as analogy of what is near at hand can be called the method of humanity."¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶ Confucianism may be understood as an all-encompassing humanism that neither denies nor slights Heaven. Confucianism differs from the major historical religion by not being an organised religion.

¹³⁷ In fact, Confucius' sense of history was so strong that he saw himself as a conservationist responsible for the continuity of the cultural values and the social norms that had worked so well for the civilisation of the Chou dynasty. (Duke of Chou, 1094 BC) This system was based on old covenants as well as on newly negotiated contracts and was an elaborate system of mutual dependence.

¹³⁸ Confucius, The Analects (Lun-Yü), 7:3.

¹³⁹ The Analects, 15:23.

¹⁴⁰ The Analects: 6:30. Mencius, 371-289 BC, follower of Confucius, listed the following description of degrees of excellence:

"He [she] who commands our liking is called good (shan).
He [she] who is sincere with himself/herself is called true (hsin).
He [she] who is sufficient and real is called beautiful (mei).
He [she] whose sufficiency and reality shine forth is called great (ta).
He [she] whose greatness transforms itself is called sagely (sheng).
He [she] whose sageliness is beyond our comprehension is called spiritual (shen).

"If you like humanness but don't like learning, it degenerates into folly. If you like knowledge but don't like learning, it degenerates into looseness. If you like trust but don't like learning, it degenerates into depredation. If you like honesty but don't like learning, it degenerates into stricture. If you like bravery but don't like learning, it degenerates into disorder. If you like strength but don't like learning, it degenerates into wildness."¹⁴¹

"You are humane if you can practice five things in the world: respectfulness, magnanimity, truthfulness, acuity, and generosity.

If you are respectful, you won't be despised.

If you are magnanimous, you will win people.

If you are truthful, you will be trusted.

If you are acute, you will be successful.

If you are generous, you will be able to employ people."¹⁴²

4. The implantation of Confucian values into the structure of Global Political Economy.

This research claims that the global system provides room and space to learn and to develop a new way of managing the global political and economic system. The teachings of Confucius are the backbone for a structural change. There is a parallel between the capacity of development of the global system and Confucian wisdom: that man shall never cease to educate him/her-self. The latter claim debates Fukuyama's comparison, that mankind "will come to seem like a long wagon train strung out along the road"¹⁴³, unable to undergo historical progress. Using Fukuyama's picture of the wagon train, it seems possible that the vehicles of the train come to halt, only because they need a thorough inspection in order to get going again. The train ran out of steam because one elementary energy of mankind's composition was denied to be recognised. With the mechanistic world view of Cartesian-Newtonian science, the sense for spirituality suffered severe suppression. As Capra states: "We live today in a globally interconnected world, in which biological, psychological, social, and environmental phenomena are all interdependent." But he suggests that the "ecological perspective", based on the study of the relationship between living organisms and their environment, does not help us to create a "new 'paradigm' - a new vision of reality, a fundamental change in our thoughts, perceptions, and values".¹⁴⁴

The ability of technology to better human life, the economic development, education, and culture depends on a parallel moral progress in man. This dependence is a crucial cognition [Erkenntnis] for the future of Global Political Economy. The task of validating moral values becomes a practical necessity and not only a theoretical conduct. Like a wagon train on a dead track, mankind without spirituality in its arrogance does not know what happens next to him. Not only does he not know it, he often refuses to acknowledge it in order to follow his egocentric game for power and possession. "Many other parts of human existence, including shared memory, space and time, the holy realm of mystery and symbol and myth, have all been repressed in favour of a knowledge that really means controlling."¹⁴⁵ Instead of being alive, life wants to eat him/her up as he/she is gobbling up life. Despite our technology, we can not gain much because we have lost some of our most important senses. The creation of just an "ecological perception" or just another theoretical "new paradigm", will only change the vocabulary. The hunting grounds of civilisation are barren, like the grass plains for the buffaloes, the equilibrium is out of balance. Talking about the global picture our main issue is to learn to be human.

Already 2500 years ago Confucius declared this profound knowledge. In the same way as he took his wisdom from the ancient sages and worthies, it is our turn to remember how to be human again. The knowledge has been given to us since creation and there is not much new we have to discover. Forty years ago (1953) DNA (the human genome: deoxyribose nucleic acid) was found by James Watts and Francis Crick, uncovering the set of laws that govern all inheritance, "the base-pairing rules that make DNA the perfect self-copying text."¹⁴⁶ "DNA

¹⁴¹ Thomas Clearly, *The essential Confucius*, page 45, *Analects*, 17:8.

¹⁴² Thomas Clearly, *ibid*, page 51, *Analects* 17:6.

¹⁴³ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Penguin Books, London 1992, page 338.

¹⁴⁴ Fritjof Capra, *The Turning Point*, op.cit., page XVIII.

¹⁴⁵ Richard Rohr, *Near Occasions of Grace*, Orbis Book, Maryknoll, NY: 1993, p. 18.

¹⁴⁶ Robert Pollack, *Sign of Life, The language and Meanings of DNA*, Viking, Penguin Books, London: 1994. page 4.

is a work of literature, a great historical text. But the metaphor of a chemical text is more than a vision: DNA is a long, skinny assembly of atoms similar in function, if not form, to the letters of a book, strung out in one long line.¹⁴⁷ Until recently, for a human being the book has been incomprehensible, but we are now beginning to read and edit this text in ways that will transform our lives. Every so many centuries a new letter is written in this 'textbook' which manipulates our inheritance. "The reality of "deep time" - that is, that the history of the planet goes back tens of thousands of millions of years - is at first difficult to comprehend. Looking at life in all its varieties and complexity, the alternative is to believe in magic. The notion of DNA as a text makes it possible to imagine natural selection as an author in deep time, writing at the rate of perhaps a letter every few centuries to produce the instruction books for all the living things that are among us today."¹⁴⁸ During the present changes - Capra's "*Turning of the Tide*" - a new letter will be printed in the combination of DNA. This letter will be a behavioural code and will decide about the future of the planet earth. It will either intensify our humane knowledge and lead to measures of global protection and some sort of resurrection, or if we further neglect humanitarian thoughts, the DNA assembly and instruction line, will instruct us to carry on with our destructive, global patterns - destruction with a 'hacker' in the system. The present awareness seems to indicate that in the next millennium human culture will change as a result of a conscious evolution. This evolution can be compared with e.g. the time when Renaissance took over from the Middle Ages. At the present time where science does not provide the answers we hoped for, we react first of all with secularism and frustration. We turned our "modern work ethic into a preoccupation that secularised reality and squeezed the mystery out of the world."¹⁴⁹ If we manage in a Confucian sense to intensify our knowledge of human attributes and behaviour, and if we learn to act out of a greater conscientiousness and responsibility, we could imagine the beautiful picture drawn by Redfield to become true: "[B]y the middle of the next millennium, humans will typically live among five hundred year old trees and carefully tended gardens, yet within easy travel distance of an urban area of incredible technological wizardry. By then, the means of survival - foodstuffs and clothing and transportation - will all be totally automated and at everyone's disposal. Our needs will be completely met without the exchange of any currency, yet also without any overindulgence or laziness. ... No one will consume excessively because we will have let go of the need to possess and to control for security."¹⁵⁰ The human spirit is astonishing resilient. In spite of all the possibilities of anxiety, the advent of a new century and a new Millennium may well trigger a widespread mood of optimism. "The year 2000 is a chance to start again both in personal terms as well as within community and nation."¹⁵¹

The concept is based on the need for the equilibrium: "Solitary *yin* (female or negative factor) cannot lead to birth, nor can isolated *yang* (male or positive factor) lead to growth. The stress of spirit at the expense of matter, and vice versa [as it has been the case in the West], are both characteristic of lifeless civilisations which can not long endure."¹⁵² A similar connection is reflected in the traditional Japanese concept of art; art is a fusion between art and life and art and spirituality. In the exact opposite of the world-denying pessimistic nihilism, e.g. Sartre's 'néant', discipline and intuition, art, life and spiritual experience are all brought together and inseparably fused.¹⁵³ The newly global circumstances of interactive relationships on a political, economic and social level are the beginning of this path. Most social sciences are characterised by the fragmentary and reductionist approach.¹⁵⁴ The suggested development means leaving behind Descartes deductionism that the essence of human nature lies in thought, and that all the things we conceive clearly and distinctly are true. Cartesian thoughts and problems were broken up into pieces and arranged in their logical order; at least in their interpreted logical order. This analytical fragmentation lead also to the fragmentation of our senses. Many humans have lost the virtues of 'chung' (to be loyal to one-self) and 'shu' (to be considerate to others). In the same way as Confucius we need to concentrate on the dual focus on the transformation of the self, away from

¹⁴⁷ Robert Pollack, *ibid*, page 5.

¹⁴⁸ Pollack, *ibid*, page 5 and 6. " Our own species is young only in comparison with life itself; we are all the children of ancestral peoples who walked the earth hundreds of thousands - perhaps even millions - of years ago. Each living person's DNA is rich in specific passages derived from a particular genealogy. Yet at the same time we can be sure that the texts we find will all refer to the same past, a past of branching descent." page 6.

¹⁴⁹ James Redfield, *The Celestine Prophecy, an adventure*, Bantam Books, London: 1994, page 257.

¹⁵⁰ Redfield, *ibid*, page 256, Paulus, 1 Kor 11.

¹⁵¹ Manifesto: A Chance to Start Again, Marking the Millennium, Churches Together in England, London: 1997.

¹⁵² Li Fu Chen, *The Confucian Way*, op.cit., page 592.

¹⁵³ Nowhere is this more clearly and more beautifully shown than in the "art of tea". A profound spiritual dimension transforms art into an essentially contemplative experience in which it awakens the primal consciousness hidden within us and which makes possible any spiritual activity.

¹⁵⁴ Capra, op.cit., chapter 7: The Impasse of Economics. page 194 - 247.

opinionatedness, dogmatism, obstinacy, and egoism and on to social participation.

This equilibrium so out of balance has made the global system sick, sick on a private, sick on a local, sick on a regional, sick on a national and sick on a global scale. Therefore healing has to take place for the individual, followed by healing of the nations and the aim is to bring healing to the ultimate level, the healing of the whole system. Healing will expand the individual level and take place within corporate conscientiousness. In particular part of the healing process on a global scale is the forgiveness of centuries; unforgiveness created and still creates wars among us; e.g. El Salvador, Serbia, Croatia, Kurdistan, Armenia, Nigeria et al. The beginning of the change starts in a Confucian sense from within the individual. From this base, the recognition emerges of what we are in relation to the complex circumstances conditioning us. The starting point is the inner pilgrimage that leads to knowledge, wisdom and respectful love. This individual conditioning, which Confucius calls 'the transformation of the self' happens in parallel with social participation. The challenge lies with our consumerist conditioning. 'Besinnung' [Contemplation] is an extraordinary simple process but clashes with our 'common sense' and the marketing principles we are made to believe.

Confucius said:

"Honour **five refinements**, and get rid of **four evils**."

The **five refinements** are: "Good people are generous without being wasteful; they are hardworking without being resentful; they desire without being greedy; they are at ease without being haughty; they are dignified without being fierce."

Confucius is asked: "What does it mean to be generous without being wasteful?", and replies: "To benefit the people based on what they find beneficial. Is this not generosity without waste?"

"If they work hard after having chosen what they can work hard at, who would be resentful? If you want humaneness and get humaneness, then why would you be greedy? Cultivated people do not dare to be inconsiderate, whether of many or few, of the small or the great, of the young or the old; is this not ease without haughtiness? Cultivated people are proper in dress and solemn in mien, so that others are awed when they look at them; is this not dignity without ferocity?"

The **four evils** are: "To execute without having admonished; this is called cruelty. To examine accomplishments without having instructed; this is called brutality. To be lax in direction yet make deadlines; this is called viciousness. To be stingy in giving what is due to others; this is called being bureaucratic."¹⁵⁵

In this simplicity of 'Besinnung' lies a big problem for us at this present moment in time. As men and women of the twentieth century, we are used in thinking of reality in terms of complexity. Complexity is part of our high technical achievements, we access our progress with all sorts of permutations of information. Complexity suggests sophistication and is one of the great selling points for consumer items. Part of 'Besinnung' is stillness which is very difficult for us to remember. If stillness is not easy it is because we are so used to distraction, constant movement and busyness. The Confucian way to perfection happens through teaching and meditation, a process which needs the realisation through the spirit.¹⁵⁶

As with many theoretical ideas, the effort would be wasted if there was not an executive to ensure the transmission from theory into practice. One executive power is Japan as part of the Asian rising countries. Japan is predestined to take on a leading role in setting a new global set of rules on the basis of Confucian wisdom. Japan has undergone a similar capitalist development after WWII, with its economic super power status causing tremendous problems with keeping up with success, frustrated secularism and lack of general social contentment. In this respect Japan is closely linked with the West. Japan is also closely linked with the East, as it lies in the midst of the new development countries of Asia. "[T]he rise of the Asian developing countries makes the international structure of Asia more multilateral and the link with other Pacific areas stronger."¹⁵⁷ It is Japan's historical and geographical position to cope with the demands of and help with support for the awakening giant of China.

"The rise of China has changed the traditional pattern of North-South relations. Most developing nations look for international cooperations and the co-operation among Southerners are more common across the continent."¹⁵⁸ Further development can narrow the gap between North and South. Japan's role is a role of guidance, first using its expertise as a first rank capitalist nation and second using the experience of the problems which capitalism created. During history many individuals have warned about men's destructive behaviour but never has a government taken on the task to proclaim ethical guidelines for the rest of the world; e.g. Chief Sealth warns in his famous testament: "The whites too shall pass; perhaps sooner than all other tribes. Continue

¹⁵⁵ The Analects, 20:4.

¹⁵⁶ Some ideas originate from John Main's teaching on Christian meditation; See: The Heart of Creation, Darton, Longman & Todd, London: 1988.

¹⁵⁷ Masahiro Sakamoto, op.cit., page 6.

¹⁵⁸ Sakamoto, ibid, page 12.

to contaminate your bed, and you will one night suffocate in your own waste."¹⁵⁹ The German theologian Helmut Gollwitzer diagnosed our present situation: "Wir gehören zu dem einen Drittel der Menschheit, das mit Entfettungskuren beschäftigt ist, während die anderen zwei Drittel mit Hunger und Verhungern beschäftigt sind (Peter Schilinski). Und dieses eine Drittel besteht zum größten Teil aus getauften Christen, die anderen zwei Drittel aus Ungetauften. ...Die Getauften sitzen als die Reichen am gedeckten Tisch, und der arme Lazarus liegt draußen vor der Tür, - wirklich draußen und darum noch ohnmächtiger, bei unserem Mahle noch leichter zu übersehen, als wenn er in unserem Hause läge, wie es das Proletariat in unseren Ländern tat."¹⁶⁰

The resources of the world are sufficient for all, provided all are willing to share. A recurring theme in the North - South conflict are the debts and the forgiveness of debt. The international debt crisis holds the poorest countries of the world in bondage to the richest. Asia and in particular China with its connection to the so called Third World countries will have to raise their voice on behalf of the poor of the world and appeal for the remission of debts. The basic thrust must come from virtue not from strength. Li Fu Chen summarises in his proclamation of the Confucian Way: "From very early times the Chinese people have entertained the lofty thought of the 'pacification of the world'. In Chinese the word p'ing denotes equality, justice and peace. Every strife is traceable to the absence of p'ing. When equality or justice is absent, contention arises; when contention is ineffective, strife follows; and strife ends when the strongest prevails. But unfortunately the victory of the strongest does not bring true peace; for the vanquished are not submissive to the victor at heart; they bow to him only because of the inadequacy of their own use of force. Therefore, in the pursuit of real equality, the basic thrust must come from virtue, not strength."¹⁶¹

A further experience is unique to Japan: No other country in the world has been strategically targeted with a nuclear bomb. As one of the loser countries of the W.W.II Japan must stop feeling guilt ridden about its past.¹⁶² Guilt is misused for humiliation and profit acceleration, e.g. regarding European Politics: The British beef crisis or the British loss of the Football European Cup created a hate campaign in the press against Germany, using clichés ridden with WWII and Nazi vocabulary. "Victors, triumphant or frustrated, do not emerge morally ennobled; but neither do their victims. As a rule, victims are not ethically superior to their victimisers; what makes them seem morally better, and makes credible their claim to this effect, is the fact that - being weaker - they have had less opportunity to commit cruelty."¹⁶³ Ernst-Otto Czempel assimilates 'conflict' with 'competition'.¹⁶⁴ Competition includes always the aim to win, to become first. As long as rules guide the players, equal opportunities are possible, but competitions without any set of rules includes any methods or devices. The American Vietnam War is one example where everything was tried, disregarding any humanitarian feelings, mercy or grace. The 'Eye for eye and tooth for tooth' method has not only terrible short term implications, far more damaging are the long term reactions. "If there is malaise, as after the ignominious intervention in Vietnam, the lesson absorbed and memorised by the defeated is the need for more force and more effective force, not more ethical conscience. In America the shame of Vietnam boosted high-tech warfare much more than it did moral self-scrutiny. With electronic surveillance and smart missiles, people can now be killed before they have the chance to respond; killing at a distance at which the killer does not see the victims and no more has to

¹⁵⁹ The Great Chief Sends Words, Chief Seathl Testament, Saint Bernard Press, Coalville, 1977, page 10.

¹⁶⁰ Wolfgang Brinkel und Heike Hilgendiek, Gollwitzer Brevier, Chr. Kaiser Verlag, München: 1988, page 225: "We belong to the one third of the population, which is occupied with diets, while in the mean time two third have to deal with starvation and starving to death. The baptised ones are the rich sitting on the table covered with food and poor Lazarus lies outside the door - even further removed from the outside door and therefore even more powerless - during our feast much easier to overlook than when he lay in our house, as the proletariats did some time ago." Biblical references: Luke 16, 19-31; Matthew 25, 40; Luke 16, 31.

¹⁶¹ Li Fu Chen, The Confucian Way, op.cit., page 576.

¹⁶² Hiroharu Seki, Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima and The World Order, paper presented at the 36th ISA Convention, Chicago, February, 1995.

¹⁶³ Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, op.cit., page 228.

¹⁶⁴ Werner Link, Überlegungen zu einer strukturellen Konflikttheorie, ed. Gert Krell, Harald Müller, Frieden und Konflikt in den internationalen Beziehungen, Festschrift für Ernst-Otto Czempel, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt, 1994, page 100: "...definiert als 'jede Differenz zwischen zwei oder mehreren Positionen, die entweder in einer Person oder zwischen mehreren oder zwischen Gruppen vorhanden sind'; 'jede soziale Beziehung gilt als ein Konfliktsystem'."

Translation: "Reflections on a Structural Theory of Conflicts", "Peace and Conflict in International Relations".

"Defined as 'every difference between two or more positions which exists either in one person or between a few people or between groups'; 'every social relation is recognised as a system of conflicts.'"

See to this subject: Ralf Dahrendorf, Der Moderne Soziale Konflikt, Stuttgart: 1992. Translation: "The Modern Social Conflict".

(or, indeed, can) count the bodies."¹⁶⁵ Guilt is therefore something which should not be further encouraged, it puts too much negative pressure onto a constructive development of the next generation. That does not mean that we should not be aware of a negative past but the process of prosecution must be limited. Wars are created through the lack of forgiveness. The release of guilt exposes the energy necessary for the fighting against the destruction of civilisation.¹⁶⁶

The mission for Japan is to have the courage to integrate the teachings of Confucius into their system and to have the courage to practice it. What makes Japan the ideal country to start the new approach is the network of "keiretsu" which is already fully operational in Japan and made the fast changes after WWII possible. Japan has managed its expertise in an economic sense due to its dual structure of "keiretsu", the horizontal and the vertical. Keiretsu: "The network as a community based on reciprocal moral obligation is perhaps the most fully developed in Japan. Besides lifetime employment, the keiretsu, or business network, is the second unique feature of the Japanese economy... [There] are two broad categories of keiretsu. The vertical keiretsu, like that of the Toyota Motor Corporation, consists of a manufacturing firm, its upstream subcontractors and suppliers, and its downstream marketing organisation. The second and more common type is the so-called horizontal or inter market keiretsu, which unites widely differing types of businesses similar to the American conglomerates."¹⁶⁷ No other country has this advanced network. On an external level Japan is bound into all international organisations where it can raise a loud voice of influence. China on the contrary has not managed yet to become part of the international network.¹⁶⁸

China will take its place in the world, the Chinese people have realised that it is time for them to forge ahead and to catch up with the West in science and "the study of the matter, for in these areas they are still comparatively backward. On the other hand, the people of the West should learn from China what they have neglected - the fundamental importance of morality. If both people can complement each other, they can yet plan together [the] prolongation and enrichment of human life."¹⁶⁹ Why copy all the 'sins' of the Western market economy and capitalisation, destruction of nature, creating pollution, destruction of family values and ties, which all create greed combined with corruption and crime.

The "Confucian Development Aid" for the world should emerge from countries on the fringes of development. Any new dictate from the West will not be accepted. Human Rights are already strongly debated as a dictate from the West. The active teachings of Confucian virtues aim to lead to:

**people finding meaning in a bewildering world,
people finding hope as they face the uncertainties of the future,
people finding the motivation to do something about changing the world.**

The media are now the template of society, defining success and failure in everything from sport to politics, from entertainment to ideas. The Marketing of moral values is a simple procedure as soon as it is made part of the news room. Information technology provides all the communication links necessary for the transmitting of a teaching program of a benevolent kind. The media are the means by which political and economic discussion and opinion, fact and revelation, are made universal. "International communication and information developments are more than just expressions of the fastest growing sector in the global political economy, they also reflect and imply transformations in how people think about their worlds -- about what is possible and even what is imaginable."¹⁷⁰ The programming is a matter of determination. Edward Comor warns of the emerging

¹⁶⁵ Bauman, op.cit., page 226, see also recent research by James Der Derian concerning security; "Virtual Security: Simulations in the Late Modernity" [Presentation given for The Nottingham Trent University, 17 May 1996, in The Broadway Cinema].

¹⁶⁶ Li Fu Chen, op.cit., page 592: "Indeed the destruction of civilisation at any moment is a definite possibility. This is the result of stressing wealth and strength at the expense of virtue."

¹⁶⁷ Fukuyama, Trust, op.cit., page 197; American conglomerates, like the Gulf & Western and ITT, which had their heydays in the 1960s and 1970s.

¹⁶⁸ See: Financial Times, Wed. June 19 1996: US-China Relations: China's bid to join the World Trade Organisation.

¹⁶⁹ Li Fu Chen, op.cit., page 592, 593.

¹⁷⁰ Edward A. Comor, The Political Economy of the Inevitable: International Information Highway Developments in the Late-Twentieth Century. Paper presented at the ISA Convention, San Diego, April 1996. Comor stresses the need for action to get a deeper understanding of the Knowledge/Information issues of the 'highway' codes and hidden agendas. He quotes W.H Auden's *Gare du Midi* to express the danger of the unintended role we may play: 'Clutching a little case, He walks out briskly to infect a city; Whose terrible future may have just arrived.'

danger of "national and international economic, intellectual and military elites", "a minority population of information 'haves'". "Those possessing the wealth, education and time required (or those able to employ specialist 'info-workers') to take full advantage of expanding and increasingly commoditized information resources typically are utilising these capacities to generate more wealth and, ultimately, deepen existing social-economic power disparities."¹⁷¹ At our present time there is enough awareness among the global society to welcome a constructive step towards the practical implantation of a value system.¹⁷² To overcome the danger, the transnational communication systems become important tools in the globalisation of the marketing of 'normative structures'.¹⁷³ The "mass media hyperbole" exposes itself as a challenge for those who wont accept the process of monopolization of blunt consumer materialism "mediated through dominant nodal points such as the American State"¹⁷⁴.

The danger demands to draw attention to the normative commercial and legal principles. Like a chessman forming a pattern with others on a board, we will manage to turn our thoughts away from ourselves to the situation in which we find ourselves. Symbolically representing in our mind the structure and direction of the flow of events, we will discover the way of escape. In that situation, the level of self-control and the level of process-control are interdependent and complementary. It touches the question of survival: To what extent can the techniques of individual survival be stretched to embrace the collective survival. "The maelstrom of the kind we are in- all of us together, and most of us individually - is so frightening because of its tendency to break down the issue of common survival into a sackful of individual survival issues, and then to take the issue so pulverized off the political agenda. Can the process be retraced? Can that which has broken be made whole again? And where to find the adhesive strong enough to keep it whole."¹⁷⁵

Certainly not in the West. The West will have to listen and to co-operate very carefully with those it needs as customers and consumers for its products. There is no need for Asia a worship Western Capitalism and to secularise what ever is left of spiritual wisdom. Confucian culture can be comprehended by the people of the world and its benefit received by all mankind. The Coca-Cola culture is so barren of any moral means that it can only achieve a disastrous end in a 'Faustian' fashion. The teaching of Confucian virtues becomes increasingly important in order to escape this catastrophe. It means to fight against the enticement of being brainwashed with the lust for consumer articles. But a huge market like China and Asia as a whole will have the power to brake down the Coca-Cola monopoly.

"Those Westerners who lack comprehension of Chinese culture imagine that when China becomes strong the "Yellow Peril" will emerge. This is due to either ignorance or faulty speculation. The fact is that the nationalism we uphold has as its object the equality of all the nationalities of the world. Our nationalism should not be misunderstood."¹⁷⁶

Confucius said in the *Doctrine of the Mean* :

"...the Way of the superior man seems concealed, but it daily becomes more illustrious, and the Way of the mean man seems to seek notoriety, but he daily goes more to ruin. The Way of the superior man is plain but not tiring, simple but polished, gentle but orderly. It knows the distant and the near, the main principles and the details, the minute and the manifest. Such a man can enter into virtue."¹⁷⁷

5. Application of means in order to serve the ends.

As established in the earlier text, the people of the world are becoming aware of changes taking place. To find meaning in a bewildering world, to find hope as they face the uncertainties of the future, to find the motivation to do something about changing the world is important.

The rising awareness in the West of an increased need for a sense of spirituality. Confucianism is a source of spirituality and forms the basis for a universal teaching of ethical values. Confucian ethics coincide with already existing Western demands for a more ethical behaviour and can actively pursue the breakdown of Western power structures which oppose any changes because it would interfere with their privileged positions in society, based on political power or based on economic power.

¹⁷¹ Comor, *ibid*, page 17.

¹⁷² Rushworth M. Kidder, *Shared Values for a Troubled World*, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco: 1994; Hans Küng, *Projekt Weltethos*, *op.cit.*

¹⁷³ Jarrod Wiener, *op.cit.*, page 9.

¹⁷⁴ Edward A. Comor, *op.cit.*, page 23.

¹⁷⁵ Zygmunt Bauman, *op.cit.*, page 247.

¹⁷⁶ Li Fu Chen, *op.cit.*, page 594.

¹⁷⁷ Li Fu Chen, *ibid*, page 594: *Doctrine of the Mean*, Ch. XXXIII. *Vide Supra*, p. 229.

The first step for the realisation of the project might be:

1. The creation of a committee: "The Restructuring of the world and the implantation of values". This committee could result out of an already existing international organisation. Despite the fact that the meaningfulness of the United Nations (UN) has been very much debated since the end of the Cold War, the UN platform can be used in its significance as an "organization-as-stage"¹⁷⁸
2. The constitution of the committee is based on Confucian teachings of virtues. The search for universal values leads to the acceptance by all global inhabitants.¹⁷⁹
3. The setting of a new agenda, addressing ways of influencing centres of powers [e.g. IMF, World Bank, The multinational corporations (MNCs)]¹⁸⁰
4. The implantation of a new global government, not only for monitoring purposes but also with executive powers.
5. The use of international communication networks to inform and teach the necessary steps of a value shift from hard materialism to a softer capitalism.

¹⁷⁸ See Inis Claude, *Swords into Plow Shares*, 4th Edition, 1971, page 13. "At best, the organisation-as-actor is likely to be valued as an instrument of states, not to be accorded a status and role equivalent to that of the state. The organisation-as stage may have greater significance; in profiting facilities for the interplay of states and for the formulation and execution of such programs of joint activity as they may agree to undertake, it may make its most substantial contribution to international order. In short, the supplying of a stage for the stars is conceivably more important than the sneaking of an additional bit player in the cast." The process to be managed is the maintenance of equilibrium between opposing tendencies operating in a dynamic context. Page 117: "(T)he urge to create global institutions for harmonising the policies and activities of regional agencies will arise."

¹⁷⁹ The search has to cope with the intellectual emulsion of the different understandings of 'basic mental phenomena like feelings of empathy, feelings of a self-centred kind, the decisional capacity, and abstract thought'; see T'ang Chün-i, *Chung-kuo wen-hua-chih ching-shen chia-chih* (The value of the Spirit of Chinese Culture; Taipei: Cheng-chung shu-chü, 1972, pp 89-101); quoted in Thomas A. Metzger, *Escape from Predicament*, Columbia University Press, New York: 1977, page 31. "Confucian thought differs from Western thought in focusing on these feelings as basic, rational, integral to human nature, and directly part of an ontologically ultimate reality which is "good". Thus a major Confucian theme is the interconnectedness of ch'ing (feelings), li (principle), and hsing (man's ontologically ultimate, heaven conferred nature), and the idea that hsing is "good". In western theories of the mind, on the other hand, these empathetic feelings typically play a secondary role, are contrasted with man's rational capacities, and do not directly stem from a good, ontologically ultimate reality." See Metzger, page 31.

¹⁸⁰ MNCs engaged in the processing of resources, applying services, but in particularly controlling the global media network. In the restructuring process of the world is the verified use of the media power the most important. The so-called media imperialism controls the capitalist world. See John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism*, Printer Publishers, London: 1991: "...the media is seen primarily as vehicles for corporate marketing, manipulating audiences to deliver them as 'good consumers' of capitalist production...(page 38)." Electronic information flows are the new basis for global domination. "American Capitalism has to persuade the people it dominates that the 'American way of life' is what they want. American superiority is natural and in everyone's best interest." J. Berger quoted in the introductory pages to Dorfman and Mattelart, p. 3. See A. Dorfman and A. Mattelart, *How to read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic*, International General Editions, New York: 1975. Arthur Kroker and David Cook, quoted by John Tomlinson, *ibid*, page 59: "...it's not TV as a mirror of society, but just the reverse, it's society as a mirror of television" and Baudrillard, quoted by J. Tomlinson, page 59: "...reality itself has given way to a media-produced 'hyperreality' in which 'the medium and the real are now in a single nebulous state whose truth is indecipherable.' See also J. Baudrillard, *The Ecstasy of Communication*", in H. Foster (ed.) *Postmodern Culture*, Pluto Press, London: 1985.

THE TWO FOLLOWING FIGURES ILLUSTRATE THE THEORY:

The **FIRST FIGURE** shows the interaction between the various presently existing regions in the World. Regions are superordinated to a universal ethical constitution, which manifests ethical values on a global level. Global ethics deal with those issues which are not only dealing with inhumanity but with life threatening issues as a whole; firstly the nuclear challenge, secondly ecological threats and thirdly the misuse of natural energies.

The regions on a subordinated level deal with interpretations of human rights, law and order, and welfare acts. The cultural melange in the future will create the possibility for interference on regional issues from the global level.

At the present moment American Capitalism is still dominating global markets and media imperialism teaches Americanisation world wide: denim, celluloid, dollar power, Madonna and McDonald's (indicated by the first arrow). Succumbed in influence is the Alpine-model, which in Michael Albert's explanation extends from northern Europe to Switzerland, and includes Japan,¹⁸¹ followed by Asian capitalism and the emerging Third World. The aim of restructuring is to profile existing virtues of non American Capitalism with Japan in a management position.¹⁸² Restructuring takes on the task to resist "the siren song of the USA and the superficial glitter of its casino economy" and to break "the spell of American politics, culture and media"¹⁸³. Japan's engagement in an active role enables and encourages China and the rest of Asia to restructure Capitalism as a new model based on Confucian wisdom.

The **SECOND FIGURE** shows the integration of the individual in the various sectors of the world. Confucian virtues are taught to the individual but not for his/her personal sake. The individual is first of all the inhabitant of the world. Secondly he/she is influenced by his/her closer community and regional customs, cultures and traditions. The global level is the space we all share. Destruction on a global level means destruction for all, independent of whatever region the individual and independent of whatever community the individual belongs, the global space is his/her priority. This dependence can be compared with that of a single cell and a living creature: neither one becomes relevant without the other.

The search for universal values aims to find the acceptance of all global inhabitants irrelevant of which race, colour and origin; no human individual's conscience should ever follow an order of releasing nuclear bombs.

The project has a short term and a long term perspective. The short term perspective is to constitute an executive committee as soon as possible and to create an action plan. The long term perspective is to obtain standards of values and to market the importance of the globe as primary to the region.

¹⁸¹ See Michel Albert, op.cit., page 100: "Like its rival, the neo-American model, it is indisputably capitalist: the market economy, private property and free enterprise are the cornerstones of both systems. ...The Rhine model represents a very different vision of economic organisation; it presupposes different financial structures and social controls. It is far from perfect, but its characteristic features combine to produce a stable, yet dynamic (and remarkably powerful) system."

See: Will Hutton, *The state We're In*, Chapter 10, pp 257; Albert places Japan in the category of Alpine Capitalism, Hutton joins Japan, the East Asian tigers and China in the currently most dynamic form of world capitalism, the East Asian capitalism.

¹⁸² See Will Hutton, op.cit., page 269: "With Japan and East Asia growing explosively, its institutional structure and value system commands increasing respect and even fear; for example, if Japan maintains its current rates investment as a proportion of national output, nearly a third as high again as the US, then it will be the largest economy in the world by 2005 while East Asia as a whole will become the dominant force in world output and trade by the first decade of the next century."

¹⁸³ See Michael Albert, *ibid*, Chapter 9, page 169: "America's seductive powers are such that even those societies which embody all the virtues of the Rhine model, and enjoy all its advantages, seem to be succumbing to her charms. In other words, they are in grave danger of becoming the latest victims of the neo-American illusion."

FIGURE 1.




FIGURE 2.



1 The Individual

2 The Community

3 The Region

4 The Globe



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